area handbook series 

Japan 

a country study 



Japan 

a country study 



Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Edited by 
Ronald E. Dolan and 
Robert L. Worden 
Research Completed 
September 1990 




On the cover: The sun rises over the islands of Japan. 



Fifth Edition, First Printing, 1992. 

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Japan : a country study / Federal Research Division, Library of 
Congress ; edited by Ronald E. Dolan and Robert L. Worden. 
p. cm. — (Area handbook series, ISSN 1057-5294) (DA 
pam ; 550-30) 

"Supersedes the 1983 ed."— Pref. 

Includes bibliographical references (pp. 511-571) and index. 
ISBN 0-8444-0731-3 

1. Japan. I. Dolan, Ronald E., 1939- . II. Worden, 
Robert L., 1945- . III. Series. IV. Series: DA pam ; 550-30. 
DS806.J223 1991 91-29874 
952— dc20 CIP 



Headquarters, Department of the Army 
DA Pam 550-30 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 



Foreword 



This volume is one in a continuing series of books prepared by 
the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress under 
the Country Studies — Area Handbook Program sponsored by the 
Department of the Army. The last page of this book lists the other 
published studies. 

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country, 
describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national 
security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelation- 
ships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural 
factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social 
scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of 
the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static 
portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make 
up the society, their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their com- 
mon interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature 
and extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their 
attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and 
political order. 

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not 
be construed as an expression of an official United States govern- 
ment position, policy, or decision. The authors have sought to 
adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections, 
additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be wel- 
comed for use in future editions. 

Louis R. Mortimer 
Chief 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Washington, D.C. 20540 



iii 



Acknowledgments 



The authors wish to acknowledge their use and adaptation of 
information from various chapters in the 1983 edition of Japan: A 
Country Study, edited by Frederica M. Bunge. The authors are also 
indebted to a number of individuals and organizations who gave 
their time and special knowledge of Japanese affairs to provide 
research data and perspective. Among those who gave generous 
and timely help were Warren M. Tsuneishi, Chief of the Asian 
Division, Library of Congress, who commented on the completed 
manuscript. Also instrumental in providing timely and useful data 
were Shojo Honda and other staff members of the Japanese Sec- 
tion of the Asian Division. 

Others who provided insight and research materials to the authors 
were Haruyuki Furukawa of the Japanese National Diet staff and 
Col. Isao Mukunoki of the Japanese Embassy in Washington. 
Yoriyoshi Naito of the Asahi Shimbun and Rikuo Sato of the Mainichi 
Newspapers, both in Washington, were extremely helpful in provid- 
ing photographs for use in the book. 

Various members of the staff of the Federal Research Division 
of the Library of Congress assisted in the preparation of the book. 
Timothy Merrill reviewed the maps and geographical references 
in the book. David P. Cabitto prepared the artwork for the cover 
illustration and coordinated the production of all maps and figures. 
Alberta J. King provided research and word processing assistance 
for sections of the book and contributed to the final proofreading. 
Janie L. Gilchrist provided word processing assistance on parts of 
the book, and Barbara Edgerton and Izella Watson performed fi- 
nal word processing for the completed manuscript. Sandra W. 
Meditz made helpful suggestions during her review of all parts of 
the book and coordinated work with Ralph K. Benesch, who over- 
sees the Country Studies — Area Handbook program for the Depart- 
ment of the Army. Marilyn L. Majeska managed editing and 
production of the book, with assistance from Andrea T. Merrill 
and Martha E. Hopkins. 

Other Library of Congress staff who assisted with the prepara- 
tion of the book were Ewen Allison and Carol Winfree, both of 
the Congressional Research Service, who provided research as- 
sistance and word processing support, respectively, for the chap- 
ter on foreign relations. Malinda B. Neale of the Library of 
Congress Composing Unit prepared camera-ready copy, under the 
direction of Peggy F. Pixley. 



v 



The authors also want to thank other individuals who contributed 
to the preparation of the manuscript: Marcie D. Rinka of John 
Carroll University for word processing support for the chapter on 
society and environment; Greenhorne and O'Mara for prepara- 
tion of the map drafts; Reiko I. Seekins and Marti Ittner, who 
designed the illustrations on the tide pages of chapters one and chap- 
ters two through eight, respectively; and Wayne Home for his 
graphics support. Additionally, special thanks go to Ann H. Covalt, 
who edited the manuscript; Catherine Schwartzstein, who per- 
formed the final prepublication editorial review; and Joan C. Cook, 
who prepared the index. 

Finally, the authors are especially grateful to those individuals 
and organizations who donated photographs and artwork for the 
illustrations used in the book, many of which are original work 
not previously published. They are acknowledged in the illustra- 
tion captions. 



VI 



Contents 



Page 

Foreword iii 

Acknowledgments v 

Preface xv 

Table A. Chronology of Major Historical 

Periods xvii 

Country Profile xix 

Introduction xxvii 

Chapter 1. Historical Setting 1 

Robert L. Worden 

EARLY DEVELOPMENTS 4 

Ancient Cultures 4 

Kofun Period, ca. A.D. 300-710 6 

NARA AND HEIAN PERIODS, A.D. 710-1185 10 

Economic, Social, and Administrative 

Developments 10 

Cultural Developments and the Establishment 

of Buddhism 11 

The Fujiwara Regency 12 

The Rise of the Military Class 15 

KAMAKURA AND MUROMACHI PERIODS, 

1185-1573 17 

The Bakufu and the Hqjo Regency 17 

The Flourishing of Buddhism 19 

Mongol Invasions 20 

Civil War 21 

Ashikaga Bakufu 21 

Economic and Cultural Developments 22 

Provincial Wars and Foreign Contacts 23 

REUNIFICATION, 1573-1600 25 

TOKUGAWA PERIOD, 1600-1867 27 

Rule of Shogun and Daimyo 27 

Seclusion and Social Control 29 

Economic Development 30 

Intellectual Trends 31 

Decline of the Tokugawa 32 



vii 



THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN JAPAN, 1868-1919 36 

The Meiji Restoration 36 

Foreign Relations 40 

Opposition to the Meiji Oligarchy 41 

The Development of Representative Government .... 41 

Modernization and Industrialization 45 

Overseas Expansion 46 

Political Rivalries 48 

World War I 50 

BETWEEN THE WARS, 1920-36 51 

Two-Party System 51 

Diplomacy 53 

The Rise of the Militarists 55 

WORLD WAR II AND THE OCCUPATION, 

1941-52 60 

TOWARD A NEW CENTURY, 1953-84 61 

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 69 

Susan 0. Long 

PHYSICAL SETTING 72 

Composition, Topography, and Drainage 72 

Geographic Regions 77 

Climate 82 

Earthquakes 83 

Pollution 84 

POPULATION 86 

Population Density 86 

Age Structure 87 

Migration 89 

Minorities 90 

VALUES AND BELIEFS 93 

Values 93 

Religious and Philosophical Traditions 99 

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION 110 

Family Ill 

Neighborhood 114 

Workplace 115 

Popular Culture 117 

Gender Stratification and the Lives of Women 118 

Age Stratification and the Elderly 121 

HEALTH CARE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 123 

Health Care 123 

Social Welfare 125 



Vlll 



Chapter 3. Education and the Arts 129 

EDUCATION 132 

Robert L. August 

Historical Background 133 

Education Reform 136 

Contemporary Setting 137 

Preschool and Day Care 141 

Primary and Secondary Education 141 

After- School Education 151 

Higher Education 152 

Social Education 161 

THE ARTS 162 

Jane T. Griffin 

Visual Arts 168 

Performing Arts 180 

Literature 187 

Films and Television 191 

Chapter 4. The Character and Structure of the 

Economy 195 

Daniel A. Metraux and Kellie Ann Warner 

PATTERNS OF DEVELOPMENT 198 

Revolutionary Change 198 

The Evolving Occupational Structure 204 

THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS 204 

Industrial Policy 206 

Monetary and Fiscal Policy 207 

THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 209 

PUBLIC CORPORATIONS 212 

PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 213 

THE CULTURE OF JAPANESE MANAGEMENT 216 

EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR RELATIONS 218 

Employment, Wages, and Working Conditions 219 

The Structure of Japan's Labor Market 220 

Aging and Retirement of the Labor Force 223 

Social Insurance and Minimum Wage Systems 224 

Labor Unions 225 

INFRASTRUCTURE AND TECHNOLOGY 226 

Construction 227 

Mining 227 

Energy 228 

Research and Development 229 



ix 



INDUSTRY 231 

Basic Manufactures 232 

Domestic Trade and Services 234 

TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS 236 

Railroads and Subways 236 

Roads 239 

Maritime Transportation 240 

Civil Aviation 240 

Telecommunications 243 

AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY, AND FISHING 244 

LIVING STANDARDS 247 

Chapter 5. International Economic Relations 253 

Edward J. Lincoln 

POSTWAR DEVELOPMENT 256 

TRADE AND INVESTMENT INSTITUTIONS 258 

The Ministry of International Trade and Industry ... 258 

The Japan External Trade Organization 259 

Trading Companies 260 

Financial Institutions 261 

Foreign Aid Institutions 262 

International Trade and Development Institutions . . . 262 

FOREIGN TRADE POLICIES 264 

Export Policies 264 

Import Policies 265 

LEVEL AND COMMODITY COMPOSITION OF 

TRADE 267 

Exports 267 

Imports 269 

Balance of Merchandise Trade 272 

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ACCOUNTS 273 

Services and the Current Account 273 

Capital Flows 275 

The Value of the Yen 280 

TRADE AND INVESTMENT RELATIONS 282 

United States and Canada 283 

Noncommunist Asia 285 

Western Europe 286 

The Middle East 287 

Oceania 288 

Latin America 289 

Africa 290 

Communist Countries 290 



x 



INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION 

AND AID 292 

MAJOR INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIES 294 

Motor Vehicles 294 

Consumer Electronics 296 

Computers 298 

Semiconductors 299 

Iron and Steel 300 

Industries of the Future 301 

Chapter 6. The Political System 303 

Donald M. Seekins 

THE POSTWAR CONSTITUTION 306 

The Status of the Emperor 308 

The Article 9 "No War" Clause 312 

Rights and Duties of Citizens 313 

THE STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT 314 

The Legislature 314 

The Cabinet and Ministries 317 

Local Government 318 

The Electoral System 320 

The Judicial System 324 

CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL VALUES 329 

Community and Leadership 330 

Consensus Building 334 

INTEREST GROUPS 335 

Business Interests 337 

Small Business 338 

Agricultural Cooperatives 339 

Labor Organizations 339 

Professional Associations and Citizen and 

Consumer Movements 340 

THE MASS MEDIA AND POLITICS 341 

THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY 343 

Party History and Basic Principles 343 

Party Structure 344 

The Liberal Democratic Party in National 

Elections 347 

BUREAUCRATS AND THE POLICY-MAKING 

PROCESS 350 

The Civil Service 351 

Policy-Making Dynamics 354 

The Budget Process 356 



xi 



THE OPPOSITION PARTIES 356 

Japan Socialist Party 358 

Komeito 360 

Japan Communist Party 361 

Democratic Socialist Party 362 

Other Parties and Independents 362 

POLITICAL EXTREMISTS 363 

Chapter 7. Foreign Relations 367 

Robert G. Sutter 

MAJOR FOREIGN POLICY GOALS AND 

STRATEGIES 371 

Early Developments 371 

Postwar Developments 375 

FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION 378 

Institutional Framework 378 

The Role of Domestic Politics 381 

AN OVERVIEW OF JAPAN'S FOREIGN RELATIONS ... 384 

Relations with the United States 384 

Relations with China 393 

Relations with the Soviet Union 400 

Relations with Other Asia-Pacific Countries 406 

Relations with Other Countries 412 

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 414 

United Nations 414 

Other Organizaitons 415 

International Banks 415 

Policy after the Cold War 416 

Chapter 8. National Security 419 

Ronald E. Dolan 

MILITARISM BEFORE 1945 422 

The Bushido Code 422 

The Modernization of the Military, 1868-1931 423 

World War II 424 

THE SELF-DEFENSE FORCES 427 

Early Development 428 

Strategic Considerations 429 

Place in National Life 431 

Missions 434 

Organization, Training, and Equipment 435 

Recruitment and Conditions of Service 444 

Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia 447 

Defense Spending 447 



Xll 



The Defense Industry 451 

Military Relations with the United States 454 

PUBLIC ORDER AND INTERNAL SECURITY 456 

The Police System 456 

The Criminal Justice System 465 

Crime 467 

Civil Disturbances 469 

Criminal Procedure 471 

The Penal System 473 

Appendix. Tables 477 

Bibliography 511 

Glossary 573 

Index 577 

List of Figures 

1 Administrative Divisions of Japan, 1990 xxvi 

2 The Japanese Empire During World War II 62 

3 Topography and Drainage 76 

4 Age-Sex Distribution, 1988 88 

5 Structure of the Education System, 1987 142 

6 Transportation Network, 1989 242 

7 Structure of National Government, 1990 316 

8 Structure of Local Government, 1990 320 

9 House of Representatives Elections, 1958-90 348 

10 Principal Organizations, Foreign Policy Formulation and 

Execution, 1988 380 

11 Northern Territories Dispute, 1990 402 

12 Organization of the Defense Establishment, 1990 438 

13 Deployment of the Ground, Maritime, and Air 

Self-Defense Forces, 1990 440 

14 Ranks and Insignia of the Self-Defense Forces, 1990 449 

15 Organization of the National Police Agency, 1989 460 



Xlll 



Preface 



This edition supersedes the fourth edition of Japan: A Country 
Study, published in 1983. It provides updated information on one 
of the most economically powerful nations in the world in a period 
of significant economic change. Although much of what was re- 
ported in 1983 has remained the same in regard to traditional be- 
havior and organizational dynamics, world events have continued 
to shape Japanese domestic and international policies. Improved 
relations with virtually all countries of the Asia-Pacific region, 
democracy movements in Eastern Europe, the general improve- 
ment in East- West relations, volatile changes in the Middle East, 
economic uncertainty throughout the world, competition for in- 
ternational markets, high-technology developments, and the whole 
panoply of Japanese relations with its major business and security 
partner, the United States, have all affected Japan as it moves 
toward a new century. 

The aim of the authors of the new edition of Japan: A Country 
Study has been to analyze Japanese society with respect to its an- 
cient traditions and postwar transformation. Both its long histori- 
cal and societal evolution and its emergence in the second half of 
the twentieth century as a major actor on the international politi- 
cal and economic scene are considered in depth. 

The Hepburn system of romanization is used for Japanese per- 
sonal names, which generally appear in standard order, with the 
family name first. In cases of certain well-known historical figures, 
such as Tokugawa Ieyasu (Ieyasu), or members of famous fami- 
lies, such as the Fujiwara, the individual is referred to by given 
name. The spelling of place names follows usage of the United States 
Board on Geographic Names. The pinyin system of romanization 
is used for most Chinese names and terms. Measurements are given 
in the metric system; a conversion table is provided to assist read- 
ers unfamiliar with metric measurements (see table 1 , Appendix). 

Users of this book are encouraged to consult the chapter bib- 
liographies at the end of the book. Selected specialized bibliographies 
have been listed in the Bibliography for those wishing to do fur- 
ther reading and research. Additionally, users may wish to use other 
bibliographies, such as the Japan Foundation's Catalogue of Books 
in English on Japan, 1945-81 (Tokyo, 1986) and An Introductory Bib- 
liography for Japanese Studies (4 vols. , Tokyo, 1975-82), which covers 
Japanese-language materials; the Association for Asian Studies' 
Bibliography of Asian Studies (Ann Arbor, annual) and Frank Joseph 



xv 



Shulman's Japan (World Bibliography Series, 103; Santa Barbara, 
California: ABC -CLIO, 1989), both of which include entries in 
English, Japanese, and other languages; and the Kokusai Bunka 
Shinkokai's K.B.S. Bibliography of Standard Reference Books for Japa- 
nese Studies (Tokyo, semiannual editions), a comprehensive listing 
of Japanese-language materials. Other useful bibliographies of 
Japanese-language sources are John W. Hall's Japanese History: A 
Guide to Japanese Reference and Research Materials (1954) and Naomi 
Fukuda's Japanese History: A Guide to Survey Histories (1984-86), both 
of which were published by the Center for Japanese Studies at the 
University of Michigan. 



xvi 



Table A. Chronology of Major Historical Periods 



Dates 




Period * 


ca 10 000-300 B C! 




Jomon 


ca. 300-B.C.-A.D. 


300 


Yayoi 


ca. A.D. 300-710 




Kofun (also called Yamato) 


A.D. 710-94 .... 




Nara 


A.D. 794-1185 




Heian 


1185^1333 




Kamakura 


1333-36 






1336-1573 






1573-1600 




Azuchi-Momoyama 


1600-1867 






1868-1912 




Meiji (Mutsuhito) 


1912-26 




Taisho (Yoshihito) 


1926-89 






1989- 




Heisei (Akihito) 


* The last four periods 


are identified by reign titles; the name of the emperor is given in parentheses. 



Reign titles are used only after the death of the emperor. 



XVII 



Country Profile 




Country 

Formal Name: Japan (Nihon Koku or Nippon Koku, literally, 
Source of the Sun Country or Land of the Rising Sun). 

Short Form: Japan. 

Term for Citizens: Japanese. 

Capital: Tokyo 

Geography 

Size: Total 377,835 square kilometers, land area 374,744 square 
kilometers. 



xix 



Topography: Mountainous islands with numerous dormant and 
active volcanos. Four main islands (Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku, 
and Kyushu) and numerous smaller islands to north and south, 
all prone to earthquakes. Highest point Mount Fuji (3,776 meters). 
Numerous, rapidly flowing rivers largely unnavigable but provide 
water for irrigation and hydroelectric-power generation. 

Climate: Generally rainy, high humidity. Diverse climatic range: 
warm summers, long, cold winters in north; hot humid summers, 
short winters in center; long, hot, humid summers, mild winters 
in southwest. 

Society 

Population: 124,225,000 in July 1990; in 1988 about 77 percent 
in urban areas. High population density — 324 persons per square 
kilometer for total area, 1,523 persons per square kilometer for 
habitable land, more than 50 percent of population lives on 2 per- 
cent of land. 

Ethnic Groups: 99.2 percent Japanese, 0.8 percent other, mostly 
Korean, some Chinese. Ainu and burakumin comprise native 
Japanese minority groups. 

Language: Japanese. Emphasis on English as second language. 

Religion: Most (84 percent) observe both Shinto and Buddhist rites, 
16 percent other religions, including 0.7 percent Christian. 

Health: In 1988 life expectancy 81.3 for women, 75.5 for men, 
mortality rate 6 per 1,000. Health-care system in late 1980s in- 
cluded 8,700 general hospitals, 1,000 mental hospitals, and 1,000 
comprehensive hospitals with total capacity 1.5 million beds, plus 
79,000 outpatient clinics and 48,000 dental clinics. More than 
190,000 physicians, nearly 67,000 dentists, and 333,000 nurses, 
primarily in urban areas. 

Education: Compulsory, free nine-year education (elementary — 
grades one through six; lower- secondary — grades seven through 
nine) followed by public and private upper- secondary schools — 
attended by about 94 percent of all lower- secondary school gradu- 
ates (grades ten through twelve); supplemented by preschool and 
after- school education. In 1988, 490 universities of which 357 were 
private, formed the top echelon of the 7,430 institutions of post- 
secondary education. Supervised by Ministry of Education, Science, 
and Culture. Literacy rate 99 percent in 1990. 



xx 



Economy 

Gross National Product (GNP): US$2.9 trillion in 1989. Per capita 
GNP (US$23,616), first among major industrial nations in 1989. 

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): ¥343.2 trillion in 1987 (for value 
of the yen — ¥ — see Glossary). 

Resources: Coal reserves in north and southwest; otherwise min- 
erals negligible. Most resources, including almost all non- renewable 
energy sources, imported. 

Industry: 32.6 percent of GDP in 1987. Basic industries: automo- 
bile manufacturing, consumer electronics; nonferrous metals, 
petrochemicals, pharmaceuticals, bioindustry, aerospace, textiles, 
and processed foods also important; older heavy industries — 
mining, steel, and shipbuilding — in decline but still important 
worldwide; high-technology industries prevalent (for example, semi- 
conductors, computers, optical fibers, optoelectronics, video discs, 
facsimile and copy machines, industrial robots). 

Services: 56.6 percent of GDP in 1987. Wholesale and retail trade 
dominant; advertising, data processing, publishing, tourism, leisure 
industries, entertainment grew rapidly in 1980s. 

Agriculture: 2.8 percent of GDP in 1987. Intense cultivation of 
diminishing arable land, already in short supply. Rice grown on 
most farmland, intercropping common. Heavy use of fertilizers, 
mechanization, experimental high-yield crops. Wood abundant — 
about 70 percent of country covered with forests; large lumber in- 
dustry. World's largest fishing nation; seafood essential to food in- 
dustry. 

Exports: Approximately US$265 billion in 1988. Major partners 
United States, Federal Republic of Germany, Republic of Korea, 
Taiwan. 

Imports: Approximately US$187 billion in 1988. Major partners 
United States, Republic of Korea, Australia, China, Indonesia, 
Taiwan. 

Balance of Payments: Large and growing positive trade balance 
since early 1980s. Exports represented 59 percent, imports 41 per- 
cent of total annual trade in 1988. 

Transportation and Communications 

Maritime: Primarily on coastal seas. Inland Sea (Seto Naikai) 
serves major industrial areas of central Japan. 



xxi 



Railroads: In late 1980s, about 18,800 kilometers of routes run 
by Japan Railways Group; another 3,400 kilometers operated by 
private companies; and small, new companies financed with pri- 
vate and local government funds. Electric-powered Shinkansen 
'bullet' trains operate at speeds up to 240 kilometers per hour on 
special track. Key bridges and tunnels carrying trains and automo- 
tive transportation link four major islands. 

Subways: Major cities served by full metro systems, Tokyo larg- 
est. Supplemented by light rail in suburbs. 

Roads: In 1987 some 1,098,900 kilometers of road, 65 percent 
paved. Extensive expressway and highway network. 

Ports: Largest at Yokohama, Nagoya, and Kobe; other major facil- 
ities at Chiba, Hakodate, Kitakyiishu, Kushiro, Osaka, Tokyo, 
and Yokkaichi. 

Airports: International facilities at Tokyo (Narita and Haneda), 
Osaka, Nagoya, Nagasaki, Fukuoka, Kagoshima, and Naha. Japan 
Airlines and All Nippon Airways major world carriers. Both, along 
with Japan Air System and South- West Air Lines, also serve domes- 
tic routes. 

Telecommunications: World-class radio and television systems 
available to virtually all citizens, those living in remote and moun- 
tainous areas via satellite. There were 64 million telephones in use 
in 1989. 

Government and Politics 

Government: Constitutional monarchy with emperor symbol of 
state. Parliamentary form of government, elected bicameral legis- 
lature (Diet: House of Councillors — upper house, House of Rep- 
resentatives — lower house), majority party president serves as prime 
minister. General elections every four years or upon dissolution 
of lower house, triennially for half of upper house. 

Administrative Divisions: Country has forty- seven administra- 
tive divisions: forty-three rural prefectures {ken), two urban prefec- 
tures (fu — Kyoto and Osaka), one metropolitan district (to — Tokyo), 
and one district (do — Hokkaido). Large cities (shi) divided into wards 
(ku), then into precincts (machi or cho) or subdistricts (shicho) and 
counties (gun). 

Justice: Civil law system heavily influenced by British and Ameri- 
can law. Independent judiciary with Supreme Court, high courts, 
district courts, and family courts in late 1980s. 



xxii 



Politics: Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) majority party, with 
numerous factions, since 1955; other major parties: Japan Socialist 
Party (held majority in House of Councillors in 1990), Democratic 
Socialist Party, Komeito (Clean Government Party). 

Foreign Affairs: A major aid donor to developing countries. Main- 
tains diplomatic relations with virtually all countries of world. 
Closely aligned since World War II with United States policies but 
neutral and independent stand on some issues. Member of Asian 
Development Bank, Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic and 
Social Development in Asia and the Pacific, International Whal- 
ing Commission, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and De- 
velopment, and the United Nations and its affiliated agencies, and 
a number of other internaitonal organizations. 

National Security 

Armed Forces: Article 9 of Constitution precludes existence of 
offensive military forces. Self-Defense Forces numbered about 
247,000 in 1989: Ground Self-Defense Force 156,200, Maritime 
Self-Defense Force 44,400, and Air Self-Defense Force 46,400. 
Reserves 48,000. 

Military Units: Five armies, five maritime districts, three air 
defense forces. Main bases in Hokkaido, eastern Honshu, central 
and western Honshu and Shikoku, and Kyushu. 

Equipment: Ground forces: medium tanks, reconnaissance vehicles, 
armored personnel carriers, towed and self-propelled howitzers, mor- 
tars, single rocket and multiple rocket launchers, air-defense guns, 
surface-to-surface missiles, antitank missiles, fixed-wing aircraft, at- 
tack helicopters, and transport helicopters. Maritime forces: sub- 
marines, guided missile destroyers, frigates with helicopters, frigates, 
patrol and coastal combatants, mine warfare ships, amphibious ships, 
auxiliaries, fixed- wing aircraft, and helicopters. Air forces: ground 
attack aircraft, fighters, reconnaissance aircraft, airborne early- 
warning aircraft, transport aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, air-to- 
air missiles, and air-defense control and warning units. 

Military Budget: Approximately US$2.8 billion in FY 1990. Ef- 
forts made for political reasons to keep direct defense expenses at 
around 1 percent of GNP. 

Foreign Military Treaties: Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and 
Security with United States (1960); can be revoked on one-year's 
notice by either party, updated by minutes periodically. 



xxiii 



Police Forces: Independent municipal and local police forces; Na- 
tional Rural Police at prefectural level; all under supervision of 
National Police Agency in 1990. 



xxiv 



I 

I 

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! 

I 
\ 

i 



Divisions 



tf (45) 

i err; 

to" f40; 

»; 

7a (37; 
a r*7J 

43) 

20; 
e(35) 
:a (22) 
(13) 

ma (33) 

18) 

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(10) 
\ma (34) 
tta (5) 
ichi (39) 
ishi (16) 



Introduction 



JAPAN IN 1990 WAS a modern, thriving democracy, yet it re- 
tained a long and esteemed imperial tradition. The Japanese took 
great pride in being "unique," yet much of Japanese civilization 
was composed of selective borrowings, from the Chinese written 
language in the sixth century to United States semiconductors in 
the latter half of the twentieth century. Although Japan lacked 
almost all raw materials, it was a highly urbanized and industrial- 
ized economic power supplying vast export markets. Yet farming 
interests still exerted a strong influence on the ruling Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) and its trade policies. Japan was a rich 
country, ranking first among major industrial nations in per cap- 
ita gross national product (GNP — see Glossary), but many of its 
people were crowded into inadequate housing lacking such basic 
amenities as indoor plumbing. Although the bushido (way of the 
warrior) legacy of the feudal era still exerted a definite influence 
on modern society, the ultranationalism that it had spawned was 
repudiated and the military machine that earlier in the twentieth 
century had conquered much of the Asia-Pacific region had been 
replaced by streamlined Self-Defense Forces, well trained but under- 
equipped and barely able to defend the home islands. 

Japan consists of the four main islands of Hokkaido, Honshu, 
Shikoku, and Kyushu, along with a plethora of smaller islands, 
and is separated from the Asian mainland by the Sea of Japan and 
bordered on the east by the Pacific Ocean (see fig. 1). Nearly 75 
percent of the country's land surface is covered by mountains, and 
the climate, although generally humid, ranges from cool in the north 
to subtropical in the south. Historically, when Japan was a pre- 
dominantly agricultural country, its varied climate made for re- 
gional diversity in economy and culture, and its insular geography 
and rugged terrain helped it limit and control foreign access. Since 
World War II, however, as Japanese society has become over- 
whelmingly urban, industrial, and internationalized, climatic and 
geographical effects have become much less significant. 

The origins of Japanese civilization are buried in legend, with 
the country's first written records dating from the sixth to the eighth 
centuries A.D., after Japan had adopted the Chinese writing sys- 
tem. Early in the sixth century, Chinese Buddhism was introduced 
to Japan by way of Korea, and with it came many Chinese govern- 
mental and fiscal practices. A society of individual military rulers, 
each responsible for his own area, evolved into an imperial system 



xxvn 




Figurt 1. Administratis Divisions of Japan, 1990 



Japan: Administrative Divisions 


— PREFECTURES — 


Aichi (21) Miyazaki (45) 


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Nagano (11) 


Aomori (2) 


MzirinaiUi /AD) 


r^hf'ho (OA\ 




nnimG \Of) 


Niigaia ( / j 


Fiikiii (14) 


Hit ft td?\ 


rUnUOKci {H 1 ) 


KjK&yaiiia (01/ 


FukushifTiB (8) 


Okina wa (47) 


KJlIU ( / D) 


DcaUa /Oft) 


KjUllllllcl ( / d.) 


Qana /AD 

oaga {^oj 


l-limchima f1R\ 

nirubfuiffa \oo/ 


OaiiafTId ( 1 / / 


nOKKaluu ( / ) 


Shiga (20) 


Hydgo (27) 


Shimane (35) 


Ibaraki (19) 


Shizuoka (22) 


Ishikawa (9) 


Tochigi (13) 


Iwate (4) 


Tokushima (33) 


Kagawa (32) 


Tokyo (18) 


Kagoshima (46) 


Tottori (30) 


Kanagawa (23) 


Toy am a (10) 


Kochi (38) 


Wakayama (34) 


Kumamoto (44) 


Yamagata (5) 


Kyoto (25) 


Yamaguchi (39) 


Mie (26) 


Yamanashi (16) 


Miyagi (6) 



Introduction 



JAPAN IN 1990 WAS a modern, thriving democracy, yet it re- 
tained a long and esteemed imperial tradition. The Japanese took 
great pride in being "unique," yet much of Japanese civilization 
was composed of selective borrowings, from the Chinese written 
language in the sixth century to United States semiconductors in 
the latter half of the twentieth century. Although Japan lacked 
almost all raw materials, it was a highly urbanized and industrial- 
ized economic power supplying vast export markets. Yet farming 
interests still exerted a strong influence on the ruling Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) and its trade policies. Japan was a rich 
country, ranking first among major industrial nations in per cap- 
ita gross national product (GNP — see Glossary), but many of its 
people were crowded into inadequate housing lacking such basic 
amenities as indoor plumbing. Although the bushidd (way of the 
warrior) legacy of the feudal era still exerted a definite influence 
on modern society, the ultranationalism that it had spawned was 
repudiated and the military machine that earlier in the twentieth 
century had conquered much of the Asia-Pacific region had been 
replaced by streamlined Self-Defense Forces, well trained but under- 
equipped and barely able to defend the home islands. 

Japan consists of the four main islands of Hokkaido, Honshu, 
Shikoku, and Kyushu, along with a plethora of smaller islands, 
and is separated from the Asian mainland by the Sea of Japan and 
bordered on the east by the Pacific Ocean (see fig. 1). Nearly 75 
percent of the country's land surface is covered by mountains, and 
the climate, although generally humid, ranges from cool in the north 
to subtropical in the south. Historically, when Japan was a pre- 
dominantly agricultural country, its varied climate made for re- 
gional diversity in economy and culture, and its insular geography 
and rugged terrain helped it limit and control foreign access. Since 
World War II, however, as Japanese society has become over- 
whelmingly urban, industrial, and internationalized, climatic and 
geographical effects have become much less significant. 

The origins of Japanese civilization are buried in legend, with 
the country's first written records dating from the sixth to the eighth 
centuries A.D., after Japan had adopted the Chinese writing sys- 
tem. Early in the sixth century, Chinese Buddhism was introduced 
to Japan by way of Korea, and with it came many Chinese govern- 
mental and fiscal practices. A society of individual military rulers, 
each responsible for his own area, evolved into an imperial system 



xxvii 



codified in the Taiho-ryoritsu (Great Treasure Code) of 701. Im- 
perial control was gradually spread throughout the main island of 
Honshu and eventually to all of Japan by military conquest. The 
leaders of these conquests were rewarded with large landholdings. 
By the tenth century, these military leaders had evolved into a war- 
rior class — the bushi or samurai — that supplanted the central 
authority of the emperor; and Japanese society evolved into a feu- 
dal economy with the large landholdings of the samurai supported 
by local peasants, artisans, and merchants. Beginning in the seven- 
teenth century, the Tokugawa shoguns, like earlier military rulers 
under the same title, asserted control over a newly reunified Japan. 
They also closed the country to outside influences and developed 
the national premodern economy. 

When Japan was reopened in the middle of the nineteenth cen- 
tury, the traditional political, military, and economic systems were 
no match for powerful foreign intruders, and the shogun's govern- 
ment failed. It was replaced by a new oligarchy of strong regional 
leaders who brought about the Meiji Restoration — the ostensible 
restoration of imperial power — in 1868. The Meiji rulers carried 
out wholesale radical reforms. The government hired thousands 
of foreigners to teach modern science, mathematics, and foreign 
languages and sent a multitude of students and envoys to Europe 
and North America to learn the lessons that had bypassed them 
during the years of exclusion. They returned to combine foreign 
ideology and modern methods with Japanese traditions, devis- 
ing a governmental and economic system that was totally new yet 
uniquely Japanese. The government also built factories and ship- 
yards to help private businesses get started. These businesses de- 
veloped rapidly into large conglomerates, some of which dominated 
the world of business in the early 1990s. Transportation and in- 
dustry were modernized; the military was reorganized and equipped 
with up-to-date weapons; and under the 1889 constitution, Japan 
took the first steps toward representative government. 

For the remainder of the nineteenth century and into the twen- 
tieth century, the economy grew at a moderate rate although it 
remained heavily dependent on agriculture. After the development 
of a strong economic and industrial base at home, successful wars 
annexing Taiwan and Korea, and the growth of spheres of influence 
over a large part of the Chinese mainland, Japan began to exert 
its influence throughout the Asia-Pacific region. In the late 1920s, 
industry outstripped agriculture, and in the 1930s industry, little 
affected by the Great Depression plaguing the rest of the industri- 
alized world, continued to grow. Using the strong Japanese econ- 
omy to support their imperialistic designs, ultranationalist military 



xxvm 



officers succeeded in stifling the young democracy and took con- 
trol of the government in the name of the emperor. With their power 
unchecked, the militarist government led the nation into a series 
of military conflicts that culminated in the almost total destruc- 
tion of the nation during World War II. 

World War II destroyed nearly half of Japan's industry. Japan's 
economy was completely disrupted, and the country was forced 
to rely on United States assistance and imports of essential food 
and raw material. Large-scale procurements by United States armed 
forces during the Korean War (1950-53) revived Japanese indus- 
try, and the country invested heavily in replacing the destroyed 
factories with modern, well-equipped factories. By the mid-1950s, 
modern plants staffed by a well-educated, disciplined work force 
had brought the Japanese economy back to pre- World War II levels. 
For the remainder of the 1950s, however, Japan endured chronic 
trade deficits. Unhampered by large military expenditures, the 
Japanese economy continued to grow at a rapid pace into the next 
decade. Japanese trade relations improved dramatically during the 
1960s, attaining a favorable balance, and Japanese industry felt 
confident enough to compete in the international market in such 
heavy industrial products as automobiles, ships, and machine tools. 

The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), 
formed in 1949, played a major role in the 1950s and 1960s in for- 
mulating and implementing Japan's international trade policy, as- 
sisting the development of domestic industry and protecting it from 
foreign competition. MITI's authority gradually decreased as pri- 
vate industry and other ministries took more responsibility on them- 
selves. By the late 1980s, MITI's control over international trade 
policy was greatly reduced. The Japan External Trade Organiza- 
tion (JETRO) was established by MITI in 1958 to promote Japan's 
external trade. Over the years JETRO 's role diversified; it went 
from promoting exports to fostering all aspects of Japan's trade 
relations and enhancing understanding with trading partners. 

In the immediate postwar period, the operations of Japanese 
financial institutions were severely restricted. In the 1970s, con- 
trols began to loosen, and these institutions rapidly expanded their 
international activities. By the late 1980s, they were major inter- 
national players, opening branches abroad to foster foreign invest- 
ments and making Tokyo a world financial center. During the late 
1980s, Japan became the world's largest creditor nation and was 
home to some of the world's largest banking and financial institu- 
tions. Japanese securities firms played a major role in international 
finances and were members of major world stock exchanges. In 
1988 the Tokyo Securities and Stock Exchange became the world's 



xxix 



largest, while the Osaka Stock Exchange ranked third behind Tokyo 
and the New York Stock Exchange. Beginning in 1986, the Tokyo 
exchange permitted foreign brokerage firms to be members. Japan 
also played an increasing role in international economic organiza- 
tions and agreements, especially the Asian Development Bank and 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Japan has a strong 
private enterprise economy, although public corporations played 
a very important role in the early postwar period. By the 1980s, 
however, their role was considerably decreased, and some of the 
largest were privatized. The thriving private enterprise sector was 
dominated by large corporations with affiliated smaller firms. 
Labor-management relations were generally harmonious, and labor 
productivity was high. 

In the late 1980s, Japan squeezed nearly 124 million people into 
less than 400,000 square kilometers of land, much of which was 
uninhabitable. But population growth, rapid in the last half of the 
nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century, had 
slowed drastically by the 1980s. This low fertility rate, combined 
with high life expectancy, was making Japan a rapidly aging soci- 
ety, placing an increasing burden on the shrinking working-age 
population. 

Women traditionally had occupied an inferior position in 
Japanese society. Even though they were given the right to vote 
in 1946 and were accorded equal rights under the 1947 Constitu- 
tion and the Civil Code of 1948, their general status did not sig- 
nificantly improve. As Japan faced a shrinking work force in the 
1980s and 1990s, however, increasing numbers of women were 
brought into the labor market, resulting in improved educational, 
political, and economic opportunities. Nevertheless, women's status 
still remained far short of that for men. 

Japan promoted exports by developing world-class industries and 
providing incentives for firms to export. In the postwar period, 
export incentives mainly took the form of tax relief and govern- 
ment assistance to build export industries along with heavy im- 
port barriers. As Japanese industry regained its strength in the 
1960s, the government gradually liberalized its trade policy, and 
tax incentives were eliminated. In the 1970s, a strong rise in the 
value of the yen (for value of the yen — see Glossary) under the new 
system of floating exchange rates and the oil price shocks of 1973 
and 1979 brought large trade deficits. The situation spurred Japan 
to reduce its dependence on unreliable foreign petroleum by con- 
servation and diversification of sources and to sharply increase its 
exports to offset the high costs of raw materials. In the 1980s, with 
the dramatic drop in the cost of raw materials, Japan developed 



xxx 



a large trade surplus. Export policy shifted to export restraints on 
certain products that were causing the greatest tensions with trad- 
ing partners, and Japan greatly increased its foreign investment. 
This trend continued through the 1980s. Japan continued to be 
the target of complaints from trading partners, however, especial- 
ly for nontariff barriers such as standards, testing procedures, and 
restrictive distribution practices. 

In the 1980s, manufactured imports still made up a share of the 
gross national product far below that of other developed countries, 
and in 1989 Japan was named an unfair trading partner by the 
United States government. Although certain Japanese industries, 
such as automobile manufacturing, were heavily export oriented, 
Japan exported a lower percentage of its GNP than most major 
industrialized nations. During the 1960s and 1970s, import growth 
kept up with exports, but in the 1980s, import growth fell off drasti- 
cally, leading to large trade surpluses. The United States was the 
largest single destination of Japanese exports (34 percent in 1988) 
as well as its largest single source of imports (22.4 percent). Japan's 
major international industries in the late 1980s were motor vehi- 
cles, consumer electronics, computers, semiconductors and other 
electronic components, and iron and steel. The rapid increase in 
the value of the yen in the late 1980s made Japanese exports less 
price competitive and imports more price competitive, but it was 
unclear in 1990 what effect the increased value of the yen would 
have on the balance of trade in the long term. 

Japan has traditionally run a deficit in services: transportation, 
insurance, travel expenditures, royalties, licensing fees, and income 
from investment. In the early 1980s, however, this deficit was some- 
what offset by the rapid growth of Japanese foreign investment. 
In the late 1980s, increased travel expenses again produced a 
marked increase in the services deficit despite a rapid growth in 
foreign investments. Although most barriers to foreign investment 
were removed in the 1980s, Japan's heavy investment in other coun- 
tries remained a major cause of tension with those countries. 

Japan's foreign aid program, begun in the 1960s as World War 
II reparations to other Asian countries, grew rapidly during the 
1980s. In the late 1980s, Japanese assistance consisted of bilateral 
grants and loans as well as support to multilateral aid organizations. 

Japan, one of the world's most literate nations, places great value 
on education. It provides children with compulsory free education 
from first grade through ninth grade. A high percentage of chil- 
dren also attends preschools and continues through into upper- 
secondary and higher education. Educational standards are high, 
and Japanese students consistently finish at or near the top in 



xxxi 



international academic tests. Teachers are held in great esteem by 
Japanese society and are charged with imparting sound moral values 
to their students along with academic information. Any antisocial 
behavior on or off campus is considered to reflect on the teacher. 
Entrance to higher education is by examination and is extremely 
competitive, causing great stress to students trying to get into the 
"right" school. Education rarely ends with graduation from the 
formal school system. Japan also has extensive, well-utilized adult 
education. 

The Japanese have shown widespread interest in their tradi- 
tional culture: the tea ritual, calligraphy, flower arranging, and No, 
Kabuki, and bunraku (puppet) theater, as well as classical works 
of art. At the same time, educated Japanese are expected to have 
a good understanding of classical Western music and art, and 
modern Western music, drama, and art have been imported and 
adapted to develop distinctive new Japanese forms. In addition, 
extensive print and broadcast media provide information and en- 
tertainment. 

The Japanese do not consider themselves a religious people. Their 
world view, however, is guided by a basic philosophy deeply rooted 
in ancient Shinto beliefs on human origins and relations with the 
spirit world, modified by later adaptations of Confucian ideas on 
societal relationships and order and Buddhist concepts of karmic 
causation and an afterlife. Japanese are very conscious of their po- 
sition in society and the various roles that they are expected to play 
throughout their lives. They put a high premium on social har- 
mony and will go to great pains to avoid bringing disgrace on their 
families and other groups with which they are associated by dis- 
rupting that harmony. For this reason, more than any other, in 
1990 the overall crime rate remained quite low in comparison with 
other major industrialized nations, and Japanese cities were among 
the safest in the world. 

The 1947 Constitution, with its stipulation of a symbolic role 
for the emperor, guarantees of civil and human rights, and renun- 
ciation of war, remained the operative basis for Japanese govern- 
ment in 1990. By pragmatic collaboration with big business, small 
business, agriculture, and professional groups, the LDP has domi- 
nated Japanese politics since it was formed as a coalition of smaller 
conservative groups in 1955. Although LDP fortunes have risen 
and ebbed over the years since its establishment, no opposition party 
has been able to oust it from power. On occasions, such as the Lock- 
heed bribery scandal in the mid-1970s and the Recruit influence- 
peddling scandal of 1988-89, LDP dominance appeared to be in 
danger. In the upper house (House of Councillors) elections of July 



xxxn 



1989, the LDP actually became the minority party behind the Japan 
Socialist Party and a coalition of smaller opposition groups. But 
voters have continued to give the LDP control of the more power- 
ful lower house (House of Representatives). This fact results as 
much from the opposition's inability to present a viable alterna- 
tive as from popular support for the LDP. The voters have preferred 
to chastise the LDP for its mistakes rather than to oust the party. 

In the postwar period, Japan concentrated on rebuilding its econ- 
omy, attempted to cultivate friendly ties with all nations, and re- 
lied on the United States for military security. By the 1970s, this 
foreign policy began to be called into question as Japan came into 
its own as a world economic power. In the 1980s, Japan became 
a leading industrial nation, the world's largest creditor nation and 
largest donor of foreign aid, and a major actor in international finan- 
cial institutions such as the World Bank (see Glossary) and the In- 
ternational Monetary Fund (see Glossary). As it entered the 1990s, 
people at home and abroad expected Japan to play a diplomatic 
role proportionate to its economic power and its role in foreign as- 
sistance, trade, and investment. But popular sentiment in Japan 
and its Asian neighbors continued strongly to oppose Japan's as- 
suming the military role expected of a world power. 

Because of their tragic experience with a military-controlled 
government before and during World War II, the Japanese peo- 
ple readily accepted the military restrictions written into the 1947 
Constitution at the insistence of occupation forces and, even in 1990, 
generally interpreted Article 9 of the Constitution as forbidding 
the Japanese Self-Defense Forces from being deployed outside of 
the country or possessing nuclear weapons. Japan still depended 
on the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with the 
United States, which mandated the United States to come to its 
aid in the event of a large-scale invasion and allowed for United 
States provision of a nuclear umbrella. There is little popular sen- 
timent for change in this arrangement. 

As Japan moved toward the twenty-first century, it was faced 
with a series of dilemmas. How could it continue to grow as a world 
economic leader without assuming a greater political role? And, 
how could it be considered a political leader when it could not even 
provide for the security of its own territory without foreign as- 
sistance? Its trading partners complained that Japan enjoyed an 
unfair advantage. Yet when Japanese firms invested in their econ- 
omies, they raised the specter of Japanese domination. Each in- 
ternational crisis found Western powers calling on Japan to 
"contribute its fair share" to the peacekeeping forces. At the same 
time, the Japanese people and their Asian neighbors, remembering 



xxxiii 



the terrible lessons of World War II, demanded that there be no 
foreign projection of Japanese military power. With less than ten 
years until the next century, Japan had yet to come to grips with 
these questions. The answers seemed far off. 

January 22, 1991 

* * * 

As the manuscript for this book was being completed, the 
Japanese economy continued to grow at a healthy rate. After a weak 
2.6 percent annualized growth in GNP in the fourth quarter of 

1990, the GNP jumped to an 11.2 percent annualized growth in 
the first quarter of 1991. But the fact that more than half of this 
increase came from exports seemed to indicate that overall growth 
for 1991 would slow considerably from the first quarter figure. 

Japan's tardiness in providing promised support to the United 
States-led coalition forces opposing the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait 
exacerbated already tense Japanese-United States trade relations. 
In March 1991, Japan's legislature, the National Diet, finally ap- 
proved the US$13 billion promised several months earlier, reliev- 
ing some of the tension in Japanese-United States relations. With 
the attention of Congress and the American public diverted to other 
areas of the world, Japanese and United States government offi- 
cials were able to quietly negotiate a trade agreement on semicon- 
ductors and an agreement to open Japanese construction projects 
to United States companies. Japan's refusal to open up its rice market 
to foreign suppliers remained a serious problem for agricultural trade. 

Although the Kaifu administration in November 1990 was un- 
successful in getting Diet authorization for the Self-Defense Forces 
to participate in peacekeeping operations, in early February 1991 
the Japanese government dispatched military transport aircraft to 
evacuate refugees from the Persian Gulf war from Jordan and Syria 
to Egypt at the request of the United Nations International Or- 
ganization for Migration. After the war, Japan sent a small flo- 
tilla of four Maritime Self-Defense Force minesweepers and two 
support ships to the Gulf to clear Iraqi mines. In the summer of 

1991 , the Kaifu administration drafted a new proposal setting aside 
a force of 1,000 troops and 50 cease-fire monitors to be available 
for United Nations peacekeeping operations. The proposal appeared 
to have substantial public support. 

On July 18,1991, after several months of difficult negotiations, 
Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki signed a joint statement with the 



xxxiv 



Dutch prime minister, Ruud Lubbers, head of the European Com- 
munity Council, and the European Commission president, Jacques 
Delors, pledging closer Japanese-European Community consulta- 
tions on foreign relations, scientific and technological cooperation, 
assistance to developing countries, and efforts to reduce trade con- 
flicts. Japanese foreign ministry officials hoped that this agreement 
would help to broaden Japanese-European Community political 
links and raise them above the narrow confines of trade disputes. 

The much heralded visit to Japan of Soviet president and general 
secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Mikhail 
Gorbachev occurred in April 1991. Although Gorbachev and Kaifu 
signed several low-level agreements on environmental protection, 
nuclear energy, and cultural exchanges, they made no progress in 
resolving the main obstacle to Japanese-Soviet relations, the Soviet 
Union's continued occupation of Shikotan, Etorofu, Kunashiri, 
and the Habomai Islands north of Hokkaido. In September 1991, 
Gorbachev resigned as general secretary of the communist party 
and his government was in transition, causing further uncertain- 
ties about that government's relations with Japan and other nations. 

In the early 1990s, the Japanese government was making a con- 
certed effort to enhance its diplomatic stature, especially in Asia. 
Kaifu 's much publicized spring 1991 tour of five Southeast Asian 
nations — Malaysia, Brunei, Thailand, Singapore, and the Philip- 
pines — culminated in a May 3 major foreign policy address in Sin- 
gapore, in which he called for a new partnership with the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and pledged that Japan would 
go beyond the purely economic sphere to seek an "appropriate role 
in the political sphere as a nation of peace." As evidence of this 
new role, Japan took an active part in promoting negotiations to 
resolve the Cambodian conflict. 

In Northeast Asia, Japan conducted lengthy negotiations with 
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) aimed 
at establishing diplomatic relations with P'yongyang while main- 
taining its relations with Seoul. The Japanese government also re- 
vived Sino-Japanese exchanges and offered support to Mongolia's 
political and economic restructuring. In January 1991, Japan began 
normalization talks with P'yongyang with a formal apology for its 
1910-45 colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula. The negotiations 
were aided by Tokyo's support of a proposal for simultaneous en- 
try to the United Nations by North Korea and the Republic of 
Korea (South Korea); the issues of international inspection of North 
Korean nuclear facilities and the nature and amount of Japanese 
economic assistance, however, proved more difficult to negotiate. 



xxxv 



Japan took the lead in restoring trade and economic agreements 
with China, suspended following Beijing's June 1989 Tiananmen 
Incident. Japan-China trade, which began to recover in Septem- 
ber 1990, increased rapidly in 1991. In March 1991, the Japan 
Export-Import Bank resumed loans to China, and in April Japan 
announced its support for restoration of Asian Development Bank 
loans to China. A series of unilateral and multilateral loans followed. 

Frequent meetings between high-level Japanese and Chinese 
government officials also took place in 1991. In March Japanese 
foreign ministry officials met in Tokyo with Chinese foreign ministry 
officials to discuss a wide range of bilateral and international is- 
sues; in May former prime ministers Nakasone Yasuhiro and 
Takeshita Noboru, in Beijing to attend the opening of a Japan- 
China youth center, met with leading Chinese officials; and in June 
the Chinese minster of foreign affairs, Qian Qichen, visited Tokyo. 
The culmination of government-to- government exchanges came 
with Prime Minister Kaifu's August 1991 visit to Beijing, the first 
by a leader of a major industrialized nation since the Tiananmen 
Incident. During the visit, Kaifu discussed a full range of bilateral 
and international issues with Chinese leaders and offered substan- 
tial economic assistance. Kaifu also visited Ulaanbaatar and offered 
Japanese encouragement and financial support to Mongolia's ef- 
forts to reorganize its government and economy. 

The political fortunes of leading Japanese political figures changed 
in 1991. Doi Takako, who in late 1989 and early 1990 had been 
considered a possible candidate for prime minister on the strength 
of her Japan Socialist Party's victory in the July 1989 House of Coun- 
cilors election, resigned her post in late July 1991 following the party's 
crushing defeat in local elections. And, in October Prime Minster 
Kaifu, despite his high rating with the Japanese public, announced 
that he would not run for another term as president of the LDP 
when he failed to attain Diet passage of a political reform bill and 
lost the support of powerful LDP factions. Miyazawa Kiichi, a strong 
political figure whose career dates from World War II and the United 
States occupation, was elected president of the LDP on October 27, 
1991, and prime minister on November 5. On December 7, Prime 
Minister Miyazawa indicated that Japan felt 'deep responsibility' 
for the suffering that it inflicted in World War II, but believed that 
it had atoned for its conduct by its contribution to peace and prosperi- 
ty since the war. It remained to be seen, however, what general 
policy changes the Miyazawa administration would bring to Japan 
and its relations with the rest of the world. 



December 9, 1991 Ronald E. Dolan 



XXXV 1 



Chapter 1. Historical Setting 



The ideograph wa, translated as "harmony, " considered a basic Japanese 
social value; written by Reiko I. Seekins 



' ' NOTHING SIMILAR MAY be found in foreign lands, ' ' wrote 
Kitabatake Chikafusa when he described Japan in his fourteenth- 
century Jinno shoto ki (Chronicle of the Direct Descent of the Di- 
vine Sovereigns). Although Japan's culture developed late in Asian 
terms and was much influenced by China and later the West, its 
history, like its art and literature, is special among world civiliza- 
tions. As some scholars have argued, these outside influences may 
have "corrupted" Japanese traditions, yet once absorbed they also 
enriched and strengthened the nation, forming part of a vibrant 
and unique culture. 

Early in Japan's history, society was controlled by a ruling elite 
of powerful clans. The most powerful emerged as a kingly line and 
later as the imperial family in Yamato (modern Nara Prefecture 
or possibly in northern Kyushu) in the third century A.D. , claim- 
ing descent from the gods who created Japan. An imperial court 
and government, shaped by Chinese political and social institu- 
tions, were established. Often powerful court families effected a 
hereditary regency, having established control over the .emperor. 
The highly developed culture attained between the eighth and the 
twelfth centuries was followed by a long period of anarchy and civil 
war, and a feudal society developed in which military overlords 
ran the government on behalf of the emperor, his court, and the 
regent. Although the Yamato (see Glossary) court continued con- 
trol of the throne, in practice a succession of dynastic military re- 
gimes ruled the now-decentralized country. In the late sixteenth 
century, Japan began a process of reunification followed by a period 
of great stability and peace, in which contact with the outside world 
was limited and tightly controlled by the government. 

Confronted by the West — inopportunely during the economically 
troubled late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries — Japan 
emerged gradually as a modern, industrial power, exhibiting some 
democratic institutions by the end of World War I. Beginning in 
the mid-nineteenth century, phenomenal social upheaval, accom- 
panied by political, military, and economic successes, led to an over- 
abundance of nationalist pride and extremist solutions, and to even 
faster modernization. Representative government was finally replaced 
by increasingly authoritarian regimes, which propelled Japan into 
World War II. After the cataclysm of nuclear war, Japan rebuilt 
itself based on a new and earnest desire for peaceful development, 



3 



Japan: A Country Study 



becoming an economic superpower in the second half of the twen- 
tieth century. 

Early Developments 

Ancient Cultures 

The literature of Shinto (Way of the Gods; see Religious and 
Philsophical Traditons, ch. 2) employs much mythology to describe 
the supposed historical origins of Japan. According to the creation 
story found in the Kojiki (Record of Ancient Matters, dating from 
712 A. D.) and the Nihongi or Nihon shoki (Chronicle of Japan, from 
720 A.D.), the Japanese islands were created by the gods, two of 
whom — the male Izanagi and the female Izanami — descended from 
heaven to carry out the task. They also brought into being other 
kami (deities or supernatural forces), such as those influencing the 
sea, rivers, wind, woods, and mountains. Two of these deities, the 
Sun Goddess, Amaterasu Omikami, and her brother, the Storm 
God, Susano-o, warred against each other, with Amaterasu emerg- 
ing victorious. 

Subsequently Amaterasu sent her grandson, Ninigi, to rule over 
the sacred islands. Ninigi took with him what became the three 
imperial regalia — a curved jewel (magatama), a mirror, and a "sword 
of gathered clouds" — and ruled over the island of Kyushu (see 
fig. 1). Ninigi's great-grandson, Jimmu, recognized as the first 
human emperor of Japan, set out to conquer Yamato. On the main 
island of Honshu, according to tradition, he established the un- 
broken line of imperial descent from the Sun Goddess and founded 
the Land of the Rising Sun in 660 B.C. 

Archaeological evidence shows some human activity as early 
as 30,000 B.C., when the islands were connected glacially to the 
Asian mainland. The first modern inhabitants of Japan, however, 
are thought to have been relative latecomers, arriving from diverse 
points of the eastern Pacific rim by around 10,000 B.C. 

Of these prehistoric people, those who left the clearest record 
were members of the heterogeneous Jomon culture (ca. 10,000- 
300 B.C.) who made by 3,000 B.C. clay pottery impressed with 
rope or cord patterns (Jomon means "patterns of plaited cord") 
with a growing sophistication. These people also used chipped stone 
tools and were hunters, gatherers, and skillful coastal and deep- 
water fishermen. They practiced a rudimentary form of agriculture 
and lived in caves and later in temporary shallow pit dwellings, 
leaving rich kitchen middens for modern anthropological study. 
Many elements of Japanese culture, such as Shinto mythology, mar- 
riage customs, and architectural styles, may date from the end 



4 



Ancient ornaments, including several magatama, or "curved jewels" 

Courtesy The Mainichi Newspapers 

of this period and reflect a mingled migration from northern Asian 
and southern Pacific areas. 

Some developments of the next cultural period, the Yayoi, are at- 
tributed to Chinese and Korean influences. The Yayoi culture 
(named after the section of Tokyo where archaeological investiga- 
tions uncovered its traces) flourished between about 300 B.C. and 
A.D. 300 from southern Kyushu to northern Honshu. The earli- 
est of these people, who are thought to have migrated from Korea 
to northern Kyushu and intermixed with the Jomon, also used 
chipped stone tools. Although the pottery of the Yayoi was more 
technologically advanced — produced on a potter's wheel — it was 
more simply decorated than Jomon ware. The Yayoi made bronze 
ceremonial nonfunctional bells, mirrors, and weapons, and by the 
first century A.D., iron agricultural tools and weapons. They wove 
cloth, lived in permanent farming villages, constructed buildings 
of wood and stone, accumulated wealth through land ownership 
and the storage of grain, and developed distinct social classes. Their 
irrigated, wet-rice culture was similar to that of central and south 
China, requiring a heavy input of human labor, which led to the 
development and eventual growth of a highly sedentary society. 
Unlike China, which had to undertake massive public works and 
water-control projects, leading to a highly centralized government, 



5 



Japan: A Country Study 

Japan had abundant water. In Japan, then, local political and so- 
cial developments were relatively more important than the activi- 
ties of the central authority and a stratified society. 

Kofun Period, ca. A.D. 300-710 

New continental influences, such as the extensive use of iron, 
characterized the next historical period. The Kofun, or old tomb, 
period (ca. A.D. 300-710, also known as the Yamato period), takes 
its name from the culture's distinctive earthen funeral mounds with 
large stone burial chambers, many of which were keyhole shaped. 
During this time, a highly aristocratic society with militaristic rul- 
ers developed. Its horse-riding warriors wore armor, carried swords 
and other weapons, and used advanced military methods like those 
of Northeast Asia. Evidence of these advances is seen in haniwa 
(literally, clay rings) funerary figures found in thousands of tombs 
scattered throughout the area. The figures are portrayed using a 
wide variety of musical instruments, weapons, modes of convey- 
ance, and so forth. Another funerary piece, the magatama, became 
one of the symbols of the power of the imperial house. 

The Kofun period was a critical stage in Japan's evolution toward 
a more cohesive and recognized state. This society was most devel- 
oped in the easternmost part of the Inland Sea (Seto Naikai), and 
its armies established a foothold on the southern tip of Korea. 
Japan's rulers of the time even petitioned the Chinese court for 
confirmation of royal titles; the Chinese, in turn, recognized 
Japanese military control over parts of the Korean Peninsula. The 
earliest written records about Japan are from Chinese sources from 
this period. Wa (the Japanese pronunciation of an early Chinese 
name for Japan) was first mentioned in A.D. 57. Early Chinese 
historians described Wa as a land of hundreds of scattered tribal 
communities, not the unified land with a 700-year tradition as laid 
out in the Nihongi, which puts the foundation of Japan at 660 B.C. 
Third-century Chinese sources reported that the Wa people lived 
on raw vegetables, rice, and fish served on bamboo and wooden 
trays, had vassal-master relations, collected taxes, had provincial 
granaries and markets, clapped their hands in worship (something 
still done in Shinto shrines), had violent succession struggles, built 
earthen grave mounds, and observed mourning. Himiko, a female 
ruler of an early political federation known as Yamatai, flourished 
during the third century. While Himiko reigned as spiritual leader, 
her younger brother carried out affairs of state, which included 
diplomatic relations with the court of the Chinese Wei Dynasty 
(A.D. 220-65). 

The Yamato polity, which emerged in the mid-Kofun period, 
was distinguished by powerful great clans or extended families, each 



6 



Haniwa ship excavated at Osaka in 1988 
Courtesy Asahi Shimbun 

with its dependents. Each clan was headed by a patriarch who per- 
formed sacred rites to the clan's kami to ensure the long-term wel- 
fare of the clan. Clan members were the aristocracy, and the kingly 
line that controlled the Yamato court was at its pinacle. 

By the fifth century A.D., the Yamato court was concentrated 
in Asuka, near modern Nara, and exercised power over clans in 
Kyushu and Honshu, bestowing titles, some hereditary, on clan 
chieftains. The Yamato name became synonomous with all of Japan 
as the Yamato rulers suppressed the clans and acquired agricul- 
tural lands. Based on Chinese models (including the adoption of 
the Chinese written language), they developed a central adminis- 
tration and an imperial court attended by subordinate clan chief- 
tains but with no permanent capital. By the mid- seventh century, 
the agricultural lands had grown to a substantial public domain, 
subject to central policy. The basic administrative unit was the 
county, and society was organized into occupation groups. Most 
people were farmers; other were fishers, weavers, potters, artisans, 
armorers, and ritual specialists. 

More exchange occurred between Japan and the continent of 
Asia late in the Kofun period. Buddhism was introduced from 
Korea, probably in A.D. 538, exposing Japan to a new body of 
religious doctrine. The Soga, a Japanese court family that rose to 



Japan: A Country Study 



prominence with the accession of the Emperor Kimmei about A.D. 
531, favored the adoption of Buddhism and of governmental and 
cultural models based on Chinese Confucianism. But some at the 
Yamato court — such as the Nakatomi family, which was responsi- 
ble for performing Shinto rituals at court, and the Mononobe, a 
military clan — were set on maintaining their prerogatives and re- 
sisted the alien religious influence of Buddhism. The Soga in- 
troduced Chinese-modeled fiscal policies, established the first 
national treasury, and considered the Korean Peninsula a trade 
route rather than an object of territorial expansion. Acrimony con- 
tinued between the Soga and the Nakatomi and Mononobe clans 
for more than a century during which the Soga temporarily emerged 
ascendant. 

The Soga intermarried with the imperial family and by A.D. 
587 Soga Umako, the Soga chieftain, was powerful enough to in- 
stall his nephew as emperor and later to assassinate him and replace 
him with the Empress Suiko. Suiko, the first of eight sovereign 
empresses, was merely a figurehead for Umako and Prince Re- 
gent Shotoku Taishi (A.D. 574-622). Shotoku, recognized as a great 
intellectual of this period of reform, was a devout Buddhist well- 
read in Chinese literature. He was influenced by Confucian prin- 
ciples, including the Mandate of Heaven, which suggested that the 
sovereign ruled at the will of a supreme force. Under Shotoku 's 
direction, Confucian models of rank and etiquette were adopted, 
and his Seventeen Article Constitution (Kenpojushichijd) prescribed 
ways to bring harmony to a society chaotic in Confucian terms. 
In addition, Shotoku adopted the Chinese calendar, developed a 
system of highways, built numerous Buddhist temples, had court 
chronicles compiled, sent students to China to study Buddhism and 
Confucianism, and established formal diplomatic relations with 
China. 

Numerous official missions of envoys, priests, and students were 
sent to China in the seventh century. Some remained twenty years 
or more; many of those who returned became prominent reform- 
ers. In a move greatly resented by the Chinese, Shotoku sought 
equality with the Chinese emperor by addressing a memorial "From 
the Son of Heaven in the Land of the Rising Sun to the Son of 
Heaven of the Land of the Setting Sun." Shotoku 's bold step set 
a precedent: Japan never again accepted a subordinate status in 
its relations with China. Although the missions continued the trans- 
formation of Japan through Chinese influences, the Korean in- 
fluence on Japan declined despite the close connections there had 
been during the early Kofun period. 



8 



Historical Setting 



About twenty years after the deaths of Shotoku (in A.D. 622), 
Soga Umako (in A.D. 626), and Empress Suiko (in A.D. 628), 
court intriques over the succession and the threat of a Chinese in- 
vasion led to a palace coup against the Soga oppression in 645. 
The revolt was led by Prince Naka and Nakatomi Kamatari, who 
seized control of the court from the Soga family and introduced 
the Taika Reform (Taika means great change) to centralize the 
state. 

The Taika Reform — influenced by Chinese practices — started 
with land redistribution, aimed at ending the existing landholding 
system of the great clans and their control over domains and oc- 
cupational groups. What were once called "private lands and pri- 
vate people' ' became ' 'public lands and public people, ' ' as the court 
now sought to assert its control over all of Japan and to make the 
people direct subjects of the throne. Land was no longer heredi- 
tary but reverted to the state at the death of the owner. Taxes were 
levied on harvests and on silk, cotton, cloth, thread, and other 
products. A corvee (labor) tax was established for military conscrip- 
tion and building public works. The hereditary titles of clan chief- 
tains were abolished, and three ministries were established to advise 
the throne (the minister of the left, minister of the right, and minister 
of the center, or chancellor). The country was divided into provinces 
headed by governors appointed by the court, and the provinces 
were further divided into districts and villages. 

Naka assumed the position of minister of the center, and 
Kamatari was granted a new family name — Fujiwara — in recog- 
nition of his great service to the imperial family. Fujiwara Kamatari 
became the first in a long line of court aristocrats. Another, long- 
lasting change was the use of the name Nippon or Nihon (see Glos- 
sary), or sometimes Dai Nippon (Great Japan) in diplomatic docu- 
ments and chronicles. Following the reigns of Naka's uncle and 
mother, Naka assumed the throne as Emperor Tenji in 662, tak- 
ing the additional title tenno (heavenly sovereign). This new title 
was intended to improve the Yamato clan's image and to emphasize 
the divine origins of the imperial family in the hope of keeping it 
above political frays, such as those precipitated by the Soga clan. 
Within the imperial family, however, power struggles continued 
as the emperor's brother and son vied for the throne. The brother, 
who later reigned as Emperor Temmu, consolidated Tenji' s re- 
forms and state power in the imperial court. 

Reforms were further consolidated and codified in A.D. 701 
under the Taiho-ryoritsu (Great Treasure Code, known as the 
Taiho Code), which, except for a few modifications and being 
relegated to primarily ceremonial functions, remained in force until 



9 



Japan: A Country Study 

1868. The Taiho Code provided for Confucian-model penal pro- 
visions (light rather than harsh punishments) and Chinese-style cen- 
tral administration through the Department of Rites, which was 
devoted to Shinto and court rituals, and the Department of State, 
with its eight ministries (for central administration, ceremonies, 
civil affairs, the imperial household, justice, military affairs, peo- 
ple's affairs, and the treasury). A Chinese-style civil service ex- 
amination system based on the Confucian classics was also adopted. 
Tradition circumvented the system, however, as aristocratic birth 
continued to be the main qualification for higher position. The 
Taiho Code did not address the selection of the sovereign. Several 
empresses reigned from the fifth to the eighth centuries, but after 
770 succession was restricted to males, usually from father to son, 
although sometimes to brother or uncle. 

Nara and Heian Periods, A.D. 710-1185 
Economic, Social, and Administrative Developments 

Before the Taiho Code was established, the capital was custo- 
marily moved after the death of an emperor because of the ancient 
belief that a place of death was polluted. Reforms and bureaucra- 
tization of government led to the establishment of a permanent im- 
perial capital at Heijokyo, or Nara, in A.D. 710. (Previously the 
capital had been about twenty-five kilometers south of Nara, in 
and around Asuka, the name given by some historians to the pre- 
Nara period [538-710] and art style.) The capital at Nara, which 
gave its name to the new period (710-94), was styled after the grand 
Chinese Tang Dynasty (618-907) capital at Chang' an and was the 
first truly urban center in Japan. It soon had a population of 
200,000, representing nearly 4 percent of the country's popula- 
tion, and some 10,000 people worked in government jobs. 

Economic and administrative activity increased during the Nara 
period. Roads linked Nara to provincial capitals and taxes were 
collected more efficiendy and routinely. Coins were minted, if not 
widely used. Outside the Nara area, however, there was little com- 
mercial activity, and in the provinces the old Shotoku land reform 
systems declined. By the mid-eighth century, shoen (landed es- 
tates), one of the most important economic institutions in medieval 
Japan, began to rise as a result of the search for a more manag- 
able form of landholding. Local administration gradually became 
more self-sufficient while the breakdown of the old land distri- 
bution system and the rise of taxes led to the loss or abandon- 
ment of land by many people who became the ''wave people," 
or ronin (see Glossary). Some of these formerly "public people" were 



10 



Historical Setting 



privately employed by large landholders, and "public lands" in- 
creasingly reverted to the shoen. 

Factional fighting at the imperial court continued throughout 
the Nara period. Imperial family members, leading court fami- 
lies, such as the Fujiwara, and Buddhist priests all contended for 
influence. In the late Nara period, financial burdens on the state 
increased, and the court began dismissing nonessential officials. 
In 792 universal conscription was abandoned, and district heads 
were allowed to establish private militia forces for local police work. 
Decentralization of authority became the rule despite the reforms 
of the Nara period. Eventually, to return control to imperial hands, 
the capital was moved in 784 to Nagaoka and in 794 to Heiankyo 
(Capital of Peace and Tranquility) or Heian, about twenty- six 
kilometers north of Nara. By the late eleventh century, the city 
was popularly called Kyoto (Capital City), the name it has had 
ever since. 

Cultural Developments and the Establishment of Buddhism 

Some of Japan's literary monuments were written during the 
Nara period including the Kojiki and Nihongi, the first national his- 
tories compiled in 712 and 720 respectively; the Man'yoshu (Col- 
lection of Ten Thousand Leaves), an anthology of poems; and the 
Kaifuso (Fond Recollections of Poetry), an anthology written in 
Chinese by Japanese emperors and princes. Another major cul- 
tural development of the era was the permanent establishment of 
Buddhism in Japan. Buddhism had been introduced in the sixth 
century, but had a mixed reception until the Nara period, when 
it was heartily embraced by the Emperor Shomu. Shomu and his 
Fujiwara consort were fervent Buddhists and actively promoted the 
spread of Buddhism, making it the "guardian of the state" and 
strengthening Japanese institutions through still further Chinese 
acculturation. During Shomu 's reign, the Todaiji (Great East Tem- 
ple) was built and within it was placed the Buddha Dainichi (Great 
Sun Buddha), a sixteen-meter-high, gilt-bronze statue. This Buddha 
was identified with the Sun Goddess, and from this point on a 
gradual syncretism of Buddism and Shinto ensued. Shomu declared 
himself the "Servant of the Three Treasures" of Buddhism: the 
Buddha, the law or teachings of Buddhism, and the Buddhist com- 
munity. 

Although these efforts stopped short of making Buddhism the 
state religion, Nara Buddhism heightened the status of the imperial 
family. Buddhist influence at court increased under the two reigns 
of Shomu 's daughter. As Empress Koken from 749 to 758, she 
brought many Buddhist priests into court. Koken abdicated in 758 



11 



Japan: A Country Study 

on the advice of her cousin, Fujiwara Nakamaro. When the re- 
tired empress came to favor a Buddhist faith healer named Dokyo, 
Nakamaro rose up in arms in 764 but was quickly crushed. Koken 
charged the ruling emperor with colluding with Nakamaro, and 
had him deposed and reascended the throne as Empress Shotoku 
from 764 to 770. It was at this point that she commissioned the 
printing of 1 million prayer charms, many examples of which sur- 
vive, and which were known as the earliest printing in the world 
until an earlier example dating 751 was discovered in Korea in 1966. 
Shotoku had the charms printed to placate the Buddhist clergy. 
She may even have wanted to make Dokyo emperor, but she died 
before she could act. Her actions shocked Nara society and led to 
the exclusion of women from imperial succession and the removal 
of Buddhist priests from positions of political authority. 

Despite such machinations, Buddhism began to spread through- 
out Japan during the ensuing Heian period (794-1 185) primarily 
through two major esoteric sects, Tendai (Heavenly Terrace) and 
Shingon (True Word). Tendai originated in China and is based 
on the Lotus Sutra. Shingon is an indigenous sect with close affilia- 
tions to original Indian, Tibetan, and Chinese Buddhist thought 
founded by Kukai (also called Kobo Daishi), who gready impressed 
the emperors following Emperor Kammu (782-806) and genera- 
tions of Japanese, not only with his holiness, but also with his poetry, 
calligraphy, painting, and sculpture. Kammu himself was a nota- 
ble patron of the otherworldly Tendai sect, which rose to great 
power over the ensuing centuries. A close relationship developed 
between the Tendai monastery complex on Mount Hiei and the 
imperial court in its new capital at the foot of the mountain and, 
as a result, Tendai emphasized great reverence for the emperor 
and the nation. 

The Fujiwara Regency 

When Kammu moved the capital to Heian (Kyoto), which re- 
mained the imperial capital for the next 1 ,000 years, he did so not 
only to strengthen imperial authority but also to improve his seat 
of government geopolitically. Kyoto had good river access to the 
sea and could be reached by land routes from the eastern provinces. 
The early Heian period (794-967) continued Nara culture; the 
Heian capital was patterned on the Chinese capital at Chang' an, 
as was Nara, but on a larger scale. Despite the decline of the Taika- 
Taiho reforms, imperial government was vigorous during the early 
Heian period. Indeed, Kammu 's avoidance of drastic reform 
decreased the intensity of political struggles, and he became recog- 
nized as one of Japan's most forceful emperors. 



12 



The eighth- century Nara Daibutsu, Todaiji 
Courtesy Asahi Shimbun 

Although Kammu had abandoned universal conscription in 792, 
he still waged major military offensives to subjugate the Ainu, a 
north Asian caucasoid people, sometimes referred to as Emishi, 
living in northern and eastern Japan. After making temporary gains 
in 794, in 797 Kammu appointed a new commander under the 
title seii taishogun (barbarian- subduing generalissimo, often referred 
to as shogun). By 801 the shogun had defeated the Ainu and ex- 
tended the imperial domains to the eastern end of Honshu. Im- 
perial control over the provinces was tenuous at best, however, and 
in the ninth and tenth centuries much authority was lost to the great 
families who disregarded the Chinese-style land and tax systems 
imposed by the government in Kyoto. Stability came to Heian 
Japan, but, even though succession was ensured for the imperial 
family through heredity, power again concentrated in the hands 
of one noble family, the Fujiwara. 

Following Kammu 's death in 806 and a succession struggle 
among his sons, two new offices were established in an effort to 
adjust the Taika-Taiho administrative structure. Through the new 
Emperor's Private Office, the emperor could issue administrative 
edicts more directly and with more self-assurance than before. The 
new Metropolitan Police Board replaced the largely ceremonial 
imperial guard units. While these two offices strengthened the 



13 



Japan: A Country Study 



emperor's position temporarily, soon they and other Chinese-style 
structures were bypassed in the developing state. Chinese influence 
effectively ended with the last imperial- sanctioned mission to China 
in 838. Tang China was in a state of decline, and Chinese Bud- 
dhists were severely persecuted, undermining Japanese respect for 
Chinese institutions. Japan began to turn inward. 

As the Soga had taken control of the throne in the sixth cen- 
tury, the Fujiwara by the ninth century had intermarried with the 
imperial family, and one of their members was the first head of 
the Emperor's Private Office. Another Fujiwara became regent for 
his grandson, then a minor emperor, and yet another was appointed 
kanpaku (regent for an adult emperor). Toward the end of the ninth 
century, several emperors tried, but failed, to check the Fujiwara. 
For a time, however, during the reign of Emperor Daigo (897-930), 
the Fujiwara regency was suspended as he ruled directly. 

Nevertheless, the Fujiwara were not demoted by Daigo, but ac- 
tually became stronger during his reign. Central control of Japan 
had continued to decline, and the Fujiwara, along with other great 
families and religious foundations, acquired ever larger shoen and 
greater wealth during the early tenth century. By the early Heian 
period, the shoen had obtained legal status, and the large religious 
establishments sought clear titles in perpetuity, waiver of taxes, 
and immunity from government inspection of the shoen they held. 
Those people who worked the land found it advantageous to transfer 
title to shoen holders in return for a share of the harvest. People 
and lands were increasingly beyond central control and taxation, 
a de facto return to conditions before the Taika Reform. 

Within decades of Daigo' s death, the Fujiwara had absolute con- 
trol over the court. By the year 1000 Fujiwara Michinaga was able 
to enthrone and dethrone emperors at will. Little authority was 
left for traditional officialdom, and government affairs were han- 
dled through the Fujiwara family's private administration. The 
Fujiwara had become what historian George B. Sansom has called 
"hereditary dictators." 

Despite their usurpation of imperial authority, the Fujiwara 
presided over a period of cultural and artistic flowering at the im- 
perial court and among the aristocracy. There was great interest 
in graceful poetry and vernacular literature. Japanese writing had 
long depended on Chinese ideograms (kanji), but these were now 
supplemented by kana, a phonetic Japanese script based on sim- 
plified Chinese ideograms; katakana, a mnemonic device using parts 
of Chinese ideograms; and hiragana, a cursive form of katakana writ- 
ing and an art form in itself (see Arts, ch. 3). Hiragana gave writ- 
ten expression to the spoken word and, with it, to the rise in Japan's 



14 



Historical Setting 



famous vernacular literature, much of it written by court women 
who had not been trained in Chinese as had their male counter- 
parts. Three late tenth-century and early eleventh-century women 
presented their views of life and romance at the Heian court in 
Kagero nikki (The Gossamer Years) by "the mother of Michitsuna, " 
Makura no soshi (The Pillow Book) by Sei Shonagon, and Genji mono- 
gatari (Tale of Genji) — the world's first novel — by Murasaki Shikibu 
(see Literature, ch. 3). Indigenous art also flourished under the 
Fujiwara after centuries of imitating Chinese forms. Vividly colored 
yamato-e (Japanese style) paintings of court life and stories about 
temples and shrines became common in the mid- and late Heian 
periods, setting patterns for Japanese art to this day (see Art, ch. 3). 

As culture flourished, so did decentralization. Whereas the first 
phase of shorn development in the early Heian period had seen the 
opening of new lands and the commending of lands to aristocrats 
and religious institutions, during the second phase patrimonial 
"house governments," as in the old clan system, arose. (In fact, 
the form of the old clan system had remained largely intact within 
the great old centralized government.) New institutions were now 
needed in the face of social, economic, and political changes. The 
Taiho Code lapsed, its institutions relegated to ceremonial func- 
tions. Family administrations now became public institutions. As 
the most powerful family, the Fujiwara governed Japan and de- 
termined the general affairs of state, such as succession to the throne. 
Family and state affairs were thoroughly intermixed, a pattern fol- 
lowed among other families, monasteries, and even the imperial 
family. Land management became the primary occupation of the 
aristocracy, not so much because direct control by the imperial fam- 
ily or central government had declined but more from strong fam- 
ily solidarity and a lack of a sense of Japan as a single nation. 

The Rise of the Military Class 

Under the early courts, when military conscription had been cen- 
trally controlled, military affairs had been taken out of the hands 
of the provincial aristocracy. But as the system broke down after 
792, local power holders again became the primary source of mili- 
tary strength. Shoen holders had access to manpower and, as they 
obtained improved military technology (such as new training 
methods, more powerful bows, armor, horses, and superior swords) 
and faced worsening local conditions in the ninth century, mili- 
tary service became part of shoen life. Not only the shoen, but also 
civil and religious institutions formed private guard units to pro- 
tect themselves. Gradually, the provincial upper class was trans- 
formed into a new military elite based on the ideals of the bushi 



15 



Japan: A Country Study 



(warrior) or samurai (literally, "one who serves"; see The Bushido 
Code, ch. 8). 

Bushi interests were diverse, cutting across old power structures 
to form new associations in the tenth century. Mutual interests, 
family connections, and kinship were consolidated in military groups 
that became part of family administration. In time, large regional 
military families formed around members of the court aristocracy 
who had become prominent provincial figures. These military 
families gained prestige from connections to the imperial court and 
court-granted military tides and access to manpower. The Fujiwara, 
Taira, and Minamoto were among the most prominent families 
supported by the new military class. 

Decline in food production, growth of the population, and com- 
petition for resources among the great families all led to the gradual 
decline of Fujiwara power and gave rise to military disturbances 
in the mid-tenth and eleventh centuries. Members of the Fujiwara, 
Taira, and Minamoto families — all of whom had descended from 
the imperial family — attacked one another, claimed control over 
vast tracts of conquered land, set up rival regimes, and generally 
broke the peace of the Land of the Rising Sun. 

The Fujiwara controlled the throne until the reign of Emperor 
Go-Sanjo (1068-73), the first emperor not born of a Fujiwara 
mother since the ninth century. Go-Sanjo, determined to restore 
imperial control through strong personal rule, implemented reforms 
to curb Fujiwara influence. He also established an office to com- 
pile and validate estate records with the aim of reasserting central 
control. Many shoen were not properly certified, and large land- 
holders, like the Fujiwara, felt threatened with the loss of their lands. 
Go-Sanjo also established the Incho, or Office of the Cloistered 
Emperor, which was held by a succession of emperors who abdi- 
cated to devote themselves to behind-the-scenes governance, or inset 
(cloistered government). 

The Incho filled the void left by the decline of Fujiwara power. 
Rather than being banished, the Fujiwara were mostly retained 
in their old positions of civil dictator and minister of the center 
while being bypassed in decision making. In time, many of the 
Fujiwara were replaced, mosdy by members of the rising Minamoto 
family. While the Fujiwara fell into disputes among themselves and 
formed northern and southern factions, the inset system allowed 
the paternal line of the imperial family to gain influence over the 
throne. The period from 1086 to 1156 was the age of supremacy 
of the Incho and of the rise of the military class throughout the 
country. Military might rather than civil authority dominated the 
government. 



16 



Historical Setting 



A struggle for succession in the mid-twelfth century gave the 
Fujiwara an opportunity to regain their former power. Fujiwara 
Yorinaga sided with the retired emperor in a violent battle in 1 158 
against the heir apparent, who was supported by the Taira and 
Minamoto. In the end, the Fujiwara were destroyed, the old sys- 
tem of government supplanted, and the inset system left powerless 
as bushi took control of court affairs, marking a turning point in 
Japanese history. Within a year, the Taira and Minamoto clashed 
and a twenty-year period of Taira ascendancy began. The Taira 
were seduced by court life and ignored problems in the provinces. 
Finally, Minamoto Yoritomo (1147-99) rose from his headquar- 
ters at Kamakura (in the Kanto region, southwest of modern Tokyo) 
to defeat the Taira, and with them the child emperor they con- 
trolled, in the Genpei War (1180-85). 

Kamakura and Muromachi Periods, 1185-1573 
The Bakufu and the Hojo Regency 

The Kamakura period (1185-1333) marks the transition to the 
Japanese "medieval" era, a nearly 700-year period in which the 
emperor, the court, and the traditional central government were 
left intact, but were largely relegated to ceremonial functions. Civil, 
military, and judicial matters were controlled by the bushi class, 
the most powerful of whom was the de facto national ruler. The 
term feudalism is generally used to describe this period, being ac- 
cepted by scholars as applicable to medieval Japan as well as 
medieval Europe. Both had land-based economies, vestiges of a 
previously centralized state, and a concentration of advanced mili- 
tary technologies in the hands of a specialized fighting class. Lords 
required the loyal services of vassals, who were rewarded with fiefs 
of their own. The fief holders exercised local military rule and public 
power related to the holding of land. This period in Japan differed 
from the old shoen system in its pervasive military emphasis. 

Once Minamoto Yoritomo had consolidated his power, he es- 
tablished a new government at his family home in Kamakura. He 
called his government a bakufu (tent government), but because he 
was given the title sett taishogun by the emperor, it is often referred 
to in Western literature as the shogunate. Yoritomo followed the 
Fujiwara form of house government and had an administrative 
board, a board of retainers, and a board of inquiry. After confis- 
cating Taira estates in central and western Japan, he had the im- 
perial court appoint stewards for the estates and constables for the 
provinces. As shogun, Yoritomo was both the steward and the 
constable- general. The Kamakura bakufu was not a national regime, 



17 



Japan: A Country Study 



however, and although it controlled large tracts of land, there was 
strong resistance to the stewards. The regime continued warfare 
against the Fujiwara in the north, but never brought either the north 
or the west under complete military control. The old court resided 
in Kyoto, continuing to hold the land over which it had jurisdic- 
tion, while newly organized military families were attracted to 
Kamakura. 

Despite a strong beginning, Yoritomo failed to consolidate the 
leadership of his family on a lasting basis. Intrafamily contention 
had long existed within the Minamoto, although Yoritomo had 
eliminated most serious challengers to his authority. When he died 
suddenly in 1 199, his son Yoriie became shogun and nominal head 
of the Minamoto, but Yoriie was unable to control the other eastern 
bushi families. By the early thirteenth century, a regency had been 
established for the shogun by his maternal grandparents — members 
of the Hqjo family, a branch of the Taira that had allied itself with 
the Minamoto in 1 180. Under the Hqjo, the bakufu became power- 
less, and the shogun, often a member of the Fujiwara family or 
even an imperial prince, was merely a figurehead. 

With the protector of the emperor a figurehead himself, strains 
emerged between Kyoto and Kamakura, and in 1221 a war — the 
Jokyu Incident — broke out between the cloistered emperor and the 
Hqjo regent. The Hqjo forces easily won the war, and the imperial 
court was brought under direct bakufu control. The shogun 's con- 
stables gained greater civil powers, and the court was obliged to 
seek Kamakura 's approval for all of its actions. Although deprived 
of political power, the court was allowed to retain extensive estates 
with which to sustain the imperial splendor the bakufu needed to 
help sanction its rule. 

Several significant administrative achievements were made dur- 
ing the Hqjo regency. In 1225 the Council of State was established, 
providing opportunities for other military lords to exercise judi- 
cial and legislative authority at Kamakura. The Hqjo regent presid- 
ed over the council, which was a successful form of collective 
leadership. The adoption of Japan's first military code of law — 
the Joei Code — in 1232 reflected the profound transition from court 
to militarized society. While legal practices in Kyoto were still based 
on 500-year-old Confucian principles, the Joei Code was a highly 
legalistic document that stressed the duties of stewards and con- 
stables, provided means for settling land disputes, and established 
rules governing inheritances. It was clear and concise, stipulated 
punishments for violators of its conditions, and remained in effect 
for the next 635 years. 



18 



Burning of the Sanjo Palace, detail from illustration from 
Heike monogatari (Tale of Heike), thirteenth century 
Courtesy Museum of Fine Arts, Boston 

As might be expected, the literature of the time reflected the un- 
settled nature of the period. The Hojoki (An Account of My Hut) 
describes the turmoil of the period in terms of the Buddhist con- 
cepts of impermanance and the vanity of human projects. The Heike 
monogatari (Tale of the Heike) narrated the rise and fall of the Taira 
(also known as the Heike), replete with tales of wars and samurai 
deeds. A second literary mainstream was the continuation of 
anthologies of poetry in the Shin kokinshu wakashu (New Collection 
of Ancient and Modern Times), of which twenty volumes were 
produced between 1201 and 1205. 

The Flourishing of Buddhism 

In the time of disunity and violence, deepening pessimism in- 
creased the appeal of the search for salvation. Kamakura was the 
age of the great popularization of Buddhism with two new sects, 
Jodo (Pure Land) and Zen (Meditation), dominating the period. 
The old Heian sects had been quite esoteric and more appealing 
to intellectuals than to the masses. The Mount Hiei monasteries 
had become politically powerful but appealed primarily to those 
capable of systematic study of the sect's teachings. This situation 
gave rise to the Jodo sect, based on unconditional faith and devotion 



19 



Japan: A Country Study 



and prayer to Amida Buddha. Zen rejected all temporal and scrip- 
tural authority, stressing moral character rather than intellectual 
attainments, an emphasis that appealed to the military class. Zen 
masters, regarded as embodiments of truth, were turned to by grow- 
ing numbers of the military class. 

Mongol Invasions 

The repulsions of two Mongol invasions were momentous events 
in Japanese history. Japanese relations with China had been ter- 
minated in the mid-ninth century after the deterioration of late Tang 
China and the turning inward of the Heian court. Some commer- 
cial contacts were maintained with southern China in later centu- 
ries, but Japanese pirates made the open seas dangerous. At a time 
when the bakufu had little interest in foreign affairs and ignored 
communications from China and Koryo (as Korea was then known), 
news arrived in 1268 of a new Mongol regime in Beijing. Its leader, 
Khubilai Khan, demanded that the Japanese pay tribute to the new 
Yuan Dynasty (1279-1368) and threatened reprisals if they failed 
to do so. Unused to such threats, Kyoto raised the diplomatic coun- 
ter of Japan's divine origin, rejected the Mongol demands, dis- 
missed the Korean messengers, and started defensive preparations. 
After further unsuccessful entreaties, the first Mongol invasion took 
place in 1274. More than 600 ships carried a combined Mongol, 
Chinese, and Korean force of 23,000 troops armed with catapults, 
combustible missiles, and bows and arrows. In fighting, these sol- 
diers grouped in close cavalry formations against samurai ac- 
customed to one-on-one combat. Local Japanese forces at Hakata, 
on northern Kyushu, defended against the superior mainland force, 
which, after one day of fighting was decimated by the onslaught 
of a sudden typhoon. Khubilai realized that nature, not military 
incompetence, had been the cause of his forces' failure so, in 1281, 
he launched a second invasion. Seven weeks of fighting took place 
in northwestern Kyushu before another typhoon struck, again de- 
stroying the Mongol fleet. 

Although Shinto priests attributed the two defeats of the Mon- 
gols to a "divine wind" (kamikaze), a sign of heaven's special pro- 
tection of Japan, the invasion left a deep impression on the bakufu 
leaders. Long-standing fears of the Chinese threat to Japan were 
reinforced, and the Korean Peninsula became regarded as "an 
arrow pointed at the heart of Japan." The Japanese victory, how- 
ever, gave the bushi a sense of fighting superiority that remained 
with Japan's soldiers until 1945. The victory also convinced the 
bushi of the value of the bakufu form of government. 



20 



Historical Setting 



The Mongol war had been a drain on the economy, and new 
taxes had to be levied to maintain defensive preparations for the 
future. The invasions also caused disaffection among those who 
expected recompense for their help in defeating the Mongols. There 
were no lands or other rewards to be given, however, and such 
disaffection, combined with overextension and the increasing 
defense costs, led to a decline of the Kamakura bakufu. Addition- 
ally, inheritances had divided family properties, and landowners 
increasingly had to turn to moneylenders for support. Roving bands 
of ronin further threatened the stability of the bakufu. 

Civil War 

The Hojo reacted to the ensuing chaos by trying to place more 
power among the various great family clans. To further weaken 
the Kyoto court, the bakufu decided to allow two contending im- 
perial lines — known as the Southern Court or junior line and the 
Northern Court or senior line — to alternate on the throne. The 
method worked for several successions until a member of the 
Southern Court ascended to the throne as Emperor Go-Daigo 
(1318-39). Go-Daigo wanted to overthrow the bakufu and openly 
defied Kamakura by naming his own son his heir. In 1331 the bakufu 
exiled Go-Daigo, but loyalist forces rebelled. They were aided by 
Ashikaga Takauji (1305-58), a constable who turned against 
Kamakura when dispatched to put down Go-Daigo 's rebellion. At 
the same time, another eastern chieftain rebelled against the bakufu, 
which quickly disintegrated, and the Hojo were defeated. 

In the swell of victory, Go-Daigo endeavored to restore imperial 
authority and tenth-century Confucian practices. This period of 
reform, known as the Kemmu Restoration (1333-36), aimed at 
strengthening the position of the emperor and reasserting the pri- 
macy of the court nobles over the bushi. The reality, however, was 
that the forces who had arisen against Kamakura had been set on 
defeating the Hojo, not on supporting the emperor. Ashikaga 
Takauji finally sided with the Northern Court in a civil war against 
the Southern Court represented by Go-Daigo. The long War Be- 
tween the Courts lasted from 1336 to 1392. Early in the conflict, 
Go-Daigo was driven from Kyoto, and the Northern Court con- 
tender was installed by Ashikaga, who became the new shogun. 

Ashikaga Bakufu 

The ensuing period of Ashikaga rule (1336-1573) was called 
Muromachi for the district in which its headquarters were in Kyoto 
after 1378. What distinguished the Ashikaga bakufu from that of 
Kamakura was that, whereas Kamakura had existed in equilibrium 



21 



Japan: A Country Study 

with the Kyoto court, Ashikaga took over the remnants of the im- 
perial government. Nevertheless, the Ashikaga bakufu was not as 
strong as the Kamakura had been and was greatly preoccupied by 
the civil war. Not until the rule of Ashikaga Yoshimitsu (as third 
shogun, 1368-94, and chancellor, 1394-1408) did a semblance of 
order emerge. 

Yoshimitsu allowed the constables, who had had limited pow- 
ers during the Kamakura period, to become strong regional rul- 
ers, later called daimyo (from dai, great, and mydden, named lands). 
In time a balance of power evolved between the shogun and the 
daimyo; the three most prominent daimyo families rotated as deputies 
to the shogun at Kyoto. Yoshimitsu was finally successful in re- 
unifying the Northern and Southern courts in 1392, but, despite 
his promise of greater balance between the imperial lines, the North- 
ern line maintained control over the throne thereafter. The line 
of shoguns gradually weakened after Yoshimitsu and increasingly 
lost power to the daimyo and other regional strongmen. The sho- 
gun' s decisions about imperial succession became meaningless, and 
the daimyo backed their own candidates. In time, the Ashikaga fam- 
ily had its own succession problems, resulting finally in the Onin 
War (1467-77), which left Kyoto devastated and effectively ended 
the national authority of the bakufu. The power vacuum that en- 
sued launched a century of anarchy (see Provincial Wars and For- 
eign Contacts, this ch.). 

Economic and Cultural Developments 

Contact with Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) China was renewed 
during the Muromachi period after the Chinese sought support 
in suppressing Japanese pirates, or wako, who controlled the seas 
and pillaged coastal areas of China. Wanting to improve relations 
with China and to rid Japan of the wako threat, Yoshimitsu ac- 
cepted a relationship with the Chinese that was to last for half a 
century. Japanese wood, sulfur, copper ore, swords, and folding 
fans were traded for Chinese silk, porcelain, books, and coins in 
what the Chinese considered tribute but the Japanese saw as profit- 
able trade. 

During the time of the Ashikaga bakufu, a new national culture, 
called Muromachi culture, emerged from the bakufu headquarters 
in Kyoto to reach all levels of society. Zen Buddhism played a large 
role in spreading not only religious but also artistic influences, es- 
pecially those derived from Chinese painting of the Chinese Song 
(960-1279), Yuan, and Ming dynasties. The proximity of the im- 
perial court and the bakufu resulted in a comingling of imperial fam- 
ily members, courtiers, daimyo, samurai, and Zen priests. Art of 



22 



Historical Setting 



all kinds, architecture, literature, No drama, comedy, poetry, the 
tea ceremony, landscape gardening, and flower arranging, all 
flourished during Muromachi times. 

There also was renewed interest in Shinto, which had quietly 
coexisted with Buddhism during the centuries of the latter' s 
predominance. In fact, Shinto, which lacked its own scriptures and 
had few prayers, as a result of syncretic practices begun in the Nara 
period had widely adopted Shingon Buddhist rituals and, between 
the eighth and fourteenth centuries, was nearly totally absorbed 
by Buddhism and became known as Ryobu Shinto (Dual Shinto) . 
The Mongol invasions in the late thirteenth century, however, had 
evoked a national consciousness of the role of the kamikaze in defeat- 
ing the enemy. Less than fifty years later (1339-43), Kitabatake 
Chikafusa (1293-1354), the chief commander of the Southern Court 
forces, wrote the Jinno shoto ki (Chronicle of the Direct Descent of 
the Divine Sovereigns). This chronicle emphasized the importance 
of maintaining the divine descent of the imperial line from Ama- 
terasu to the current emperor, a condition that gave Japan a spe- 
cial national polity (kokutai). Besides reenforcing the concept of the 
emperor as a deity, the Jinno shoto ki provided a Shinto view of his- 
tory, which stressed the divine nature of all Japanese and the coun- 
try's spiritual supremacy over China and India. As a result, a 
change gradually occurred in the balance between the dual 
Buddhist- Shinto religious practice. Between the fourteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, Shinto reemerged as the primary belief sys- 
tem, developed its own philosophy and scripture (based on Con- 
fucian and Buddhist canons), and became a powerful nationalistic 
force. 

Provincial Wars and Foreign Contacts 

The Onin War led to serious political fragmentation and obliter- 
ation of domains: a great struggle for land and power ensued among 
bushi chieftains until the mid-sixteenth century. Peasants rose against 
their landlords and samurai against their overlords as central con- 
trol virtually ceased. The imperial house was left impoverished, 
and the bakufu was controlled by contending chieftains in Kyoto. 
The provincial domains that emerged after the Onin War were 
smaller and easier to control. Many new small daimyo arose from 
among the samurai who had overthrown their great overlords. 
Border defenses were improved and well-fortified castle towns began 
to be built to protect the newly opened domains, for which land 
surveys were made, roads built, and mines opened. New house 
laws provided practical means of administration, stressing duties 
and rules of behavior. Emphasis was put on success in war, estate 



23 



Japan: A Country Study 

management, and finance. Threatening alliances were guarded 
against through strict marriage rules. Aristocratic society was over- 
whelmingly military in character, the rest of society controlled in 
a system of vassalage. The shoen were obliterated, and court no- 
bles and absentee landlords were dispossessed. The new daimyo 
directly controlled the land, keeping the peasantry in permanent 
serfdom in exchange for protection. 

Most wars of the period were short and localized, though they 
occurred throughout Japan. By 1500 the entire country was en- 
gulfed in civil wars. Rather than disrupting the local economies, 
however, the frequent movement of armies stimulated the growth 
of transportation and communications, which in turn provided ad- 
ditional revenues from customs and tolls. To avoid such fees, com- 
merce shifted to the central region, which no daimyo had been able 
to control, and to the Inland Sea. Economic developments and the 
desire to protect trade achievements brought about the establish- 
ment of merchant and artisan guilds. 

By the end of the Muromachi period, the first Europeans had 
arrived. The Portuguese landed in southern Kyoshu in 1543 and 
within two years were making regular port calls. The Spanish ar- 
rived in 1587, followed by the Dutch in 1609. The Japanese began 
to attempt studies of European civilization in depth, and new op- 
portunities were presented for the economy along with serious po- 
litical challenges. European firearms, fabrics, glassware, clocks, 
tobacco, and other Western innovations were traded for Japanese 
gold and silver. Wealth was accumulated on a major scale through 
trade, and lesser daimyo, especially in Kyushu, greatiy increased 
their power. Provincial wars were made more deadly with the in- 
troduction of firearms, such as muskets and cannons, and greater 
use of infantry. 

Christianity had an impact on Japan, largely through the efforts 
of the Jesuits, led first by Saint Francis Xavier (1506-52), who ar- 
rived in Kagoshima in southern Kyushu in 1549. Both daimyo and 
merchants seeking better trade arrangements as well as peasants 
were among the converts. By 1560 Kyoto had become another 
major area of missionary activity in Japan. In 1568 the port of 
Nagasaki was established by a Christian daimyo, and turned over 
to Jesuit administration in 1579. By 1582 there were as many as 
150,000 converts (2 percent of the population) and 200 churches. 
But bakufu tolerance for this alien influence diminished as the coun- 
try became more unified and the openness of the period decreased. 
Proscriptions against Christianity began in 1587 and outright perse- 
cutions in 1597. Although foreign trade was still encouraged, it 
was closely regulated, and by 1640 the exclusion and suppression 



24 



Historical Setting 



of Christianity had become national policy (see Tokugawa Period, 
1600-1867, this ch.; Religious and Philosophical Traditions, ch. 2). 

Reunification, 1573-1600 

Between 1560 and 1600, powerful military leaders arose to defeat 
the warring daimyo and unify Japan. Three major figures dominated 
the period in succession: Oda Nobunaga (1534-82), Toyotomi 
Hideyoshi (1536-98), and Tokugawa Ieyasu (1542-1616), each of 
whom emerged as a major overlord with large military forces under 
his command. As their power increased, they looked to the im- 
perial court in Kyoto for sanction. In 1568 Nobunaga, who had 
defeated another overlord's attempt to attack Kyoto in 1560, 
marched on the capital, gained the support of the emperor, and 
installed his own candidate in the succession struggle for shogun. 
Backed by military force, Nobunaga was able to control the bakufu. 

Initial resistance to Nobunaga in the Kyoto region came from 
the Buddhist monks, rival daimyo, and hostile merchants. Sur- 
rounded by his enemies, Nobunaga struck first at the secular power 
of the militant Tendai Buddhists, destroying their monastic center 
at Mount Hiei near Kyoto and killing thousands of monks in 1571 . 
By 1573 he had defeated the local daimyo, banished the last Ashikaga 
shogun, and ushered in what historians call the Azuchi-Momoyama 
period (1573-1600), named after the castles of Nobunaga and 
Hideyoshi. Having taken these major steps toward reunification, 
Nobunaga then built a seven- story castle surrounded by stone walls 
at Azuchi on the shore of Lake Biwa. The castle was able to with- 
stand firearms and became a symbol of the age of reunification. 
Nobunaga' s power increased as he enfeoffed the conquered daimyo, 
broke down the barriers to free commerce, and drew the humbled 
religious communities and merchants into his military structure. 
He secured control of about one-third of the provinces through the 
use of large-scale warfare and he institutionalized administrative prac- 
tices, such as systematic village organization, tax collection, and stan- 
dardized measurements. At the same time, other daimyo, both those 
Nobunaga had conquered and those beyond his control, built their 
own heavily fortified castles and modernized their garrisons. In 1577 
Nobunaga dispatched his chief general, Hideyoshi, to conquer twelve 
western Honshu provinces. The war was a protracted affair, and 
in 1582, when Nobunaga led an army to assist Hideyoshi, he was 
assassinated. 

After destroying the forces responsible for Nobunaga' s death, 
Hideyoshi was rewarded with a joint guardianship of Nobunaga' s 
heir, who was a minor. By 1584 Hideyoshi had eliminated the three 
other guardians, taken complete control of Kyoto, and become the 



25 



Japan: A Country Study 



undisputed successor of his late overlord. A commoner by birth 
and without a surname, Hideyoshi was adopted by the Fujiwara 
family, given the surname Toyotomi, and granted the tide kanpaku, 
representing civil and military control of all Japan. By the follow- 
ing year, he had secured alliances with three of the nine major daimyo 
coalitions and continued the war of reunification in Shikoku and 
northern Kyushu. In 1590, with an army of 200,000 troops, 
Hideyoshi defeated his last formidable rival, who controlled the 
Kanto region of eastern Honshu. The remaining contending daimyo 
capitulated, and the military reunification of Japan was complete. 

All of Japan was controlled by the dictatorial Hideyoshi either 
directly or through his sworn vassals, and a new national govern- 
ment structure had evolved: a country unified under one daimyo 
alliance but still decentralized. The basis of the power structure 
was again the distribution of territory. A new unit of land mea- 
surement and assessment — the koku — was instituted. One koku was 
equivalent to about 180 liters of rice; daimyo were by definition those 
who held lands capable of producing 10,000 koku or more of rice. 
Hideyoshi personally controlled 2 million of the 18.5 million koku 
total national assessment (taken in 1598). Tokugawa Ieyasu, a pow- 
erful central Honshu daimyo (not completely under Hideyoshi' s con- 
trol), held 2.5 million koku. 

Despite Hideyoshi 's tremendous strength and the fear in which 
he was held, his position was far from secure. He attempted to re- 
arrange the daimyo holdings to his advantage, for example, reas- 
signing the Tokugawa family to the conquered Kanto region and 
surrounding their new territory with more trusted vassals. He also 
adopted a hostage system for daimyo wives and heirs at his castle 
town at Osaka and used marriage alliances to enforce feudal bonds. 
He imposed the koku system and land surveys to reassess the en- 
tire nation. In 1590 Hideyoshi declared an end to any further class 
mobility or change in social status, reinforcing the class distinc- 
tions between cultivators and bushi (only the latter could bear arms). 
He provided for an orderly succession in 1591 by taking the title 
taiko, or retired kanpaku, turning the regency over to his son 
Hideyori. Only toward the end of his life did Hideyoshi try to for- 
malize the balance of power by establishing the five-member Board 
of Regents (one of them Ieyasu), sworn to keep peace and support 
the Toyotomi, the five-member Board of House Administrators 
for routine policy and administrative matters, and the three-member 
Board of Mediators, who were charged with keeping peace between 
the first two boards. 

Momoyama art (1573-1615), named after the hill on which 
Hideyoshi built his castle at Fushima, south of Kyoto, flourished 



26 



Historical Setting 



during this period. It was a period of interest in the outside world, 
the development of large urban centers, and the rise of the mer- 
chant and leisure classes. Ornate castle architecture and interiors 
adorned with painted screens embellished with gold leaf reflected 
daimyo power and wealth of the period. Depictions of the "southern 
barbarians" — Europeans — were exotic and popular. 

In 1577 Hideyoshi had seized Nagasaki, Japan's major point 
of contact with the outside world. He took control of the various 
trade associations and tried to regulate all overseas activities. 
Although China rebuffed his efforts to secure trade concessions, 
Hideyoshi succeeded in sending commercial missions to the Philip- 
pines, Malaya, and Siam (present-day Thailand). He was suspi- 
cious of Christianity, however, as potentially subversive to daimyo 
loyalties and he had some missionaries crucified. 

Hideyoshi' s major ambition was to conquer China, and in 1592, 
with an army of 200,000 troops, he invaded Korea, then a Chinese 
vassal state. His armies quickly overran the peninsula before los- 
ing momentum in the face of a combined Korean-Chinese force. 
During peace talks Hideyoshi demanded a division of Korea, free- 
trade status, and a Chinese princess as consort for the emperor. 
The equality with China sought by Japan was rebuffed by the 
Chinese and peace efforts ended. In 1597 a second invasion was 
begun, but it abruptly ended with Hideyoshi 's death in 1598. 

Tokugawa Period, 1600-1867 
Rule of Shogun and Daimyo 

An evolution had taken place in the centuries from the time of 
the Kamakura bakufu, which existed in equilibrium with the im- 
perial court, to the Tokugawa, when the bushi became the un- 
challenged rulers in what historian Edwin O. Reischauer has called 
a ''centralized feudal" form of government. Instrumental in the 
rise of the new bakufu was Tokugawa Ieyasu, the main beneficiary 
of the achievements of Nobunaga and Hideyoshi. Already power- 
ful, Ieyasu profited by his transfer to the rich Kanto area. He main- 
tained 2.5 million koku of land, had a new headquarters at Edo, 
a strategically situated castle town (the future Tokyo), and had an 
additional 2 million koku of land and thirty-eight vassals under his 
control. After Hideyoshi 's death, Ieyasu moved quickly to seize 
control from the Toyotomi family. 

Ieyasu 's victory over the western daimyo at the Battle of Sekiga- 
hara (1600) gave him virtual control of all Japan. He rapidly 
abolished numerous enemy daimyo houses, reduced others, such 
as that of the Toyotomi, and redistributed the spoils of war to his 



27 



Japan: A Country Study 

family and allies. Ieyasu still failed to achieve complete control of 
the western daimyo, but his assumption of the title of shogun helped 
consolidate the alliance system. After further strengthening his 
power base, Ieyasu was confident enough to install his son Hidetada 
(1579-1632) as shogun and himself as retired shogun in 1605. The 
Toyotomi were still a significant threat, and Ieyasu devoted the 
next decade to their eradication. In 1615 the Toyotomi stronghold 
at Osaka was destroyed by the Tokugawa army. 

The Tokugawa (or Edo) period brought 200 years of stability 
to Japan. The political system evolved into what historians call 
bakuhan, a combination of the terms bakufu and han (domains) to 
describe the government and society of the period. In the bakuhan, 
the shogun had national authority and the daimyo had regional 
authority, a new unity in the feudal structure, which had an in- 
creasingly large bureaucracy to administer the mixture of central- 
ized and decentralized authorities. The Tokugawa became more 
powerful during their first century of rule: land redistribution gave 
them nearly 7 million koku, control of the most important cities, 
and a land assessment system reaping great revenues. 

The feudal hierarchy was completed by the various classes of 
daimyo. Closest to the Tokugawa house were the shinpan or "re- 
lated houses." They were twenty-three daimyo on the borders of 
Tokugawa lands, daimyo all direcdy related to Ieyasu. The shinpan 
held mostly honorary titles and advisory posts in the bakufu. The 
second class of the hierarchy were the fudai, or "house daimyo" 
rewarded with lands close to the Tokugawa holdings for their faithful 
service. By the eighteenth century, 145 fudai controlled such smaller 
han, the greatest assessed at 250,000 koku. Members of the fudai 
class staffed most of the major bakufu offices. Ninety-seven han 
formed the third group, the tozama (outside vassals), former oppo- 
nents or new allies. The tozama were located mostly on the periph- 
eries of the archipelago and collectively controlled nearly 10 million 
koku of productive land. Because the tozama were least trusted of 
the daimyo, they were the most cautiously managed and gener- 
ously treated, although they were excluded from central govern- 
ment positions. 

The Tokugawa not only consolidated their control over a reuni- 
fied Japan, they also had unprecedented power over the emperor, 
the court, all daimyo, and the religious orders. The emperor was 
held up as the ultimate source of political sanction for the shogun, 
who ostensibly was the vassal of the imperial family. The Tokugawa 
helped the imperial family recapture its old glory by rebuilding its 
palaces and granting it new lands. To ensure a close tie between 



28 



The six-story Himeji Castle, built in 1601-9, considered one of the 
grandest of the surviving castles, Hyogo Prefecture 
Courtesy Eliot Frankeherger 

the imperial clan and the Tokugawa family, Ieyasu's granddaughter 
was made an imperial consort in 1619. 

A code of laws was established to regulate the daimyd houses. The 
code encompassed private conduct, marriage, dress, and types of 
weapons and numbers of troops allowed; required alternate-year resi- 
dence at Edo; prohibited the construction of ocean-going ships; 
proscribed Christianity; and stipulated that bakufu regulations were 
the national law. Although the daimyd were not taxed per se, they 
were regularly levied for contributions for military and logistical sup- 
port and such public works projects as castles, roads, bridges, and 
palaces. The various regulations and levies not only strengthened 
the Tokugawa but depleted the wealth of the daimyd, thus weaken- 
ing their threat to the central administration. The han, once military- 
centered domains, became mere local administrative units. The dai- 
myd did have full administrative control over their territory and com- 
plex systems of retainers, bureaucrats, and commoners. Loyalty was 
exacted from religious foundations, already greatly weakened by 
Nobunaga and Hideyoshi, through a variety of control mechanisms. 

Seclusion and Social Control 

Like Hideyoshi, Ieyasu encouraged foreign trade but also was 



29 



Japan: A Country Study 

suspicious of outsiders. He wanted to make Edo a major port, but 
once he learned that the Europeans favored ports in Kyushu and 
that China had rejected his plans for official trade, he moved to 
control existing trade and allowed only certain ports to handle spe- 
cific kinds of commodities. 

The ' ' Christian problem" was, in effect, a problem in control- 
ling both the Christian daimyo in Kyushu and trade with the Euro- 
peans. By 1612 the shogun's retainers and residents of Tokugawa 
lands had been ordered to foreswear Christianity. More restric- 
tions came in 1616 (the restriction of foreign trade to Nagasaki and 
Hirado, an island northwest of Kyushu), 1622 (the execution of 
120 missionaries and converts), 1624 (the expulsion of the Span- 
ish), and 1629 (the execution of thousands of Christians). Finally, 
in 1635, an edict prohibited any Japanese from traveling outside 
Japan or, if someone left, from ever returning. In 1636 the Por- 
tuguese were restricted to Deshima, a man-made islet — and thus, 
not true Japanese soil — in Nagasaki's harbor. 

The Shimabara Rebellion of 1637-38, in which discontented 
Christian samurai and peasants rebelled against the bakufu — and 
Edo called in Dutch ships to bombard the rebel stronghold — marked 
the end of the Christian movement. Soon thereafter the Portuguese 
were permanently expelled, members of the Portuguese diplomatic 
mission were executed, all subjects were ordered to register at a 
Buddhist or Shinto temple, and the Dutch and Chinese were re- 
stricted respectively to Deshima and a special quarter in Nagasaki. 
Besides small trade of some outer daimyo with Korea and the Ryukyu 
Islands, to the southwest of Japan's main islands, by 1641 foreign 
contacts were limited to Nagasaki. 

Japanese society of the Tokugawa period was influenced by Con- 
fucian principles of social order. At the top of the hierarchy, but 
removed from political power, were the imperial court families at 
Kyoto. The real political power holders were the samurai followed 
by the rest of society, in descending hierarchical order: farmers, 
who were organized into villages, artisans, and merchants. Urban 
dwellers, often well-to-do merchants, were known as chonin (towns- 
people) and confined to special districts. The individual had no 
legal rights in Tokugawa Japan. The family was the smallest legal 
entity, and the maintenance of family status and privileges was of 
great importance at all levels of society. 

Economic Development 

Economic development during the Tokugawa period included 
urbanization, more shipping of commodities, a significant expan- 
sion of domestic and, initially, foreign commerce, and a diffusion 



30 



Historical Setting 



of trade and handicraft industries. Edo had a population of more 
than 1 million and Osaka and Kyoto each had more than 400,000 
inhabitants by the mid-eighteenth century. Many other castie towns 
grew as well. Osaka and Kyoto became busy trading and handicraft 
production centers while Edo was the center for the supply of food 
and essential urban consumer goods. The construction trades 
flourished along with banking facilities and merchant associations. 
Increasingly, han authorities oversaw the rising agricultural produc- 
tion and the spread of rural handicrafts. 

Intellectual Trends 

The flourishing of neo-Confucianism was the major intellectual 
development of the Tokugawa period. Confucian studies had long 
been kept active in Japan by Buddhist clerics, but during the 
Tokugawa period, Confucianism emerged from Buddhist religious 
control. This system of thought increased attention to a secular view 
of man and society. The ethical humanism, rationalism, and histor- 
ical perspective of neo-Confucian doctrine appealed to the official 
class, and by the mid-seventeenth century, it was Japan's dominant 
legal philosophy and contributed direcdy to the development of the 
kokugaku (national learning) school of thought. 

Advanced studies and growing applications of neo-Confucianism 
contributed to the transition of the social and political order from 
feudal norms to class-and large- group-oriented practices. The rule 
of the people or Confucian man was gradually replaced by the rule 
of laws. New laws were developed and new administrative devices 
were instituted. A new theory of government and a new vision of 
society emerged as a means of justifying more comprehensive gover- 
nance by the bakufu. Each person had a distinct place in society and 
was expected to work to fulfill his mission in life. The people were 
to be ruled with benevolence by those whose assigned duty it was 
to rule. Government was all-powerful but responsible and humane. 
Although the class system was influenced by neo-Confucianism, it 
was not identical to it. Whereas soldiers and clergy were at the bot- 
tom of the hierarchy in the Chinese model, in Japan some mem- 
bers of these classes constituted the ruling elite. 

Members of the samurai class adhered to bushi traditions with a 
renewed interest in Japanese history and cultivating the ways of Con- 
fucian scholar- administrators, resulting in the development of the 
concept of bushido (the way of the warrior — see Glossary). Another 
special way of life — chonindo — also emerged. Chonindo (the way of 
the townspeople) was a distinct culture that arose in cities such as 
Osaka, Kyoto, and Edo. It encouraged aspiration to bushido 
qualities — diligence, honesty, honor, loyalty, and frugality — while 



31 



Japan: A Country Study 

blending Shinto, neo-Confucian, and Buddhist beliefs. Study of 
mathematics, astronomy, cartography, engineering, and medicine 
were also encouraged. Emphasis was placed on quality of work- 
manship, especially in the arts. For the first time, urban popula- 
tions had the means and leisure time to support a new mass culture. 
Their search for enjoyment became known as ukiyo (the floating 
world), an ideal world of fashion and popular entertainment. Profes- 
sional female entertainers (geisha), music, popular stories, Kabuki 
and bunraku (puppet) theater, poetry, a rich literature, and art, ex- 
emplified by beautiful woodblock prints (known as ukiyo-e), were 
all part of this flowering culture (see Visual Arts, ch. 3). Litera- 
ture also flourished with the talented examples of the playwright 
Chikamatsu Monzaemon (1653-1724) and the poet, essayist, and 
travel writer Matsuo Basho (1644-94). 

Buddhism and Shinto were both still important in Tokugawa 
Japan. Buddhism, combined with neo-Confucianism, provided 
standards of social behavior. Although not as powerful politically 
as it had been in the past, Buddhism was espoused by the upper 
classes. Proscriptions against Christianity benefited Buddhism in 
1640 when the bakufu ordered everyone to register at a temple. The 
rigid separation of Tokugawa society into han, villages, wards, and 
households helped reaffirm local Shinto attachments. Shinto pro- 
vided spiritual support to the political order and was an important 
tie between the individual and his community. Shinto also helped 
preserve a sense of national identity. 

Shinto eventually assumed an intellectual form as shaped by neo- 
Confucian rationalism and materialism. The kokugaku movement 
emerged from the interactions of these two belief systems. Kokugaku 
contributed to the emperor-centered nationalism of modern Japan 
and the revival of Shinto as a national creed in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. The Kojiki, Nihongi, and Man'yoshu were all 
studied anew in the search for the Japanese spirit. Some purists in 
the kokugaku movement even criticized the Confucian and Buddhist 
influences — in effect, foreign ones — for contaminating Japan's an- 
cient ways. Japan was the land of the kami and, as such, had a spe- 
cial destiny. 

Knowledge of the West during the early Tokugawa was restricted 
to a tiny school of thought known as Rangaku (Dutch Learning). 
Its adherents were mostly in Nagasaki, where the Dutch outpost 
was located on Deshima Island. 

Decline of the Tokugawa 

The Tokugawa did not eventually collapse simply because of in- 
trinsic failures. Foreign intrusions helped to precipitate a complex 



32 



Historical Setting 



political struggle between the bakufu and a coalition of its critics. 
The continuity of the anti-bakufu movement in the mid-nineteenth 
century would finally bring down the Tokugawa. From the out- 
set, the Tokugawa attempted to restrict families' accumulation of 
wealth and fostered a "back to the soil" policy, in which the farmer, 
the ultimate producer, was the ideal person in society. Despite these 
efforts to restrict wealth, and partly because of the extraordinary 
period of peace, the standard of living for urban and rural dwellers 
alike grew significantiy during the Tokugawa period. Better means 
of crop production, transportation, housing, food, and entertain- 
ment were all available, as was more leisure time, at least for urban 
dwellers. The literacy rate was high for a preindustrial society, and 
cultural values were redefined and widely imparted throughout the 
samurai and chonin classes. Despite the reappearance of guilds, eco- 
nomic activities went well beyond the restrictive nature of the guilds, 
and commerce spread and a money economy developed. Although 
government heavily restricted the merchants and viewed them as 
unproductive and usurious members of society, the samurai, who 
gradually became separated from their rural ties, depended greatly 
on the merchants and artisans for consumer goods, artistic interests, 
and loans. In this way, a subtle subversion of the warrior class by 
the chonin took place. 

A struggle arose in the face of political limitations that the shogun 
imposed on the entrepreneurial class. The government ideal of an 
agrarian society failed to square with the reality of commercial dis- 
tribution. A huge government bureaucracy had evolved, which now 
stagnated because of its discrepancy with a new and evolving so- 
cial order. Compounding the situation, the population increased 
significantly during the first half of the Tokugawa period. Although 
the magnitude and growth rates are uncertain, there were at least 
26 million commoners and about 4 million members of samurai 
families and their attendants when the first nationwide census was 
taken in 1721. Drought, followed by crop shortages and starva- 
tion, resulted in twenty great famines between 1675 and 1837. 
Peasant unrest grew, and by the late eighteenth century, mass pro- 
tests over taxes and food shortages had become commonplace. New- 
ly landless families became tenant farmers while the displaced rural 
poor moved into the cities. As the fortunes of previously well-to- 
do families declined, others moved in to accumulate land, and a 
new, wealthy farming class emerged. Those people who benefited 
were able to diversify production and to hire laborers, while others 
were left discontented. Many samurai fell on hard times and were 
forced into handicraft production and wage jobs for merchants. 



33 



Japan: A Country Study 

Western intrusions were on the increase in early nineteenth cen- 
tury. Russian warships and traders encroached on Karafuto (today 
the Soviet island of Sakhalin) and the Kuril Islands, the southern- 
most of which are considered by the Japanese as the northern islands 
of Hokkaido. A British warship entered Nagasaki Harbor search- 
ing for enemy Dutch ships in 1808, and other warships and whal- 
ers were seen in Japanese waters with increasing frequency in the 
1810s and 1820s. Whalers and trading ships from the United States 
also arrived on Japan's shores. Although the Japanese made some 
minor concessions and allowed some landings, they largely at- 
tempted to keep all foreigners out, sometimes using force. Ran- 
gaku became crucial not only in understanding the foreign 
£ 'barbarians" but in using the knowledge gained from the West 
to fend them off. 

By the 1830s, there was a general sense of crisis. Famines and 
natural disasters hit hard, and unrest led to a peasant uprising 
against officials and merchants in Osaka in 1837. Although it lasted 
only a day, the uprising made a dramatic impression. Remedies 
came in the form of traditional solutions that sought to reform moral 
decay rather than institutional problems. The shogun's advisers 
pushed for a return to the martial spirit, more restrictions on for- 
eign trade and contacts, suppression of Rangaku, censorship of liter- 
ature, and elimination of "luxury" in the government and samurai 
class. Others sought the overthrow of the Tokugawa and espoused 
the political doctrine of sonnd-joi (revere the emperor, expel the bar- 
barians), which called for unity under imperial rule and opposed 
foreign intrusions. The bakufu persevered for the time being amidst 
growing concerns over Western successes in establishing colonial 
enclaves in China following the Opium War of 1839-42. More re- 
forms were ordered, especially in the economic sector, to strengthen 
Japan against the Western threat. 

Japan turned down a demand from the United States, which 
was greatly expanding its own presence in the Asia-Pacific region, 
to establish diplomatic relations when Commodore James Biddle 
appeared in Edo Bay with two warships in July 1846. However, 
when Commodore Matthew C. Perry's four-ship squadron ap- 
peared in Edo Bay in July 1853, the bakufu was thrown into tur- 
moil. The chairman of the senior councillors, Abe Masahiro 
(1819-57), was responsible for dealing with the Americans. Hav- 
ing no precedent to manage this threat to national security, Abe 
tried to balance the desires of the senior councillors to compromise 
with the foreigners, of the emperor who wanted to keep the foreign- 
ers out, and of the daimyo who wanted to go to war. Lacking con- 
sensus, Abe decided to compromise by accepting Perry's demands 



34 



Historical Setting 



for opening Japan to foreign trade while also making military prepa- 
rations. In March 1854, the Treaty of Peace and Amity (or Treaty 
of Kanagawa) opened two ports to American ships seeking provi- 
sions, guaranteed good treatment to shipwrecked American sailors, 
and allowed a United States consul to take up residence in Shimoda, 
a seaport on the Izu Peninsula, southwest of Edo. A commercial 
treaty, opening still more areas to American trade, was forced on 
the bakufu five years later. 

The resulting damage to the bakufu was significant. Debate over 
government policy was unusual and had engendered public cri- 
ticism of the bakufu. In the hope of enlisting the support of new 
allies, Abe, to the consternation of the fudai, had consulted with 
the shinpan and tozama daimyd, further undermining the already 
weakened bakufu. In the Ansei Reform (1854-56), Abe then tried 
to strengthen the regime by ordering Dutch warships and arma- 
ments from the Netherlands and building new port defenses. In 
1855 a naval training school with Dutch instructors was set up at 
Nagasaki, and a We stern- style military school was established at 
Edo; by the next year, the government was translating Western 
books. Opposition to Abe increased within fudai circles, which op- 
posed opening bakufu councils to tozama daimyd, and he was replaced 
in 1855 as chairman of the senior councillors by Hotta Masayoshi 
(1810-64). 

At the head of the dissident faction was Tokugawa Nariaki, who 
had long embraced a militant loyalty to the emperor along with 
antiforeign sentiments, and who had been put in charge of national 
defense in 1854. The Mito school — based on neo-Confucian and 
Shinto principles — had as its goal the restoration of the imperial 
institution, the turning back of the West, and the founding of a 
world empire under the divine Yamato Dynasty. 

In the final years of the Tokugawa, foreign contacts increased 
as more concessions were granted . The new treaty with the United 
States in 1859 allowed more ports to be opened to diplomatic 
representatives, unsupervised trade at four additional ports, and 
foreign residences in Osaka and Edo. It also embodied the con- 
cept of extraterritoriality (foreigners were subject to the laws of their 
own countries but not to Japanese law). Hotta lost the support of 
key daimyd, and when Tokugawa Nariaki opposed the new treaty, 
Hotta sought imperial sanction. The court officials, perceiving the 
weakness of the bakufu, rejected Hotta' s request and thus suddenly 
embroiled Kyoto and the emperor in Japan's internal politics for 
the first time in many centuries. When the shogun died without 
an heir, Nariaki appealed to the court for support of his own son, 
Tokugawa Yoshinobu (or Keiki), for shogun, a candidate favored 



35 



Japan: A Country Study 

by the shinpan and tozama daimyb. The fudai won the power strug- 
gle, however, installing Tokugawa Yoshitomi, arresting Nariaki 
and Keiki, executing Yoshida Shoin (1830-59, a leading sonnb-jbi 
intellectual who had opposed the American treaty and plotted a 
revolution against the bakufu), and signing treaties with the United 
States and five other nations, thus ending more than 200 years of 
exclusion. 

The strong measures the bakufu took to reassert its dominance 
were not enough. Revering the emperor as a symbol of unity, ex- 
tremists wrought violence and death against the bakufu and han 
authorities and foreigners. Foreign naval retaliation led to still 
another concessionary commercial treaty in 1865, but Yoshitomi 
was unable to enforce the Western treaties. A bakufu army was 
defeated when it was sent to crush dissent in Satsuma and Choshu 
han in 1866. Finally, in 1867, the emperor died and was succeeded 
by his minor son Mutsuhito; Keiki reluctantly became head of the 
Tokugawa house and shogun. He tried to reorganize the govern- 
ment under the emperor while preserving the shogun 's leadership 
role. Fearing the growing power of the Satsuma and Choshu daimyb, 
other daimyo called for returning the shogun 's political power 
to the emperor and a council of daimyo chaired by the former 
Tokugawa shogun. Keiki accepted the plan in late 1867 and 
resigned, announcing an "imperial restoration." The Satsuma, 
Choshu, and other han leaders and radical courtiers, however, 
rebelled, seized the imperial palace, and announced their own resto- 
ration on January 3, 1868. The bakufu was abolished, Keiki was 
reduced to the ranks of the common daimyb, and the Tokugawa 
army gave up without a fight (although other Tokugawa forces 
fought until November 1868, and bakufu naval forces continued 
to hold out for another six months). 

The Emergence of Modern Japan, 1868-1919 
The Meiji Restoration 

Those people who wanted to end Tokugawa rule did not envi- 
sion a new government or a new society; they merely sought the 
transfer of power from Edo to Kyoto while retaining all their feudal 
prerogatives. Instead, a profound change took place. The emperor 
emerged as a national symbol of unity in the midst of reforms that 
were much more radical than had been envisioned. 

The first reform was the promulgation of the Charter Oath in 
1868, a general statement of the aims of the Meiji leaders to boost 
morale and win financial support for the new government. Its five 
provisions were the establishment of deliberative assemblies, the 



36 



Historical Setting 



involvement of all classes in carrying out state affairs, freedom of 
social and occupational mobility, replacement of "evil customs" 
with the "just laws of nature," and an international search for 
knowledge to strengthen the foundations of imperial rule. Implicit 
in the Charter Oath was an end to exclusive political rule by the 
bakufu and a move toward more democratic participation in govern- 
ment. To implement the Charter Oath, an eleven- article consti- 
tution was drawn up. Besides providing for a new Council of State, 
legislative bodies, and systems of ranks for nobles and officials, it 
limited office tenure to four years, allowed public balloting, provided 
for a new taxation system, and ordered new local administrative 
rules. 

The Meiji government assured the foreign powers that it would 
abide by the old treaties negotiated by the bakufu and announced 
that it would act in accordance with international law. Mutsuhito, 
who was to reign until 1912, selected a new reign title — Meiji, or 
Enlightened Rule — to mark the beginning of a new era in Japanese 
history. To further dramatize the new order, the capital was relo- 
cated from Kyoto, where it had been situated since 794, to Tokyo 
(Eastern Capital), the new name for Edo. In a move critical for 
the consolidation of the new regime, most daimyd voluntarily sur- 
rendered their land and census records to the emperor, symboliz- 
ing that the land and people were under the emperor's jurisdiction. 
Confirmed in their hereditary positions, the daimyd became gov- 
ernors, and the central government assumed their administrative 
expenses and paid samurai stipends. The han were replaced with 
prefectures in 1871 , and authority continued to flow to the national 
government. Officials from the favored former han, such as 
Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa, and Hizen, staffed the new ministries. 
Formerly out-of-favor court nobles and lower-ranking but more 
radical samurai replaced bakufu appointees, daimyd, and old court 
nobles as a new ruling class appeared. 

Inasmuch as the Meiji Restoration had sought to return the em- 
peror to a preeminent position, efforts were made to establish a 
Shinto-oriented state much like the state of 1,000 years earlier. An 
Office of Shinto Worship was established, ranking even above the 
Council of State in importance. The kokutai ideas of the Mito school 
were embraced, and the divine ancestry of the imperial house em- 
phasized. The government supported Shinto teachers, a small but 
important move. Although the Office of Shinto Worship was de- 
moted in 1872, by 1877 the Home Ministry controlled all Shinto 
shrines and certain Shinto sects were given state recognition. Shinto 
was at last released from Buddhist administration and its proper- 
ties restored. Although Buddhism suffered from state sponsorship 



37 



Japan: A Country Study 

of Shinto, it had its own resurgence. Christianity was also legal- 
ized and Confucianism remained an important ethical doctrine. 
Increasingly, however, Japanese thinkers identified with Western 
ideology and methods. 

The Meiji oligarchy, as the new ruling class is known to histori- 
ans, was a privileged clique that exercised imperial power, some- 
times despotically. The members of this class were adherents to 
kokugaku and believed they were the creators of a new order as grand 
as that established by Japan's original founders. Two of the major 
figures of this group were Okubo Toshimichi (1832-78), son of a 
Satsuma retainer, and Satsuma samurai Saigo Takamori (1827-77), 
who had joined forces with Choshu, Tosa, and Hizen to overthrow 
the Tokugawa. Okubo became minister of finance and Saigo a field 
marshal; both were imperial councillors. Kido Koin (1833-77), native 
of Choshu, student of Yoshida Shoin, and coconspirator with Oku- 
bo and Saigo, became minister of education and chairman of the 
Governors' Conference and pushed for constitutional government. 
Also prominent were Iwakura Tomomi (1825-83), a Kyoto native 
who had opposed the Tokugawa and was to become the first am- 
bassador to the United States, and Okuma Shigenobu (1838-1922), 
of Hizen, a student of Rangaku, Chinese, and English, who held 
various ministerial portfolios, eventually becoming prime minister 
in 1898. 

To accomplish the new order's goals, the Meiji oligarchy set out 
to abolish the Tokugawa class system through a series of economic 
and social reforms. Bakufu revenues had depended on taxes on 
Tokugawa and other daimyo lands, loans from wealthy peasants and 
urban merchants, limited customs fees, and reluctantly accepted 
foreign loans. To provide revenue and develop a sound infrastruc- 
ture, the new government financed harbor improvements, light- 
houses, machinery imports, schools, overseas study for students, 
salaries for foreign teachers and advisers, modernization of the army 
and navy, railroads and telegraph networks, and foreign diplomatic 
missions. 

Difficult economic times, manifested by increasing incidents of 
agrarian rioting, led to calls for social reforms. Besides the old high 
rents, taxes, and interest rates, the average citizen was faced with 
cash payments for new taxes, military conscription, and tuition 
charges for compulsory education. The people needed more time 
for productive pursuits while correcting social abuses of the past. 
To achieve these reforms, the old Tokugawa class system of 
samurai, farmer, artisan, and merchant was abolished by 1871, 
and, even though old prejudices and status consciousness con- 
tinued, all were theoretically equal before the law. Actually helping 



38 



Emperor Meiji and Empress Haruko in Western garb, a sign of the 

reform taken under his rule (1868-1912) 
Courtesy Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress 

to perpetuate social distinctions, the government named new so- 
cial divisions: the former daimyo became nobility, the samurai be- 
came gentry, and all others became commoners. Daimyo and 
samurai pensions were paid off in lump sums, and the samurai 
later lost their exclusive claim to military positions. Former samurai 
found new pursuits as bureaucrats, teachers, army officers, police 
officials, journalists, scholars, colonists in the northern parts of 
Japan, bankers, and businessmen. These occupations helped stem 
some of the discontent this large group felt; some profited im- 
mensely, but many were not successful and provided significant 
opposition in the ensuing years (see Opposition to the Meiji Oli- 
garchy, this ch.). 

Additionally, between 1871 and 1873, a series of land and tax 
laws were enacted as the basis for modern fiscal policy. Private 
ownership was legalized, deeds were issued, and lands were as- 
sessed at a fair market value with taxes paid in cash rather than 
in kind as in pre-Meiji days and at slightly lower rates. 

Undeterred by opposition, the Meiji leaders continued to modern- 
ize the nation through government- sponsored telegraph cable links 



39 



Japan: A Country Study 

to all major Japanese cities and the Asian mainland, and the con- 
struction of railroads, shipyards, munitions factories, mines, tex- 
tile manufacturing facilities, factories, and experimental agriculture 
stations. Much concerned about national security, the leaders made 
significant efforts at military modernization, which included es- 
tablishing a small standing army and a large reserve system, and 
compulsory militia service for all men (see Militarism Before 1945, 
ch. 8). Foreign military systems were studied, foreign advisers 
brought in, and Japanese cadets sent abroad to European and 
United States military and naval schools. 

Foreign Relations 

The Meiji leaders also modernized foreign policy, an important 
step in making Japan a full member of the international commu- 
nity. The traditional East Asia world view was based not on an 
international society of national units but on cultural distinctions 
and tributary relationships; monks, scholars, and artists, rather than 
professional diplomatic envoys, had generally served as the con- 
veyors of foreign policy. Foreign relations were related more to 
the sovereign's desires than to the public interest. For Japan to 
emerge from the feudal period, it had to avoid the fate of other 
Asian countries by establishing genuine national independence and 
equality. The Meiji oligarchy was aware of Western progress, and 
' 'learning missions" were sent abroad to absorb as much^>f it as 
possible. One such mission, led by Iwakura, Kido, and Okubo, 
and containing forty-eight members in total, spent two years 
(1871-73) touring the United States and Europe, studying govern- 
ment institutions, courts, prison systems, schools, the import-export 
business, factories, shipyards, glass plants, mines, and other en- 
terprises. Upon returning, mission members called for domestic 
reforms that would help Japan catch up with the West. The revi- 
sion of unequal treaties forced on Japan became a top priority. The 
returned envoys also sketched a new vision for a modernized Japan's 
leadership role in Asia, but they realized that this role required 
that Japan develop its national strength, cultivate nationalism 
among the population, and carefully craft policies toward poten- 
tial enemies. No longer could Westerners be seen as "barbarians," 
for example. In time, Japan formed a corps of professional 
diplomats. 

Although he never assumed a government post, another influen- 
tial Meiji period figure was Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835-1901). He 
was a prolific writer on many subjects, the founder of schools and 
a newspaper, and, above all, an educator bent on impressing his 
fellow Japanese with the merits of Westernization. 



40 



Historical Setting 



Japan was shortly to test its new world outlook. Disputes with 
China over sovereignty of the Ryukyii Islands, with Russia over 
sovereignty of the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin, and with Korea over 
the Korean court's refusal to recognize the new Meiji government 
and its envoys were all settled diplomatically between 1874 and 
1876. Military threats had been made in the Chinese and Korean 
affairs, and it seemed to many that Japan would soon use military 
means to achieve its goals. 

Opposition to the Meiji Oligarchy 

The 1873 Korean crisis resulted in the resignation of military- 
expedition proponents Saigo and Councillor of State Eto Shimpei 
(1834-74). Eto, the founder of various patriotic organizations, con- 
spired with other discontented elements to start an armed insur- 
rection against government troops in Saga, the capital of his native 
prefecture in Kyushu in 1874. Charged with suppressing the revolt, 
Okubo swiftly crushed Eto, who had appealed unsuccessfully to 
Saigo for help. Three years later, the last major armed uprising — 
but most serious challenge to the Meiji government — took shape 
in the Satsuma Rebellion, this time with Saigo playing an active 
role. The Saga Rebellion and other agrarian and samurai upris- 
ings mounted in protest to the Meiji reforms had been easily put 
down by the army. Satsuma' s former samurai were numerous, 
however, and they had a long tradition of opposition to central 
authority. Saigo, with some reluctance and only after more 
widespread dissatisfaction with the Meiji reforms, raised a rebel- 
lion in 1877. Both sides fought well, but the modern weaponry and 
better financing of the government forces ended the Satsuma Re- 
bellion. Although he was defeated and committed suicide, Saigo 
was not branded a traitor and became a heroic figure in Japanese 
history. The suppression of the Satsuma Rebellion marked the end 
of serious threats to the Meiji regime but was sobering to the oligar- 
chy. The fight drained the national treasury, led to serious infla- 
tion, and forced land values — and badly needed taxes — down. Most 
importantly, calls for reform were renewed. 

The Development of Representative Government 

The major institutional accomplishment after the Satsuma Re- 
bellion was the start of the trend toward developing representative 
government. People who had been forced out or left out of the 
governing apparatus after the Meiji Restoration had witnessed or 
heard of the success of representative institutions in other coun- 
tries of the world and applied greater pressure for a voice in 
government. 



41 



Japan: A Country Study 



A major proponent of representative government was Itagaki 
Taisuke (1837-1919), a powerful leader of Tosa forces who had 
resigned from his Council of State position over the Korean affair 
in 1873. Itagaki sought peaceful rather than rebellious means to 
gain a voice in government. He started a school and a movement 
aimed at establishing a constitutional monarchy and a legislative 
assembly. Itagaki and others wrote the Tosa Memorial in 1874 
criticizing the unbridled power of the oligarchy and calling for the 
immediate establishment of representative government. Dissatis- 
fied with the pace of reform after having rejoined the Council of 
State in 1875, Itagaki organized his followers and other democratic 
proponents into the nationwide Aikokusha (Society of Patriots) to 
push for representative government in 1878. In 1881, in an action 
for which he is best known, Itagaki helped found the Jiyuto (Liberal 
Party), which favored French political doctrines. In 1882 Okuma 
established the Rikken Kaishinto (Constitutional Progressive Party), 
which called for a British- style constitutional democracy. In re- 
sponse, government bureaucrats, local government officials, and 
other conservatives established the Rikken Teiseito (Imperial Rule 
Party), a progovernment party, in 1882. Numerous political demon- 
strations followed, some of them violent, resulting in further govern- 
ment restrictions. The restrictions hindered the political parties and 
led to divisiveness within and among them. The Jiyiito, which had 
opposed the Kaishinto, was disbanded in 1884, and Okuma re- 
signed as Kaishinto president. 

Government leaders, long preoccupied with violent threats to 
stability and the serious leadership split over the Korean affair, 
generally agreed that constitutional government should someday 
be established. Kido had favored a constitutional form of govern- 
ment since before 1874, and several proposals that provided for 
constitutional guarantees had been drafted. The oligarchy, however, 
while acknowledging the realities of political pressure, was deter- 
mined to keep control. Thus, modest steps were taken. The Osaka 
Conference in 1875 resulted in the reorganization of government 
with an independent judiciary and an appointed Council of Elders 
(Genronin) tasked with reviewing proposals for a legislature. The 
emperor declared that "constitutional government shall be estab- 
lished in gradual stages" as he ordered the Council of Elders to 
draft a constitution. Three years later, the Conference of Prefec- 
tural Governors established elected prefectural assemblies. Although 
limited in their authority, these assemblies represented a move in 
the direction of representative government at the national level, 
and by 1880 assemblies also had been formed in villages and towns. 
In 1880 delegates from twenty-four prefectures held a national 



42 



Historical Setting 



convention to establish the Kokkai Kisei Domei (League for Es- 
tablishing a National Assembly). 

Although the government was not opposed to parliamentary rule, 
confronted with the drive for "people's rights," it continued to 
try to control the political situation. New laws in 1875 prohibited 
press criticism of the government or discussion of national laws. 
The Public Assembly Law (1880) severely limited public gather- 
ings by disallowing attendance by civil servants and requiring police 
permission for all meetings. Within the ruling circle, however, and 
despite the conservative approach of the leadership, Okuma con- 
tinued as a lone advocate of British- style government, a govern- 
ment with political parties and a cabinet organized by the majority 
party, answerable to the national assembly. He called for elections 
to be held by 1882 and for a national assembly to be convoked by 
1883; in doing so, he precipitated a political crisis that ended with 
an 1881 imperial rescript declaring the establishment of a national 
assembly in 1890 and dismissing Okuma. 

Rejecting the British model, Iwakura and other conservatives 
borrowed heavily from the Prussian constitutional system. One of 
the Meiji oligarchy, Ito Hirobumi (1841-1909), a Choshu native 
long involved in government affairs, was charged with drafting 
Japan's constitution. He led a Constitutional Study Mission abroad 
in 1882, spending most of his time in Germany. He rejected the 
United States Constitution as "too liberal" and the British sys- 
tem as too unwieldy and having a parliament with too much con- 
trol over the monarchy; the French and Spanish models were 
rejected as tending toward despotism. 

On Ito's return, one of the first acts of the government was to 
establish new ranks for the nobility. Five hundred persons from 
the old court nobility, former daimyo, and samurai who had provided 
valuable service to the emperor were organized in five ranks: prince, 
marquis, count, viscount, and baron. Ito was put in charge of the 
new Bureau for Investigation of Constitutional Systems in 1884, 
and the Council of State was replaced in 1885 with a cabinet headed 
by Ito as prime minister. The positions of chancellor, minister of 
the left, and minister of the right, which had existed since the 
seventh century as advisory positions to the emperor, were all 
abolished. In their place, the Privy Council was established in 1888, 
to evaluate the forthcoming constitution and to advise the emperor. 
To further strengthen the authority of the state, the Supreme War 
Council was established under the leadership of Yamagata Aritomo 
(1838-1922), a Choshu native who has been credited with the found- 
ing of the modern Japanese army and was to become the first con- 
stitutional prime minister. The Supreme War Council developed 



43 



Japan: A Country Study 



a German-style general staff system with a chief of staff who had 
direct access to the emperor and could operate independently of 
the army minister and civilian officials. 

When finally granted by the emperor as a sign of his sharing 
his authority and giving rights and liberties to his subjects, the 1889 
Constitution of the Empire of Japan (the Meiji Constitution) pro- 
vided for the Imperial Diet (Teikoku Gikai), composed of a popu- 
larly elected House of Representatives with a very limited franchise 
of male citizens who paid ¥15 (for value of the yen — see Glossary) 
in national taxes, about 1 percent of the population; the House 
of Peers, composed of nobility and imperial appointees; and a cabi- 
net responsible to the emperor and independent of the legislature. 
The Diet could approve government legislation and initiate laws, 
make representations to the government, and submit petitions to 
the emperor. Nevertheless, in spite of these institutional changes, 
sovereignty still resided in the emperor on the basis of his divine 
ancestry. The new constitution specified a form of government that 
was still authoritarian in character, with the emperor holding the 
ultimate power and only minimal concessions made to popular 
rights and parliamentary mechanisms. Party participation was 
recognized as part of the political process. The Meiji Constitution 
was to last as the fundamental law until 1947. 

The first national election was held in 1890 and 300 members 
were elected to the House of Representatives. The Jiyuto and 
Kaishinto parties had been revived in anticipation of the election 
and together won over half of the seats. The House of Represen- 
tatives soon became the arena for disputes between the politicians 
and the government bureaucracy over large issues, such as the bud- 
get, the ambiguity of the constitution on the Diet's authority, and 
the desire of the Diet to interpret the "will of the emperor" versus 
the oligarchy's position that the cabinet and administration should 
"transcend" all conflicting political forces. The main leverage the 
Diet had was in its approval or disapproval of the budget, and it 
successfully wielded its authority henceforth. 

In the early years of constitutional government, the strengths 
and weaknesses of the Meiji Constitution were revealed. A small 
clique of Satsuma and Choshu elite continued to rule Japan, be- 
coming institutionalized as an extraconstitutional body of genro (elder 
statesmen). Collectively, the genro made decisions reserved for the 
emperor, and the genro, not the emperor, controlled the govern- 
ment politically. Throughout the period, however, political prob- 
lems were usually solved through compromise, and political parties 
gradually increased their power over the government and held an 
ever larger role in the political process as a result. 



44 



ltd Hirobumi, major statesman 
of the Meiji era 
Courtesy Prints and Photographs 
Division, Library of Congress 




Between 1891 and 1895, Ito served as prime minister with a cabi- 
net composed mostly of genro who wanted to establish a govern- 
ment party to control the House of Representatives. Although not 
fully realized, the trend toward party politics was well established. 

Modernization and Industrialization 

Japan emerged from the Tokugawa-Meiji transition as the first 
Asian industrialized nation. Domestic commercial activities and 
limited foreign trade had met the demands for material culture in 
the Tokugawa period, but the modernized Meiji era had radically 
different requirements. From the onset, the Meiji rulers embraced 
the concept of a market economy and adopted British and North 
American forms of free enterprise capitalism. The private sector — in 
a nation blessed with an abundance of aggressive entrepeneurs — 
welcomed such change. 

Economic reforms included a unified modern currency based 
on the yen, banking, commercial and tax laws, stock exchanges, 
and a communications network. Establishment of a modern institu- 
tional framework conducive to an advanced capitalist economy took 
time, but was completed by the 1890s. By this time, the govern- 
ment had largely relinquished direct control of the moderniza- 
tion process, primarily for budgetary reasons. Many of the former 
daimyd, whose pensions had been paid in a lump sum, benefited 
greatly through investments they made in emerging industries, while 



45 



Japan: A Country Study 



those who had been informally involved in foreign trade before the 
Meiji Restoration also flourished. Old bakufu-serv'mg firms that 
clung to their traditional ways failed in the new business en- 
vironment. 

The government was initially involved in economic moderniza- 
tion, providing a number of "model factories" to facilitate the tran- 
sition to the modern period. After the first twenty years of the Meiji 
period, the industrial economy expanded rapidly through to about 
1920 with inputs of advanced Western technology and large pri- 
vate investments. Stimulated by wars and through cautious eco- 
nomic planning, Japan emerged from World War I as a major 
industrial nation. 

Overseas Expansion 

Historically, Japan's main foreign preoccupation has been China. 
The Korean Peninsula, a strategically located feature critical to 
the defense of the Japanese archipelago, greatly occupied Japan's 
attention in the nineteenth century. Earlier tension over Korea had 
been settled temporarily through the Treaty of Kanghwa in 1876, 
which opened Korean ports to Japan, and in 1885 the Tianjin Con- 
vention had provided for the removal from Korea of both Chinese 
and Japanese troops sent to support contending factions in the 
Korean court. In effect, the convention had made Korea a co- 
protectorate of Beijing and Tokyo at a time when Russian, Brit- 
ish, and United States interests in the peninsula also were on the 
increase. A crisis was precipitated in 1894 when a leading pro- 
Japanese Korean political figure was assassinated in Shanghai with 
Chinese complicity. Prowar elements in Japan called for a puni- 
tive expedition, which the cabinet resisted. With assistance from 
several Japanese nationalistic societies, the illegal Tonghak (Eastern 
Learning) nationalistic religious movement in Korea staged a re- 
bellion that was crushed by Chinese troops. Japan responded with 
force and quickly defeated China in the First Sino-Japanese War 
(1894-95). After nine months of fighting, a cease-fire was called 
and peace talks were held. The victor's demands were such that 
a Japanese protectorate over China seemed in the offing, but an 
assassination attempt on Li Hongzhang, China's envoy to the peace 
talks, embarrassed Japan, which then quickly agreed to an ar- 
mistice. The Treaty of Shimonoseki recognized Korean indepen- 
dence; the end of Korean tribute to China; a 200-million-tael 
(Chinese ounces of silver, the equivalent in 1895 of US$150 mil- 
lion) indemnity; the ceding of Taiwan, the Penghu Islands, and 
the Liaodong Peninsula (the southern part of Manchuria) to Japan; 
and the opening of Chang Jiang (Yangtze River) ports to Japanese 



46 



Historical Setting 



trade. It also assured Japanese rights to engage in industrial enter- 
prises in China. 

Having their own imperialist designs on China and fearing its 
impending disintegration, Russia, Germany, and France jointly 
objected to Japanese control of Liaodong. Threatened with a tripar- 
tite naval maneuver in Korean waters, Japan decided to give back 
Liaodong in return for a larger indemnity from China. Russia 
moved to fill the void by securing from China a twenty-five-year 
lease of Dalian (Dairen in Japanese, also known as Port Arthur) 
and rights to the South Manchurian Railway Company, a semi- 
official Japanese company, to construct a railroad. St. Petersburg 
also wanted to lease more Manchurian territory, and, although 
Japan was loath to confront Russia over this issue, it did move to 
use Korea as a bargaining point: Japan would recognize Russian 
leaseholds in southern Manchuria if Russia would leave Korean 
affairs to Japan. The Russians only agreed not to impede the work 
of Japanese advisers in Korea, but Japan was able to use diplo- 
matic initiatives to keep St. Petersburg from leasing Korean terri- 
tory in 1899. At the same time, Japan was able to wrest a concession 
from China that the coastal areas of Fujian Province, across the 
strait from Taiwan, were within Japan's sphere of influence and 
could not be leased to other powers. In 1900 Japanese forces par- 
ticipated in suppressing the Boxer Uprising, exacting still more in- 
demnity from China. 

Japan then succeeded in attracting a Western ally to its cause. 
Japan and Britain, both of whom wanted to keep Russia out of 
Manchuria, signed a Treaty of Alliance in 1902, which was in ef- 
fect until 1921, when the two signed the Four Power Treaty on 
Insular Possessions, which took effect in 1923. The British recog- 
nized Japanese interests in Korea and assured Japan they would 
remain neutral in case of a Russo-Japanese war but would become 
more actively involved if another power (probably an allusion to 
France) entered the war as a Russian ally. In the face of this joint 
threat, Russia became more conciliatory toward Japan and agreed 
to withdraw its troops from Manchuria in 1903. The new balance 
of power in Korea favored Japan and allowed Britain to concen- 
trate its interests elsewhere in Asia. Hence, Tokyo moved to gain 
influence over Korean banks, opened its own financial institutions 
in Korea, and began constructing railroads and obstructing Rus- 
sian and French undertakings on the peninsula. 

When Russia failed to withdraw its troops from Manchuria by 
an appointed date, Tokyo issued a protest. St. Petersburg replied 
that it would agree to a partition of Korea at the thirty-ninth parallel, 
with a Japanese sphere to the south and a neutral zone to the north. 



47 



Japan: A Country Study 

But Manchuria was to be outside Japan's sphere, and Russia would 
not guarantee the evacuation of its troops. Despite the urging of 
caution by most genro, Japan's hardliners issued an ultimatum to 
Russia, which showed no signs of further compromise. War broke 
out in February 1904 with Japanese surprise attacks on Russian 
warships at Dalian and Chemulpo (in Korea, now called Inch' on). 
Despite tremendous loss of life on both sides, the Japanese won 
a series of land battles and then decisively defeated Russia's Baltic 
Sea Fleet (renamed the Second Pacific Squadron) at the Battle of 
Tsushima in May 1905. At an American-mediated peace con- 
ference in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, Russia acknowledged 
Japan's paramount interests in Korea and agreed to avoid * 'mili- 
tary measures" in Manchuria and Korea. Both sides agreed to 
evacuate Manchuria, except for the Guandong Territory, a lease- 
hold on the Liaodong Peninsula, and restore the occupied areas 
to China. Russia transferred its lease on Dalian and adjacent ter- 
ritories and railroads to Japan, ceded the southern half of Sakhalin 
to Japan, and granted Japan fishing rights in the Sea of Okhotsk 
and the Bering Sea. 

Japanese nationalism intensified after the Russo-Japanese War 
and a new phase of continental expansion began after 1905. Polit- 
ically and economically, Korea became a protectorate of Japan and 
in 1910 was formally annexed as a part of the empire. By means 
of the South Manchurian Railway, Japanese entrepreneurs vig- 
orously exploited Manchuria. By 1907 Russia had entered into a 
treaty arrangement with Japan whereby both sides recognized the 
other's sphere of influence in Manchuria. 

Political Rivalries 

After the bitter political rivalries between the inception of the 
Diet and 1894, when the nation was unified for the war effort against 
China, there followed five years of unity, unusual cooperation, and 
coalition cabinets. From 1900 to 1912, the Diet and the cabinet 
cooperated even more directly, with political parties playing larger 
roles. Throughout the entire period, the old Meiji oligarchy re- 
tained ultimate control, but steadily yielded power to the opposi- 
tion parties. The major figures of the period were Yamagata 
Aritomo, whose long tenure (1868-1922) as a military and civil 
leader, including two terms as prime minister, was characterized 
by his intimidation of rivals and resistance to democratic proce- 
dures; and Ito, who was a compromiser and, although overruled 
by the genro, wanted to establish a government party to control the 
House during his first term. When Ito returned to the prime 
ministership in 1898, he again pushed for a government party, but 



48 



Historical Setting 



when Yamagata and others refused, Ito resigned. With no willing 
successor among the genro, the Kenseito (Constitutional Party) was 
invited to form a cabinet under the leadership of Okuma and 
Itagaki, a major achievement in the opposition parties' competi- 
tion with the genro. This success was short-lived: the Kenseito split 
into two parties, the Kenseito led by_ Itagaki and the Kensei Honto 
(Real Constitutional Party) led by Okuma, and the cabinet ended 
after only four months. Yamagata then returned as prime min- 
ister with the backing of the military and the bureaucracy. Despite 
broad support of his views on limiting constitutional government, 
Yamagata formed an alliance with Kenseito. Reforms of electoral 
laws, an expansion of the House to 369 members, and provisions 
for secret ballots won Diet support for Yamagata' s budgets and 
tax increases. He continued to use imperial ordinances, however, 
to keep the parties from fully participating in the bureaucracy and 
to strengthen the already independent position of the military. When 
Yamagata failed to offer more compromises to the Kenseito, the 
alliance ended in 1900, beginning a new phase of political de- 
velopment. 

Ito and a protege, Saionji Kimmochi (1849-1940), finally suc- 
ceeded in forming a progovernment party — the Seiyukai (Associ- 
ation of Friends of Constitutional Government) — in September 
1900, and a month later Ito became prime minister of the first Seiyu- 
kai cabinet. The Seiyukai held the majority of seats in the House, 
but Yamagata' s conservative allies had the greatest influence in 
the House of Peers, forcing Ito to seek imperial intervention. Tiring 
of political infighting, Ito resigned in 1901. Thereafter, the prime 
ministership alternated between Yamagata' s protege, Katsura Taro 
(1847-1913; prime minister 1901-5 and 1908-11), and Saionji 
(prime minister 1905-8 and 1911-12). The alternating of political 
power was an indication of the two sides' ability to cooperate and 
share power and helped foster the continued development of party 
politics. 

The Meiji era ended with the death of the emperor in 1912 and 
the accession of Crown Prince Yoshihito as emperor of the Taisho 
period (Great Righteousness, 1912-26). The end of the Meiji era 
was marked by huge government domestic and overseas invest- 
ments and defense programs, nearly exhausted credit, and a lack 
of foreign exchange to pay debts. The beginnning of the Taisho 
era was marked by a political crisis that interrupted the earlier 
politics of compromise. When Saionji tried to cut the military bud- 
get, the army minister resigned, bringing down the Seiyukai cabi- 
net. Both Yamagata and Saionji refused to resume office and the 
genro were unable to find a solution. Public outrage over the military 



49 



Japan: A Country Study 



manipulation of the cabinet and the recall of Katsura for a third 
term led to still more demands for an end to genro politics. Despite 
old guard opposition, the conservative forces formed a party of their 
own in 1913, the Rikken Doshikai (Constitutional Association of 
Friends), a party that won a majority in the House over the Seiyukai 
in late 1914. 

World War I 

Seizing the opportunity of Berlin's distraction with the Europe- 
an War, and wanting to expand its sphere of influence in China, 
Japan declared war on Germany in August 1914 and quickly oc- 
cupied German-leased territories in China's Shandong Province 
and the Mariana, Caroline, and Marshall islands in the Pacific. 
With its Western allies heavily involved in the war in Europe, Japan 
sought further to consolidate its position in China by presenting 
the Twenty-One Demands to China in January 1915. Besides ex- 
panding its control over the German holdings, Manchuria, and 
Inner Mongolia, Japan also sought joint ownership of a major min- 
ing and metallurgical complex in central China, prohibitions on 
China's ceding or leasing any coastal areas to a third power, and 
miscellaneous other political, economic, and military controls, which 
if achieved, would have reduced China to a Japanese protectorate. 
In the face of slow negotiations with the Chinese government, 
widespread anti-Japanese sentiments in China, and international 
condemnation, Japan withdrew the final group of demands, and 
treaties were signed in May 1915. 

Japan's hegemony in northern China and other parts of Asia 
was facilitated through other international agreements. One with 
Russia in 1916 helped further secure Japan's influence in Man- 
churia and Inner Mongolia, and agreements with France, Britain, 
and the United States in 1917 recognized Japan's territorial gains 
in China and the Pacific. The Nishihara Loans (named after Nishi- 
hara Kamezo, Tokyo's representative in Beijing) of 1917 and 1918, 
while aiding the Chinese government, put it still deeper into Japan's 
debt. Toward the end of the war, Japan increasingly filled orders 
for its European allies' needed war materiel, thus helping to diversify 
the country's industry, increase its exports, and transform Japan 
from a debtor to a creditor nation for the first time. 

Japan's power in Asia grew with the demise of the tsarist re- 
gime in Russia and the disorder the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution 
left in Siberia. Wanting to seize the opportunity, the Japanese army 
planned to occupy Siberia as far west as Lake Baykal. To do so, 
Japan had to negotiate an agreement with China allowing the transit 
of Japanese troops through Chinese territory. Although the force 



50 



Historical Setting 



was scaled back to avoid antagonizing the United States, more than 
70,000 Japanese troops joined the much smaller units of the Al- 
lied Expeditionary Force sent to Siberia in 1918. 

The year 1919 saw Japan sitting among the ' 'Big Five" powers 
at the Versailles Peace Conference. Tokyo was granted a perma- 
nent seat on the Council of the League of Nations, and the peace 
treaty confirmed the transfer to Japan of Germany's rights in Shan- 
dong, a provision that led to anti-Japanese riots and a mass politi- 
cal movement throughout China. Similarly, Germany's former 
Pacific islands were put under a Japanese mandate. Despite its small 
role in World War I (and the Western powers' rejection of its bid 
for a racial equality clause in the peace treaty), Japan emerged as 
a major actor in international politics at its close. 

Between the Wars, 1920-36 
Two-Party System 

The two-party political system that had been developing in Japan 
since the turn of the century finally came of age after World War 
I. This period has sometimes been called that of "Taisho democ- 
racy," after the reign title of the emperor. In 1918 Hara Takashi 
(1856-1921), a protege of Saionji and a major influence in the 
prewar Seiyukai cabinets, had become the first commoner to serve 
as prime minister. He took advantage of long-standing relation- 
ships he had throughout the government, won the support of the 
surviving genrd and the House of Peers, and brought into his cabi- 
net as army minister Tanaka Giichi (1864-1929), who had a greater 
appreciation of favorable civil-military relations than his predeces- 
sors. Nevertheless, major problems confronted Hara: inflation, the 
need to adjust the Japanese economy to postwar circumstances, 
the influx of foreign ideas, and an emerging labor movement. 
Prewar solutions were applied by the cabinet to these postwar 
problems, and little was done to reform the government. Hara 
worked to ensure a Seiyukai majority through time-tested methods, 
such as new election laws and electoral redistricting, and embarked 
on major government-funded public works programs. 

The public grew disillusioned with the growing national debt 
and the new election laws, which retained the old minimum tax 
qualifications for voters. Calls were raised for universal suffrage 
and the dismantling of the old political party network. Students, 
university professors, and journalists, bolstered by labor unions 
and inspired by a variety of democratic, socialist, communist, anar- 
chist, and other Western schools of thought, mounted large but 
orderly public demonstrations in favor of universal male suffrage 



51 



Japan: A Country Study 



in 1919 and 1920. New elections brought still another Seiyukai 
majority, but barely so. In the political milieu of the day, there 
was a proliferation of new parties, including socialist and communist 
parties. 

In the midst of this political ferment, Hara was assassinated by 
a disenchanted railroad worker in 1921 (see Diplomacy, this ch.). 
He was followed by a succession of nonparty prime ministers and 
coalition cabinets. Fear of a broader electorate, left-wing power, 
and the growing social change engendered by the influx of Western 
popular culture together led to the passage of the Peace Preserva- 
tion Law (1925), which forbade any change in the political struc- 
ture or the abolition of private property. 

Unstable coalitions and divisiveness in the Diet led the Kenseikai 
(Constitutional Government Association) and the Seiyu Honto 
(True Seiyukai) to merge as the Rikken Minseito (Constitutional 
Democratic Party) in 1927. The Minseito platform was commit- 
ted to the parliamentary system, democratic politics, and world 
peace. Thereafter, until 1932, the Seiyukai and the Rikken Minseito 
alternated in power. 

Despite the political realignments and hope for more orderly 
government, domestic economic crises plagued whichever party 
held power. Fiscal austerity programs and appeals for public sup- 
port of conservative government policies like the Peace Preserva- 
tion Law — including reminders of the moral obligation to make 
sacrifices for the emperor and the state — were attempted as solu- 
tions. Although the world depression of the late 1920s and early 
1930s had minimal effects on Japan — indeed Japanese exports grew 
substantially during this period — there was a sense of rising dis- 
content that was heightened with the assassination of Minseito prime 
minister Hamaguchi Osachi in 1931, 

The events flowing from the Meiji Restoration in 1868 had seen 
not only the fulfillment of many domestic and foreign economic 
and political objectives — without Japan's first suffering the colonial 
fate of other Asian nations — but also a new intellectual ferment, 
in a time when there was interest worldwide in socialism and an 
urban proletariat was developing. Universal male suffrage, social 
welfare, workers' rights, and nonviolent protest were ideals of the 
early leftist movement. Government suppression of leftist activi- 
ties, however, led to more radical leftist action and even more sup- 
pression, resulting in the dissolution of the Japan Socialist Party 
(Nihon Shakaito), only a year after its 1906 founding, and in the 
general failure of the socialist movement. 

The victory of the communists in Russia in 1917 and their hopes 
for a world revolution led to the establishment of the Comintern 



52 



Historical Setting 



(a contraction of Communist International, the organization founded 
in Moscow in 1919 to coordinate the world communist movement). 
The Comintern realized the importance of Japan in achieving suc- 
cessful revolution in East Asia and actively worked to form the Japan 
Communist Party (Nihon Kyosanto), which was founded in July 
1922. An end to feudalism, the abolition of the monarchy, with- 
drawal of Japanese troops from Siberia, Sakhalin, China, Korea, 
and Taiwan, and recognition of the Soviet Union were the an- 
nounced goals of the Japan Communist Party in 1923. A brutal 
suppression of the party followed. Radicals responded with an as- 
sassination attempt on Prince Regent Hirohito. The 1925 Peace 
Preservation Law was a direct response to the "dangerous thoughts" 
perpetrated by communist elements in Japan. 

The liberalization of election laws, also in 1925, benefited com- 
munist candidates even though the Japan Communist Party itself 
was banned. A new Peace Preservation Law in 1928, however, 
further impeded communist efforts by banning the parties they had 
infiltrated. The police apparatus of the day was ubiquitous and 
quite thorough in attempting to control the socialist movement (see 
The Police System, ch. 8). By 1926 the Japan Communist Party 
had been forced underground, by the summer of 1929 the party 
leadership had been virtually destroyed, and by 1933 the party had 
largely disintegrated. 

Diplomacy 

Emerging Chinese nationalism, the victory of the communists 
in Russia, and the growing presence of the United States in East 
Asia all worked against Japan's postwar foreign policy interests. 
The four-year Siberian expedition and activities in China, com- 
bined with big domestic spending programs, had depleted Japan's 
wartime earnings. Only through more competitive business prac- 
tices, supported by further economic development and industrial 
modernization, all accommodated by the growth of the zaibatsu 
(wealth groups — see Glossary), could Japan hope to become pre- 
dominant in Asia. The United States, long a source of many im- 
ported goods and loans needed for development, was seen as 
becoming a major impediment to this goal because of its policies 
of containing Japanese imperialism. 

An international turning point in military diplomacy was the 
Washington Conference of 1921-22, which produced a series of 
agreements that effected a new order in the Pacific region. Japan's 
economic problems made a naval buildup nearly impossible and, 
realizing the need to compete with the United States on an eco- 
nomic rather than a military basis, the Japanese government came 



53 



Japan: A Country Study 



to see rapprochement as inevitable. Japan adopted a more neutral 
attitude toward the civil war in China; joined the United States, 
Britain, and France in encouraging Chinese self-development; and 
dropped efforts to expand its hegemony into China proper. 

In the Four Power Treaty on Insular Possessions (December 13, 
1921), Japan, the United States, Britain, and France agreed to 
recognize the status quo in the Pacific, and Japan and Britain agreed 
to terminate formally their Treaty of Alliance. The Five Power 
Naval Disarmament Treaty (February 6, 1922) established an in- 
ternational capital ship ratio (5, 5, 3, 1.75, and 1.75, respectively, 
for the United States, Britain, Japan, France, and Italy) and limited 
the size and armaments of capital ships already built or under con- 
struction. In a move that gave the Japanese Imperial Navy greater 
freedom in the Pacific, Washington and London agreed not to build 
any new military bases between Singapore and Hawaii. 

The goal of the Nine Power Treaty (February 6, 1922), signed 
by Belgium, China, the Netherlands, and Portugal along with the 
original five powers, was the prevention of war in the Pacific. The 
signatories agreed to respect China's independence and integrity, 
not to interfere in Chinese attempts to establish a stable govern- 
ment, to refrain from seeking special privileges in China or threaten- 
ing the positions of other nations there, to support a policy of equal 
opportunity for commerce and industry of all nations in China, 
and to reexamine extraterritoriality and tariff autonomy policies. 
Japan also agreed to withdraw its troops from Shandong, relin- 
quishing all but purely economic rights there, and to evacuate its 
troops from Siberia. 

In 1928 Japan joined fourteen other nations in signing the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact, which denounced "recourse to war for the 
solution of international controversies." Thus, when Japan invaded 
Manchuria only three years later, its pretext was the defense of 
its nationals and economic interests there. The London Naval Con- 
ference in 1930 came at the time of an economic recession in Japan, 
and the Japanese government was amenable to further, cost-saving 
naval reductions. Although Prime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi 
(1870-1931) had civilian support, he bypassed the Naval General 
Staff and approved the signing of the London Naval Treaty. 
Hamaguchi 's success was pyrrhic: ultranationalists called the treaty 
a national surrender, and navy and army officials girded them- 
selves for defense of their budgets. Hamaguchi himself died from 
wounds suffered in an assassination attempt in November 1930, 
and the treaty, with its complex formula for ship tonnage and num- 
bers aimed at restricting the naval arms race, had loopholes that 
made it ineffective by 1938. 



54 



Historical Setting 



The Rise of the Militarists 

Ultranationalism had characterized right-wing politicians and 
conservative military men since the inception of the Meiji Resto- 
ration, contributing greatly to the prowar politics of the 1870s. Dis- 
enchanted former samurai had formed patriotic societies and 
intelligence-gathering organizations, such as the Gen'yosha (Black 
Ocean Society, founded in 1881) and its later offshoot, the Kokuryu- 
kai (Black Dragon Society, or Amur River Society, founded in 
1901). These groups became active in domestic and foreign poli- 
tics, helped foment prowar sentiments, and supported ultranation- 
alist causes through the end of World War II. After Japan's victories 
over China and Russia, the ultranationalists concentrated on domes- 
tic issues and perceived domestic threats, such as socialism and com- 
munism. 

After World War I and the intellectual ferment of the period, 
nationalist societies became numerous but had a minority voice 
during the era of two-party democratic politics. Diverse and angry 
groups called for nationalization of all wealth above a fixed minimal 
amount and for armed overseas expansion. The emperor was highly 
revered by these groups, and when Hirohito was enthroned in 1927 
initiating the Showa period (Bright Harmony, 1926-89), there were 
calls for a "Showa Restoration" and a revival of Shinto. Emperor- 
centered neo-Shintoism, or State Shinto, which had long been de- 
veloping, came to fruition in the 1930s and 1940s. It glorified the 
emperor and traditional Japanese virtues to the exclusion of the 
Western influences perceived as greedy, individualistic, bourgeois, 
and assertive. The ideals of the Japanese family-state and self- 
sacrifice in service of the nation were given a missionary interpre- 
tation, being thought by their ultranationalist proponents to be ap- 
plicable to the modern world. 

The 1930s were a decade of fear in Japan, characterized by the 
resurgence of right-wing patriotism, the weakening of democratic 
forces, domestic terrorist violence (including an assassination at- 
tempt on the emperor in 1932), and stepped-up military aggres- 
sion abroad. A prelude to this state of affairs was Tanaka Giichi's 
term as prime minister from 1927 to 1929. Twice he sent troops 
to China to obstruct Chiang Kai-shek's unification campaign, and, 
in June 1928, adventurous officers of the Guandong Army, the 
Imperial Japanese Army unit stationed in Manchuria, embarked 
on unauthorized initiatives to protect Japanese interests, includ- 
ing the assassination of a former ally, Manchurian warlord Zhang 
Zuolin. The perpetrators hoped the Chinese would be prompted 
to take military action, forcing the Guandong Army to retaliate. 



55 



Japan: A Country Study 

The Japanese high command and the Chinese, however, both re- 
fused to mobilize. The incident turned out to be a striking exam- 
ple of unchecked terrorism. Even though press censorship kept the 
Japanese public from knowing about these events, they led to the 
downfall of Tanaka and set the stage for a similar plot, the Man- 
churian Incident, in 1931. 

A secret society founded by army officers seeking to establish 
a military dictatorship — the Sakurakai (Cherry Society, the cherry 
blossom being emblematic of self-sacrifice) — plotted to attack the 
Diet and political party headquarters, assassinate the prime 
minister, and declare martial law under a "Showa Restoration" 
government led by the army minister. Although the army cancelled 
its coup plans (to have been carried out in March 1931), no reprisals 
were taken and terrorist activity was again tacitly condoned. 

The Manchurian Incident of September 1931 did not fail and 
it set the stage for the eventual military takeover of the Japanese 
government. Guandong Army conspirators blew up a few meters 
of South Manchurian Railway Company track near Mukden (now 
Shenyang), blamed it on Chinese saboteurs, and used the event 
as an excuse to seize Mukden. One month later, in Tokyo, mili- 
tary figures plotted the October Incident, which was aimed at set- 
ting up a national socialist state. The plot failed, but again the news 
was suppressed and the military perpetrators were not punished. 
Japanese forces attacked Shanghai in January 1932 on the pretext 
of Chinese resistance in Manchuria. Finding stiff Chinese resistance 
in Shanghai, the Japanese waged a three-month undeclared war 
there before a truce was reached in March 1932. Several days later, 
Manchukuo was established. Manchukuo was a Japanese puppet 
state headed by the last Chinese emperor, Puyi, as chief executive 
and later emperor. The civilian government in Tokyo was power- 
less to prevent these military happenings. Instead of being con- 
demned, the Guandong Army's actions enjoyed popular support 
back home. International reactions were extremely negative, 
however. Japan withdrew from the League of Nations, and the 
United States became increasingly hostile. 

The Japanese system of party government finally met its demise 
with the May 15th Incident in 1932, when a group of junior naval 
officers and army cadets assassinated Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi 
(1855-1932). Although the assassins were put on trial and sentenced 
to fifteen years' imprisonment, they were seen popularly as having 
acted out of patriotism. Inukai 's successors, military men chosen 
by Saionji, the last surviving genro, recognized Manchukuo and 
generally approved the army's actions in securing Manchuria as an 
industrial base, an area for Japanese emigration, and a staging 



56 



Hirohito, the Emperor Showa, 
124th Japanese sovereign, and 
Empress Nagako in full 
ceremonial dress, at their 1927 
enthronement 
Courtesy Prints and Photographs 
Division, Library of Congress 



Japan: A Country Study 



ground for war with the Soviet Union. Various army factions con- 
tended for power amid increasing suppression of dissent and more 
assassinations. In the February 26th Incident of 1936, about 1,500 
troops went on a rampage of assassination against the current and 
former prime ministers and other cabinet members, and even 
Saionji and members of the imperial court. The revolt was put down 
by other military units and its leaders executed after secret trials. 
Despite public dismay over these events and the discredit they 
brought to numerous military figures, Japan's civilian leadership 
capitulated to the army's demands in the hope of ending domestic 
violence. Increases were seen in defense budgets, naval construc- 
tion (Japan announced it would no longer accede to the London 
Naval Treaty), and patriotic indoctrination as Japan moved toward 
a wartime footing. 

In November 1936, the Anti-Comintern Pact, an agreement to 
exchange information and collaborate in preventing communist ac- 
tivities, was signed by Japan and Germany (Italy joined a year 
later). War was launched against China after the Marco Polo Bridge 
Incident of July 7, 1937, in which an allegedly unplanned clash 
took place near Beiping (as Beijing was then called) between Chinese 
and Japanese troops and quickly escalated into full-scale warfare. 
The Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-45) ensued, and relations 
with the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union deteriorated. 
The increased military activities in China — and Japan's idea of 
establishing "Mengukuo" in Inner Mongolia and the Mongolian 
People's Republic — soon led to a major clash over rival Mongolia- 
Manchukuo border claims. When Japanese troops invaded eastern 
Mongolia, a major ground and air battle with a joint Soviet- 
Mongolian army took place between May and September 1939 at 
the Battle of Halhin Gol. The Japanese were severely defeated, 
sustaining as many as 80,000 casualties, and thereafter Japan con- 
centrated its war efforts on its southward drive in China and 
Southeast Asia, a strategy that helped propel Japan ever closer to 
war with the United States, Britain, and their allies. 

Under the prime ministership of Konoe Fumimaro (1891- 
1945) — the last head of the famous Fujiwara house — the govern- 
ment was streamlined and given absolute power over the nation's 
assets. In 1940, the 2,600th anniversary of the founding of Japan 
according to tradition, Konoe 's cabinet called for the establishment 
of a * 'Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere," a concept build- 
ing on Konoe 's 1938 call for a "New Order in Greater East Asia," 
encompassing Japan, Manchukuo, China, and Southeast Asia. The 
Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere was to integrate Asia po- 
litically and economically — under Japanese leadership — against 



58 



Historical Setting 



Western domination. It was developed in recognition of the chang- 
ing geopolitical situation emerging in 1940, and, eventually, a 
Greater East Asia Ministry was established (in 1942) and the 
Greater East Asia Conference was held in Tokyo in 1943. Also 
in 1940, political parties were ordered to dissolve, and the Imperial 
Rule Assistance Association, comprising members of all former par- 
ties, was established to transmit government orders throughout 
society. In September 1940, Japan joined the Axis alliance with 
Germany and Italy when it signed the Tripartite Pact, a military 
agreement to redivide the world that was directed primarily against 
the United States. 

There had been a long-standing and deep-seated antagonism be- 
tween Japan and the United States since the first decade of the twen- 
tieth century. Each perceived the other as a military threat, and 
trade rivalry was carried on in earnest. The Japanese greatly re- 
sented the racial discrimination perpetuated by United States im- 
migration laws, and the Americans became increasingly wary of 
Japan's interference in the self-determination of other peoples. 
Japan's military expansionism and quest for national self-sufficiency 
eventually led the United States in 1940 to embargo war supplies, 
abrogate a long-standing commercial treaty, and put greater re- 
strictions on the export of critical commodities. These American 
tactics, rather than forcing Japan to a standstill, made Japan more 
desperate. After the signing of the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact 
in April 1941, and while still actively making war plans against 
the United States, Japan participated in diplomatic negotiations 
with Washington aimed at achieving a peaceful settlement. Wash- 
ington was quite concerned about Japan's role in the Tripartite 
Pact and demanded the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China 
and Southeast Asia. Japan countered that it would not use force 
unless "a country not yet involved in the European war" (that is, 
the United States) attacked Germany or Italy, and demanded that 
the United States and Britain not interfere with a Japanese settle- 
ment in China (a pro-Japanese puppet government had been set 
up in Nanjing in 1940). Because certain Japanese military leaders 
were working at cross-purposes with officials seeking a peaceful set- 
tlement (including Konoe, other civilians, and some military 
figures), talks were deadlocked. On October 15, 1941, army min- 
ister Tqjo Hideki (1884-1948) declared the negotiations ended. 
Konoe resigned, replaced by Tqjo, and after one final United States 
rejection of Japan's terms of negotiation, on December 1, 1941, 
the Imperial Conference (an ad hoc meeting convened — and then 
rarely — in the presence of the emperor) ratified the decision to 



59 



Japan: A Country Study 

embark on a war of "self-defense and self-preservation" and to 
attack the United States naval base at Pearl Harbor. 

World War II and the Occupation, 1941-52 

After initial battlefield success and a tremendous overextension 
of its resources in the war (known to Japan as the Greater East 
Asia War, to the United States as the Pacific War) against a quickly 
mobilizing United States and Allied war effort, Japan was unable 
to sustain "Greater East Asia" (see fig. 2). As early as 1943, Konoe 
led a peace movement, and Tqjo was forced from office in July 
1944. His successors sought peace mediation (Sweden and the Soviet 
Union were approached for help in such a process), but the enemy 
offered only unconditional surrender. After the detonation of atomic 
bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 8, 1941, 
respectively, the emperor asked that the Japanese people bring peace 
to Japan by "enduring the unendurable and suffering what is in- 
sufferable" by surrendering to the Allied powers. The documents 
of surrender were signed on board the U.S.S. Missouri in Tokyo 
Bay, on September 2, 1945 (see World War II, ch. 8). The terms 
of surrender included the occupation of Japan by Allied military 
forces, assurances that Japan would never again go to war, re- 
striction of Japanese sovereignty to the four main islands "and such 
minor islands as may be determined," and surrender of Japan's 
colonial holdings. 

A period of demilitarization and democratization followed in 
Japan (1945-47). Under the direction of General Douglas Mac- 
Arthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), 
Japan's army and navy ministries were abolished, munitions and 
military equipment were destroyed, and war industries were con- 
verted to civilian uses. War crimes trials found 4,200 Japanese offi- 
cials guilty; 700 were executed, and 186,000 other public figures 
were purged. State Shinto was disestablished, and on January 1, 
1946, Emperor Hirohito repudiated his divinity. MacArthur pushed 
the government to amend the 1889 Meiji Constitution, and on 
May 3, 1947, the new Japanese Constitution (often called the 
"MacArthur Constitution") came into force (see The Postwar Con- 
stitution, ch. 6). Constitutional reforms were accompanied by eco- 
nomic reforms, including agricultural land redistribution, the 
reestablishment of trade unions, and severe proscriptions on zaibatsu 
(see Patterns of Development, ch. 4). 

Relatively rapid stabilization of Japan led to a relaxation of SCAP 
purges and press censorship. Quick economic recovery was en-, 
couraged, restrictions on former zaibatsu members eventually were 
lifted, and foreign trade was allowed. Finally, fifty-one nations met 



60 



Historical Setting 



in San Francisco in September 1951 to reach a peace accord with 
Japan (formally known as the Treaty of Peace with Japan; China, 
India, and the Soviet Union participated in the conference but did 
not sign the treaty). Japan renounced its claims to Korea, Taiwan, 
Penghu, the Kuril Islands, southern Sakhalin, islands it gained by 
League of Nations mandate, South China Sea islands, and Ant- 
arctic territory, while agreeing to settle disputes peacefully according 
to the United Nations Charter. Japan's rights to defend itself and 
to enter into collective security arrangements were acknowledged. 
The 1952 ratification of the Japan-United States Mutual Security 
Assistance Pact also ensured a strong defense for Japan and a large 
postwar role in Asia for the United States (see Relations with the 
United States, ch. 7; Early Developments, ch. 8). 

Toward a New Century, 1953-84 

Political parties had begun to revive almost immediately after 
the occupation began. Left-wing organizations, such as the Japan 
Socialist Party and the Japan Communist Party quickly reestab- 
lished themselves, as did various conservative parties. The old 
Seiyiikai and Rikken Minseito came back as, respectively, the 
Liberal Party (Nihon Jiyuto) and the Japan Progressive Party 
(Nihon Shimpoto). The first postwar elections were held in 1946 
(women were given the franchise for the first time), and the Liberal 
Party's vice president, Yoshida Shigeru (1878-1967), became prime 
minister. For the 1947 elections, anti-Yoshida forces left the Liberal 
Party and joined forces with the Progressive Party to establish the 
new Democratic Party (Minshuto). This divisiveness in conserva- 
tive ranks gave a plurality to the Japan Socialist Party, which was 
allowed to form a cabinet that lasted less than a year. Thereafter 
the socialist party steadily declined in its electoral successes. After 
a short period of Democratic Party administration, Yoshida re- 
turned in late 1948 and continued to serve as prime minister until 
1954. 

Even before Japan regained full sovereignty, the government 
had rehabilitated nearly 80,000 people who had been purged, many 
of whom returned to their former political and government posi- 
tions. A debate over limitations on military spending and the 
sovereignty of the emperor ensued, contributing to the great reduc- 
tion in the Liberal Party's majority in the first postoccupation elec- 
tions (October 1952). After several reorganizations of the armed 
forces, in 1954 the Self-Defense Forces were established under a 
civilian director (see The Self-Defense Forces, ch. 8). Cold War 
realities and the hot war in nearby Korea also contributed signifi- 
cantly to the United States-influenced economic redevelopment, 



61 



Japan: A Country Study 




Source: Based on information from Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan, 8, Tokyo, 1983, 274. 



Figure 2. The Japanese Empire During World War II 

the suppression of communism, and the discouragement of or- 
ganized labor in Japan during this period. 

Continual fragmentation of parties and a succession of minor- 
ity governments led conservative forces to merge the Liberal Party 



62 



Historical Setting 




(Jiyuto) with the Japan Democratic Party (Nihon Minshuto), an 
offshoot of the earlier Democratic Party, to form the Liberal 
Democratic Party (Jiyo-Minshuto; LDP) in November 1955. This 
party has continuously held power from 1955 through 1990 (see 



63 



Japan: A Country Study 



The Liberal Democratic Party, ch. 6). Its leadership was drawn 
from the elite who had seen Japan through the defeat and occupa- 
tion; it attracted former bureaucrats, local politicians, business- 
men, journalists, other professionals, farmers, and university 
graduates. In October 1955, socialist groups reunited under the 
Japan Socialist Party, which emerged as the second most power- 
ful political force. It was followed closely in popularity by the 
Komeito (Clean Government Party), founded in 1964 as the po- 
litical arm of the Soka Gakkai (Value Creation Society), a lay or- 
ganization of the Buddhist sect Nichiren Shoshu (see Komeito, 
ch. 6). The Komeito emphasized traditional Japanese beliefs and 
attracted urban laborers, former rural residents, and many women. 
Like the Japan Socialist Party, it favored the gradual modification 
and dissolution of the Japan-United States Mutual Security As- 
sistance Pact. 

Japan's biggest postwar political crisis took place in 1960 over 
the revision of this pact. As the new Treaty of Mutual Coopera- 
tion and Security was concluded, which renewed the United States 
role as military protector of Japan, massive street protests and po- 
litical upheaval occurred, and the cabinet resigned a month after 
the Diet's ratification of the treaty. Thereafter political turmoil sub- 
sided. Japanese views of the United States, after years of mass pro- 
tests over nuclear armaments and the mutual defense pact, 
improved by 1972, with the reversion of United States-occupied 
Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty and the winding-down of the Sec- 
ond Indochina War (1954-75). 

Japan had reestablished relations with the Republic of China 
after World War II, and cordial relations were maintained with 
the nationalist government when it was exiled to Taiwan, a policy 
that won Japan the enmity of the People's Republic of China, which 
was established in 1949. After the general warming of relations be- 
tween China and Western countries, especially the United States, 
which shocked Japan with its sudden rapprochement with Beijing 
in 1971 , Tokyo established relations with Beijing in 1972 and close 
cooperation in the economic sphere followed (see Communist Coun- 
tries, ch. 5; Relations with China, ch. 7). 

Japan's relations with the Soviet Union continued to be 
problematic long after the war. The main object of dispute was 
the Soviet occupation of what Japan calls its Northern Territories, 
the two most southerly islands in the Kurils (Etorofu and Kunashiri) 
and Shikotan and the Habomai Islands (northeast of Hokkaido), 
which were seized by the Soviets in the closing days of World War 
II (see Soviet Union, ch. 7). 



64 



Historical Setting 



Throughout the postwar period, Japan's economy continued to 
boom, with results far outstripping expectations. Japan rapidly 
caught up with the West in foreign trade, gross national product 
(GNP — see Glossary), and general quality of life (see Living Stan- 
dards, ch. 4; Postwar Development, ch. 5). These achievements 
were underscored by the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games and the 
Osaka International Exposition (Expo '70) world's fair in 1970. 

The high economic growth and political tranquility of the mid- 
to-late 1960s were tempered by the quadrupling of oil prices by 
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries in 1973. Almost 
completely dependent on imports for petroleum, Japan experienced 
its first and only recession since the war. 

Despite its wealth and central position in the world economy, 
Japan has had little or no influence in global politics for much of 
the postwar period. Under the prime ministership of Tanaka Kakuei 
(1972-74), Japan took a stronger but still low-key stance by stead- 
ily increasing its defense spending and easing trade frictions with 
the United States. Tanaka' s administration was also characterized 
by high-level talks with United States, Soviet, and Chinese lead- 
ers, if with mixed results. His visits to Indonesia and Thailand 
prompted riots, a manifestation of long-standing anti-Japanese sen- 
timents (see Relations with other Asian Countries, ch. 7). Tanaka 
was forced to resign in 1974 because of his alleged connection to 
financial scandals and, in the face of charges of involvement in the 
Lockheed bribery scandal, he was arrested and jailed briefly in 1976. 

By the late 1970s, the Komeito and the Democratic Socialist Party 
had come to accept the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Secu- 
rity, and the Democratic Socialist Party even came to support a 
small defense buildup. The Japan Socialist Party, too, was forced 
to abandon its once strict antimilitary stance. The United States 
kept up pressure on Japan to increase its defense spending above 
1 percent of its GNP, engendering much debate in the Diet, with 
most opposition coming not from minority parties or public opin- 
ion but from budget-conscious officials in the Ministry of Finance 
(see Defense Spending, ch. 8). 

The fractious politics of the LDP hindered consensus in the Diet 
in the late 1970s. The sudden death of Prime Minister Ohira 
Masayoshi just before the June 1980 elections, however, brought 
out a sympathy vote for the party and gave the new prime minister, 
Suzuki Zenko, a working majority. Suzuki was soon swept up in 
a controversy over the publication of a textbook that appeared to 
many of Japan's former enemies as a whitewash of Japanese ag- 
gression in World War II. This incident, and serious fiscal 



65 



Japan: A Country Study 

problems, caused the Suzuki cabinet, composed of numerous LDP 
factions, to fall. 

Nakasone Yasuhiro, a conservative backed by the still-powerful 
Tanaka and Suzuki factions, who once served as director general 
of the Defense Agency, became prime minister in November 1982. 
Several cordial visits between Nakasone and United States presi- 
dent Ronald Reagan were aimed at improving relations between 
their countries. Nakasone 's more strident position on Japanese 
defense issues made him popular with some United States officials 
but not, generally, in Japan or among Asian neighbors. Although 
his characterization of Japan as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier," 
his noting the "common destiny" of Japan and the United States, 
and his calling for revisions to Article 9 of the Constitution (which 
renounced war as the sovereign right of the nation), among other 
prorearmament statements, produced negative reactions at home 
and abroad, a gradual acceptance emerged of the Self-Defense 
Forces and the mutual security treaty with the United States in 
the mid-1980s. 

Another serious problem was Japan's growing trade surplus, 
which reached record heights during Nakasone 's first term (see For- 
eign Trade Policies; Trade and Investment Relations, ch. 5). The 
United States pressured Japan to remedy the imbalance, demanding 
that Tokyo raise the value of the yen and open its markets further 
to facilitate more imports from the United States. Because Japan 
aids and protects its key industries, it was accused of creating an 
unfair competitive advantage. Tokyo agreed to try to resolve these 
problems, but generally defended its industrial policies and made 
concessions on its trade restrictions very reluctantly. 

In November 1984, Nakasone was chosen for a second term as 
LDP president. His cabinet received an unusually high rating, a 
50 percent favorable response in polling during his first term, while 
opposition parties reached a new low in popular support. As he 
moved into his second term, Nakasone thus held a strong position 
in the Diet and the nation. Despite being found guilty of bribery 
in 1983, Tanaka in the early to mid-1980s remained a power be- 
hind the scenes through his control of the party's informal apparatus 
and continued as an influential adviser to the more internationally 
minded Nakasone. Fluctuation in the popularity of the LDP and 
charges of corruption among political leaders continued as the de- 
cade progressed. 



Many histories of Japan are available to Western readers. H. 
Paul Varley's A Syllabus of Japanese Civilization provides a structure 



66 



Historical Setting 



for studying Japanese history while suggesting useful additional 
readings. Short general overview histories include Edwin O. 
Reischauer's Japan: The Story of a Nation, Reischauer and Albert M. 
Craig's Japan: Tradition and Transformation, Richard Storry's^4 History 
of Modern Japan, and Conrad Totman's Japan Before Perry. More 
detailed studies are John Whitney Hall's Japan: From Prehistory to 
Modern Times, Arthur E. Tiedemann's An Introduction to Japanese 
Civilization, and George B. Sansom's three- volume History of Japan. 
Feudalism in Japan by Peter Duus provides an excellent overview 
of the evolution from tribal rule to premodern Japan, while Studies 
in the Institutional History of Early Modern Japan, edited by Hall and 
Marius B. Jansen, is an excellent analytical collection on the 
Tokugawa period. A similar collection, covering the Meiji, Taisho, 
and Showa periods, is Harry Wray and Hilary Conroy's Japan Ex- 
amined. Books by Donald Keene {The Japanese Discovery of Europe, 
1720-1830) and Michael Cooper (They Came to Japan) are useful 
in understanding the dynamics of Japanese-Western relations start- 
ing in the sixteenth century. The Rise of Modern Japan by Duus, The 
Modern History of Japan by W.G. Beasley, and Political Development 
in Modern Japan by Robert E. Ward provide useful information on 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 

Analyses and translations of historical works are found in 
Ryusaku Tsunoda and colleagues' Sources of Japanese Tradition. 
Another excellent reference is the nine-volume Kodansha Encyclope- 
dia of Japan. The Cambridge History of Japan, three of the six volumes 
of which have been published, provides in-depth analyses of many 
topics. (For further information and complete citations, see Bib- 
liography.) 



67 



Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 



Family crest using plum blossoms (ume), a sign of beauty and impervious- 
ness to late winter weather 



JAPAN IS KNOWN throughout the world for its economic suc- 
cesses, yet Japanese society remains an enigma to many outside 
its borders. Those people who stress the nation's uniqueness, in- 
cluding many Japanese, often overlook the common human traits 
that make cross-cultural communication possible and rewarding. 
Those who stress Japan's convergence with the West miss the deeper 
differences that have allowed Japan to chart its own path through 
the unknowns of the postindustrial period. 

Geography and climate do not determine social organization or 
values, but they do set parameters for human action. Leaders of 
this island nation historically have exerted close political control 
over their people and limited foreign influence to degrees not pos- 
sible elsewhere. Mountainous terrain and wet-rice agriculture 
fostered — but did not ensure — attitudes of cooperation within the 
social unit and a sense of separateness from the outside. Extend- 
ing nearly 3,800 kilometers from northeast to southwest, Japan has 
a generally mild, temperate climate with a rich variety of local 
habitats. This expansiveness resulted in regional variations in cul- 
ture and economic development historically, but these differences 
decreased in importance (or were relegated to tourist attractions) 
in the twentieth century. With 77 percent of the population living 
in urban areas and a large majority of farm families earning most 
of their income from nonfarm labor, regional and rural-urban differ- 
ences in life-style were minimal in the early 1990s. The large and 
stable national population, with low fertility and mortality rates, 
was aging rapidly. 

Japanese society underwent great social changes after 1945. Fam- 
ilies became smaller, women increasingly participated in paid labor, 
and urban life replaced the rural community as the common en- 
vironment in which children were raised and human interaction 
took place. The changes brought new problems, such as industrial 
pollution, the entrance examination ' 'hell," and social anomie. The 
government responded with new policies, and ordinary citizens uti- 
lized traditional customs to give meaning to the present. Japanese 
cities in the late twentieth century were convenient and safe. Sur- 
face prosperity masked an unequal distribution of wealth and 
discrimination against those perceived to be "different." Films, 
television, nightlife, and comic books (manga), sometimes garish 
and violent, offered an escape from the pressures of contemporary 
life. Categorization of social problems as medical syndromes tended 



71 



Japan: A Country Study 

to focus attention on personal-problem solving and away from 
societal-level causes, such as poverty, gender roles, or the lack of 
assistance in caring for ill elderly relatives. 

The pace and rhythm of life in 1990 Japan would have seemed 
familiar to Westerners. Yet the Japanese approached them with 
a world view eclectically derived from a variety of religious and 
secular traditions, emphasizing human relations. Many Japanese 
were willing to delay rewards, to put forth their best efforts for their 
teams, and to avoid open conflict. The outside world was an arena 
of intense competition. Family, neighborhood, and workplace rep- 
resented ever-widening circles of social relations to which individuals 
adjusted and through which they grew as human beings. 

Japan, with the world's second largest gross national product 
(GNP — see Glossary) and seventh largest population, played an 
increasingly important part in world affairs. As the government 
embarked on a policy of internationalization, individual Japanese 
creatively combined elements from their own history with foreign 
influences and new inventions, as they adapted to the postindus- 
trial world. 

Physical Setting 

Composition, Topography, and Drainage 

The mountainous islands of the Japanese Archipelago form a 
crescent off the eastern coast of Asia (see fig. 1). They are sepa- 
rated from the mainland by the Sea of Japan, which historically 
served as a protective barrier. Japan's insular nature, together with 
the compactness of its main territory and the cultural homogen- 
eity of its people, enabled the nation to remain free of outside dom- 
ination until its defeat in World War II (see World War II and 
the Occupation, 1941-52, ch. 1). The country consists of four prin- 
cipal islands: Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu; more than 
3,000 adjacent islands and islets, including Oshima in the Nampo 
chain; and more than 200 other smaller islands, including those 
of the Amami, Okinawa, and Sakishima chains of the Ryiikyu 
Archipelago. The national territory also includes the small Bonin 
Islands (called Ogasawara by the Japanese), I wo Jima, and the Vol- 
cano Islands (Kazan Retto), stretching some 1,100 kilometers from 
the main islands. A territorial dispute with the Soviet Union, dat- 
ing from the end of World War II, over the two southernmost of 
the Kuril Islands, Etorofu and Kunashiri, and the smaller Shikotan 
and Habomai island groups northeast of Hokkaido remained 
a sensitive spot in Japan-Soviet Union relations throughout the 
1980s (see Relations with the Soviet Union, ch. 7). Excluding 



72 



At the summit of Mount Fuji, overlooking Lake Yamanaka 
Courtesy Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress 

disputed territory, the archipelago covers about 377,000 square 
kilometers. No point in Japan is more than 150 kilometers from 
the sea. 

The four major islands are separated by narrow straits and form 
a natural entity. The Ryukyii Islands curve 970 kilometers south- 
ward from Kyushu. 

The distance between Japan and the Korean Peninsula, the 
nearest point on the Asian continent, is about 200 kilometers at 
the Korea Strait. Japan has always been linked with the continent 
through trade routes, stretching in the north toward Siberia, in 
the west through the Tsushima Islands to the Korean Peninsula, 
and in the south to the ports on the south China coast. 

The Japanese islands are the summits of mountain ridges up- 
lifted near the outer edge of the continental shelf. About 75 per- 
cent of Japan's area is mountainous, and scattered plains and 
intermontane basins (in which the population is concentrated) cover 
only about 25 percent. A long chain of mountains runs down the 
middle of the archipelago, dividing it into two halves, the ''face," 
fronting on the Pacific Ocean, and the "back," toward the Sea 
of Japan. On the Pacific side are steep mountains 1,500 to 3,000 
meters high ,with deep valleys and gorges. Central Japan is marked 
by the convergence of the three mountain chains — the Hida, Kiso, 



73 



Japan: A Country Study 



and Akaishi mountains — that form the Japanese Alps (Nihon 
Arupusu), several of whose peaks are higher than 3,000 meters. 
The highest point in the Japanese Alps is Kitadake at 3, 192 meters. 
The highest point in the country is Mount Fuji (Fujisan, also called 
Fujiyama in the West but not in Japan), a volcano dormant since 
1707 that rises to 3,776 meters above sea level in Shizuoka Prefec- 
ture. On the Sea of Japan side are plateaus and low mountain dis- 
tricts, with altitudes of 500 to 1,500 meters. 

None of the populated plains or mountain basins is exten- 
sive in area. The largest, the Kanto Plain, where Tokyo is situated, 
covers only 13,000 square kilometers. Other important plains are 
the Nobi Plain surrounding Nagoya, the Kinki Plain in the Osaka- 
Kyoto area, the Sendai Plain around the city of Sendai in north- 
eastern Honshu, and the Ishikari Plain on Hokkaido. Many of these 
plains are along the coast, and their areas have been increased by 
reclamation throughout recorded history. 

The small amount of habitable land prompted significant human 
modification of the terrain over many centuries. Land was reclaimed 
from the sea and from river deltas by building dikes and drainage, 
and rice paddies were built on terraces carved into mountainsides. 
The process continued in the modern period with extension of shore- 
lines and building of artificial islands for industrial and port 
development, such as Port Island in Kobe and the new Kansai In- 
ternational Airport, which was under construction in Osaka Bay 
in 1 990 . Hills and even mountains have been razed to provide flat 
areas for housing. 

Rivers are generally steep and swift, and few are suitable for 
navigation except in their lower reaches. Most rivers are less than 
300 kilometers in length, but their rapid flow from the mountains 
provides a valuable, renewable resource: hydroelectric power gener- 
ation. Japan's hydroelectric power potential has been exploited 
almost to capacity. Seasonal variations in flow have led to exten- 
sive development of flood control measures. Most of the rivers are 
very short. The longest, the Shinano, which winds through Nagano 
Prefecture to Niigata Prefecture and flows into the Sea of Japan, 
is only 367 kilometers long. The largest freshwater lake is Lake 
Biwa, northeast of Kyoto. 

Extensive coastal shipping, especially around the Inland Sea (Seto 
Naikai) compensates for the lack of navigable rivers. The Pacific 
coastline south of Tokyo is characterized by long, narrow, gradu- 
ally shallowing inlets produced by sedimentation, which has created 
many natural harbors. The Pacific coastline north of Tokyo, the 
coast of Hokkaido, and the Sea of Japan coast are generally un- 
indented, with few natural harbors (see fig. 3). 



74 



The Society and Its Environment 

Geographic Regions 

The country's forty-seven prefectures are grouped into eight 
regions frequently used as statistical units in government documents 
(see Local Government, ch. 6). The islands of Hokkaido, Shikoku, 
and Kyushu each form a region, and the main island of Honshu 
is divided into five regions. 

Hokkaido 

Hokkaido, about 83,500 square kilometers in area, constitutes 
more than 20 percent of Japan's land area. Like the other main 
islands, Hokkaido is generally mountainous, but its mountains are 
lower than in other parts of Japan; many have leveled summits, 
and hills predominate. Valleys cut through the terrain, and com- 
munications are comparatively easy. Hokkaido was long looked 
upon as a remote frontier area, and until the second half of the 
nineteenth century was left largely to the indigenous Ainu (see 
Minorities, this ch.). The Ainu in the 1980s numbered fewer than 
20,000, and they were being rapidly assimilated into the main 
Japanese population. Since the movement of modern technology 
and development into the area in the late nineteenth century, 
Hokkaido has been considered the major center of Japanese agricul- 
ture, forestry, fishing, and mining. Hokkaido, with about 90 per- 
cent of Japan's pastureland, produced the same proportion of its 
dairy products in the late 1980s. Manufacturing industry played 
a smaller role compared to the other regions. 

Hokkaido's environmental quality and rural character were 
altered by industrial and residential development in the 1980s, with 
developments such as the completion of the Seikan Tunnel link- 
ing Hokkaido and Honshu. Hokkaido was both an important 
agricultural center and a growing industrial area, with most in- 
dustrial development near Sapporo, the prefectural capital. 

Tdhoku 

The northeastern part of Honshu, called Tohoku (literally "the 
northeast"), includes six prefectures. Tohoku, like most of Japan, 
is hilly or mountainous. Its initial historical settlement occurred 
between the seventh and ninth centuries A.D., well after Japanese 
civilization and culture had become firmly established in central 
and southwestern Japan. Although iron, steel, cement, chemical, 
pulp, and petroleum-refining industries began developing in the 
1960s, Tohoku was traditionally considered the granary of Japan 
because it supplied Sendai and the Tokyo-Yokohama market with 
rice and other farm commodities. Tdhoku provided 20 percent of 



77 



The Society and Its Environment 



Geographic Regions 

The country's forty-seven prefectures are grouped into eight 
regions frequently used as statistical units in government documents 
(see Local Government, ch. 6). The islands of Hokkaido, Shikoku, 
and Kyushu each form a region, and the main island of Honshu 
is divided into five regions. 

Hokkaido 

Hokkaido, about 83,500 square kilometers in area, constitutes 
more than 20 percent of Japan's land area. Like the other main 
islands, Hokkaido is generally mountainous, but its mountains are 
lower than in other parts of Japan; many have leveled summits, 
and hills predominate. Valleys cut through the terrain, and com- 
munications are comparatively easy. Hokkaido was long looked 
upon as a remote frontier area, and until the second half of the 
nineteenth century was left largely to the indigenous Ainu (see 
Minorities, this ch.). The Ainu in the 1980s numbered fewer than 
20,000, and they were being rapidly assimilated into the main 
Japanese population. Since the movement of modern technology 
and development into the area in the late nineteenth century, 
Hokkaido has been considered the major center of Japanese agricul- 
ture, forestry, fishing, and mining. Hokkaido, with about 90 per- 
cent of Japan's pastureland, produced the same proportion of its 
dairy products in the late 1980s. Manufacturing industry played 
a smaller role compared to the other regions. 

Hokkaido's environmental quality and rural character were 
altered by industrial and residential development in the 1980s, with 
developments such as the completion of the Seikan Tunnel link- 
ing Hokkaido and Honshu. Hokkaido was both an important 
agricultural center and a growing industrial area, with most in- 
dustrial development near Sapporo, the prefectural capital. 

Tdhoku 

The northeastern part of Honshu, called Tohoku (literally "the 
northeast"), includes six prefectures. Tohoku, like most of Japan, 
is hilly or mountainous. Its initial historical settlement occurred 
between the seventh and ninth centuries A.D., well after Japanese 
civilization and culture had become firmly established in central 
and southwestern Japan. Although iron, steel, cement, chemical, 
pulp, and petroleum-refining industries began developing in the 
1960s, Tohoku was traditionally considered the granary of Japan 
because it supplied Sendai and the Tokyo-Yokohama market with 
rice and other farm commodities. Tohoku provided 20 percent of 



77 



Japan: A Country Study 



the nation's rice crop (see Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing, ch. 4). 
The climate, however, is harsher than in other parts of Honshu 
and permits only one crop a year on paddy land. 

The inland location of many of the region's lowlands has led to 
a concentration of much of the population there. Coupled with 
coastlines that do not favor port development, this settlement pat- 
tern resulted in a much greater than usual dependence on land and 
railroad transportation. Low points in the central mountain range 
fortunately make communications between lowlands on either side 
of the range moderately easy. Tourism became a major industry 
in the Tohoku region, with points of interest including the islands 
of Matsushima Bay, Lake Towada, the Rikuchu Coasdine National 
Park, and the Bandai-Asahi National Park. 

Kantd 

The Kanto ("east of the barrier") region encompasses seven 
prefectures around Tokyo on the Kanto Plain. The plain itself, 
however, makes up only slighdy more than 40 percent of the region. 
The rest consists of the hills and mountains that border it except 
on the seaward side. Once the heartland of feudal power, the Kanto 
became the center of modern development (see Tokugawa Period, 
1600-1867, ch. 1). Within the Tokyo-Yokohama metropolitan area, 
the Kanto housed not only Japan's seat of government, but also 
the largest group of universities and cultural institutions in addi- 
tion to the greatest population and a large industrial zone. Although 
most of the Kanto Plain was used for residential, commercial, or 
industrial construction, it was still farmed in the early 1990s. Rice 
was the principal crop, although the zone around Tokyo and Yoko- 
hama had been landscaped to grow garden produce for the 
metropolitan market. 

The Kanto region in the late twentieth century was the most 
highly developed, urbanized, and industrialized part of Japan. 
Tokyo and Yokohama formed a single industrial complex with a 
concentration of light and heavy industry along Tokyo Bay. Smaller 
cities, farther away from the coast, housed substantial light indus- 
try. The average population density reached 5,471 persons per 
square kilometer in 1987 (see Population Density, this ch.). 

Chubu 

The Chubu or central region encompasses nine prefectures in 
the midland of Japan, west of the Kanto region. The region is the 
widest part of Honshu and is characterized by high, rugged moun- 
tains. The Japanese Alps divide the country into the sunnier Pa- 
cific side, known as the front of Japan or Omote-Nihon, and the 



78 



The Society and Its Environment 



colder Sea of Japan side, or Ura-Nihon, the back of Japan. The 
region comprises three distinct districts: Hokuriku, a coastal strip 
on the Sea of Japan that is a major wet-rice producing area; Tosan, 
or the Central Highlands; and Tokai, or the eastern seaboard, a nar- 
row corridor along the Pacific Coast. 

Hokuriku lies west of the massive mountains that occupy the 
central Chubu region. The district has a very heavy snowfall and 
strong winds. Its turbulent rivers are the source of abundant hydro- 
electric power. Niigata Prefecture is the site of domestic gas and 
oil production. Industrial development is extensive, especially in 
the cities of Niigata and Toyama. Fukui and Kanazawa also have 
large manufacturing industries. Hokuriku developed largely in- 
dependently of other regions, mainly because it remained relatively 
isolated from the major industrial and cultural centers on the Pa- 
cific Coast. Because port facilities were limited and road transport 
hampered by heavy winter snows, the district relied largely on rail- 
road transportation (see Railroads and Subways, ch. 4). 

The Tosan district is an area of complex and high rugged 
mountains — often called the roof of Japan — that include the Japa- 
nese Alps. The population is* chiefly concentrated in six elevated 
basins connected by narrow valleys. Tosan was long a main silk- 
producing area, although output declined after World War II. 
Much of the labor formerly required in silk production was ab- 
sorbed by the district's diversified manufacturing industry, which 
included precision instruments, machinery, textiles, food process- 
ing, and other light manufacturing. 

The Tokai district, bordering the Pacific Ocean, is a narrow cor- 
ridor interrupted in places by mountains that descend into the sea. 
Since the Tokugawa period (1600-1867), this corridor has been 
important in linking Tokyo, Kyoto, and Osaka. One of old Japan's 
most famous roads, the Tokaido, ran through it connecting Edo 
(Tokyo, since 1868) and Kyoto, the old imperial capital; in the 
twentieth century it became the route of new super-express high- 
ways and high-speed railroad lines. 

A number of small alluvial plains are found in the corridor sec- 
tion. A mild climate, favorable location relative to the great 
metropolitan complexes, and the availability of fast transportation 
have made them truck-gardening centers for out-of- season vegeta- 
bles. Upland areas of rolling hills are extensively given over to the 
growing of mandarin oranges and tea. The corridor also has a num- 
ber of important small industrial centers. The western part of Tokai 
includes the Nobi Plain, where rice was grown by the seventh cen- 
tury A.D. Nagoya, facing Ise Bay, is a center for heavy industry, 
including iron and steel and machinery manufacturing. 



79 



Japan: A Country Study 
Kinki 

The Kinki region lies to the west of Tokai and consists of seven 
prefectures forming a comparatively narrow area of Honshu, 
stretching from the Sea of Japan on the north to the Pacific Ocean 
on the south. It includes Japan js second largest industrial- 
commercial complex, centered on Osaka and Kobe, and the two 
former capital cities of Nara and Kyoto, seats of the imperial fam- 
ily from the early eighth century A.D. until the Meiji Restoration 
in 1868 (see The Meiji Restoration, ch. 1). The area is rich in im- 
perial and cultural history and attracts many Japanese and foreign 
tourists ._ 

The Osaka Plain is the site of Osaka, Kobe, and a number of 
intermediate- sized industrial cities, which together form the Han- 
shin commercial-industrial complex. The suburbs of Osaka were 
given over to farming, including vegetables, dairy farming, poultry 
raising, and rice cultivation in the 1980s. These areas were progres- 
sively reduced as the cities expanded and residential areas, including 
numerous so-called "new cities," were built, such as the develop- 
ments north of Osaka resulting from the Osaka International Ex- 
position (Expo '70) world's fair. 

Chugoku 

The Chugoku region, occupying the western end of Honshu en- 
compasses five prefectures. It is characterized by irregular rolling 
hills and limited plain areas and is divided into two distinct parts 
by mountains running east and west through its center. The north- 
ern, somewhat narrower, district is known as San'in, or "shady 
side of the mountain," and the southern district, as San'yo, or 
"sunny side," because of their marked differences in climate. The 
whole Inland Sea region, including San'yo underwent rapid de- 
velopment in the late twentieth century. The city of Hiroshima, 
rebuilt after being destroyed by the atomic bomb in 1945, was an 
industrial metropolis of more than 2.8 million people by 1987. Over- 
fishing and pollution reduced the productivity of the Inland Sea 
fishing grounds, and the area concentrated on heavy industry. 
San'in, on the other hand, was less industrialized and relied on 
agriculture. 

Shikoku 

The Shikoku region — comprising the entire island of Shikoku— 
covers about 18,800 square kilometers and consists of four prefec- 
tures. It is connected to Honshu by ferry and air, and since 1988 
by the Seto-Ohashi bridge network. Until completion of the bridges, 



80 



The Society and Its Environment 



the region was isolated from the rest of Japan, and the freer move- 
ment between Honshu and Shikoku was expected to promote eco- 
nomic development on both sides of the bridges. 

Mountains running east and west divide Shikoku into a narrow 
northern subregion, fronting on the Inland Sea, and a southern 
part facing the Pacific Ocean. Most of the population lived in the 
north in the 1980s, and all but one of the island's few larger cites 
were located there. Industry was moderately well developed and 
included the processing of ores from the important Besshi copper 
mine. Land was used intensively. Wide alluvial areas, especially 
in the eastern part of the zone, were planted with rice and subse- 
quently double cropped with winter wheat and barley. Fruit was 
grown throughout the northern area in great variety, including 
citrus fruits, persimmons, peaches, and grapes. 

The larger southern section of Shikoku is mountainous and 
sparsely populated. The only significant lowland is a small alluvial 
plain at Kochi, a prefectural capital. The section's mild winters 
stimulated some truck farming, specializing in growing out-of- 
season vegetables under plastic covering. Two crops of rice can 
be cultivated annually in the southern portion. The pulp and paper 
industry took advantage of the abundant forests and hydroelectric 
power. 

Kyushu 

Kyushu, meaning "nine provinces" (from its ancient adminis- 
trative structure), is the southernmost of the main islands and in 
modern times comprises seven prefectures. It was the stepping stone 
to Honshu for early migrants from the Korean Peninsula and a 
channel for the spread of ideas from the Asian mainland (see Early 
Developments, ch. 1). Kyushu lies at the western end of the In- 
land Sea. Its northern extremity is only about 1 .6 kilometers from 
Honshu, and the two islands are connected by the Kammon Bridge 
and by three tunnels, including one for the Japan Railways Group's 
Shinkansen (bullet train). The region is divided not only geographi- 
cally, but economically, by the Kyushu Mountains, which run di- 
agonally across the middle of the island. The north, including 
Kitakyushu industrial region, became increasingly urbanized and 
industrialized after World War II, while the agricultural south be- 
came relatively poorer. The hilly northwestern part of the island 
has extensive coal deposits, the second largest in Japan, which 
formed the basis for a large iron and steel industry. An extensive 
lowland area, in the northwest, between Kumamoto and Saga, was 
an important farming district in the late 1980s. 



81 



Japan: A Country Study 

The climate of Kyushu is generally warm and humid, and the 
cultivation of vegetables and fruits was supplemented by cattle rais- 
ing. The cities of Kitakyushu and Sasebo were noted for iron and 
steel production, and Nagasaki for manufacturing. Nagasaki is a 
city of historical and cultural importance, a center for Chinese and 
Western influences from the sixteenth century on, and the only 
port open to foreign ships during most of the Tokugawa period. 
Like Hiroshima, it also was rebuilt after being devastated by an 
atomic bomb attack in 1945. 

Ryukyu Islands 

The Ryukyu Islands include more than 200 islands and islets — 
some little more than coral outcrops — of which fewer than half are 
populated. They extend in a chain generally southwestward from 
the Tokara Strait, which separates them from the oudying islands 
of Kyushu, to within 120 kilometers of Taiwan. The Ryukyus are 
considered part of the Ryushu region but historically have been 
quite distinctively separate from the rest of the region. 

The islands are the tops of mountain ranges along the outer edge 
of the continental shelf. They are generally hilly or mountainous, 
with active volcanos occurring mainly in the northern part of the 
archipelago. Okinawa is the largest and economically the most im- 
portant of the Ryukyus. There was little industry in the 1980s, and 
the economy relied heavily on tourism. Northern Okinawa is quite 
rugged and forested, while the southern part consists of rolling hills. 
Although agriculture and fishing remained the occupations of most 
of the population in the Ryukyus, the region experienced consider- 
able industrial expansion during the period of United States occu- 
pation from 1945 to 1972. 

Climate 

Lying in the middle latitudes, covering about 22° of latitude in 
the northern hemisphere, Japan is generally a rainy country with 
high humidity. Because of its wide range of latitude, Japan has 
diverse climates, with a range often compared to that of the east 
coast of North America, from Nova Scotia to Georgia. Tokyo's 
latitude is about 36° north, comparable to that of Tehran, Athens, 
or Los Angeles. The generally humid, temperate climate exhibits 
marked seasonal variation celebrated in art and literature, as well 
as regional variations ranging from cool in Hokkaido to subtropi- 
cal in Kyushu. Climate also varies with altitude and with location 
on the Pacific Ocean or on the Sea of Japan. Northern Japan has 
warm summers but long, cold winters with heavy snow. Central 



82 



The Society and Its Environment 

Japan has hot, humid summers and short winters, and southwestern 
Japan has long, hot, humid summers and mild winters. 

Two primary factors influence Japanese climate: a location near 
the Asian continent and the existence of major oceanic currents. 
The climate from June to September is marked by hot, wet weather 
brought by tropical airflows from the Pacific Ocean and Southeast 
Asia. These airflows are full of moisture and deposit substantial 
amounts of rain when they reach land. There is a marked rainy 
season, beginning in early June and continuing for about a month. 
It is followed by hot, sticky weather. Five or six typhoons pass over 
or near Japan every year from early August to early September, 
sometimes resulting in significant damage. Annual precipitation, 
which averages between 100 and 200 centimeters, is concentrated 
in the period between June and September. In fact, 70 to 80 per- 
cent of the annual precipitation falls during this period. In winter, 
a high-pressure area develops over Siberia, and a low-pressure area 
over the northern Pacific Ocean. The result is a flow of cold air 
eastward across Japan that brings freezing temperatures and heavy 
snowfalls to the central mountain ranges facing the Sea of Japan, 
but clear skies to areas fronting on the Pacific. 

Two major ocean currents affect this climatic pattern. The warm 
Kuroshio Current (Black Current; also known as the Japan Cur- 
rent) and the cold Oyashio Current (Parent Current; also known 
as the Okhotsk Current). The Kuroshio Current flows northward 
on the Pacific side of Japan and warms areas as far north as Tokyo; 
a small branch, the Tsushima Current, flows up the Sea of Japan 
side. The Oyashio Current, which abounds in plankton beneficial 
to cold-water fish, flows southward along the northern Pacific, cool- 
ing adjacent coastal areas. The meeting point of these currents at 
latitude 36° north is a bountiful fishing ground. 

Earthquakes 

Ten percent of the world's active volcanos — 40 in the 1980s 
(another 148 were dormant) — are found in Japan, which lies in 
a zone of extreme crustal instability. As many as 1 ,500 earthquakes 
are recorded yearly, and magnitudes of four to six on the Richter 
scale are not uncommon. Minor tremors occur almost daily in one 
part of the country or another, causing slight shaking of buildings. 
Major earthquakes occur infrequently; the most famous in the twen- 
tieth century was the great Kanto earthquake of 1923, in which 
130,000 people died. Undersea earthquakes also expose the Japa- 
nese coastline to danger from tsunami. 

Japan has become a world leader in research on causes and 
prediction of earthquakes. The development of advanced technology 



83 



Japan: A Country Study 

has permitted the construction of skyscrapers even in earthquake- 
prone areas. Extensive civil defense efforts focus on training in pro- 
tection against earthquakes, in particular against accompanying 
fire, which represents the greatest danger. 

Pollution 

As Japan changed from an agricultural society to an urbanized 
industrial power, much of its natural beauty was destroyed and 
defaced by overcrowding and industrial development. However, 
as the world's leading importer of both exhaustible and renewable 
natural resources and the second largest consumer of fossil fuels, 
Japan came to realize that it had a major international responsi- 
bility to conserve and protect the environment. By 1990 Japan had 
some of the world's strictest environmental protection regulations. 

These regulations were the consequence of a number of well pub- 
licized environmental disasters. Cadmium poisoning from indus- 
trial waste in Toyama Prefecture was discovered to be the cause 
of the extremely painful itai-itai disease {itai-itai means ouch-ouch), 
which causes severe pain in the back and joints, contributes to britde 
bones that fracture easily, and brings about degeneration of the 
kidneys. Recovery of cadmium effluent halted the spread of the 
disease, and no new cases have been recorded since 1946. In the 
1960s, hundreds of inhabitants of Minamata City in Kumamoto 
Prefecture contracted "Minamata disease," a degeneration of the 
central nervous system caused by eating mercury-poisoned seafood 
from Minamata Bay (nearly 1 ,300 cases of Minamata disease had 
been diagnosed by 1979). In Yokkaichi, a port in Mie Prefecture, 
air pollution caused by sulfur oxide and nitrogen oxide emissions 
led to a rapid increase in the number of people suffering from 
asthma and bronchitis. In urban areas, photochemical smog from 
automotive and industrial exhaust fumes also contributed to the 
rise in respiratory problems. In the early 1970s, chronic arsenic 
poisoning attributed to dust from local arsenic mines (since shut 
down) was experienced in Shimane and Miyazaki prefectures. The 
incidence of polychlorobiphenyl (PCB) poisoning, caused by pol- 
luted cooking oil and food, particularly seafood, was also prob- 
lematic. 

Grass-roots pressure groups were formed in the 1960s and 1970s 
as a response to increasing environmental problems. These groups 
were independent of formal political parties and focused on sin- 
gle, usually local, environmental issues. Such citizens' movements 
were reminiscent of earlier citizen protests in the 1890s. As a result 
of this pressure, Japan began in the early 1970s to combat pollu- 
tion on an official governmental level, with the establishment of 



84 



The Society and Its Environment 



the Environmental Agency. Although the agency lacked strong pub- 
lic influence and political power, it established effective regulations 
to curb pollution from photochemical smog through strict automo- 
tive emissions standards. It also worked to reduce noise from trains 
and airplanes, to remove mining, forestry, and tourist debris left 
on mountainsides and in national forests, and to monitor noise and 
air pollutant levels in major cities. 

Groups also pressured the government and industry for a sys- 
tem of compensation for pollution victims. A series of lawsuits in 
the early 1970s established that corporations were responsible for 
damage cause by their products or activities. The Pollution Health 
Damage Compensation Law of 1973 provides industry funds for 
victims. Compensation, however, was slow, and awards small, while 
the establishment of a government fund helped industry diffuse 
public outrage. In 1984, it was reported that Japan had more than 
85,000 recognized victims of environmental pollution, with an esti- 
mated rate of increase of 6 percent a year. The regulations aimed 
at business were not enough to solve Japan's environmental 
problems, according to the Environmental Agency's 1989 White 
Paper on the Environment, although public awareness and interest had 
grown and a number of civic and public interest groups had been 
established to combat pollution. Fewer public interest groups were 
engaged in the environmental debate than in antinuclear issues, 
and the peak of public interest in the environment occurred in the 
1970s and early 1980s. 

Japan had still not addressed worldwide environmental issues 
adequately. Japanese whaling continued in the late 1980s to be the 
object of international protest, and Japanese corporate involvement 
in the deforestation of Southeast Asia created concern among 
domestic and international groups. 

The late 1980s saw the beginnings of change. In a 1984 public 
opinion poll conducted by the government, Japanese citizens had 
indicated less concern for environmental problems than their Euro- 
pean counterparts. In the same year, the Environmental Agency 
had issued its first white paper calling for greater participation by 
Japan's public and private sectors in protecting the global environ- 
ment. That challenge was repeated in the 1989 study. When citizens 
were asked in 1989 if they thought environmental problems had 
improved compared with the past, nearly 41 percent thought things 
had improved, 31 percent thought that they had stayed the same, 
and nearly 21 percent thought that they had worsened. Some 75 
percent of those surveyed expressed concern about endangered spe- 
cies, shrinkage of rain forests, expansion of deserts, destruction of 
the ozone layer, acid rain, and increased water and air pollution 



85 



Japan: A Country Study 

in developing cquntries. Most believed that Japan, alone or in 
cooperation withbther industrialized countries, had the responsi- 
bility to solve environmental problems. Although environmental 
public interest groups were not as numerous or active as they had 
been in the 1970s, the increased awareness of global environmen- 
tal issues was likely to result in increased grass-roots activism. 

Since the 1960s, Japan has made slow but significant progress 
in combating environmental problems. Efforts made in the late 
1980s created a base of technology and concern that was expected 
to help the Japanese face the environmental issues of the 1990s. 

Population 

With a population of 122.6 million in 1988, Japan was three times 
more densely populated than Europe as a whole and twelve times 
more densely populated than the United States. The population 
has grown more than threefold since 1872, when it stood at 34.8 
million. Beginning in the 1950s the birth rate declined, however, 
and by the late 1980s the rate of natural increase was 0.5 percent, 
the lowest in the world outside Europe. Both the density and the 
age structure of Japan's population are likely to influence the coun- 
try's future. 

Population Density 

Japan had an average of 324 persons per square kilometer in 
1988, high compared with China (115), the United States (26), or 
the Soviet Union (13), but lower than in some other Asian coun- 
tries, such as the Republic of Korea (South Korea), which had 428 
people per square kilometer. The population per square kilometer 
of habitable land in 1988 was 1,523 persons, however, compared 
with 384 in the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), 
165 in France, and 54 in the United States. About 77 percent of 
the population lived in urban areas, and the Pacific Coast from 
Tokyo to Osaka was particularly densely populated. Well over 50 
percent of the Japanese population lived on slightly over 2 percent 
of its land. 

Japan's population density has helped promote extremely high 
land prices. Between 1955 and 1989, land prices in the six largest 
cities increased 15,456 percent. Urban land prices generally in- 
creased 40 percent from 1980 to 1987; in the six largest cities, the 
price of land doubled over that period. For many families, this trend 
put housing in central cities out of reach. The result was lengthy 
commutes for many workers; daily commutes of up to two hours 
each way were not uncommon in the Tokyo area in the late 1980s. 
Despite the large amount of forested land in Japan, parks in cities 



86 



The Society and Its Environment 



were smaller and scarcer than in major European or United States 
cities, which averaged ten times the amount of parkland per in- 
habitant. However, despite the high cost of urban housing, more 
people were likely to move back into central city areas, especially 
as the price of transportation and commuting time increased. Na- 
tional and regional governments devoted resources to making 
regional cities and rural areas more attractive by developing trans- 
portation networks, social services, industry, and education insti- 
tutions in attempts to decentralize settlement and improve the 
quality of life. Nevertheless, major cities, especially Tokyo, re- 
mained attractive to young people seeking education and jobs. 

Age Structure 

Like other postindustrial countries, Japan in the 1980s faced the 
problems associated with an aging population (see Patterns of De- 
velopment, ch. 4). In 1988, only 11.2 percent of the population 
was sixty-five years or older, but projections were that nearly 24 
percent would be in that age category by 2020 (see table 2, Ap- 
pendix). That shift will make Japan one of the world's most el- 
derly societies, and the change will have taken place in a shorter 
span of time than in any other country. 

This aging of the population was brought about by a combina- 
tion of low fertility and high life expectancies. In 1988, the fertil- 
ity rate was 11.9 per 1,000, and the average number of children 
born to a woman over her lifetime had been fewer than two since 
the late 1970s (the average number was 1 .7 in the mid-1980s). Fam- 
ily planning was nearly universal, with condoms and legal abortions 
the main forms of birth control. A number of factors contributed 
to the trend toward small families: late marriage, increased par- 
ticipation of women in the labor force, small living spaces, and the 
high costs of children's education. Life expectancies at birth, 81.3 
years for women and 75.5 years for men in 1988, were the highest 
in the world. (The expected life span at the end of World War II, 
for both men and women, was fifty years.) The mortality rate in 
1988 was 6 per 1,000. The leading causes of death were cancer, 
heart disease, and cerebrovascular disease, a pattern common to 
postindustrial societies (see Health Care, this ch.). 

Public policy, the media, and discussions with private citizens 
revealed a high level of concern for the implications of one in four 
persons in Japan being sixty-five or older. By 2025 the depen- 
dency ratio (the ratio of people under fifteen years plus those sixty- 
five and older to those aged fifteen to sixty-five, indicating in a 
general way the ratio of the dependent population to the working 
population) was expected to be two dependents for every three 



87 



Japan: A Country Study 




Figure 4. Age-Sex Distribution, 1988 



workers. The aging of the population was already becoming evi- 
dent in the aging of the labor force and the shortage of young work- 
ers in the late 1980s, with potential impacts on employment 
practices, wages and benefits, and the roles of women in the labor 
force (see The Structure of Japan's Labor Markets, ch. 4). The 
increasing proportion of elderly people in the population also had 
a major impact on government spending. As recently as the early 
1970s, social expenditures amounted to only about 6 percent of 
Japan's national income. In 1989, that portion of the national bud- 
get was 18 percent, and it was expected that by 2025, 27 percent 
of national income would be spent on social welfare. 

In addition, the median age of the elderly population was rising 
in the late 1980s (see fig. 4). The proportion of people aged seventy- 
five to eighty-five was expected to increase from 6 percent in 1985 



88 



The Society and Its Environment 



to 15 percent in 2025. Because the incidence of chronic disease in- 
creases with age, the health-care and pension systems, too, were 
expected to come under severe strain. The government in the 
mid-1980s began to reevaluate the relative burdens of government 
and the private sector in health care and pensions, and it estab- 
lished policies to control government costs in these programs. 
Recognizing the lower probability that an elderly person will be 
residing with an adult child and the higher probability of any daugh- 
ter or daughter-in-law's participation in the paid labor force, the 
government encouraged establishment of nursing homes, day-care 
facilities for the elderly, and home health programs. Longer life 
spans were altering relations between spouses and across genera- 
tions, creating new government responsibilities, and changing vir- 
tually all aspects of social life. 

Migration 

Between 6 million and 7 million people moved their residences 
each year during the 1980s. About 50 percent of these moves were 
within the same prefecture; the others were relocations from one 
prefecture to another. During Japan's economic development in 
the twentieth century, and especially during the 1950s and 1960s, 
migration was characterized by urbanization as people from rural 
areas in increasing numbers moved to the larger metropolitan areas 
in search of better jobs and education. Out-migration from rural 
prefectures continued in the late 1980s, but more slowly than in 
previous decades. 

In the 1980s, government policy provided support for new urban 
development away from the large cities, particularly Tokyo, and 
assisted regional cities to attract young people to live and work there. 
Regional cities offered familiarity to those from nearby areas, lower 
costs of living, shorter commutes, and, in general, a more relaxed 
life-style then could be had in larger cities. Young people continued 
to move to large cities, however, to attend universities and find 
work, but some returned to regional cities (a pattern known as 
U-turn) or to their prefecture of origin (a pattern known as J-turn). 

Government statistics show that in the 1980s significant num- 
bers of people left the largest cities (Tokyo and Osaka). In 1988, 
more than 500,000 people left Tokyo, which experienced a net loss 
through migration of nearly 73,000 for the year. Osaka had a net 
loss of nearly 36,000 in the same year. However, the prefectures 
showing the highest net growth were located near the major urban 
centers, such as Saitama, Chiba, Ibaraki, and Kanazawa around 
Tokyo, and Hyogo, Nara, and Shiga near Osaka and Kyoto. This 
pattern suggests a process of suburbanization, people moving away 



89 



Japan: A Country Study 



from the cities for affordable housing but still commuting there for 
work and recreation, rather than a true decentralization. 

Japanese economic success has led to an increase in certain types 
of external migration. In 1988, about 8.5 million Japanese went 
abroad. Over 80 percent of these people traveled as tourists, espe- 
cially visiting other parts of Asia and North America. However, 
about 548,000 Japanese were living abroad, 48,000 of whom had 
permanent foreign residency, about four times the number who 
had that status in 1975. Nearly 200,000 Japanese went abroad in 
1988 for extended periods of study, research, or business assign- 
ments. As the government and private corporations have stressed 
internationalization, greater numbers of individuals have been 
directly affected, decreasing Japan's historically claimed insularity. 
Despite the benefits of experiencing life abroad, individuals who have 
lived outside of Japan for extended periods often faced problems 
of discrimination upon their return because others might no longer 
consider them fully Japanese. By the late 1980s, these problems, 
particularly the bullying of returnee children in the schools, had be- 
come a major public issue both in Japan and in Japanese commu- 
nities abroad (see Primary and Secondary Education, ch. 3). 

Minorities 

Japanese society, with its ideology of homogeneity, has tradi- 
tionally been intolerant of ethnic and other differences. People iden- 
tified as different might be considered "polluted" — the category 
applied historically to the outcasts of Japan, particularly the 
burakumin — and thus not suitable as marriage partners or employees. 
Men or women of mixed ancestry, those with family histories of 
certain diseases, atomic bomb survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
and their descendants, foreigners, and members of minority groups 
faced discrimination in a variety of forms. 

Foreign Residents 

If Japanese society was reluctant to readmit returnees in the 
1980s, it was even less willing to accept those people who were not 
ethnic Japanese as full members of society. In 1988 there were 
941,000 foreign residents in Japan, less than 1 percent of Japan's 
population (if illegal aliens were counted, the number of foreign- 
ers might be several times higher than the quoted figure). Of this 
number, 677,000 (about 72 percent) were Koreans, and 129,000 
(some 14 percent) were Chinese. Many of these people were descen- 
dants of those brought to Japan during Japan's occupation of Tai- 
wan (1895-1945) and of Korea (1905-45) to work at unskilled jobs, 
such as coal mining. Because Japanese citizenship was based on 



90 



The Society and Its Environment 



the nationality of the parent rather than the place of birth, subse- 
quent generations were not automatically Japanese and had to be 
naturalized to claim citizenship, despite being born and educated 
in Japan and speaking only Japanese, as was the case with most 
Koreans in Japan. Until the late 1980s, people applying for citizen- 
ship were expected to use only the Japanese renderings of their 
names and, even as citizens, continued to face discrimination in 
education, employment, and marriage. Thus, few chose naturali- 
zation, and they faced legal restrictions as foreigners as well as ex- 
treme social prejudice. 

All non-Japanese were required by law to register with the 
government and carry alien registration cards. From the early 
1980s, a civil disobedience movement encouraged refusal of the 
fingerprinting that accompanied registration every five years. Those 
people who opposed fingerprinting argued that it was discrimina- 
tory since the only Japanese who were fingerprinted were crimi- 
nals. The courts upheld fingerprinting, but the law was changed 
so that fingerprinting was done once rather than with each renew- 
al of the registration. Some Koreans, often with the support of either 
the Republic of Korea (South Korea) or the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea (North Korea), attempted to educate their chil- 
dren in Korean language, history, and culture and to instill pride 
in their Korean heritage. Most Koreans in Japan in 1990, however, 
had never been to the Korean Peninsula, and did not speak Korean. 
Many were caught in a vicious cycle of poverty and discrimina- 
tion in a society that emphasized Japan's homogeneity and cul- 
tural uniqueness. Other Asians, too, whether students or permanent 
residents, faced prejudice and a strong "we-they" distinction. Euro- 
peans and North Americans might be treated with greater hospi- 
tality but nonetheless found it difficult to become full members of 
Japanese society. Public awareness of the place of foreigners (gaijiri) 
in Japanese society was heightened in the late 1980s in debates over 
the acceptance of Vietnamese and Chinese refugees and the im- 
porting of Filipino brides for rural farmers. 

Burakumin 

Despite Japan's claim of homogeneity, two Japanese minority 
groups can be identified. The largest is known as burakumin (liter- 
ally, residents of buraku, hamlets), descendants of premodern out- 
cast hereditary occupational groups, such as butchers, leatherworkers, 
and certain entertainers. Discrimination against these occupational 
groups arose historically because of Buddhist prohibitions against 
killing and Shinto notions of pollution, as well as governmental at- 
tempts at social control. During the Tokugawa period, such people 



91 



Japan: A Country Study 

were required to live in special buraku and, like the rest of the popu- 
lation, were bound by sumptuary laws based on the inheritance 
of social class. The Meiji government abolished derogatory names 
applied to burakumin in 1871, but the new laws had little effect on 
the social discrimination faced by the former outcasts and their 
descendants. The laws, however, did eliminate the economic mo- 
nopoly they had over certain occupations. 

Burakumin in 1990, although physically indistinguishable from 
other Japanese, often lived in urban ghettoes or in the traditional 
special hamlets in rural areas. Some attempted to pass as ordinary 
Japanese, but the checks on family background that were often part 
of marriage arrangements and employment applications made this 
difficult. Estimates on the number of burakumin ranged from 2 mil- 
lion to 4 million, or about 2 to 3 percent of the national population. 

Ordinary Japanese claimed that burakumin status can be sur- 
mised from the location of the family home, occupation, dialect, 
or mannerisms, and, despite legal equality, continued to discrimi- 
nate against people they surmised to be burakumin. Past and cur- 
rent discrimination had resulted in lower educational attainment 
and socioeconomic status among burakumin than among the majority 
of Japanese. Movements with objectives ranging from "liberation" 
to encouraging integration have tried over the years to change this 
situation. As early as 1922, leaders of the burakumin community or- 
ganized a movement, the Levelers Association of Japan (Suiheisha), 
to advance their rights. After World War II, the National Commit- 
tee for Burakumin Liberation was founded, changing its name to 
the Burakumin Liberation League in the 1950s. The league, with 
the support of the socialist and communist parties, pressured govern- 
ment into making important concessions in the late 1960s and 1970s. 
One concession was the passing of a Special Measures Law for As- 
similation Projects, which provided financial aid for burakumin com- 
munities. Another was the closing of nineteenth-century family 
registers, kept by the Ministry of Justice for all Japanese, which re- 
vealed the outcaste origins of burakumin families and individuals. 
These records could now be consulted only in legal cases, making 
it more difficult to identify or discriminate against burakumin. Even 
into the 1980s, however, the subjects of burakumin discrimination 
and liberation were taboo in public discussion. In the late 1970s, 
the Sayama incident, which involved a murder conviction of a 
burakumin based on circumstantial evidence, focused public atten- 
tion on the problems of the burakumin. In the 1980s, some educa- 
tors and local governments, particularly in areas with relatively large 
burakumin populations, began special education programs, which they 



92 



The Society and Its Environment 



hoped would encourage greater educational and economic success 
for young burakumin and decrease the discrimination they faced. 

Ainu 

The second minority group among Japanese citizens is the Ainu, 
who are thought to be related to Tungusic, Altaic, and Uralic peo- 
ples of Siberia. Historically, the Ainu (Ainu means human in the 
Ainu language) were an indigenous hunting and gathering popu- 
lation who occupied most of northern Honshu as late as the Nara 
period (A.D. 710-94). As Japanese settlement expanded, the Ainu 
were pushed northward, until by the Meiji period, they were con- 
fined by the government to a small area in Hokkaido, in a man- 
ner similar to the placing of native Americans on reservations. 
Characterized as remnants of a primitive circumpolar culture, the 
fewer than 20,000 Ainu in 1990 were considered racially distinct 
and thus not fully Japanese. Disease and a low birth rate had se- 
verely diminished their numbers over the past two centuries and 
intermarriage had brought about an almost completely mixed popu- 
lation. 

Although no longer in daily use, the Ainu language in 1990 was 
preserved in epics, songs, and stories transmitted orally over suc- 
ceeding generations. Distinctive rhythmic music and dances and 
some Ainu festivals and crafts were preserved, but mainly in order 
to take advantage of tourism. 

Values and Beliefs 

Contemporary Japan is a secular society. Creating harmonious 
relations with others through reciprocity and the fulfillment of so- 
cial obligations is more significant for most Japanese than an in- 
dividual's relationship to a transcendent God. Harmony, order, 
and self-development are three of the most important values that 
underlie Japanese social interaction. Basic ideas about self and the 
nature of human society are drawn from several religious and 
philosophical traditions. Religious practice, too, emphasizes the 
maintenance of harmonious relations with others (both spiritual 
beings and other humans) and the fulfillment of social obligations 
as a member of a family and a community. 

Values 

Empathy and Human Relations 

In Japanese mythology, the gods display human emotions, such 
as love and anger. In these stories, behavior that results in positive 
relations with others is rewarded, and empathy, identifying oneself 



93 



Japan: A Country Study 



with another, is highly valued. By contrast, those actions that are 
antisocial, or that harm others, are condemned. Hurtful behavior 
is punished in the myths by ostracizing the offender. 

No society can exist that tolerates significant antisocial behavior 
in the long term, but Japan is among the societies that most strongly 
rely on social rather than supernatural sanctions and emphasize 
the benefits of harmony. Japanese children learn from their earli- 
est days that human fulfillment comes from close association with 
others. Children learn early to recognize that they are part of an 
interdependent society, beginning in the family and later extend- 
ing to larger groups such as neighborhood, school, community, 
and workplace. Dependence on others is a natural part of the human 
condition; it is viewed negatively only when the social obligations 
it creates are too onerous to fulfill. 

In interpersonal relationships, most Japanese tend to avoid open 
competition and confrontation. Working with others requires self- 
control, but it carries the rewards of pride in contributing to the 
group, emotional security, and social identity. Wa, the notion of 
harmony within a group, requires an attitude of cooperation and 
a recognition of social roles. If each individual in the group under- 
stands personal obligations and empathizes with the situations of 
others, then the group as a whole benefits. Success can come only 
if all put forth their best individual efforts. Decisions are often made 
only after consulting with everyone in the group. Consensus does 
not imply that there has been universal agreement, but this style 
of consultative decision making involves each member of the group 
in an information exchange, reinforces feelings of group identity, 
and makes implementation of the decision smoother. Cooperation 
within a group also is often focused on competition between that 
group and a parallel one, whether the issue is one of educational 
success or market share. Symbols such as uniforms, names, ban- 
ners, and songs identify the group as distinct from others both to 
outsiders and internally. Participation in group activities, whether 
official or unofficial, is a symbolic statement that an individual 
wishes to be considered part of the group. Thus, after- work bar 
hopping provides not only instrumental opportunities for the ex- 
change of information and release of social tensions, but also op- 
portunities to express nonverbally a desire for continued affiliation. 

Working in a group in Japan requires the development of suc- 
cessful channels of communication, which reinforce group inter- 
dependence and the sense of difference from those who are not 
members of the group. Yet social interaction beyond that which 
occurs with individuals with whom one lives and works is a neces- 
sity in contemporary society. If the exchange is brief and relatively 



94 




Practitioners of Kendo — the "way oj the sword" — a form of spiritual 
discipline combined with ancient Chinese fencing techniques 

Courtesy Eliot Frankeberger 

insignificant, such as buying a newspaper, anonymity will be main- 
tained. But if the relationship is expected to continue over a long 
period, whether in business, marriage, employment, or neighbor- 
hood, great care is likely to be invested in establishing and main- 
taining good relationships. Such relationships are often begun by 
using the social networks of a relative, friend, or colleague who 
can provide an introduction to the desired person or serve as nakodo 
(go-between). The nakodo most often refers to the person (or peo- 
ple) who negotiates marriage arrangements, including checking each 
family's background, conveying questions and criticisms, and 
smoothing out difficulties. But this kind of personal mediation is 
common in many aspects of Japanese life. 

Group membership in Japan provides enjoyment and fulfillment, 
but also causes tremendous tension. An ideology of group harmony 
does not ensure harmony in fact. Japan is an extremely competi- 
tive society, yet competition within the group must be suppressed. 
Minor issues are sometimes dealt with by appeals to higher author- 
ity, but they may well smolder unresolved for years. Major problems 
may be denied, especially to outsiders, but may result in factions 
or in the fissioning of the group (see Interest Groups, ch. 6). It 
is often the individual, however, who bears the burden of these 



95 



Japan: A Country Study 

interpersonal tensions. This burden is reflected in high rates of al- 
cohol consumption and of minor, sometimes psychosomatic, ill- 
ness. Many Japanese cope with these stresses by retreating into 
the private self or by enjoying the escapism offered by much of 
the popular culture (see The Arts, ch. 3). 

The Public Sphere: Order and Status 

It is difficult to imagine a Japanese vision of the social order 
without the influence of Confucianism, because prior to the ad- 
vent of Chinese influence in the sixth century, Japan did not have 
a stratified society (see Religious and Philosophical Traditions, this 
ch.). Confucianism emphasizes harmony among heaven, nature, 
and human society achieved through each person's accepting his 
or her social role and contributing to the social order by proper 
behavior. An often quoted phrase from the Confucian essay "Da 
Xue" (The Great Learning) explains, "Their persons being cul- 
tivated, their families were regulated. Their families being regu- 
lated, their states were rightly governed. Their states being rightly 
governed, the whole kingdom was made tranquil and happy." 

This view implies that hierarchy is natural. Relative status differ- 
ences define nearly all social interaction. Age or seniority, gender, 
educational attainment, and place of employment are common dis- 
tinctions that guide interaction. Without some knowledge of the 
other's background, age and gender may be an individual's only 
guidelines. A Japanese person may prefer not to interact with a 
stranger to avoid potential errors in etiquette. The business cards 
or calling cards so frequently exchanged in Japan are valuable tools 
of social interaction because they provide enough information about 
another person to facilitate normal social exchange. Japan scholar 
Edwin O. Reischauer noted that whereas Americans often act to 
minimize status differences, Japanese find it awkward, even un- 
becoming, when a person does not behave in accordance with sta- 
tus expectations. 

The Japanese language is one means of expressing status differ- 
ences and contributes to the assumption that hierarchy is natural. 
Verb endings regularly express relationships of superiority or in- 
feriority. Japanese has a rich vocabulary of honorific and humble 
terms that indicate a person's status or may be manipulated to ex- 
press what the speaker desires the relationship to be. Men and 
women employ somewhat different speech patterns, with women 
making greater use of polite forms. Certain words are identified 
with masculine speech and others with feminine. For example, there 
are a number of ways to say the pronoun "I," depending on the 
formality of the occasion, the gender of the speaker, and the relative 



96 



People and goods being ferried from Nagasaki 
Courtesy The Mainichi Newspapers 

status of the speaker and listener. As is appropriate in a culture 
that stresses the value of empathy, one person cannot speak without 
considering the other. 

The term hierarchy implies a ranking of roles and a rigid set of 
rules, and Japan has its share of bureaucracy. But the kind of 
hierarchical sense that pervades the whole society is of a different 
sort, which anthropologist Robert Smith calls "diffuse order." For 
example, in premodern times, local leaders were given a great deal 
of autonomy in exchange for assuming total responsibility for af- 
fairs in their localities. In contemporary Japan also, responsibility 
is collective and authority diffuse. The person seeming to be in 
charge is, in reality, bound into the web of group interdependence 
as tightly as those who appear to be his subordinates. Leadership 
thus calls not for a forceful personality and sharp decision-making 
skills, but for sensitivity to the feelings of others and skills in medi- 
ation. Even in the early 1990s, leaders were expected to assume 
responsibility for a major problem occurring in or because of their 
groups by resigning their posts, although they may have had no 
direct involvement in the situation. 

Status in Japan is based on specific relationships between in- 
dividuals, often relationships of social dependency between those 
of unequal status. Girt (duty), the sense of obligation to those to 



97 



Japan: A Country Study 

whom one is indebted, requires deferential behavior and eventu- 
ally repayment of the favor, which in turn calls forth future favors. 
Relations of social dependence thus continue indefinitely, with their 
very inequality binding individuals to each other. Rules of hier- 
archy are tempered by the relationship itself. This tempering is 
known as ninjo (human emotion or compassion). The potential con- 
flict between giri and ninjo has been a frequent theme in Japanese 
drama and literature (see Performing Arts; Literature, ch. 3). 
Although young Japanese in 1990 were less likely to phrase a per- 
sonal dilemma in those terms, claiming that the concept of gin was 
old-fashioned, many continued to feel stress in doing what they 
should when it was not what they wanted. Social order exists in 
part because all members of the society are linked in relationships 
of social dependency, each involved in giving and receiving. 

The Private Sphere: Goals and Self 

Relative status may be seen as the basis of social organization 
and affiliation with others may be considered desirable, but these 
assumptions by no means negate a concept of self. An ideology 
of harmony with others does not automatically create a congruence 
of individual with group or institutional goals. Anthropologist Brian 
Moeran distinguishes Japanese attitudes toward individuality and 
individualism. Individuality, or the uniqueness of a person, is not 
only tolerated, but often admired if the person is seen as sincere, 
as acting from the heart. A work of art conveys strength as well 
as beauty from its * 'individuality." Individualism, on the other 
hand, is viewed negatively, for it is equated with selfishness, the 
opposite of the empathy that is so highly valued. While many 
modern Japanese deny the relevance of the concept of seishin (self- 
less spiritual strength, as in World War II soldiers), selfishness (es- 
pecially "selfish mothers," because the behavior of mothers is 
commonly thought to effect the mental and physical health of chil- 
dren) takes the blame for many social problems of modern soci- 
ety. These problems include ones categorized as psychosomatic 
medical syndromes, such as kitchen syndrome (dadokoro shokogun), 
in which formerly meticulous housewives suddenly adopt odd be- 
haviors and complain of aches and pains, nonverbally expressing 
their frustration with or rejection of the "good wife-wise mother" 
role, or school-refusal syndrome (toko kyohi), in which children com- 
plain of somatic problems, such as stomachaches, and thus miss 
school in an attempt to avoid academic or social failure. 

Japan, like all other societies, has conflicts between individual 
and group. What is different from North American society is not 
that the Japanese have no sense of self, but rather that the self is 



98 



The Society and Its Environment 



defined through its interaction with others and not merely through 
the force of individual personality. 

According to Japan scholar Edwin O. Reischauser, "The cooper- 
ative, relativistic Japanese is not thought of as the bland product 
of a social conditioning that has worn off all individualistic cor- 
ners, but rather as the product of firm inner self-control that has 
made him master of his . . . anti- social instincts .... Social con- 
formity . . . is no sign of weakness but rather the proud, tempered 
product of inner strength." This mastery is achieved by overcom- 
ing hardship, through self-discipline, and through personal striv- 
ing for a perfection that one knows is not possible but remains a 
worthy goal. In this view, both the self and society can be improved, 
and in fact are interrelated, since the ideal of selfhood toward which 
many Japanese strive is one in which consideration of others is para- 
mount. Whereas Americans attempt to cultivate a self that is 
unique, most Japanese place greater emphasis on cultivating "a 
self that can feel human in the company of others," according to 
David Plath. Maturity means continuing to care about what others 
are thinking but feeling confident in one's ability to judge and act 
effectively, acknowledging social norms while remaining true to self. 

Religious and Philosophical Traditions 

The values described in the preceding section are derived from 
a number of religious and philosophical traditions, both indigenous 
and foreign. Taken together, these traditions may be considered 
the Japanese world view, although the personal beliefs of an in- 
dividual Japanese may incorporate some aspects and disregard 
others. The Japanese world view is eclectic, contrasting with a 
Western view in which religion is exclusive and defines one's iden- 
tity. Contemporary Japanese society is highly secular. Cause and 
effect relations are frequently based in scientific models, and ill- 
ness and death are explained by modern medical theories. Yet the 
scientific view is but one of the options from which an individual 
may draw in interpreting life's experiences. 

The Japanese world view is characterized also by a pragmatic 
approach to problem solving, in which the technique may be less 
important than the results. Thus a Japanese who is ill may simul- 
taneously or sequentially seek the assistance of a medical doctor, 
obtain medication from a person trained in the Chinese herbal tra- 
dition, and visit a local shrine. Each of these actions is based on 
a different belief in causation of the illness: the physician may say 
that the illness is due to a bacterial infection; the herbalist regards 
the body as being out of balance; and the basis of the shrine visit 
is the belief that the mind must be cleansed to heal the body. In 



99 



Japan: A Country Study 

the West, these explanations might be viewed as mutually exclu- 
sive, but the Japanese patient may hold all of these views simul- 
taneously without a sense of discord. Similarly, a student studying 
for university entrance examinations knows that without extraor- 
dinary hard work, admission is impossible. Yet the student will 
probably also visit a special shrine to ask for the help of the spiritual 
world in assuring success. 

The roots of the Japanese world view can be traced to several 
traditions. Shinto, the only indigenous religion of Japan, provided 
the base. Confucianism, from China, provided concepts of hier- 
archy, loyalty, and the emperor as the son of heaven. Daoism, also 
from China, helped give order and sanction to the system of govern- 
ment implied in Shinto. Buddhism brought with it not only its con- 
templative religious aspects but also a developed culture of art and 
temples, which had a considerable role in public life. Christianity 
brought an infusion of Western ideas, particularly those involving 
social justice and reform. 

Shinto 

Shinto (Way of the Gods) is the term used to refer to an assort- 
ment of beliefs and practices indigenous to Japan that predate the 
arrival of Buddhism, but have in turn been influenced by it. The 
Shinto world view is of a pantheistic universe of kami, spirits or 
gods with varying degrees of power. 

Although each person is expected to continue existence as a kami 
after death, Shinto is concerned with this world rather than with 
the afterlife. This world contains defiling substances, and Shinto 
ritual often involves mental and physical purification of a person 
who has come into contact with a pollutant, such as death. Water 
or salt commonly serve as purifying agents. Some kami are guar- 
dian deities for villages, and thus they symbolize the unity of the 
human community as well as mediating in its relationship with the 
natural and supernatural worlds. 

Japanese legends describe the activities and personalities of the 
kami. The most well-known legends describe the creation of the 
human world and trace the origins of the Japanese imperial fam- 
ily to the gods (see Ancient Cultures, ch. 1). The latter legend 
formed the basis of the wide acceptance of the concept of the em- 
peror's divine descent in pre- 1945 Japan. 

In the fifth and sixth centuries, Shinto came under the influence 
of Chinese Confucianism and Buddhism. From the former, it bor- 
rowed the veneration of ancestors, and from the latter it adopted 
philosophical ideas and religious rites. Because of the popularity 
of things Chinese and the ethical and philosophical attraction of 



100 



The Society and Its Environment 



Buddhism for the court and the imperial family, Shinto became 
somewhat less influential than Buddhism for more than a millen- 
nium. Many people, however, were adherents to both systems of 
belief. By the seventeenth century, Shinto began to emerge from 
Buddhism's shadow through the influence of neo-Confucian ra- 
tionalism (see Intellectual Trends, ch. 1). 

The emerging nationalism of the late Tokugawa period com- 
bined with the political needs of the Meiji Restoration (1868) 
oligarchs to reform Shinto into a state religion, and it flourished 
as such until 1945 under government patronage. Japan's defeat 
in World War II and the emperor's denial of his divinity brought 
an end to State Shinto (see The Status of the Emperor, ch. 6). Some- 
times considered synonymous with State Shinto before 1945 was 
Shrine Shinto (Jinja Shinto), but after the war most Shinto tradi- 
tions were observed in the home rather than in shrines. Most 
shrines, which had previously benefited from state sponsorship, were 
organized into the Association of Shinto Shrines after 1946. Sect 
Shinto (Kyoha Shinto) consists of more than eighty private reli- 
gious sects, which conduct services in houses of worship or lecture 
halls rather than in shrines. 

In 1987 there were more than 81,350 Shinto shrines and 102,000 
clergy in Japan. After World War II, the requirement of mem- 
bership in a shrine parish was revoked, but in 1990 local shrines 
still served as focal points for community identity for many 
Japanese, and occasional informal or ritual visits are common. 
Nearly 95 million Japanese citizens professed adherence to some 
form of Shinto. Some of the Sect Shinto groups are considered new 
religions. 

Buddhism 

Buddhism, which originated in India, was introduced into Japan 
in the sixth century A.D. from Korea and China. Buddhism in- 
troduced ideas into Japanese culture that have become insepara- 
ble from the Japanese world view: the concept of rebirth, ideas of 
karmic causation, and an emphasis on the unity of experience. It 
gained the patronage of the ruling class, which supported the build- 
ing of temples and production of Buddhist art (see Cultural De- 
velopments and the Establishment of Buddhism, ch. 1). In the early 
centuries of Buddhism in Japan, scholarly esoteric sects were popu- 
lar, and the Buddhist influence was limited mainly to the upper 
class. From the late Heian period (A.D. 794-1185) through the 
Kamakura period (1185-1333), Pure Land (Jodo) and Nichiren 
Shoshu sects, which had much wider appeal, spread throughout 
all classes of society (see The Flourishing of Buddhism, ch. 1). These 



101 




4^ 



102 



The 160-meter- high torii gate at Itsukushima Shrine, in Hiroshima 
Bay, dedicated to Shinto kami, who protect seafarers and oversee fishing 

Courtesy Jane T. Griffin 



103 



Japan: A Country Study 



sects stressed experience and faith, promising salvation in a future 
world. Zen Buddhism, which encourages the attainment of enlight- 
enment through meditation and an austere life style, had wide ap- 
peal among the bushi or samurai — the warrior class — who had come 
to have great political power (see The Rise of the Military Class, 
ch. 1). Under the sponsorship of the ruling military class, Zen had 
a major impact on Japanese aesthetics. In addition, Japan scholar 
Robert Bellah has argued, Buddhist sects popular among com- 
moners in the Tokugawa period encouraged values such as hard 
work and delayed rewards, which, like Protestantism in Europe, 
helped lay the ideological foundation for Japan's industrial success. 

Buddhist funerary and ancestral rites remained pervasive in 
Japan in the late 1980s. Although regular attendance at Buddhist 
temples was rare, partly because many Buddhist sects did not ob- 
serve community worship, there were in 1987 more than 77,000 
temples and 274,000 clergy. Buddhist as well as Shinto priests marry 
and often sons inherit the responsibility for their father's parish 
at his death. The Nichiren school, based on belief in the Lotus Sutra 
and its doctrine of universal salvation, was the largest sect in Japan 
in 1989, with 35,541,430 members. Its wide appeal was based on 
the broad range of religious and social thought and the lay activi- 
ties it incorporates. 

Confucianism 

Although not practiced as a religion, Confucianism from China 
has deeply influenced Japanese thought. In essence, Confucian- 
ism is the practice of proper forms of conduct, especially in social 
and familial relationships. It is derived from compilations attributed 
to the fifth-century B.C. Chinese philosopher Kong Fuzi or Kongzi 
(Confucius; in Japanese, Koshi). Confucian government was to 
be a moral government, bureaucratic in form and benevolent 
toward the ruled. Confucianism also provided an hierarchical sys- 
tem, in which each person was to act according to his or her status 
to create a harmoniously functioning society and ensure loyalty to 
the state. The teachings of filial piety and humanity continue to 
form the foundation for much of social life and ideas about family 
and nation. 

Neo-Confucianism, introduced to Japan in the twelfth century, 
is an interpretation of nature and society based on metaphysical 
principles, and influenced by Buddhist and Daoist ideas. In Japan, 
where it is known as Shushigaku (Shushi School, after the Chinese 
neo-Confucian scholar Zhu Xi — Shushi in Japanese), it brought 
the idea that family stability and social responsibility are human 
obligations. The school used various metaphysical concepts to 



104 



Japan: A Country Study 



explain the natural and social order. Shushigaku, in turn, influenced 
the kokutai (national polity) theory, which emphasized the special 
national characteristics of Japan. 

Daoism 

Daoism (literally, the way) from China has also influenced 
Japanese thought, and has a special affinity for Zen Buddhism. 
Zen's praise of emptiness, exhortations to act in harmony with na- 
ture, and admonitions to avoid discrimination and duality all are 
parallel in Daoist beliefs. The lunar calendar, the selection of auspi- 
cious days for special events, the siting of buildings, and numer- 
ous folk medicinal treatments also have origins in Daoism and 
continue as customs to varying degrees in contemporary Japanese 
society. Daoism has also influenced native shamanistic traditions 
and rituals. 

Christianity 

Christianity was introduced in the sixteenth century by Por- 
tuguese and Spanish Roman Catholic missionaries, but, because 
it was associated with Western imperialism and considered a threat 
to Japanese political control, it was banned from the mid- 
seventeenth century to the mid-nineteenth century (see Seclusion 
and Social Control, ch. 1). With the reopening of Japan in the 
mid- 1850s, missionaries again arrived. While fewer than 900,000 
people (less than 1 percent of the population) considered themselves 
Christian in the late 1980s, Christianity was respected for its con- 
tributions to society, particularly in education and social action. 
In the late 1980s, about 64 percent of all Christians belonged to 
Protestant churches, about 32 percent to the Roman Catholic 
Church, and about 4 percent to other Christian denominations. 
There were more than 3,200 places of Christian worship in Japan. 

New Religions 

A number of religious organizations are generally labeled "new 
religions" {shinko shukyo), although some date back to the early 
nineteenth century. The largest are Soka Gakkai (Value Creation 
Society), Rissho Koseikai (Society for the Establishment of Jus- 
tice and Community for the Rise [of Buddhism]), and Tenrikyo 
(Religion of Divine Wisdom), with more than 17 million, 6 mil- 
lion, and about 2.5 million members, respectively, in the late 1980s. 
Both Soka Gakkai and Rissho Koseikai are offshoots of the Nichiren 
Shoshu sect of Buddhism. Tenrikyo was once considered an off- 
shoot of Sect Shinto but is now regarded as independent of other 



106 



The Society and Its Environment 



divisions of Shinto. Some of the larger of these new religions were 
active internationally as well as in Japan. 

No one category can be used to describe all of the new religions. 
What distinguishes them from popular or folk religions is their claim 
to an organizational status equivalent to Shinto or Buddhism. Their 
teachings are diverse, but most syncretize elements of Buddhist, 
Shinto, Christian, and other beliefs. Most emphasize the depen- 
dence of the living on kami, the Buddha or Buddhist figures, or 
ancestors. Some, such as Tenrikyo, are monotheistic and stress in- 
dividual salvation. For example, Rissho Koseikai adherents gather 
in small groups to discuss religious issues and problems of daily 
life. Most of the new religions provide special support to their ad- 
herents through small group meetings, and encourage solving 
problems through ritual and proper behavior. Many stress har- 
monious relations with others, hard work, and sincerity as the way 
to a better life. 

Most of the new religions were founded by charismatic lay peo- 
ple, often women, who had experienced transforming spiritual epi- 
sodes and felt called upon to convey these experiences to others. 
They stressed lay participation, involving small, local, face-to-face 
groups as well as national organizations. They encouraged direct 
contact with the supernatural, and some groups practiced faith heal- 
ing and mutual support techniques. People who joined these groups 
often did so in response to personal problems, but many found con- 
tinuing fulfillment through their emphasis on returning to tradi- 
tional values. 

Religious Practice 

Most Japanese participate in rituals and customs derived from 
several religious traditions (see table 3, Appendix). Life cycle events 
are often marked by visits to a Shinto shrine. The birth of a new 
baby is celebrated with a formal shrine visit at the age of about 
one month, as are the third, fifth, and seventh birthdays and the 
official beginning of adulthood at age twenty. Wedding ceremo- 
nies are often performed by Shinto priests, but Christian weddings 
are also popular. In the early 1980s, more than 8 percent of wed- 
dings were held in a shrine or temple and nearly 4 percent in a 
church. The most popular place for a wedding ceremony — chosen 
by 41 percent — was a wedding hall. 

Funerals are most often performed by Buddhist priests, and 
Buddhist rites are also common on death day anniversaries of de- 
ceased family members. Some Japanese do not perform ancestral 
ceremonies at all, and some do so rather mechanically and awk- 
wardly. But there have also been changes in these practices, such 



107 



Japan: A Country Study 

as more personal and private ceremonies and women honoring their 
own as well as their husband's ancestors, that make them more 
meaningful to contemporary participants. 

There are two categories of holidays in Japan: matsuri (festivals), 
which are largely of Shinto origin and relate to the cultivation of 
rice and the spiritual well-being of the community; and nenchu gyd 
(annual events), mainly of Chinese or Buddhist origin. The matsuri 
were supplemented during the Heian period with more festivals 
added, and they were organized into a formal calendar. In addi- 
tion to the complementary nature of the different holidays, there 
were later accretions during the feudal period. Very few matsuri 
or nenchu gyd are national holidays, but they are included in the 
national calendar of annual events (see table 4, Appendix). 

Most holidays are secular in nature, but the two most significant 
for the majority of Japanese — New Year's Day for Shinto believers 
and Obon (also call Bon Festival) for Buddhists, which marks the 
end of the ancestors' annual visit to their earthly home — involve 
visits to Shinto shrines or Buddhist temples. The New Year's holi- 
day (January 1-3) is marked by the practice of numerous customs 
and the consumption of special foods. These customs include time 
for getting together with family and friends, for special television 
programming, and for visiting Shinto shrines to pray for family bless- 
ings in the coming year. Dressing in a kimono, hanging out special 
decorations, eating noodles on New Year's Eve to show continuity 
into the new year, and playing a poetry card game are among the 
more "traditional" practices. During Obon season, in mid- August 
(or mid-July depending on the locale), bon (spirit altars) are set up 
in front of Buddhist family altars, which, along with ancestral graves, 
are cleaned in anticipation of the return of the spirits. As with the 
New Year holiday, people living away from their family homes return 
for visits with relatives. Celebrations include folk dancing and prayers 
at the Buddhist temple as well as family rituals in the home. 

Many Japanese also participate, at least as spectators, in one 
of the many local matsuri celebrated throughout the country. Matsuri 
may be sponsored by schools, towns, or other groups, but are most 
often associated with Shinto shrines. As religious festivals, these 
strike a Western observer as quite commercialized and secular, but 
the many who plan the events, cook special foods, or carry the floats 
on their shoulders, find renewal of self and of community through 
participation. 

Religion and the State 

Article 20 of the 1947 Constitution states that, "Freedom of 
religion is guaranteed to all. No religious organization shall receive 



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Japan: A Country Study 



any privileges from the State, nor exercise any political author- 
ity . . (see The Postwar Constitution, ch. 6). Contemporary re- 
ligious freedom fits well with the tolerant attitude of most Japanese 
toward other religious beliefs and practices. Separation of religion 
and the state, however, is a more difficult issue. 

Historically, there was no distinction between a scientific and 
a religious world view. In early Japanese history, the ruling class 
was responsible for performing propitiatory rituals, which later came 
to be identified as Shinto, and for the introduction and support 
of Buddhism. Later, religious organization was used by regimes 
for political purposes, as when the Tokugawa government required 
each family to be registered as a member of a Buddhist temple for 
purposes of social control. In the late nineteenth century, rightists 
created State Shinto, requiring that each family belong to a shrine 
parish and that the concepts of emperor worship and a national 
Japanese "family" be taught in the schools. 

In the 1980s, the meaning of the separation of state and religion 
again became controversial. The issue came to a head in 1985 when 
Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro paid an official visit to Yasukuni 
Shrine, which honors Japanese war dead, including leaders from 
the militarist period in the 1930s and 1940s (see The Rise of the 
Militarists, ch. 1). Supporters of Nakasone 's action (mainly on the 
political right) argued that the visit was to pay homage to patriots; 
others claimed that the visit was an attempt to revive State Shinto 
and nationalistic extremism. The visit was protested by China, 
North Korea, South Korea, and other countries occupied by Japan 
in the first half of the twentieth century, and domestically by leftists, 
intellectuals, and the Japanese news media. Similar cases have oc- 
curred at local levels, and courts increasingly often have been asked 
to clarify the division between religion and government. Separat- 
ing religious elements of the Japanese world view from what is 
merely "Japanese" is not easy, especially given the ambiguous role 
of the emperor, whose divinity was denied in 1945, but who con- 
tinued to perform functions of both state and religion. 

Social Organization 

From birth Japanese are recognized as autonomous human beings. 
However, from the beginning infants are influenced by society's em- 
phasis on social interdependence. In fact, Japanese human develop- 
ment may be seen as a movement toward mastery of an ever- 
expanding circle of social life, beginning with the family, widening 
to include school and neighborhood as children grow, and incor- 
porating roles as colleague, inferior, and superior. Viewed in this 
perspective, socialization does not culminate with adolescence, for 



110 



The Society and Its Environment 



the individual must learn to be, for example, a section chief, a 
parent-teacher association member, or a grandparent at various 
points in life. 

Many Westerners ask whether there is a Japanese self that exists 
apart from identification with a group. The answer lies in the 
Japanese distinction between uchi (inside) and soto (outside). These 
terms are relative, and the "we" implied in uchi can refer to the 
individual, the family, a work group, a company, a neighborhood, 
or even all of Japan. But it is always defined in opposition to a 
"they." The context or situation thus calls for some level of defi- 
nition of self. When an American businessman meets a Japanese 
counterpart, the Japanese will define himself as a member of a par- 
ticular company with which the American is doing business. 
However, if the American makes a cultural mistake, the Japanese 
is likely to define himself as Japanese as distinguished from a 
foreigner. The American might go away from his encounter with 
the belief that the Japanese think of themselves only as members 
of a group. The same person attending a school event with one 
of his children might be defined at the level of his family or house- 
hold. Viewed relaxing at home or playing golf with former class- 
mates, he would perhaps have reached a level of definition more 
similar to an American concept of self. 

From childhood, however, Japanese are taught that this level 
of self should not be assertive, but rather considerate of the needs 
of others; the private emotions and perhaps the fun-loving, relaxed 
side of Japanese individuals are tolerated and even admired as long 
as these do not interfere with the performance of more public 
responsibilities. The proper performance of social roles is neces- 
sary to the smooth functioning of society. Individuals, aware of 
private inner selves (and even resistance to the very roles they per- 
form), use a shifting scale of uchi and soto to define themselves in 
various situations. 

Family 

The family is the earliest locus of social life for an individual 
and provides a model of social organization for most later encoun- 
ters with the wider world. Yet, as uchi, the Japanese family does 
not have clear boundaries. At times the term family may refer to 
a nuclear family of parents and unmarried children. On other oc- 
casions it refers to a line of descent, and on still others it refers 
to the household as a unit of production or consumption. 

A great variety of family forms have existed historically in Japan, 
from the matrilocal customs of the Heian elite, which are described 
in Genji monogatari (Tale of Genji), to the extreme patrilineality of 



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Japan: A Country Study 

the samurai class in the feudal period. Numerous family forms, 
through which ran a common belief in the existence of the family- 
household beyond the life of its current members, coexisted, par- 
ticularly in the countryside. Among the upper classes and wealth- 
ier merchant and artisan urban households of the Tokugawa period, 
the chonin, providing for household continuity, and if possible en- 
riching the household's estate, represented duty to one's ancestors 
and appreciation toward one's parents. 

With the promulgation of the Domestic Relations and Inheritance 
Law in 1898, the Japanese government institutionalized more rigid 
family controls than most people had known in the feudal period. 
Individuals were registered in an official family registry. In the early 
twentieth century, each family was required to conform to the ie 
(household) system, with a multigenerational household under the 
legal authority of a household head. In establishing the ie system, 
the government moved the ideology of family in the opposite direc- 
tion of trends resulting from urbanization and industrialization. 
The ie system took as its model for the family the Confucian- 
influenced pattern of the Tokugawa period upper classes. Authority 
and responsibility for all members of the ie lay legally with the house- 
hold head. Each generation supplied a male and female adult, with 
a preference for first son inheritance and patrilocal marriage. When 
possible, daughters were expected to marry out and younger sons 
to establish their own households. Women could not legally own 
or control property or select spouses. The ie system thus artifici- 
ally restricted the development of individualism, individual rights, 
women's rights, and the nuclearization of the family. It formal- 
ized patriarchy and emphasized lineal and instrumental rather than 
conjugal and emotional ties within the family. 

After World War II, the Allied occupation forces established a 
new family ideology based on equal rights for women, equal in- 
heritance by all children, and free choice of spouse and career. From 
the late 1960s, most marriages in Japan have been based on the 
mutual attraction of the couple and not the arrangement of par- 
ents. Moreover, arranged marriages in the 1980s might have begun 
with an introduction by a relative or family friend, but actual negoti- 
ations did not begin until all parties, including the bride and groom, 
were satisfied with the relationship. 

Under the ie system, only a minority of households included three 
generations at a time, since nonsuccessor sons (those who were not- 
heirs) often set up their own household. From 1970 to 1983, the 
proportion of three- generation households fell from 19 percent to 
15 percent of all households, while two- generation households con- 
sisting of a couple and their unmarried children increased only 



112 



The Society and Its Environment 



slightly, from 41 percent to 42 percent of all households. The 
greatest change has been the increase in couple-only households 
and in elderly single-person households. 

Public opinion surveys in the late 1980s seemed to confirm the 
statistical movement away from the three- generation ie family 
model. Half of the respondents did not think that the first son had 
a special role to play in the family, and nearly two- thirds rejected 
the need for adoption of a son in order to continue the family. Other 
changes, such as an increase in filial violence and school refusal 
suggest a breakdown of strong family authority. 

Official statistics, however, indicate that Japanese concepts of 
family continued to diverge from those in the United States in the 
1980s. The divorce rate, although increasing slowly, remained at 
1.3 per 1,000 marriages in 1987, low by international standards. 
Strong gender roles remained the cornerstone of family responsi- 
bilities. Most survey respondents said that family life should em- 
phasize parent-child ties over husband- wife relations. Nearly 80 
percent of respondents in a 1 986 government survey believed that 
the ancestral home and family grave should be carefully kept and 
handed on to one's children. Over 60 percent thought it best for 
elderly parents to live with one of their children. This sense of fam- 
ily as a unit that continued through time was stronger among peo- 
ple who had a livelihood to pass down, such as farmers, merchants, 
owners of small companies, and physicians, than among urban sal- 
ary and wage earners. Anthropologist Jane Bachnik noted the con- 
tinued emphasis on continuity in the rural families she studied. 
Uchi (here, the contemporary family) were considered the living 
members of an ie, which had no formal existence. Yet, in each 
generation, there occurred a sorting of members into permanent 
and temporary members, defining different levels of uchi. 

Various family life-styles exist side by side in contemporary 
Japan. In many urban families, the husband may commute to work 
and return late, having little time with his children except for Sun- 
days, a favorite day for family outings. The wife might be a "pro- 
fessional housewife," with nearly total responsibility for raising 
children, assuring their careers and marriages, running the house- 
hold, and managing the family budget. She also has primary respon- 
sibility for maintaining social relations with the wider circles of 
relatives, neighbors, and acquaintances, and for managing the fam- 
ily's reputation. Her social life remains separate from that of her 
husband. It is increasingly likely that in addition to these family 
responsibilities, she would also have a part-time job or participate 
in adult education or other community activities. The closest emo- 
tional ties within such families are between the mother and children. 



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Japan: A Country Study 

In other families, particularly among the self-employed, husband 
and wife work side by side in a family business. Although gender- 
based roles are clear cut, they might not be as rigidly distinct as 
in a household where work and family are more separated. In such 
families, fathers are more involved in their children's development 
because they have more opportunity for interacting with them. 

As women worked outside of the home with increasing frequency 
in the 1970s and 1980s, there was pressure on their husbands to 
take on more responsibility for housework and child care. Farm 
families, who depended on nonfarm employment for most of their 
income, were also developing patterns of interaction different from 
those of previous generations. 

Neighborhood 

Beyond the family, the next group to which children are in- 
troduced is the neighborhood. Although the loose, informal groups 
of children who wandered through villages of the past had no coun- 
terpart in contemporary heavily trafficked city streets, neighbor- 
hood playgrounds and the grounds of local shrines and temples are 
sites where young children, accompanied by mothers, begin to learn 
to get along with others. 

Among neighbors, there is great concern for face. In old urban 
neighborhoods or rural villages, families might have been neigh- 
bors for generations, and thus expect relationships of assistance 
and cooperation to continue into the future. In newer company 
housing, neighbors represent both competition and stress at the 
workplace, which cannot be expressed. Extra care is taken to main- 
tain proper relations while maximizing family privacy. Participation 
in neighborhood activities is not mandatory, but nonparticipants 
might lose face. If a family plans to stay in an area, people feel 
strong pressures to participate in public projects such as neigh- 
borhood cleanups or seasonal festivals. Concern for the family's 
reputation is real because background checks for marriage and em- 
ployment might include asking neighbors their opinions about a 
family. More positively, neighbors become uchi for certain purposes, 
such as local merchants providing personal services, physicians 
responding to calls for minor ailments and emergency treatment, 
and neighbors taking care of children while their mother goes out. 

People who work in the neighborhood where they live often have 
a different attitude from those who spend most of their waking hours 
at distant workplaces, creating differences in character between the 
central city and the suburbs. Central city areas, dominated by the 
old middle class of artisans, merchants, and small business own- 
ers, generally have more active neighborhood associations and other 



114 



The Society and Its Environment 



local groups, such as merchant associations and shrine associations. 
The neighborhood association's activities include public sanitation 
and health, volunteer firefighting, disaster preparedness, crime 
prevention, information exchange, and recreational activities, par- 
ticularly for children and the elderly. In new urban or suburban 
developments, local governments might take a more active role in 
performing these functions. In neighborhoods with mixtures of new 
and old middle class residents, it is people with the time and in- 
terest, most likely those with businesses in the area, who are ac- 
tive in neighborhood affairs. The activities of women and children, 
however, might cut across such class distinctions. The emphasis 
on good relations with neighbors helps counteract the potential de- 
personalization of urban living. Working together on community 
projects, exchanging information, and cooperating in community 
rituals, such as festivals, helps maintain a sense of community. 

The consequences of economic growth were examined more 
closely by 1980s consumers, who began to demand higher quality 
social services, more libraries and cultural centers, greater access 
to sports facilities, and more parkland. Attention was increasingly 
focused on the adverse effects of urban life on families: modern 
children were seen as more demanding and less disciplined than 
their forebears, who had experienced war and poverty. 

Despite these problems, urban life was much safer and more con- 
venient than in many other countries in the late twentieth century. 
In contrast to most industrialized nations, urban crime rates were 
declining. The streets of Tokyo were safe even at night, and a public 
campaign was more likely to urge residents to lock their doors than 
to suggest they install deadbolts. Public transportation was con- 
gested but convenient, clean, punctual, and relatively inexpensive 
(see Transportation and Communications, ch. 4). Complaints were 
heard, however, that railroad station parking lots were too small 
to accommodate all commuter bicycles. In urban areas, houses were 
close together; but at the same time shops were close by, and house- 
wives could easily purchase fresh vegetables and fish daily. Urban 
life was made more attractive for many by a wide variety of cul- 
tural and sports activities, including the symphony orchestra, the- 
ater, sumo, professional baseball, museums, and art galleries (see 
The Arts, ch. 3). 

Workplace 

Entry into the labor force widens the circle of social relation- 
ships. For many adults, these contacts are important sources of 
friendships and resources. For men especially, the workplace is the 
focus of their social world. Many both in and outside of Japan share 



115 



Japan: A Country Study 

an image of the Japanese workplace that is based on a lifetime- 
employment model used by large companies. These employment 
practices came about as the result of labor shortage in the 1920s, 
when companies competed to recruit and retain the best workers 
by offering better benefits and job security. By the 1960s, em- 
ployment at a large prestigious company had become the goal of 
children of the new middle class; the pursuit of which required 
mobilization of family resources and great individual perseverance 
in order to achieve success in the fiercely competitive education 
system. 

Lifetime employment referred not to a worker's lifetime, but to 
the time from school graduation until mandatory retirement, in 
1990 at age sixty for most men. Workers were recruited directly 
out of school, and large investments were made in training. Em- 
ployees were expected to work hard and demonstrate loyalty to the 
firm, in exchange for some degree of job security and benefits, such 
as housing subsidies, good insurance, the use of recreational facil- 
ities, and bonuses and pensions. Wages began low, but seniority 
was rewarded with promotions based on a combination of senior- 
ity and ability. Leadership was not based on assertiveness or quick 
decision making, but on the ability to create consensus, taking into 
account the needs of subordinates. Surveys indicated continued 
preference for bosses who were demanding but showed concern 
for workers' private lives over less-demanding bosses interested only 
in performance on the job. This system rewarded behavior demon- 
strating identification with the team effort, indicated by singing 
the company song, not taking all of one's vacation days, and shar- 
ing credit for accomplishments with the work group. Pride in one's 
work was expressed through competition with other parallel sec- 
tions in the company and between one's company and other com- 
panies in similar lines of business. Thus, individuals were motivated 
to maintain wa (harmony) and participate in group activities, not 
only on the job, but in after-hours socializing as well. The image 
of group loyalty, however, might have been more a matter of ideol- 
ogy than practice, especially for people who did not make it to the 
top. 

Every worker did not enjoy the benefits of such employment prac- 
tices and work environments in the 1980s. Although 64 percent 
of households in 1985 depended on wages or salaries for most of 
their income, most of these workers were employed by small and 
medium- sized firms that could not afford the benefits or achieve 
the successes of the large companies, despite the best intentions 
of owners. Even in the large corporations, distinctions between per- 
manent and temporary employees made many workers, often 



116 



The Society and Its Environment 



women, ineligible for benefits and promotions. These workers were 
also the first to be laid off in difficult business conditions. Japan 
scholar Dorinne K. Kondo compares the status of permanent and 
temporary workers with Bachnik's distinctions between permanent 
and temporary members of an ie, creating degrees of inside and 
outside within a firm. Traditions of entrepreneurship and of in- 
heritance of the means of livelihood continued among merchants, 
artisans, farmers, and fishermen, still nearly 20 percent of the work 
force in 1985. These workers gave up security for autonomy, and 
when economically necessary, supplemented household income with 
wage employment. Traditionally, such businesses used unpaid fam- 
ily labor, but in 1990 wives or even husbands were likely to go 
off to work in factories or offices and leave spouses or retired par- 
ents to work the farm or mind the shop. Policies of decentraliza- 
tion provided factory jobs locally for families that farmed part-time; 
on the other hand, unemployment created by deindustrialization 
affected rural as well as urban workers. Unemployment was low 
in Japan compared to other industrialized nations (less than 3 per- 
cent through the late 1980s), but an estimated 400,000 day laborers 
shared none of the security or affluence enjoyed by those employees 
with lifetime-employment benefits. 

Although Japanese workers are known worldwide for their hard 
work and dedication to their firms, more than 50 percent of respon- 
dents of a 1988 government survey said that they would rather have 
more free time than increased income. The proportion preferring 
free time to increased income was greater among professionals, su- 
pervisors, and white-collar workers. There was also evidence of 
increased interfirm mobility among some types of workers in the 
late 1980s, as a result of a labor shortage and changing attitudes 
toward work among young people. 

Popular Culture 

Japanese popular culture not only reflects the attitudes and con- 
cerns of the present, but also provides a link to the past. Popular 
films, television programs, comics, and music all developed from 
older artistic and literary traditions, and many of their themes and 
styles of presentation can be traced to traditional art forms. Con- 
temporary forms of popular culture, like the traditional forms, 
provide not only entertainment, but also an escape for the con- 
temporary Japanese from the problems of an industrial world. 
When asked how they spent their leisure time, 80 percent of a sam- 
ple of men and women surveyed by the government in 1 986 aver- 
aged about two and one-half hours per weekday watching television, 
listening to the radio, and reading newspapers or magazines. Some 



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Japan: A Country Study 



16 percent spent an average of two and one-quarter hours a day 
engaged in hobbies or amusements. Others spent leisure time par- 
ticipating in sports, socializing, and personal study. Teenagers and 
retired people reported more time spent on all of these activities 
than other groups. 

In the late 1980s, the family was the focus of leisure activities, 
such as excursions to parks or shopping districts. Although Japan 
is often thought of as a hard-working society with little time for 
pleasure, the Japanese seek entertainment wherever they can. In 
the 1980s, it was common to see Japanese commuters riding the 
train to work, enjoying their favorite comic book or listening 
through earphones to the latest in popular music on cassette players. 

In the mid-1980s, Japan had about 71 million television sets in 
use, and television was the main source of home entertainment and 
information for most of the population. The Japanese had a wide 
variety of programs to choose from, including the various dramas 
(police, crime, home, and samurai), cartoons, news, and game, 
quiz, and sports shows provided by the Japan Broadcasting Cor- 
poration (Nippon Hoso Kyokai — NHK) general station, the NHK 
educational station, and numerous commercial and independent 
stations. The violence of the samurai and police dramas and the 
scatological humor of the cartoons drew criticism from mothers and 
commentators. Characters in dramas and cartoons often reflected 
racial and gender stereotypes. Women news anchors were not given 
equal exposure in news broadcasts, and few women were portrayed 
on television in high career positions. 

Individuals also could choose from a variety of types of popular 
entertainment. There was a large selection of musical tapes, films, 
television programs, and the products of a huge comic book in- 
dustry, among other forms of entertainment, from which to choose 
in the late 1980s (see Performing Arts; Literature; and Films and 
Television, ch. 3). 

Gender Stratification and the Lives of Women 

Gender has been an important principle of stratification through- 
out Japanese history, but the cultural elaboration of gender differ- 
ences has varied over time and among different social classes. In 
the twelfth century, for example, women could inherit property 
in their own names and manage it by themselves. Later, under 
feudal governments, the status of women declined. Peasant women 
continued to have de facto freedom of movement and decision- 
making power, but upper-class women's lives were subject to the 
patrilineal and patriarchal ideology supported by the government 
as part of its efforts at social control. With early industrialization, 



118 



The fourteenth- century Golden Pavilion in Kyoto 
Courtesy Eliot Frankeberger 
St. Mary's Cathedral in Tokyo, designed by Tange Kenzo 

Courtesy St. Mary's Cathedral 



119 



Japan: A Country Study 



young women participated in factory work under exploitative and 
unhealthy working conditions without gaining personal autonomy. 
In the Meiji period, industrialization and urbanization lessened the 
authority of fathers and husbands, but at the same time the Meiji 
Civil Code denied women legal rights and subjugated them to the 
will of household heads. Peasant women were less affected by the 
institutionalization of this trend, but it gradually spread even to re- 
mote areas. In the 1930s and 1940s, the government encouraged 
the formation of women's associations, applauded high fertility, and 
regarded motherhood as a patriotic duty to the Japanese Empire. 

After World War II, the legal position of women was redefined 
by the occupation authorities, who included an equal rights clause 
in the 1947 Constitution and the revised Civil Code of 1948. In- 
dividual rights were given precedence over obligation to family. 
Women as well as men were guaranteed the right to choose spouses 
and occupations, to inherit and own property in their own names, 
to initiate divorce, and to retain custody of their children. Women 
were given the right to vote in 1946. Other postwar reforms opened 
education institutions to women and required that women receive 
equal pay for equal work. In 1986, an Equal Employment Oppor- 
tunity Law took effect. Legally, few barriers to women's equal par- 
ticipation in the life of society remained. 

Gender inequality, however, continued in family life, the work- 
place, and popular values. The notion expressed in the proverbial 
phrase "good wife, wise mother," continued to influence beliefs 
about gender roles. Most women may not have been able to re- 
alize that ideal, but many believed that it was in their own, their 
children's, and society's best interests that they stay home to de- 
vote themselves to their children, at least while the children were 
young. Many women found satisfaction in family life and in the 
accomplishments of their children, gaining a sense of fulfillment 
from doing good jobs as household managers and mothers. In most 
households, women were responsible for their family budgets and 
made independent decisions about the education, careers, and life- 
styles of their families. On the other hand, women took the social 
blame for problems of family members. 

Women's educational opportunities have increased in the twen- 
tieth century. Among new workers in 1989, 37 percent of women 
had received education beyond upper- secondary school, compared 
with 43 percent of men, but most women had received their post- 
secondary education in junior colleges and technical schools rather 
than in universities and graduate schools (see Higher Education, 
ch. 3). 

Forty- seven percent of all women over fifteen years of age 
participated in the paid labor force in 1987. Two major changes 



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The Society and Its Environment 



in the female work force were under way. The first was a move 
away from household-based employment. Peasant women and those 
from merchant and artisan families had always worked. With self- 
employment becoming less common, however, the more usual pat- 
tern was separation of home and workplace, creating new problems 
of child care, care of the elderly, and housekeeping responsibili- 
ties. The second major change was the increased participation of 
married women in the labor force. In the 1950s, most women em- 
ployees were young and single; 62 percent of the female labor force 
in 1960 had never been married. In 1987, 66 percent of the fe- 
male labor force was married, and only 23 percent was made up 
women who had never married. Some women continued working 
after marriage, most often in professional and government jobs, 
but their numbers were small. Others started their own businesses, 
or took over family businesses. More commonly, women left paid 
labor after marriage, then returned after their youngest children 
were in school. These middle-age recruits generally took low-paying, 
part-time service or factory jobs. They continued to have nearly 
total responsibility for home and children, and often justified their 
employment as an extension of their responsibilities for the care 
of their families. Despite legal support for equality and some im- 
provement in their status, married women understood that their 
husbands' jobs demanded long hours and extreme commitment. 
Because women earned an average of only 60 percent as much as 
men, most did not find it advantageous to take full-time, respon- 
sible jobs after marriage, if doing so left no one to manage the house- 
hold and care for children (see Working Women, ch. 4). 

Yet women's status in the labor force was changing in the late 
1980s, most likely as a result of changes brought about by the aging 
of the population. Longer life expectancies, smaller families and 
bunched births, and lowered expectations of being cared for in old 
age by their children have all led women to participate more fully 
in the labor force. At the same time, service job opportunities in 
the postindustrial economy expanded, and there were fewer new 
male graduates to fill them. 

Some of the same demographic factors — low birth rates and high 
life expectancies — also changed workplace demands on husbands. 
For example, men recognized their need for a different kind of rela- 
tionship with their wives in anticipation of long post-retirement 
periods. 

Age Stratification and the Elderly 

Another key principle in the stratification of Japanese society 
is age. "Acting one's age" may be more important in Japan than 



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Japan: A Country Study 

in some other societies, resulting in relatively narrow age ranges 
for such life cycle events as university education, first job, or mar- 
riage. This pattern fits with the value placed on playing social roles 
appropriately. 

Old age ideally represents a time of relaxation of social obliga- 
tions, assisting with the family farm or business without carrying 
the main responsibility, socializing, and receiving respectful care 
from family and esteem from the community. In the late 1980s, 
high (although declining) rates of suicide among older people and 
the continued existence of temples where one could pray for quick 
death indicated that this ideal was not always fulfilled. Japan has 
a national holiday called Respect for the Aged Day, but for most 
people it is merely another day for picnics or an occasion when 
the commuter trains run on holiday schedules. True respect for 
the elderly may be questioned when buses and trains carry signs 
above specially reserved seats to remind people to give up their 
seats for elderly riders. Although the elderly might not have been 
accorded a generalized respect based on age, many older Japanese 
continued to live full lives that included gainful employment and 
close relationships with adult children. 

Although the standard retirement age in Japan throughout most 
of the postwar period was fifty-five, people aged sixty-five and over 
in Japan were more likely to work than in any other developed 
country in the 1980s. In 1987, 36 percent of men and 15 percent 
of women in this age-group were in the labor force. With better 
pension benefits and decreased opportunities for agricultural or 
other self-employed work, however, labor force participation by 
the elderly has been decreasing since 1960. In 1986, 90 percent 
of Japanese surveyed said that they wished to continue working 
after age sixty-five. They indicated both financial and health rea- 
sons for this choice. Other factors, such as a strong work ethic and 
the centering of men's social ties around the workplace, may also 
be relevant. Employment was not always available, however, and 
men and women who worked after retirement usually took sub- 
stantial cuts in salary and prestige. Between 1981 and 1986, the 
proportion of people sixty and over who reported that a public pen- 
sion was their major source of income increased from 35 percent 
to 53 percent, while those relying most on earnings for income fell 
from 31 to 25 percent, and those relying on children decreased from 
16 to 9 percent (see Aging and Retirement of the Labor Force, 
ch. 4). 

As the 1990s approached, there was a major trend toward the 
elderly maintaining separate households rather than co-residing with 
the families of adult children. The proportion living with children 



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The Society and Its Environment 



decreased from 77 percent in 1970 to 65 percent in 1985, although 
this rate was still much higher than in other industrialized coun- 
tries. The number of elderly living in Japan's retirement or nurs- 
ing homes also increased from around 75,000 in 1970 to more than 
216,000 in 1987; still, this group was a small portion of the total 
elderly population. People living alone or only with spouses con- 
stituted 32 percent of the sixty-five-and-over group. Less than half 
of those responding to a government survey believed that it was 
the duty of the eldest son to care for parents, but 63 percent re- 
plied that it was natural for children to take care of their elderly 
parents. The motive of co-residence seems to have changed, from 
being the expected arrangement of an agricultural society to be- 
ing an option for coping with circumstances such as illness or widow- 
hood in a postindustrial society. 

In the late 1980s, concern for the health of the aged continued 
to receive a great deal of attention, and nearly free medical care 
for people over seventy years of age was a national policy. Respon- 
sibility for the care of the aged, bedridden, or senile, however, still 
devolved mainly on family members, usually daughters-in-law. 

Health Care and Social Welfare 

While most postwar Japanese relied on personal savings and the 
support of family, both the government and private companies have 
long provided assistance for the ill or otherwise disabled, and for 
the old. Beginning in the 1920s, the government enacted a series 
of welfare programs, based mainly on European models, to pro- 
vide medical care and financial support. Government expenditures 
for all forms of social welfare increased from 6 percent of national 
income in the early 1970s to 18 percent in 1989. The mixtures of 
public and private funding have created complex pension and in- 
surance systems. 

Health Care 

A person who becomes ill in Japan has a number of options. 
One may visit a Buddhist temple or Shinto shrine, or send a fam- 
ily member in their place. There are numerous folk remedies, in- 
cluding hot springs baths and chemical and herbal over-the-counter 
medications. A person may seek the assistance of traditional heal- 
ers, such as herbalists, masseurs, and acupuncturists. However, 
Western biomedicine has dominated Japanese medical care in the 
postwar period. 

Public health services, including free screening examinations for 
particular diseases, prenatal care, and infectious disease control 
were provided by national and local governments. Payment for 



123 



Japan: A Country Study 



personal medical services was offered through a universal medical 
insurance system that provided relative equality of access, with fees 
set by a government committee. People without insurance through 
employers could participate in a national health insurance program 
administered by local governments. Since 1973, all elderly persons 
were covered by government-sponsored insurance. Patients were 
free to select physicians or facilities of their choice. 

There were more than 1,000 mental hospitals, 8,700 general 
hospitals, and 1 ,000 comprehensive hospitals with a total capacity 
of 1.5 million beds. Hospitals provided both out-patient and in- 
patient care. In addition, 79,000 clinics offered primarily out-patient 
services, and there were 48,000 dental clinics. Most physicians and 
hospitals sold medicine directly to patients, but there were 36,000 
pharmacies where patients could purchase synthetic or herbal medi- 
cation. 

National health expenditures rose from about ¥1 trillion (for 
value of the yen — see Glossary) in 1965 to over ¥18 trillion in 1987, 
or from slightly more than 5 percent to almost 7 percent of Japan's 
national income. In addition to cost control problems, the system 
was troubled with excessive paperwork, long waits to see physi- 
cians, assembly-line care for out-patients (because few facilities made 
appointments), overmedication, and abuse of the system because 
of low out-of-pocket costs to patients. Another problem in the late 
1980s was an uneven distribution of health personnel, with cities 
favored over rural areas. 

In the late 1980s, government and professional circles were con- 
sidering changing the system so that primary, secondary, and ter- 
tiary levels of care would be clearly distinguished within each 
geographical region, and facilities might be designated by level of 
care, with referrals required to obtain more complex care. Policy 
makers and administrators also recognized the need to unify the 
various insurance systems and control costs. 

There were nearly 191,400 physicians, 66,800 dentists, and 
333,000 nurses, plus more than 200,000 people licensed to practice 
massage, acupuncture, moxibustion, and other East Asian therapeu- 
tic methods. Since around 1900, Chinese-style herbalists have been 
required to be licensed medical doctors. Training was professional- 
ized and, except for East Asian healers, was based on a biomedical 
model of disease. However, the practice of biomedicine was in- 
fluenced as well by Japanese social organization and cultural ex- 
pectations concerning education, the organization of the workplace, 
and social relations of status and dependency, decision-making styles, 
and ideas about the human body, causes of illness, gender, individu- 
alism, and privacy. Anthropologist Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney notes 



124 



The Society and Its Environment 



that "daily hygienic behavior and its underlying concepts, which 
are perceived and expressed in terms of biomedical germ theory, 
in fact are directly tied to the basic Japanese symbolic structure." 

Although the number of cases remained small by international 
standards, public health officials were concerned in the late 1980s 
about the worldwide epidemic of acquired immune deficiency syn- 
drome (AIDS). The first confirmed case of AIDS in Japan was 
reported in 1985. By August 1989, there were 108 confirmed cases 
and between 1,000 and 2,500 others infected with the virus. Offi- 
cials anticipated a fourfold increase by 1992. Japanese statistics on 
patterns of transmission of the disease differ greatly from those of 
other countries. Fifty-eight percent of AIDS patients were hemo- 
philiacs, who were infected with the AIDS virus by receiving tainted 
imported blood products. Another 29 percent were homosexual and 
the remaining 13 percent were infected through heterosexual in- 
tercourse. While frightened by the deadliness of the disease yet sym- 
pathetic to the plight of hemophiliac AIDS patients, most Japanese 
were unconcerned with contracting AIDS themselves. Various levels 
of government responded to the introduction of AIDS into the het- 
erosexual population by establishing government committees, man- 
dating AIDS education, and advising testing for the general public 
without targeting special groups. A fund, underwritten by phar- 
maceutical companies that distributed imported blood products, 
was established in 1988 to provide financial compensation for AIDS 
patients. 

Social Welfare 

The futures of Japan's health and welfare systems in 1990 were 
being shaped by the rapid aging of the population. Medical insur- 
ance, health care for the elderly, and public health expenses con- 
stituted about 60 percent of social welfare and social security costs 
in 1975, while government pensions accounted for 20 percent. By 
the early 1980s, pensions accounted for nearly 50 percent of social 
welfare and social security expenditures because people were liv- 
ing longer after retirement. A fourfold increase in workers' indi- 
vidual contributions was projected by the twenty-first century. 

A major revision in the public pension system in 1986 unified 
several former plans into a single Employee Pension Insurance Plan. 
In addition to merging the former plans, the 1986 reform attempted 
to reduce benefits to hold down increases in worker contribution 
rates. It also established the right of women who did not work out- 
side the home to pension benefits of their own, not only as a de- 
pendent of a worker. Everyone aged between twenty and sixty was 
a compulsory member of this Employee Pension Insurance Plan. 



125 



Japan: A Country Study 

Despite complaints that these pensions amounted to little more 
than "spending money," an increasing number of people plan- 
ning for their retirement counted on them as an important source 
of income. Benefits increased so that the basic monthly pension 
was about US$420 in 1987, with future payments adjusted to the 
consumer price index. Forty percent of elderly households in 1985 
depended on various types of annuities and pensions as their only 
sources of income. 

Some people were also eligible for corporate retirement al- 
lowances. About 90 percent of firms with thirty or more employees 
gave retirement allowances in the late 1980s frequently as lump 
sum payments, but increasingly often in the form of annuities. 

Japan also had public assistance programs benefiting about 1 
percent of the population. About 33 percent of recipients were el- 
derly people, about 45 percent were households with sick or dis- 
abled members, about 14 percent were fatherless families, and about 
8 percent were in other categories. 

Japanese often claim to outsiders that their society is homogene- 
ous. By world standards, the Japanese enjoy a high standard of 
living, and nearly 90 percent of the population consider themselves 
part of the middle class. Most people express satisfaction with their 
lives and take great pride in being Japanese and in their country's 
status as an economic power on a par with the United States and 
Western Europe. In folk crafts and in right-wing politics, in the 
new religions and in international management, the Japanese have 
turned to their past to interpret the present. In doing so, however, 
they may be reconstructing history as a common set of beliefs and 
practices that make the country look more homogeneous than it is. 

In a society that values outward conformity, individuals may 
appear to take a back seat to the needs of the group. Yet it is in- 
dividuals who create for themselves a variety of life-styles. They 
are constrained in their choices by age, gender, life experiences, 
and other factors, but they draw from a rich cultural repertoire 
of past and present through which the wider social world of fami- 
lies, neighborhoods, and institutions gives meaning to their lives. 
As Japan set out to internationalize itself in the 1990s, the iden- 
tification of inherent Japanese qualities took on new significance, 
and the ideology of homogeneity sometimes masked individual de- 
cisions and life-styles of postindustrial Japan. 

* * * 

A good general introduction to Japanese society is Edwin O. 
Reischauer's The Japanese Today. The Kodans ha Encyclopedia of Japan 



126 



The Society and Its Environment 



contains articles on numerous aspects of Japanese society. The 
Japanese government publishes excellent information in English 
on a variety of subjects as well as statistical reports, such as the 
Japan Statistical Yearbook. Japan's physical setting and its relation 
to society are discussed in Martin Collcutt and others' Cultural Atlas 
of Japan. Hori Ichiro and others' Japanese Religion and H. Byron 
Earhart's Japanese Religion: Unity and Diversity provide good introduc- 
tions to religious life. 

Analyses of Japanese culture and values can be found in Japanese 
Society by Robert J. Smith, Long Engagements by David Plath, The 
Monkey as Mirror by Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney, a variety of articles 
in Japanese Culture and Behavior edited by Takie Sugiyama Lebra 
and William P. Lebra, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword by Ruth 
Benedict, and Conflict in Japan, edited by Ellis S. Krauss and others. 
Social organization is described by Nakane Chie in Japanese Soci- 
ety, Ezra F. Vogel in Japan's New Middle Class, Harumi Befu in 
Japan: An Anthropological Introduction, and Joy Hendry in Understanding 
Japanese Society. (For further information and complete citations, 
see Bibliography.) 



127 



Chapter 3. Education and the Arts 




Artist's rendition of Great Wave off the Coast of Ka.na.gaw a., from the 
series Thirty-six Views of Mount Fuji by ukiyo-e artist Hokusai 
Katsushika (1760-1849) 



JAPANESE CULTURAL VALUES are deeply imbedded in the 
country's richly varied, ancient past. Rooted in the native religion 
of Shinto (Way of the Gods), these values are also heavily indebted 
to the continental influences of Buddhism and Confucianism. In 
Shinto, gods permeate the universe and are perceived as embodied 
in specific places, such as sacred Mount Fuji and the Nachi Falls, 
or as tutelary spirits of rocks and trees. Therefore, a reverence for 
nature and admiration for particular scenic places are pervasive 
in Japanese art, echoed in literary descriptions, and expressed in 
architectural concepts that remove walls to allow the outside in and 
in avant-garde smoke sculptures, which recreate mists. Shinto con- 
cepts of ritual cleanliness, purification, and renewal have played 
a role in preserving the forms of ancient shrines like that at Ise 
and have nurtured handicrafts. They also have shaped some fu- 
nereal practices, for example, the clay sculptures or haniwa in the 
Kofun period (ca. A.D. 300-710), which provided the first real 
likeness of the ancient Japanese. 

Buddhist thought was fundamental to the formulation of most 
of Japan's arts, blending and absorbing elements from the proto- 
historic Shinto. Basic to Buddhist thought is the comprehension 
of the universe as in constant flux, which results in emphasis on 
the idea that all living things perish or are transformed in the chain 
of existence. From this view comes a feeling for ''the poignancy 
of things" {mono no aware), a frequent element in literature begin- 
ning in the Heian period (794-1185). Cherry blossoms are ap- 
preciated for their short-lived beauty, which symbolizes the samurai 
ideal of a brilliant life with a sudden, dramatic end. Zen Buddhism 
affirms the values of rustic simplicity and finding pleasure in the 
ordinary or minimal; it stresses austerity, simplicity, and brevity 
in all things and a life of solitude and contemplation, ideas which, 
together with Zen teaching devices, found expression in the tea 
ceremony, short poems, spontaneous ink paintings, and medita- 
tion gardens. 

Chinese artistic forms and philosophical concepts have been var- 
iously integrated and modified over the centuries by the Japanese. 
Confucianism glorifies the cultivation of wisdom: the scholarly life 
is its ideal, as are the virtues of ethical behavior, sincerity, and 
a desire for social harmony. All these elements were embodied in 
the gentleman- scholar and his successors, the teacher-scholar and 



131 



Japan: A Country Study 

the artist-writer, whose proficiency in language and use of the brush 
made literature and calligraphy the most admired art forms. 

Japanese children are taught a reverence for learning and trained 
in the traditional arts both within the school system and outside. 
Instruction in music, calligraphy, flower arrangement, and the tea 
ritual may begin at home, but soon the child studies with a skilled 
practitioner. Only the martial arts, such as judo or Japanese fenc- 
ing (kendo), are generally limited to men. Men often practice the 
other arts as well. Such early introduction to and widespread par- 
ticipation in different expressions of Japanese heritage lead to sup- 
port for traditional cultural values and the appreciation throughout 
society of artistic qualities. 

Education 

Many of the historical and cultural characteristics that shape 
Japanese arts shape its education as well. Japanese tradition stresses 
respect for society and the established order and prizes group goals 
above individual interests. In the early 1990s, schooling empha- 
sized in addition diligence, self-criticism, and well-organized study 
habits. More generally, the belief was ingrained that hard work 
and perseverance would yield success in life. Much of official school 
life was devoted directly or indirectly to teaching correct attitudes 
and moral values and to developing character, with the aim of creat- 
ing a citizenry that was both literate and attuned to the basic values 
of culture and society. 

At the same time, the academic achievement of Japanese students 
was extremely high by international standards. Japanese children 
consistentiy ranked at or near the top in successive international tests 
of mathematics. The system was characterized by high enrollment 
and retention rates throughout. An entrance examination system, 
particularly important at the college level, exerted strong influences 
throughout the entire system. The structure did not consist exclu- 
sively of government- sponsored, formal official education institu- 
tions. Private education also formed an important part of the 
educational landscape, and the role of schools outside the official 
school system could not be ignored. 

A majority of children began their education by attending 
preschool, although it was not part of the official system. The offi- 
cial structure in the early 1990s provided compulsory free school- 
ing and a sound and balanced education to virtually all children 
from grade one through grade nine. Upper- secondary school, from 
grades ten through twelve, though also not compulsory, attracted 
about 94 percent of those who completed lower- secondary school. 
About one-third of all Japanese upper- secondary school graduates 



132 



Education and the Arts 



advanced to postsecondary education — to full four-year universi- 
ties, two-year junior colleges, or to other institutions. 

Japan in the early 1990s remained a highly education-minded 
society. Education was esteemed, and educational achievement was 
often the prerequisite for success in work and in society at large. 

Historical Background 

Japan has had relations with other cultures since the dawn of 
its history (see Early Developments, ch. 1). Foreign civilizations 
have often provided new ideas for the development of Japan's own 
culture. Chinese teachings and ideas, for example, flowed into Japan 
from the sixth to ninth centuries. Along with the introduction of 
Buddhism came the Chinese system of writing and its literary tra- 
dition, and Confucianism (see Religious and Philosophical Tradi- 
tions, ch. 2). 

By the ninth century, Kyoto, the imperial capital, had five in- 
stitutions of higher learning, and during the remainder of the Heian 
period (794-1185), other schools were established by the nobility 
and the imperial court. During the medieval period (1185-1600), 
Zen Buddhist monasteries were especially important centers of 
learning, and the Ashikaga School (Ashikaga Gakko) flourished 
in the fifteenth century as a center of higher learning. 

In the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, Japan ex- 
perienced intense contact with the major European powers. Jesuit 
missionaries, who accompanied Portuguese traders, proselytized 
Christianity, opening a number of religious schools. Japanese stu- 
dents thus began to study Latin and Western music, as well as their 
own language. 

By 1603 Japan had been reunified by the Tokugawa regime, and 
by 1640 foreigners had been ordered out of Japan, Christianity 
banned, and virtually all foreign contact prohibited. The nation 
then entered a period of isolation and relative domestic tranquil- 
ity, which was to last 200 years. When the Tokugawa period began, 
few common people in Japan could read or write. By the period's 
end, learning had become widespread. Tokugawa education left 
a valuable legacy: an increasingly literate populace, a meritocra- 
tic ideology, and an emphasis on discipline and competent perfor- 
mance. Under subsequent Meiji leadership, this foundation would 
facilitate Japan's rapid transition from feudal country to modern 
nation (see Tokugawa Period, 1600-1867, ch. 1). 

During the Tokugawa period, the role of many of the bushi, or 
samurai, changed from warrior to administrator, and as a conse- 
quence, their formal education and their literacy increased propor- 
tionally. Samurai curricula stressed morality and included both 



133 



Japan: A Country Study 

military and literary studies. Confucian classics were memorized, 
and their reading and recitation were common methods of study. 
Arithmetic and calligraphy were also studied. Most samurai at- 
tended schools sponsored by their han (domains), and by the time 
of the Meiji Restoration of 1868, more than 200 of the 276 han 
had established schools. Some samurai and even commoners also 
attended private academies, which often specialized in particular 
Japanese subjects or in Western medicine, modern military science, 
gunnery, or Rangaku (Dutch studies), as European studies were 
called (see Intellectual Trends; The Emergence of Modern Japan, 
1868-1919, ch. 1). 

Education of commoners was generally practically oriented, 
providing basic training in reading, writing, and arithmetic, em- 
phasizing calligraphy and use of the abacus. Much of this educa- 
tion was conducted in so-called temple schools (terakoya), derived 
from earlier Buddhist schools. These schools were no longer reli- 
gious institutions, nor were they, by 1867, predominantly located 
in temples. By the end of the Tokugawa period, there may have 
been more than 14,000 such schools. Teaching techniques included 
reading from various textbooks, memorizing, and repeatedly copy- 
ing Chinese characters and Japanese script. 

After 1868 new leadership set Japan on a rapid course of moder- 
nization. Realizing from the outset that education was fundamental 
to nation building and modernization, the Meiji leaders established 
a public education system to help Japan catch up with the West. 
Missions were sent abroad to study the education systems of lead- 
ing Western countries. These missions and other observers returned 
with the ideas of decentralization, local school boards, and teacher 
autonomy. Such ideas and ambitious initial plans, however, proved 
very difficult to carry out. After some trial and error, a new na- 
tional education system emerged. As an indication of its success, 
elementary school enrollments climbed from about 40 or 50 per- 
cent of the school-age population in the 1870s to over 90 percent 
by 1900. 

By the 1890s, after earlier intensive preoccupation with Western, 
particularly United States, educational ideas, a much more con- 
servative and traditional orientation evolved: the education sys- 
tem became more reflective of Japanese values. Confucian precepts 
were stressed, especially those concerning the hierarchical nature 
of human relations, service to the new state, the pursuit of learn- 
ing, and morality. These ideals, embodied in the 1890 Imperial 
Rescript on Education, along with highly centralized government 
control over education, largely guided Japanese education until the 
end of World War II. 



134 



Education and the Arts 



In the early twentieth century, education at the primary level 
was egalitarian and virtually universal, but at higher levels it was 
multitracked, highly selective, and elitist. College education was 
largely limited to the few national universities, where German in- 
fluences were strong. Three of the imperial universities admitted 
women, and there were a number of women's colleges, some quite 
prestigious, but women had relatively few opportunities to enter 
higher education. During this period, a number of universities were 
founded by Christian missionaries, who also took an active role 
in expanding educational opportunities for women, particularly at 
the secondary level. 

After 1919 several of the private universities received official sta- 
tus, being granted government recognition for programs they had 
conducted, in many cases, since the 1880s. In the 1920s, the tra- 
dition of liberal education briefly reappeared, particularly at the 
kindergarten level, where the Montessori method attracted a fol- 
lowing. In the 1930s, education was subject to strong military and 
nationalistic influences. 

By 1945 the Japanese education system had been devastated, 
and with the defeat came the discredit of much prewar thought. 
A new wave of foreign ideas was introduced during the postwar 
period of military occupation (see World War II and the Occupa- 
tion, 1941-52, ch. 1). 

Occupation policy makers and the United States Education 
Mission, set up in 1946, made a number of changes aimed at 
democratizing Japanese education: instituting the six-three-three 
grade structure (six years of elementary school, three of lower- 
secondary school, and three of upper- secondary school) and ex- 
tending compulsory schooling to nine years. They replaced the 
prewar system of higher- secondary schools with comprehensive 
upper- secondary schools (high schools). Curricula and textbooks 
were revised, the nationalistic morals course was abolished and 
replaced with social studies, locally elected school boards were in- 
troduced, and teachers unions established (see Contemporary Set- 
ting, this ch.). 

With the abolition of the elitist higher education system and an 
increase in the number of higher education institutions, the op- 
portunities for higher learning grew. Expansion was accomplished 
initially by granting university or junior college status to a num- 
ber of technical institutes, normal schools, and advanced secon- 
dary schools. 

After the restoration of full national sovereignty in 1952, Japan 
immediately began to modify some of the changes in education, 



135 



Japan: A Country Study 



to reflect Japanese ideas about education and educational adminis- 
tration. The postwar Ministry of Education regained a great deal 
of power. School boards were appointed, instead of elected. A course 
in moral education was reinstituted in modified form, despite sub- 
stantial initial concern that it would lead to a renewal of height- 
ened nationalism. 

By the 1960s, postwar recovery and accelerating economic growth 
brought new demands to expand higher education and greater stress 
related to higher education quality and finances. In general, the 
1960s was a time of great turbulence in higher education. Late in 
the decade especially, universities in Japan were rocked by violent 
student riots that disrupted many campuses. Campus unrest was 
the confluence of a number of factors, including the anti- Vietnam 
War movement in Japan, ideological differences between various 
Japanese student groups, disputes over campus issues such as dis- 
cipline, student strikes, and even general dissatisfaction with the 
university system itself. 

The government responded with the University Control Law 
in 1969, and in the early 1970s, with further education reforms. 
New laws governed the founding of new universities and teachers' 
compensation, and public school curricula were revised. Private 
education institutions began to receive public aid, and a nation- 
wide standardized university entrance examination was added for 
the national universities. Also during this period, strong disagree- 
ment developed between the government and teachers groups. 

Despite the numerous educational changes that have occurred 
in Japan since 1868, and especially since 1945, the education sys- 
tem in 1990 still reflected long-standing cultural and philosophical 
ideas: that learning and education are esteemed and to be pursued 
seriously, and that moral and character development are integral 
to education. The meritocratic legacy of the Meiji period has en- 
dured, as has the centralized education structure. Interest remains 
in adapting foreign ideas and methods to Japanese traditions and 
in improving the system generally. 

Education Reform 

In spite of the admirable success of the education system since 
World War II, there were still problems in the 1980s. Some of these 
difficulties as perceived by domestic and foreign observers included 
rigidity, excessive uniformity, lack of choices, undesirable influences 
of the university examinations, and overriding emphasis on for- 
mal educational credentials. There was also a belief that educa- 
tion was responsible for some social problems and for the general 
academic, behavioral, and adjustment problems of some students. 



136 



Education and the Arts 



There was great concern too that Japanese education be respon- 
sive to the new requirements caused by international challenges 
of the changing world in the twenty-first century. 

Flexibility, creativity, internationalization (kokusaika), individu- 
ality, and diversity thus became the watchwords of Japan's momen- 
tous education reform movement of the 1980s, although they echoed 
themes heard earlier, particularly in the 1970s (see Higher Educa- 
tion, this ch.). The proposals and potential changes of the 1980s 
were so significant that some are comparing them to the educa- 
tional changes that occurred when Japan opened to the West in 
the nineteenth century and to those of the occupation. 

Concerns of the new reform movement were captured in a se- 
ries of reports issued between 1985 and 1987 by the National Coun- 
cil on Educational Reform. The final report outiined basic emphases 
in response to the internationalization of education, new informa- 
tion technologies, and the media; and emphases on individuality, 
lifelong learning, and adjustment to social change. To explore these 
new directions, the council suggested that eight specific subjects 
be considered: designing education for the twenty-first century, 
organizing a system of lifelong learning and reducing the empha- 
sis on the educational background of individuals, improving and 
diversifying higher education, enriching and diversifying elemen- 
tary and secondary education, improving the quality of teachers, 
adapting to internationalization, adapting to the information age, 
and conducting a review of the administration and finance of edu- 
cation. These subjects reflected both educational and social aspects 
of the reform, in keeping with the Japanese view about the rela- 
tionship of education to society. Even as debate over reform took 
place, the government quickly moved to begin implementing 
changes in most of these eight areas. 

Contemporary Setting 

The late twentieth-century Japanese education system had a 
strong legal foundation. Three documents in particular — the Fun- 
damental Law of Education, the School Education Law, and the 
new Constitution, all adopted in 1947 — provided this legal basis 
(see The Postwar Constitution, ch. 6). The system was highly cen- 
tralized, although three levels of government administration — 
national, prefectural, and municipal — had various responsibilities 
for providing, financing, and supervising educational services for 
the nation's more than 65,000 schools and the nearly 27 million 
students in 1989 (see table 5, Appendix). At the top of the system 
stood the Ministry of Education, Science, and Culture (hereafter, 
the Ministry of Education, or Monbusho), which had significant 



137 



Japan: A Country Study 

responsibility for funding, curricula, textbooks, and national edu- 
cation standards. 

More general responsibilities of the Ministry of Education were 
the promotion and dissemination of education, scientific knowledge, 
academic research, culture, and sports. The ministry was supported 
by advisory bodies and standing councils, such as the Central Coun- 
cil on Education, and by ad hoc councils, such as the National 
Council on Educational Reform. 

The ministry's authority and responsibilities were not limited 
to public institutions. Most of its regulations, particularly concern- 
ing compulsory education, also applied to private institutions. The 
ministry had power to approve the founding of universities and 
supervised the national universities. In addition, it provided finan- 
cial assistance and guidance to lower levels of government on educa- 
tional matters and was empowered to mandate changes in local 
policies. 

The ministry drafted its annual budget and education-related 
legislation and submitted them to the Diet (see The Legislature, 
ch. 6). Monbusho administered the disbursement of funds and 
cooperated with other agencies concerned with education and its 
finance. In 1990 a main area of ministry activity was implement- 
ing reforms based on the reports and recommendations of the Na- 
tional Council on Educational Reform, whose final report was 
submitted to the prime minister in 1987. 

Each of the forty-seven prefectures had a five-member board of 
education appointed by the governor with the consent of the prefec- 
tural assembly. The prefectural boards administered and operated 
public schools under their supervision, including most of the pub- 
lic upper- secondary schools, special schools for the handicapped, 
and some other public institutions in the prefecture (see Local 
Government, ch. 6). Prefectural boards were the teacher-licensing 
bodies; with the advice of municipal governments, they appointed 
teachers to public elementary and lower- secondary schools; they 
also licensed preschools and other schools in their municipalities 
and promoted social education. 

Municipal-level governments operated the public elementary and 
lower- secondary schools in their jurisdictions. Supervision was con- 
ducted by the local board of education, usually a five-member or- 
ganization appointed by the mayor with the consent of the local 
assembly. The board also made recommendations to the prefec- 
tures about the appointment or dismissal of teachers and adopted 
textbooks from the list certified by the Ministry of Education. 
Mayors also were charged with some responsibilities for municipal 
universities and budget coordination. 



138 



Education and the Arts 



All three levels of government — national, prefectural, and 
municipal — provided financial support for education. National 
government was the largest source of direct funding, through the 
budget of the Ministry of Education, and a significant source of 
indirect funding of local education through a tax rebate to local 
government, in a tax allocation grant. The national government 
bore from one-third to one-half of the cost of education in the form 
of teachers' salaries, school construction, the school lunch program, 
and vocational education and equipment. 

The ministry's budget between fiscal year (FY — see Glossary) 
1980 and FY 1988 increased a total of about 7 percent (see The 
Role of Government and Business, ch. 4). But, as a percentage 
of the total national budget (before the deduction of mandated ex- 
penses and debt service), the ministry's share actually declined stead- 
ily throughout the 1980s, from about 10 percent in 1980 to about 
7.7 percent in the budget proposed for FY 1989. The proposed FY 
1989 budget asked for ¥4.637 trillion (for value of the yen — see 
Glossary), an increase of 1.34 percent over FY 1988's ¥4.576 trillion. 

Teaching remained an honored profession, and teachers had high 
social status, stemming from the Japanese cultural legacy and public 
recognition of their important social responsibilities. Society ex- 
pected teachers to embody the ideals they were to instill, particu- 
larly because teaching duties extended to the moral instruction and 
character development of children. Formal classroom moral edu- 
cation, informal instruction, and even academic classes were all 
viewed as legitimate venues for this kind of teaching. Teachers' 
responsibilities to their schools and students frequently extended 
beyond the classroom, off school grounds and after school hours. 

In the 1980s, teachers were well paid, and periodic improvements 
also were made in teachers' salaries and compensation. Starting 
salaries compared favorably with those of other white collar profes- 
sionals, and in some cases were higher. In addition to salary, there 
were many types of special allowances and a bonus (paid in three 
installments), which in the late 1980s amounted to about five 
months' salary. Teachers also received the standard health and 
retirement benefits available to most Japanese salaried workers. 

Whether for economic reward, social status, or the desire to teach, 
the number of people wishing to enter teaching exceeded the num- 
ber of new openings by as many as five or six applicants to every 
one position. Prefectural boards and other public bodies were able 
to select the best qualified from a large pool of applicants. 

By the late 1980s, the great majority of new teachers were en- 
tering the profession with a bachelor's degree, but about 25 per- 
cent of the total teaching force at the elementary school level did 



139 



Japan: A Country Study 

not have a bachelor's degree. The program for prospective teachers 
at the undergraduate level included study in education as well as 
concentration in academic areas. Most new teachers majored in 
a subject other than education, and graduates of colleges of edu- 
cation were still in the minority. After graduation, a teacher had 
to pass a prefectural-level examination to be licensed by a prefec- 
tural board of education. 

Changes also occurred during the 1980s in in-service training 
and supervision of new teachers. In-service training, particularly 
that conducted under the auspices of the Ministry of Education, 
had been questioned for many years. After considerable debate, 
and some opposition from the Japan Teachers Union (Nihon 
Kyoshokuin Kumiai — Nikkyoso), a new system of teacher train- 
ing was introduced in 1989. The new system established a one- 
year training program, required new teachers to work under the 
direction of a master teacher, and increased the required number 
of both in-school and out-of-school training days and the length 
of time new teachers were under probationary status. 

The Japan Teachers Union, established in 1947, was the larg- 
est teachers union in the late 1980s. The union functioned as a 
national federation of prefectural teachers unions, although each 
of these unions had considerable autonomy and its own strengths 
and political orientation. Historically, there had been considera- 
ble antagonism between the union and the Ministry of Education, 
owing to a variety of factors. Some were political, because the stance 
of the union had been strongly leftist and it often opposed the more 
conservative ruling Liberal Democratic Party. Another factor was 
the trade union perspective that the teachers union had on the 
profession of teaching (see The Liberal Democratic Party, ch. 6). 
Additional differences on education issues concerned training re- 
quirements for new teachers, decentralization in education, school 
autonomy, curricula, textbook censorship, and, in the late 1980s, 
the reform movement. 

The union tended to support the Japan Socialist Party, while 
a minority faction supported the Japan Communist Party (see The 
Opposition Parties, ch. 6). In the late 1980s, internal disagreements 
in the Japan Teachers Union on political orientation and on the 
union's relationships to other national labor organizations finally 
caused a rupture. The union thus became less effective than in previ- 
ous years at a time when the national government and the minis- 
try were moving ahead on reform issues. The union had opposed 
many reforms proposed or instituted by the ministry, but failed 
to forestall changes in certification and teacher training, two is- 
sues on which it was often at odds with the government. The new 



140 



Education and the Arts 



union leadership that emerged after several years of internal dis- 
cord seemed to take a more conciliatory approach to the ministry 
and reform issues, but the union's future directions were not clear. 

Preschool and Day Care 

Early childhood education began at home, and there were numer- 
ous books and television shows aimed at helping mothers of 
preschool children to educate their children and to ''parent" more 
effectively. Much of the home training was devoted to teaching 
manners, proper social behavior, and structured play, although 
verbal and number skills were also popular themes. Parents were 
strongly committed to early education and frequently enrolled their 
children in preschools. 

Preschool education provided the transition from home to for- 
mal school for most children. Children's lives at home were charac- 
terized by indulgence, and the largely nonacademic preschool 
experience helped children make the adjustment to the group- 
oriented life of school and, in turn, to life in society itself (see Values, 
ch. 2). 

Preschools (ydchien), predominantly staffed by young female junior 
college graduates, were supervised by the Ministry of Education 
in the 1980s, but were not part of the official education system. 
In addition to preschools, a well-developed system of government- 
supervised day-care centers (hoikuen), supervised by the Ministry 
of Labor, was an important provider of preschool education. 
Together, these two kinds of institutions enrolled well over 90 per- 
cent of all preschool-age children prior to their entrance into the 
formal system at first grade. The Ministry of Education's 1990 
Course of Study for Preschools, which applied to both kinds of in- 
stitutions, covered such areas as human relationships, environment, 
words (language), and expression. The 58 percent of preschools 
that were private accounted for 77 percent of all children enrolled. 

Primary and Secondary Education 

Education in postwar Japan was compulsory and free for all 
school children from the first through the ninth grades (see fig. 5). 
The school year began on April 1 and ended on March 3 1 of the 
following year. Schools used a trimester system demarcated by va- 
cation breaks. Japanese children attended school five full weekdays 
and one-half day on Saturdays. The school year had a legal mini- 
mum of 210 days, but most local school boards added about 30 
more days for school festivals, athletic meets, and ceremonies with 
nonacademic educational objectives, especially those encouraging 
cooperation and school spirit. With allowance made for the time 



141 



Japan: A Country Study 



Age 
25 

24 

23 

22 

21 

20 

19 

18 

17 

16 

15 

14 

13 

12 

11 

10 

9 

8 

7 

6 

5 

4 

3 

2 

1 



Grade 
Level 



MISCEL- 
LANEOUS 



SPECIAL 
TRAINING 
SCHOOLS 



GRADUATE 
STUDIES 



UNIVERSITY 



JUNIOR 
COLLEGE 



UPPER- 
SECONDARY 
SCHOOL 
(HIGH SCHOOL) 



UPPER- 
SECONDARY 
DEPARTMENT 



(COMPULSORY) 




LOWER- 


LOWER SECONDARY 




SECONDARY 


SCHOOL 




DEPARTMENT 


(JUNIOR HIGH) 






(COMPULSORY) 




ELEMENTARY 


ELEMENTARY 




DEPARTMENT 


SCHOOL 







TECHNICAL 
COLLEGE 




I 

Ikindergarten! 



Source: Based on information from Robert Leestma et al., Japanese Education Today, Washing- 
ton, 1987, 6; and Japan, Ministry of Education, Science, and Culture, Education 
in Japan: A Graphic Presentation, Tokyo, 1982, 14. 



Figure 5. Structure of the Education System, 1987 

devoted to such activities and the half day of school on Saturday, 
the number of days devoted to instruction was about 195 per year. 

The Japanese hold several important beliefs about education, 
especially compulsory schooling: that all children have the ability 
to learn the material; that effort, perseverance, and self-discipline, 
not academic ability, determine academic success; and that these 
study and behavioral habits can be taught. Thus, students in 



142 



Education and the Arts 



elementary and lower-secondary schools were not grouped or taught 
on the basis of their ability, nor was instruction geared to individual 
differences. 

The nationally designed curricula exposed students to balanced, 
basic education, and compulsory schooling was known for its equal 
educational treatment of students and for its relatively equal dis- 
tribution of financial resources among schools. However, the de- 
mands made by the uniform curricula and approach extracted a 
price in lack of flexibility, including expected conformity of be- 
havior. Little effort was made to address children with special needs 
and interests. Much of the reform proposed in the late 1980s, par- 
ticularly that part emphasizing greater flexibility, creativity, and 
opportunities for greater individual expression, was aimed at chang- 
ing these approaches. 

Textbooks were free to students at compulsory school levels. New 
texts were selected by school boards or principals once every three 
years from the Ministry of Education's list of approved textbooks 
or from a small list of texts that the ministry itself published. The 
ministry bore the cost of distributing these books, in both public 
and private schools. Textbooks were small, paperbound volumes 
that could easily be carried by the students and that became their 
property. 

Almost all schools had a system of access to health profession- 
als. Educational and athletic facilities were good; almost all elemen- 
tary schools had an outdoor playground, roughly 90 percent had 
a gymnasium, and 75 percent an outdoor swimming pool. 

Elementary School 

In the late 1980s, more than 99 percent of elementary school- 
age children were enrolled in school. All children entered first grade 
at age six, and starting school was considered a very important 
event in a child's life. 

Virtually all elementary education took place in public schools; 
less than 1 percent of the schools were private. Private schools tended 
to be costly, although the rate of cost increases in tuition for these 
schools had slowed in the 1980s. Some private elementary schools 
were prestigious and served as a first step to higher-level private 
schools with which they were affiliated, and thence to a univer- 
sity. Competition to enter some of these "ladder schools" was quite 
intense. 

Although public elementary education was free, some school ex- 
penses were borne by parents, for example, school lunches and sup- 
plies. For many families, there were also nonschool educational 
expenses, for extra books, or private lessons, or juku (see Glossary). 



143 



Japan: A Country Study 

Such expenses rose throughout the decade, reaching an average 
of ¥184,000 (US$1,314) in FY 1987 for each child. Costs for pri- 
vate elementary schools were substantially higher. 

Elementary school classes were large, about thirty-one students 
per class on average, but higher numbers were permitted. Students 
were usually organized into small work groups, which had both 
academic and disciplinary functions. Discipline also was main- 
tained, and a sense of responsibility encouraged, by the use of stu- 
dent monitors and by having the students assume responsibility 
for the physical appearance of their classroom and school. 

The ministry's Course of Study for Elementary Schools was com- 
posed of a wide variety of subjects, both academic and nonaca- 
demic, including moral education and "special activities." "Special 
activities" referred to scheduled weekly time given over to class 
affairs and to preparing for the school activities and ceremonies 
that were used to emphasize character development and the im- 
portance of group effort and cooperation. The standard academic 
curriculum included Japanese language, social studies, arithme- 
tic, and science. Nonacademic subjects taught included art and 
handicrafts, music, homemaking, physical education, and moral 
education. Japanese language was the subject most emphasized. 
The complexity of the written language and the diversity of its 
spoken forms in educated speech require this early attention. 

A new course of study was established in 1989, partly as a result 
of the education reform movement of the 1980s and partly because 
of ongoing curriculum review. Important changes scheduled were 
an increased number of hours devoted to Japanese language, the 
replacement of the social sciences course with a daily life course — 
instruction for children on proper interaction with the society and 
environment around them — and an increased emphasis on moral 
education. While evidence was still inconclusive, it appeared that 
at least some children were having difficulties with Japanese lan- 
guage. New emphasis also was to be given in the curriculum to 
the national flag and the national anthem. The ministry suggested 
that the flag be flown and the national anthem be sung at impor- 
tant school ceremonies. Because neither the flag nor the anthem 
had been legally designated as national symbols, and because of 
the nationalistic wartime associations the two had in the minds of 
some citizens, the suggestion from the ministry was greeted with 
some opposition. The revised history curriculum was to empha- 
size cultural legacies and events and the biographies of key figures. 
The ministry provided a proposed list of biographies, and there 
was some criticism surrounding particular suggestions. 



144 



Education and the Arts 



Elementary teachers were generally responsible for all subjects, 
and classes remained in one room for most activities. Teachers were 
well prepared in the subjects they taught. Most teachers, about 60 
percent of the total, were women; but most principals and head 
teachers in elementary schools were men. 

Teachers had ample teaching materials and audiovisual equip- 
ment. There was an excellent system of educational television and 
radio, and almost all elementary schools used programs prepared 
by the School Education Division of Japan Broadcasting Corpo- 
ration (Nippon Hoso Kyokai — NHK). In addition to broadcast 
media, schools increasingly were equipped with computers. 
Although only 6.5 percent of public elementary schools had per- 
sonal computers in 1986, by 1989 the number had passed 20 per- 
cent. The ministry was greatly concerned with this issue and 
planned much greater use of such equipment. 

Virtually all elementary schoolchildren received a full lunch at 
school. Although heavily subsidized by government, both directly 
and indirectiy, the program was not altogether free. Full meals 
usually consisted of bread (or increasingly, of rice), a main dish, 
and milk. Though the program grew out of concern in the immedi- 
ate postwar period for adequate nutrition, the school lunch was 
also important as a teaching device. Because there were relatively 
few cafeterias in elementary schools, meals were taken in the class- 
room with the teacher, providing another informal opportunity for 
teaching nutrition and health and good eating habits and social 
behavior. Frequently, students also were responsible for serving 
the lunch and cleanup. 

Japanese elementary schooling was acknowledged both in Japan 
and abroad to be excellent, but not without some problems, nota- 
bly increasing absenteeism and a declining but troublesome num- 
ber of cases of bullying. In addition, special provision for the many 
young children returning to Japan from long absences overseas was 
an issue of major interest. The government also was concerned with 
the education of Japanese children residing abroad and sent teachers 
overseas to teach in Japanese schools. 

Elementary school education was seen in Japan as fundamental 
in shaping a positive attitude toward lifelong education. Regard- 
less of academic achievement, almost all children in elementary 
school were advanced to lower- secondary schools, the second of 
the two compulsory levels of education. 

Lower-Secondary School 

Lower- secondary school covered grades seven, eight, and nine — 
children between the ages of roughly twelve and fifteen — with 



145 



Japan: A Country Study 

increased focus on academic studies. Although it was still possible 
to leave the formal education system after completing lower- 
secondary school and find work, fewer than 4 percent did so by 
the late 1980s. 

Like elementary schools, most lower- secondary schools in the 
1980s were public, but 5 percent were private. Private schools were 
costly, averaging ¥558,592 (US$3,989) per student in 1988, about 
four times more than the ¥130,828 (US$934) that the ministry 
estimated as the parental cost for students enrolled in public lower- 
secondary schools. 

The teaching force in lower- secondary schools was two-thirds 
male. Schools were headed by principals, 99 percent of whom were 
men in 1988. Teachers had often majored in the subjects they 
taught, and more than 80 percent had graduated from a four-year 
college. Classes were large, with thirty-eight pupils per class on 
average, and each class was assigned a homeroom teacher who dou- 
bled as counselor. Unlike elementary students, lower-secondary 
school students had different teachers for different subjects. The 
teacher, however, rather than the students, moved to a new room 
for each fifty-minute period. 

Instruction in lower- secondary schools tended to rely on the lec- 
ture method. Teachers also used other media, such as television 
and radio, and there was some lab work. About 45 percent of all 
public lower- secondary schools had computers, including schools 
that used them only for administrative purposes. Classroom or- 
ganization was still based on small work groups, although no longer 
for reasons of discipline. By lower- secondary school, students were 
expected to have mastered daily routines and acceptable behavior. 

All course contents were specified in the Course of Study for 
Lower- Secondary Schools. Some subjects, such as Japanese lan- 
guage and mathematics, were coordinated with the elementary cur- 
riculum. Others, such as foreign-language study, usually English, 
began at this level. The curriculum covered Japanese language, 
social studies, mathematics, science, music, fine arts, health, and 
physical education. All students also were exposed to either indus- 
trial arts or homemaking. Moral education and special activities 
continued to receive attention. 

Students also attended mandatory club meetings during school 
hours, and many also participated in after-school clubs. Most lower- 
secondary students said they liked school, although it was the chance 
to meet their friends daily — not the lessons — that was particularly 
attractive to them. 

The ministry recognized a need to improve the teaching of all 
foreign languages, especially English. To improve instruction in 



146 



Education and the Arts 



spoken English, the government invited many young native speak- 
ers of English to Japan to serve as assistants to school boards and 
prefectures under its Japan Exchange and Teaching Program. By 
1988, participants numbered over 1,000. 

As part of the movement to develop an integrated curriculum 
and the education reform movement of the late 1980s, the entire 
Course of Study for Lower- Secondary Schools was revised in 1989 
to take effect in the 1991-93 school years. A main aim of the re- 
form was to equip students with the basic knowledge needed for 
citizenship. In some measure, this meant increased emphasis on 
Japanese history and culture, as well as understanding Japan as 
a nation and its relationships with other nations of the world. The 
course of study also increased elective hours, recommending that 
electives be chosen in light of individual student differences and 
with an eye toward diversification. 

Two problems of great concern to educators and citizens began 
to appear at the lower- secondary level in the 1980s: bullying, which 
seemed rampant in the mid-1980s but had abated somewhat by 
the end of the decade, and the school-refusal syndrome (toko kyohi — 
manifested by a student's excessive absenteeism), which was on 
the rise. Experts disagreed over the specific causes of these phenome- 
na, but there was general agreement that the system offered little 
individualized or specialized assistance, thus contributing to dis- 
affection among those who could not conform to its demands or 
who were otherwise experiencing difficulties. Another problem con- 
cerned Japanese children returning from abroad. These students, 
particularly if they had been overseas for extended periods, often 
needed help not only in reading and writing, but in adjusting to 
rigid classroom demands. Even making the adjustment did not 
guarantee acceptance: besides having acquired a foreign language, 
many of these students had also acquired foreign customs of speech, 
dress, and behavior that marked them as different. 

Special Education 

Japanese special education at the compulsory level was highly 
organized in the late 1980s, even though it had been nationally 
mandated and implemented only in 1979. In 1990 there was still 
controversy over whether children with special needs could or should 
be "mainstreamed." In a society that stressed the group, many 
parents desired to have their children attend regular schools. Main- 
streaming in Japan, however, did not necessarily mean attend- 
ing regular classes; it often meant attending a regular school that 
had special classes for handicapped students. There were also spe- 
cial public schools for the handicapped, which had departments 



147 



Japan: A Country Study 

equivalent to the various levels of elementary and secondary schools, 
including kindergarten and upper- secondary departments in some 
cases. There were few private institutions for special education. 
Some students attended regular classes and also special classes for 
training for their particular needs. Some teachers were also dis- 
patched to children who could not attend schools (see table 6, Ap- 
pendix) . 

Upper-Secondary School 

Even though upper- secondary school was not compulsory in 
Japan, 94 percent of all lower- secondary school graduates entered 
upper- secondary schools in 1989. Private upper- secondary schools 
accounted for about 24 percent of all upper-secondary schools, and 
neither public nor private schools were free. The Ministry of Edu- 
cation estimated that annual family expenses for the education of 
a child in a public upper- secondary school were about ¥300,000 
(US$2,142) in both 1986 and 1987 and that private upper- secondary 
schools were about twice as expensive. 

All upper- secondary schools, public and private, were informally 
ranked, based on their success in placing graduates in freshman 
classes of the most prestigious universities. In the 1980s, private 
upper- secondary schools occupied the highest levels of this hier- 
archy, and there was substantial pressure to do well in the exami- 
nations that determined the upper- secondary school a child entered. 
Admission also depended on the scholastic record and performance 
evaluation from lower-secondary school, but the examination results 
largely determined school entrance. Students were closely coun- 
seled in lower- secondary school, so that they would be relatively 
assured of a place in the schools to which they applied. 

The most common type of upper- secondary schools had a full- 
time, general program that offered academic courses for students 
preparing for higher education and also technical and vocational 
courses for students expecting to find employment after gradua- 
tion. More than 70 percent of upper- secondary school students en- 
rolled in the general academic program in the late 1980s. A small 
number of schools offered part-time or evening courses or correspon- 
dence education. 

The first-year programs for students in both academic and com- 
mercial courses were similar. They included basic academic courses, 
such as Japanese language, English, mathematics, and science. In 
upper-secondary school, differences in ability were first publicly 
acknowledged, and course content and course selection were far 
more individualized in the second year. However, there was a core 
of academic material throughout all programs. 



148 



Education and the Arts 



Vocational- technical programs included several hundred special- 
ized courses, such as information processing, navigation, fish farm- 
ing, business English, and ceramics. Business and industrial courses 
were the most popular, accounting for 72 percent of all students 
in full-time vocational programs in 1989. 

The upper- secondary curriculum also underwent thorough re- 
vision; and in 1989 a new Course of Study for Upper- Secondary 
Schools was announced that would be phased in beginning in 1994. 
Among noteworthy changes was the requirement that both male 
and female students take a course in home economics. The govern- 
ment was concerned with instilling in all students an awareness 
of the importance of family life, the various roles and responsibili- 
ties of family members, the concept of cooperation within the fam- 
ily, and the role of the family in society. The family continued to 
be an extremely important part of the social infrastructure, and 
the ministry clearly was interested in maintaining family stability 
within a changing society. Another change of note was the divi- 
sion of the old social studies course into history, geography, and 
civics courses. 

Most upper- secondary teachers in the late 1980s were univer- 
sity graduates. Upper-secondary schools were organized into depart- 
ments, and teachers specialized in their major fields although they 
taught a variety of courses within their disciplines. Although women 
composed about 20 percent of the teaching force, only 2.5 percent 
of principals were women. 

Teaching depended largely on the lecture system, with the main 
goal of covering the very demanding curriculum in the time allot- 
ted. Approach and subject coverage tended to be uniform, at least 
in the public schools. As in lower- secondary school, the teachers, 
not the students, moved from room to room after each fifty-minute 
class period. 

Upper- secondary students were subject to a great deal of super- 
vision by school authorities and school rules even outside of school. 
Students' behavior and some activities were regulated by school 
codes that were known and obeyed by most children. School regu- 
lations often set curfews and governed dress codes, hairstyles, stu- 
dent employment, and even leisure activities. The school frequently 
was responsible for student discipline when a student ran afoul of 
the regulations, or occasionally, of the law. Delinquency, generally, 
and school violence, in particular, were troubling to Japanese 
authorities. Violations by upper- secondary school students included 
smoking and some substance abuse (predominantly of ampheta- 
mines). Use of drugs, although not a serious problem by interna- 
tional standards, was of concern to the police and civil authorities 



149 



Japan: A Country Study 

(see Public Order and Internal Security, ch. 8). Bullying and the 
drop-out rate were also subjects of attention. Upper- secondary stu- 
dents dropped out at a rate of between 2.0 and 2.5 percent per 
year. The graduation rates for upper- secondary schools stood at 
87.5 percent in 1987. 

Discrimination in education was prohibited, but the burakumin 
(outcast people), a group of people racially and culturally Japanese 
who had been discriminated against historically, were still dis- 
advantaged in education to some degree (see Minorities, ch. 2). 
Their relatively poor educational attainment through the upper- 
secondary level in the 1960s was said to have been largely corrected 
by the 1980s, but reliable evidence was lacking. 

There were some private schools for the children of the foreign 
community in Japan, and some Korean schools for children of 
Japan's Korean minority population, many of whom were second- 
generation or third- generation residents in Japan. Graduates of 
Korean schools faced some discrimination, particularly in enter- 
ing higher education. Observers estimated that 75 percent of Korean 
children were attending Japanese schools in the early 1980s. 

Training of handicapped students, particularly at the upper- 
secondary level, emphasized vocational education, to enable stu- 
dents to be as independent as possible within society. Vocational 
training varied considerably depending on the student's handicap, 
but the options were limited for some. It was clear that the govern- 
ment was aware of the necessity of broadening the range of possi- 
bilities for these students. Advancement to higher education was 
also a goal of the government, and it struggled to have institutions 
of higher learning accept more handicapped students. 

Upper- secondary school students returning to Japan after liv- 
ing overseas presented another problem. The ministry was trying 
to get upper-secondary schools to accept these students more readily, 
and in the late 1980s had decided to allow credit for one upper- 
secondary school year spent abroad. 

Upper- secondary school graduates choosing to enter the world 
of work were supported by a very effective system of job place- 
ment, which, combined with favorable economic conditions, kept 
the unemployment rate among new graduates quite low (see The 
Structure of Japan's Labor Market, ch. 4). For those students going 
on to college, the final phases of school life became increasingly 
dedicated to preparing for examinations, particularly in some of 
the elite private schools. About 31 percent of upper- secondary 
graduates advanced to some form of higher education direcdy after 
graduation. 



150 



Education and the Arts 



After- school clubs provided an important upper- secondary school 
activity. Sports, recreational reading, and watching television were 
popular daily leisure activities, but schoolwork and other studies 
remained the focus of the daily lives of most children. The college 
entrance examinations greatly influenced school life and study 
habits, not only for college-bound students, but indirectly for all; 
the prospect of the examinations often imparted a seriousness to 
the tone of school life at the upper- secondary level. 

After-School Education 

Much debated, and often criticized in the late twentieth century, 
juku were special private schools that offered highly organized les- 
sons conducted after regular school hours and on the weekends. 
Although best known and most widely publicized for their role as 
"cram schools," where children (sent by concerned parents) could 
study to improve scores on upper- secondary school entrance ex- 
aminations, academicjtt£w actually performed several educational 
functions. They provided supplementary education that many chil- 
dren needed just to keep up with the regular school curriculum, 
remedial education for the increasing numbers of children who 
fell behind in their work, and preparation for students striving to 
improve test scores and preparing for the all-important upper- 
secondary and university entrance examinations. In many ways, 
juku compensated for the formal education system's inability or un- 
willingness to address particular individual problems. Half of all 
compulsory school-age children attended academic juku, which 
offered instruction in mathematics, Japanese language, science, 
English, and social studies. Many other children, particularly 
younger children, attended nonacademic7'w£tt for piano lessons, art 
instruction, swimming, and abacus lessons. To some observers, 
juku represented an attempt by parents to exercise a meaningful 
measure of choice in Japanese education, particularly for children 
attending public schools. Some juku offered subject matter not avail- 
able in the public school curricula, while others emphasized a spe- 
cial philosophical or ethical approach. 

Juku also played a social role, and children in Japan said they 
liked going to juku because they were able to make new friends; 
many children asked to be sent because their friends attended. Some 
children seemed to like juku because of the closer personal contact 
they had with their teachers. 

Juku attendance rose from the 1970s through the mid-1980s; par- 
ticipation rates increased at every grade level throughout the com- 
pulsory education years. This phenomenon was a source of great 
concern to the ministry, which issued directives to the regular 



151 



Japan: A Country Study 

schools that it hoped would reduce the need for after- school les- 
sons, but these directives had little practical effect. 

Somejw^w even had branches in the United States and other coun- 
tries to help children living abroad to catch up with students in 
Japan. Because of the commercial nature of most juku, some crit- 
ics argued that they had profit rather than education at heart, and 
not all students could afford to attend. Juku introduced some in- 
equality into what had been a relatively egalitarian approach to 
education, at least in public schools through ninth grade. Yet, while 
some juku were expensive, the majority were affordable for most 
families \juku could not price themselves beyond the reach of their 
potential clientele. If rising enrollments in juku were any indica- 
tion, costs were not yet a limiting factor for most parents, andjw/rw 
clearly were given some priority in family budgeting. 

If a student did not attend juku, it did not mean that he or she 
was necessarily at a disadvantage in school. Other avenues of as- 
sistance were available. For example, self-help literature and sup- 
plemental texts and study guides, some produced by publishing 
houses associated with juku, were widely available commercially. 
Most of these items were moderately priced. A correspondence 
course of the Upper- Secondary School of the Air was broadcast 
almost daily on the NHK educational radio and television chan- 
nels. These programs were free, and costs for accompanying text- 
books were nominal. In addition, about 1 percent of elementary 
school students and 7.3 percent of lower- secondary school students 
took extra lessons at home with tutors. 

Higher Education 

College Entrance 

College entrance was based largely on the scores that students 
achieved in entrance examinations. Private institutions accounted 
for 73 percent of all university enrollments in 1988, but with a few 
exceptions, the public national universities were the most highly 
regarded. This distinction had its origins in historical factors — the 
long years of dominance of the select imperial universities, such 
as Tokyo and Kyoto universities, which trained Japan's leaders 
before the war — and also in differences in quality, particularly in 
facilities and faculty ratios. In addition, certain prestigious employ- 
ers, notably the government and select large corporations, continued 
to restrict their hiring of new employees to graduates of the most 
esteemed universities. There was a close link between university 
background and employment opportunity. Because Japanese so- 
ciety placed such store in academic credentials, the competition 



152 




An elementary-level juku poetry-reading class 
Courtesy The Mainichi Newspapers 
Mathematics class, Fukuoka Upper-Secondary School, Iwate Prefecture 

Courtesy Eliot Frankeberger 



153 



Japan: A Country Study 

to enter the prestigious universities was keen. In addition, the 
eighteen-year-old population was still growing in the late 1980s, 
increasing the number of applicants. 

Students applying to national universities took two entrance ex- 
aminations, first a nationally administered uniform achievement 
test and then an examination administered by the university that 
the student hoped to enter. Applicants to private universities needed 
to take only the university's examination. Some national schools 
had so many applicants that they used the first test, the Joint First 
Stage Achievement Test, as a screening device for qualification to 
their own admissions test. 

Such intense competition meant that many students could not 
compete successfully for admission to the college of their choice. 
An unsuccessful student could either accept an admission elsewhere, 
forego a college education, or wait until the following spring to take 
the national examinations again. A large number of students chose 
the last option. These students, called ronin (see Glossary), spent 
an entire year, and sometimes longer, studying for another attempt 
at the entrance examinations. 

Yobiko (see Glossary) are private schools that in current times, 
like many juku, help students prepare for entrance examinations. 
Whileyobiko have many programs for upper-secondary school stu- 
dents, they are best known for their specially designed full-time, 
year-long classes for ronin. The number of applicants to four-year 
universities totalled almost 560,000 in 1988. Ronin accounted for 
about 40 percent of new entrants to four-year colleges in 1988. Most 
ronin were men, but about 14 percent were women. The ronin ex- 
perience was so common in Japan that the Japanese educational 
structure was often said to have an extra ronin year built into it. 

Yobiko sponsored a variety of programs, both full-time and part- 
time, and employed an extremely sophisticated battery of tests, stu- 
dent counseling sessions, and examination analysis to supplement 
their classroom instruction. The cost oi yobiko education was high, 
comparable to first-year university expenses, and some specialized 
courses at yobiko were even more expensive. Someyobiko published 
modified commercial versions of the proprietary texts they used 
in their classrooms through publishing affiliates or by other means, 
and these were popular among the general population preparing 
for college entrance exams. Yobiko also administered practice ex- 
aminations throughout the year, which they opened to all students 
for a fee. 

In the late 1980s, the examination and entrance process were 
the subjects of renewed debate. In 1987 the schedule of the Joint 
First Stage Achievement Test was changed, and the content of the 



154 



Education and the Arts 



examination itself was revised for 1990. The schedule changes for 
the first time provided some flexibility for students wishing to ap- 
ply to more than one national university. The new Joint First Stage 
Achievement Test was prepared and administered by the National 
Center for University Entrance Examination and was designed to 
accomplish better assessment of academic achievement. 

The ministry hoped many private schools would adopt or adapt 
the new national test to their own admissions requirements and 
thereby reduce or eliminate the university tests. But, by the time 
the new test was administered in 1990, few schools had displayed 
any inclination to do so. The ministry urged universities to increase 
the number of students admitted through alternate selection 
methods, including admission of students returning to Japan from 
long overseas stays, admission by recommendation, and admis- 
sion of students who had graduated from upper- secondary schools 
more than a few years before. Although a number of schools had 
programs in place or reserved spaces for returning students, only 
5 percent of university students were admitted under these alter- 
nate arrangements in the late 1980s. 

Other college entrance issues were proper guidance for college 
placement at the upper- secondary level and better dissemination 
of information about university programs. The ministry provided 
information through the National Center for University Entrance 
Examination's on-line information access system and encouraged 
universities, faculties, and departments to prepare brochures and 
video presentations about their programs. 

Universities 

In 1989 there were just over 2 million students enrolled in Japan's 
490 universities. At the top of the higher education structure, these 
institutions provided four-year training leading to a bachelor's 
degree, and some offered six-year programs leading to a profes- 
sional degree. There were two types of public four-year colleges: 
the 95 national universities (including the University of the Air) 
and the 38 local public universities, founded by prefectures and 
municipalities. The 357 remaining four-year colleges were private 
(see table 7, Appendix). 

The overwhelming majority of college students attended full-time 
day programs. In 1988 the most popular courses, enrolling almost 
40 percent of all undergraduate students, were in the social sciences, 
including business, law, and accounting. Other popular subjects 
were engineering (20 percent), the humanities (15 percent), and 
education (7.5 percent). 



155 



Japan: A Country Study 

The average costs (tuition, fees, and living expenses) for a year 
of higher education in 1986 were ¥1.4 million (US$10,000), of 
which parents paid a little less than 80 percent, or about 20 per- 
cent of the average family's income in 1986. To help defray ex- 
penses, students frequently worked part-time or borrowed money 
through the government-supported Japan Scholarship Association. 
Assistance also was offered by local governments, nonprofit cor- 
porations, and other institutions. 

In 1988 women accounted for about 26 percent of all university 
undergraduates, and their numbers were slowly increasing. Wom- 
en's choices of majors and programs of study still tended to follow 
traditional patterns, with more than two-thirds of all women en- 
rolled in education, social sciences, or humanities courses. Only 
15 percent studied scientific and technical subjects, and women 
represented less than 3 percent of students in engineering, the most 
popular subject for men. 

Junior Colleges 

Junior colleges — mainly private institutions — were a legacy of 
the occupation period; many had been prewar institutions upgraded 
to college status at that time. More than 90 percent of the students 
in junior colleges were women, and higher education for women 
was still largely perceived as preparation for marriage or for a short- 
term career before marriage. Junior colleges provided many women 
with social credentials as well as education and some career op- 
portunities. These colleges frequently emphasized home econom- 
ics, nursing, teaching, the humanities, and social sciences in their 
curricula. 

Special Training Schools 

Advanced courses in special training schools required upper- 
secondary- school graduation. These schools offered training in 
specific skills, such as computer science and vocational training, 
and they enrolled a large number of men. Some students attended 
these schools in addition to attending a university; others went to 
qualify for technical licenses or certification. The prestige of spe- 
cial training schools was lower than that of universities, but gradu- 
ates, particularly in technical areas, were readily absorbed by the 
job market. 

Miscellaneous Schools 

In 1988 there were about 3,700 predominantly private "miscel- 
laneous schools," whose attendance did not require upper- 
secondary school graduation. Miscellaneous schools offered a variety 



156 



Students at Shokutoku Junior College 
Courtesy The Mainichi Newspapers 

of courses in such programs as medical treatment, education, so- 
cial welfare, and hygiene, diversifying practical postsecondary train- 
ing and responding to social and economic demands for certain 
skills. 

Technical Colleges 

Most technical colleges were national institutions established to 
train highly skilled technicians in five-year programs in a number 
of fields, including the merchant marine. Sixty- two of these schools 
had been operating since the early 1960s. About 10 percent of tech- 
nical college graduates transferred to universities as third-year stu- 
dents, and some universities, notably the University of Tokyo and 
Tokyo Institute of Technology, earmarked entrance places for these 
transfer students in the 1980s. 

Graduate Education and Research 

Graduate schools became a part of the formal higher education 
system only after World War II and were still not stressed in 1990. 
Even though 60 percent of all universities had graduate schools, 
only 7 percent of university graduates advanced to master's pro- 
grams, and total graduate school enrollment was about 4 percent 
of the entire university student population. 



157 



Japan: A Country Study 



The pattern of graduate enrollment was almost the opposite of 
that of undergraduates: the majority (63 percent) of all graduate 
students were enrolled in the national universities, and it appeared 
that the disparity between public and private graduate enrollments 
was widening. Graduate education was largely a male preserve, 
and women, particularly at the master's level, were most heavily 
represented in the humanities, social sciences, and education. Men, 
on the other hand, were frequently found in engineering programs 
where, at the master's level, women comprised only 2 percent of 
the students. At the doctoral level, the two highest levels of female 
enrollment were found in medical programs and the humanities, 
where in both fields 30 percent of doctoral students were women. 
Women accounted for about 13 percent of all doctoral enrollments. 

The generally small numbers of graduate students and the gradu- 
ate enrollment profile resulted from a number of factors, especially 
the traditional employment pattern of industry. The private sec- 
tor frequently preferred to hire and train new university gradu- 
ates, allowing them to develop their research skills within the 
corporate structure. Thus, the demand for students with advanced 
degrees was low. 

The Ministry of Education, Science, and Culture 

The Ministry of Education, Science, and Culture was the primary 
authority over higher education. It approved the establishment of 
all new institutions, both public and private, and directly controlled 
the budgets of all national institutions and their affiliated research 
institutes. In addition, the ministry regulated many aspects of the 
university environment, including standards for academics and 
physical plants and facilities. The ministry also provided subsidies 
to private higher education institutions for both operation and 
equipment and made long-term loans for physical plant im- 
provement. 

Government appropriations were the largest source of funds for 
national universities (over 75 percent), and tuition and fees provided 
most revenues for private schools (about 66 percent), with subsi- 
dies accounting for another 10 to 15 percent for the private schools. 
The 1975 Private School Promotion Law allowed the government 
to subsidize private education and increased the ministry's authority 
over private schools, but the ministry's own budgetary limits and 
general fiscal restraint have tended to limit such subsidies, which 
remained relatively low. In FY 1988, for example, only ¥244 bil- 
lion of the total ministry budget of ¥4.6 trillion went for this purpose. 

The Ministry of Education had two major areas of responsibil- 
ity related to graduate education and research. In addition to being 



158 



Education and the Arts 



generally responsible for the national universities and establishing 
their research institutes, the ministry also promoted the research 
conducted at universities and funded both institutions and indi- 
viduals. About a half-dozen research institutes, such as the Na- 
tional Institute for Educational Research and the National Institute 
for Special Education, were also under direct ministry supervision. 
Several types of research organizations were affiliated with uni- 
versities: the national research institutes attached to national uni- 
versities, independent research facilities affiliated with national 
universities but open to researchers from universities throughout 
Japan, other research centers, and other facilities at national, local, 
public, and private universities. 

The ministry was not the exclusive agent for funding and promot- 
ing research, but it accounted for about half of the entire govern- 
ment budget for research throughout most of the 1980s. In addition 
to providing funds for research institutes and national universi- 
ties, the ministry gave smaller amounts for scientific grants and 
programs in other public and private institutions. 

The ministry could devote funds to particular areas of research 
that it considered important. In FY 1988, space science, particu- 
larly scientific satellites, rockets, and astronomy, high-energy phys- 
ics and accelerator experiments, and the construction of a national 
research and development information network were programs that 
the ministry emphasized in its budget. 

Reform 

The quality of undergraduate and graduate education was the 
subject of widespread criticism in the 1980s, and its improvement 
was one of the focal points of university reform. One complaint 
was that students, once admitted, had little incentive to study be- 
cause graduation was virtually automatic. There were few atten- 
dance requirements and, except for examinations, students were 
free to come and go as they pleased. There was poor teaching, and 
little study. Students and the system were accused of squandering 
the four years. 

In response to the call for university reform in the reports of the 
National Council on Educational Reform, the ministry founded 
the University Council in 1987. High on the council's agenda were 
the diversification and reform of graduate education, improvement 
in the management and organization of universities, and the de- 
velopment of a policy for lifelong education and diversification in 
educational activities. The recommendations that had emerged by 
1989 included improvements in the provision of private financial 
support to universities and modified personnel practices for college 



159 



Japan: A Country Study 

instructors in the national schools. There were calls for better in- 
formation and data-processing education and for the establishment 
or reorganization of departments and research faculties in those 
fields. Finally, in the area of lifelong education, changes under dis- 
cussion were the provision of more public lectures, expansion of 
university entrance opportunities for the general adult population, 
improvements in the University of the Air, and better school- 
community links. 

The University of the Air, which had no entrance requirements, 
was originally designed to give all Japanese access to higher edu- 
cation through radio and television broadcasts. Although it was 
hampered by limited broadcast radius and frequencies, it had a 
potential leading role in promoting lifelong learning (see Social Edu- 
cation, this ch.). 

Internationalization was an issue for every education level, but 
particularly for higher education. The number of students study- 
ing in Japan from foreign countries, especially Asian countries, 
was increasing, and the higher education structure was not partic- 
ularly well-equipped to deal with them. In 1988 approximately 
25,000 foreign students from more than 100 countries were study- 
ing in Japanese universities and colleges, and the ministry expected 
the figure to be 100,000 by the beginning of the twenty-first cen- 
tury. The ministry was also working to regulate and improve the 
standards for teaching Japanese to foreign students and trying to 
improve their financial and living arrangements. During the 1980s, 
Japanese universities established branches in the United States, 
and many American schools also set up Japanese branches. At least 
one Japanese women's university began to require its undergradu- 
ates to spend a semester on the campus of an affiliated school in 
the United States. 

As in virtually every other area of education, debate over re- 
form of graduate education and research was widespread at the 
end of the 1980s. The University Council established a subcom- 
mittee on graduate schools consisting of academics, researchers, 
and corporate executives. The subcommittee identified a number 
of critical issues: establishing graduate schools that were indepen- 
dent of traditional university structures, founding new and special- 
ized graduate schools, reconsidering entrance and graduation 
criteria, increasing the international student population and inter- 
nationalizing graduate education, addressing the qualifications of 
graduate school faculties, modifying the mission of doctoral courses, 
arranging for flexibility in admissions to graduate school, stan- 
dardizing the length of graduate programs and reconciling the var- 
iations between degrees awarded by different schools and in different 



160 



Education and the Arts 



disciplines, establishing an accreditation and evaluation system, 
and reviewing the financial situation of graduate students. These 
recommendations were acknowledged in the ministry's FY 1988 
budget, which included funds for expanding student aid programs, 
reforming graduate programs, and establishing a new Graduate 
School for Advanced Studies. Proposed reform of the research sys- 
tem concentrated on improving cooperation between universities 
and the private sector, and between universities and other insti- 
tutions. 

Finally, the subcommittee recommended greater Japanese par- 
ticipation and cooperation in international projects and greater 
efforts to make Japanese scientific and technical literature avail- 
able in English. Although there were more programs for interna- 
tional scholarly exchange and more foreign researchers and foreign 
graduate students in Japan than in the past, Japanese society and 
education institutions were still having some difficulties in accom- 
modating them smoothly. 

Some of the urgency behind considering reforms in graduate edu- 
cation and research came from the recognition that Japan was in- 
creasingly involved in advanced research and was no longer assured 
of having foreign models to study. To remain competitive and to 
guarantee its future, Japan would need to make serious changes 
in its education and research structures. Its institutions would have 
to be more flexible and diverse, and encourage the creativity in 
education that would foster new technology. This need was seen 
to require a national effort, one not limited to the graduate sector. 

Social Education 

Modern Japan is unquestionably a society that values educa- 
tion highly. Nowhere in the 1980s was this better reflected than 
in "social education," as the Japanese called nondegree-oriented 
education. Diverse institutions, such as the miscellaneous schools, 
provided these services. Large newspaper companies sponsored cul- 
tural centers that offered ongoing programs of informal education, 
department stores organized curricula covering everything from 
cooking classes to music, English conversation, and Japanese poetry. 

"Lifelong learning," another term for social education, was also 
a key phrase in the education reforms of the late 1980s. The respon- 
sibility for social education was shared by all levels of government, 
but especially local government. Local governments also were 
largely responsible for such public facilities as libraries and mu- 
seums, basic resources in social education (see table 8, Appendix). 
The ministry was interested in increasing the use of public school 
facilities for lifelong learning activities, increasing the number of 



161 



Japan: A Country Study 

social education facilities, training staff, and disseminating infor- 
mation about lifelong learning opportunities. 

The Japanese are voracious readers. In the 1980s, well-known 
bookstores were full from the moment they opened their doors each 
day with readers seeking books from a staggering range of foreign 
as well as Japanese titles. The top four national newspapers alone 
had a combined daily circulation (with two editions each day) of 
over 35 million, and there were four daily English-language papers 
as well. 

Although education in Japan in 1990 was in transition in many 
regards, it still retained its postwar organizational structure. Even 
with growing pressure for reforms and for more emphasis on in- 
dividuality and internationalization in education, it was clear that 
educational changes would be a unique amalgam of traditional 
values and modern innovations. 

The Arts 

The introduction of Western cultural values, which had flooded 
Japan by the late nineteenth century, led to a dichotomy develop- 
ing between traditional values and the attempts to duplicate and 
assimilate a variety of clashing new ideas. This split remained evi- 
dent in the late twentieth century, although much synthesis had 
occurred, which had created an international cultural atmosphere 
and stimulated contemporary Japanese arts toward ever more in- 
novative forms. 

Japan's aesthetic conceptions, deriving from diverse cultural tra- 
ditions, have been formative in the production of unique art forms, 
all of which are characterized by an overwhelming technical per- 
fection. Over the centuries, a wide range of artistic motifs devel- 
oped and were refined, becoming imbued with symbolic significance 
and acquiring many layers of meaning. Japanese aesthetics pro- 
vide a key to understanding artistic works perceivably different from 
those coming from Western traditions. 

Within the East Asian artistic tradition, China has been the ac- 
knowledged teacher and Japan the devoted student. Nevertheless, 
Japanese arts developed their own style, which can be clearly differen- 
tiated from the Chinese. The monumental, symmetrically balanced, 
rational approach of Chinese art forms became miniaturized, irregu- 
lar, and subdy suggestive in Japanese hands. Miniature rock gardens, 
diminutive plants (bonsai), and flower arrangements, in which the 
selected few represented a garden, were the favorite pursuits of re- 
fined aristocrats for a millennium, and they have remained a part 
of contemporary cultural life. 



162 



i 

4 



Daisen-in rock garden, Kyoto 
Courtesy Jane T. Griffin 




The diagonal, reflecting a natural flow, rather than the fixed tri- 
angle became the favored structural device, whether in painting, 
architectural or garden design, dance steps, or musical notations. 
Odd numbers replace even ones in the regularity of a Chinese 
master pattern, and a pull to one side allows a motif to turn the 
corner of a three-dimensional object, thus giving continuity and 
motion that is lacking in a static frontal design. Japanese painters 
used the devices of the cutoff, close-up, and fade-out by the twelfth 
century in yamato-e, or Japanese-style, scroll painting, perhaps one 
reason why modern filmmaking has been such a natural and 
successful art form in Japan. Suggestion is used rather than direct 
statement; oblique poetic hints, allusive, inconclusive melodies and 
thoughts — all have proved frustrating to the Westerner trying to 
penetrate the meanings of literature, music, painting, and even 
everyday language. 

The Japanese began defining such aesthetic ideas in a number 
of evocative phrases by at least the tenth or eleventh centuries. The 
courtly refinements of the aristocratic Heian period evolved into 
the elegant simplicity seen as the essence of good taste in the under- 
stated art that is called shibui (see Nara and Heian Periods, 710- 
1185, ch. 1). Two terms originating from Zen Buddhist medita- 
tive practices describe degrees of tranquility: one, the repose found 
in humble melancholy (wabi), the other, the serenity accompany- 
ing the enjoyment of subdued beauty (sabi). Zen thought also 



163 



Japan: A Country Study 

contributed a penchant for combining the unexpected or startling, 
used to jolt one's consciousness toward the goal of enlightenment: 
in art, this approach was expressed in combinations of such un- 
likely materials as lead inlaid in lacquer and in clashing poetic im- 
agery. Unexpectedly humorous and sometimes grotesque images 
and motifs also stem from the Zen koan (conundrum). Although 
the arts have been mainly secular since the Tokugawa period, tradi- 
tional aesthetics and training methods, stemming generally from 
religious sources, continue to underlie artistic productions (see 
Tokugawa Period, 1600-1867, ch. 1). 

In the Meiji period (1868-1912), Western art forms came into 
Japan and were studied with intense interest by Japanese artists, 
who quickly imitated a variety of European models. By the early 
twentieth century, a period of assimilation began as techniques were 
mastered and the new forms of literature and the visual and per- 
forming arts were adapted. Artists divided into two main camps, 
those continuing in traditional Japanese style and those who whole- 
heartedly studied the new Western culture. By the late 1920s, a 
generation of Japanese artists had synthesized Western and 
Japanese artistic conceptions. Oil painters used the calligraphic, 
black lines of traditional Japanese brushwork, and musicians used 
the Asian tonal system and instruments to create a concerto, while 
new theaters dealt with social themes in the allusive traditional liter- 
ary style. Artists employing Western forms were accused of im- 
itating rather than innovating. Yet, the age-old Asian cultural 
tradition has always entailed copying a master's style until it has 
been perfected, which explains why so much so-called "imitative 
art" was produced. Japan produced much vibrant and unique new 
art through such exchanges. 

After World War II, many artists began working in art forms 
deriving from the international scene, moving away from local ar- 
tistic developments into the mainstream of world art. But tradi- 
tional Japanese conceptions endured, particularly in the use of 
modular space in architecture and certain spacing intervals in music 
and dance, and a propensity for certain color combinations and 
characteristic literary forms. The wide variety of art forms avail- 
able to the Japanese in the 1990s reflected the vigorous state of 
the arts, widely supported by the Japanese people and promoted 
by the government. 

Traditionally, the artist was a vehicle for expression and was per- 
sonally reticent, in keeping with the role of an artisan or enter- 
tainer of low social status. The calligrapher — a member of the 
Confucian literati class, or samurai — did have a higher status, while 
artists of great genius were often recognized in the medieval period 



164 



Education and the Arts 



by receiving a name from a feudal lord and thus rising socially (see 
The Kamakura and Muromachi Periods, 1185-1573, ch. 1). The 
performing arts, however, were generally held in less esteem, and 
the purported immorality of actresses of the early Kabuki theater 
caused the Tokugawa government to bar women from the stage; 
female roles in Kabuki and No thereafter were played by men (see 
The Bakufu and the Hqjo Regency, ch. 1). 

In the early 1990s, there were a number of specialized universi- 
ties for the arts, led by the national universities. The most impor- 
tant was the prestigious Tokyo Arts University, said to be the most 
difficult of all national universities to enter. Another seminal center 
was Tama Arts University in Tokyo, which produced many of 
Japan's late twentieth-century innovative young artists. Traditional 
training in the arts remained: experts taught from their homes or 
headed schools working within a master-pupil relationship. A pupil 
did not experiment with a personal style until the top level of train- 
ing, or graduation, or becoming head of a school. Many young 
artists have criticized this system as stifling creativity and individu- 
ality. A new generation of the avant-garde has broken with this 
tradition, often receiving its training in the West. In the traditional 
arts, however, the master-pupil system preserved the secrets and 
skills of the past. Some master-pupil lineages could be traced to 
the medieval period, from which they continued to use a great 
master's style or theme. Japanese artists considered technical vir- 
tuosity as the sine qua non of their professions, a fact recognized 
by the rest of the world as one of the hallmarks of Japanese art. 

The national government has actively supported the arts through 
the Agency for Cultural Affairs, set up in 1968 as a special body 
of the Ministry of Education. The agency's budget for FY 1989 
rose to ¥37.8 billion after five years of budget cuts, but still 
represented much less than 1 percent of the general budget. The 
agency's Cultural Affairs Division disseminated information about 
the arts within Japan and internationally, and the Cultural Proper- 
ties Protection Division protected the nation's cultural heritage. 
The Cultural Affairs Division was concerned with such areas as 
art and culture promotion, arts copyrights, and improvements in 
the national language. It also supported both national and local 
arts and cultural festivals, and funded traveling cultural events in 
music, theater, dance, art exhibitions, and filmmaking. Special 
prizes were offered to encourage young artists and established prac- 
titioners, and some grants were given each year to enable them 
to train abroad. The agency funded national museums of modern 
art in Kyoto and Tokyo and the Museum of Western Art in Tokyo, 
which exhibited both Japanese and international shows. The agency 



165 



Japan: A Country Study 

also supported the Japan Academy of Arts, which honored emi- 
nent persons of arts and letters, appointing them to membership 
and offering ¥3.5 million in prize money. Awards were made in 
the presence of the emperor, who would personally bestow the 
highest accolade, the Cultural Medal. In 1989 the fifth woman ever 
to be so distinguished was cited for Japanese-style painting, while 
for the first time two women — a writer and a costume designer — 
were nominated for the Order of Cultural Merit, another official 
honor carrying the same stipend. 

The Cultural Properties Protection Division originally was es- 
tablished to oversee restorations after World War II. In 1989 it 
was responsible for over 2,500 historic sites, including the ancient 
capitals of Asuka, Heijokyo, and Fujiwara, more than 275 scenic 
places, and nearly 1,000 national monuments, and for such in- 
digenous fauna as ibis and storks. As of 1989, some 1,000 build- 
ings, paintings, sculptures, and other art forms had been designated 
National Treasures. In addition, about 1 1 ,500 items had the lesser 
designation of Important Cultural Properties, with buildings ac- 
counting for the largest share, closely followed by sculpture and 
craft objects. 

The government also protected buried properties, of which some 
300,000 had been identified. During the 1980s, many important 
prehistoric and historic sites were investigated by the archaeologi- 
cal institutes that the agency funded, resulting in about 2,000 ex- 
cavations in 1989. The wealth of material unearthed shed new light 
on the controversial period of the formation of the Japanese state 
(see Early Developments, ch. 1). 

A 1975 amendment to the Cultural Properties Protection Act 
of 1897 enabled the Agency for Cultural Affairs to designate tradi- 
tional areas and buildings in urban centers for preservation. From 
time to time, various endangered traditional artistic skills were 
added to the agency's preservation roster, such as the 1989 inclu- 
sion of a kind of ancient doll making. 

One of the most important roles of the Cultural Properties Pro- 
tection Division was to preserve the traditional arts and crafts and 
performing arts through their living exemplars. Individual artists 
and groups, such as a dance troupe or a pottery village, were desig- 
nated as mukei bunkazai (intangible cultural assets) in recognition of 
their skill. Major exponents of the traditional arts have been desig- 
nated as ningen kokuhd (living national treasures). About seventy per- 
sons are so honored at any one time; in 1989 the six newly designated 
masters were a kyogen (comic) performer, a chanter of bunraku (pup- 
pet) theater, a performer of the nagauta samisen (a special kind of 
stringed instrument), the head potter making Nabeshima decorated 



166 



Education and the Arts 



porcelain ware, the top pictorial lacquer-ware artist, and a metal- 
work expert. Each was provided a lifetime annual pension of ¥2 
million and financial aid for training disciples. 

The national museums of Japanese and Asian art in Tokyo, 
Kyoto, Nara, and Osaka, the cultural properties research institutes 
at Tokyo and Nara, the national theaters, the Ethnological Mu- 
seum, the National Museum of History and Folk Culture, and the 
National Storehouse for Fine Arts all came under the aegis of the 
Cultural Properties Protection Division. During the 1980s, the Na- 
tional No Theater and the National Bunraku Theater were con- 
structed by the government. 

Arts patronage and promotion by the government were broad- 
ened to include a new cooperative effort with corporate Japan to 
provide funding beyond the tight budget of the Agency for Cul- 
tural Affairs. Many other public and private institutions partici- 
pated, especially in the burgeoning field of awarding arts prizes. 
A growing number of large corporations joined major newspapers 
in sponsoring exhibitions and performances and in giving yearly 
prizes. The most important of the many literary awards given were 
the venerable Naoki Prize and the Akutagawa Prize, the latter being 
the equivalent of the Pulitzer Prize in the United States. In 1989 
an effort to promote cross-cultural exchange led to the establish- 
ment of a Japanese " Nobel Prize" for the arts — the Premium Im- 
periale — by the Japan Art Association. This prize of US$100,000 
was funded largely by the mass media conglomerate Fuji-Sankei 
and awarded on a world-wide selection basis. 

A number of foundations promoting the arts arose in the 1980s, 
including the new Cultural Properties Foundation set up to preserve 
historic sites overseas, especially along the Silk Route in Inner Asia 
and at Dunhuang in China. Another international arrangement 
was made in 1988 with the United States Smithsonian Institution 
for cooperative exchange of high-technology studies of Asian arti- 
facts. The government played a major role by funding the Japan 
Foundation, which provided both institutional and individual 
grants, effected scholarly exchanges, awarded annual prizes, sup- 
ported publications and exhibitions, and sent traditional Japanese 
arts groups to perform abroad. The Arts Festival held for two 
months each fall for all the performing arts was sponsored by the 
Agency for Cultural Affairs. Major cities also provided substan- 
tial support for the arts; a growing number in the 1980s had built 
large centers for the performing arts and, stimulated by govern- 
ment funding, were offering prizes such as the Lafcadio Hearn Prize 
initiated by the city of Matsue. There were also a number of new 
municipal museums providing about one-third more facilities in 



167 



Japan: A Country Study 

the 1980s than were previously available. In the late 1980s, Tokyo 
added more than twenty new cultural halls, notably, the large Cul- 
tural Village built by Tokyu Corporation and the reconstruction 
of Shakespeare's Globe Theater. All these efforts reflected a rising 
popular enthusiasm for the arts. Japanese art buyers swept the 
Western art markets in the late 1980s, paying record highs for im- 
pressionist paintings and US$51.7 million alone for one blue pe- 
riod Picasso. 

After World War II, artists typically gathered in arts associa- 
tions, some of which were long-established professional societies 
while others reflected the latest arts movement. The Japan Artists 
League, for example, was responsible for the largest number of 
major exhibitions including the prestigious annual Nitten (Japan 
Art Exhibition). The P.E.N. Club of Japan (P.E.N, stands for 
prose, essay, and narrative) — a branch of an international writers' 
organization — was the largest of some thirty major authors' associ- 
ations. Actors, dancers, musicians, and other kinds of performing 
artists boasted their own major and minor societies, including the 
Kabuki Society, organized in 1987 to maintain this art's traditional 
high standards, which were thought to be endangered by modern 
innovation. By the 1980s, however, avant-garde painters and sculp- 
tors had eschewed all groups, and were "unattached" artists. 

Visual Arts 

Architecture 

With the introduction of Western building techniques, materials, 
and styles into Meiji Japan, new steel and concrete structures were 
built in strong contrast to traditional styles. Japan played some role 
in modern skyscraper design because of its long familiarity with 
the cantilever principle to support the weight of heavy tiled tem- 
ple roofs. Frank Lloyd Wright was strongly influenced by Japanese 
spatial arrangements and the concept of interpenetrating exterior 
and interior space, long achieved in Japan by opening up walls 
made of sliding doors. In the late twentieth century, however, only 
in domestic and religious architecture was Japanese style commonly 
employed. Cities bristled with modern skyscrapers, epitomized by 
Tokyo's crowded skyline, reflecting a total assimilation and trans- 
formation of modern Western forms. 

The widespread urban planning and reconstruction necessitated 
by the devastation of World War II produced such major architects 
as Maekawa Kunio and Tange Kenzo. Maekawa, a student of 
world-famous architect Charles LeCorbusier, produced thoroughly 
international, functional modern works. Tange, who worked at first 



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Education and the Arts 

for Maekawa, supported this concept. Both were notable for in- 
fusing Japanese aesthetic ideas into starkly contemporary build- 
ings, returning to the spatial concepts and modular proportions 
of tatami (sleeping mats), using textures to enliven the ubiquitous 
ferroconcrete and steel, and integrating gardens and sculpture into 
their designs. Tange used the cantilever principle in a pillar and 
beam system reminiscent of ancient imperial palaces; the pillar — 
a hallmark of Japanese traditional monumental timber construc- 
tion — became fundamental to his designs. Maki Fumihiko advanced 
new city planning ideas based on the principle of layering or cocoon- 
ing around an inner space (oku), a Japanese spatial concept that 
was adapted to urban needs. He also advocated the use of empty 
or open spaces (ma), a Japanese aesthetic principle reflecting Bud- 
dhist spatial ideas. Another quintessentially Japanese aesthetic con- 
cept was a basis for Maki designs, which focused on openings onto 
intimate garden views at ground level while cutting off ugly sky- 
lines. A dominant 1970s architectural concept, the "metabolism" 
of convertibility, provided for changing the functions of parts of 
buildings according to use, and has remained influential in the 
1990s. 

A major architect of the 1970s and 1980s was Isozaki Arata, origi- 
nally a student and associate of Tange' s, who also based his style 
on the LeCorbusier tradition and then turned his attention toward 
the further exploration of geometric shapes and cubic silhouettes. 
He synthesized Western high-technology building concepts with 
peculiarly Japanese spatial, functional, and decorative ideas to create 
a modern Japanese style. Isozaki' s predilection for the cubic grid 
and trabeated pergola in large-scale architecture, for the semicircular 
vault in domestic- scale buildings, and for extended barrel vault- 
ing in low, elongated buildings led to a number of striking varia- 
tions. New Wave architects of the 1980s were influenced by his 
designs, either pushing to extend his balanced style, often into man- 
nerism, or reacting against them. 

A number of avant-garde experimental groups were encompassed 
in the New Wave of the late 1970s and the 1980s. They reexamined 
and modified the formal geometric structural ideas of modernism 
by introducing metaphysical concepts, producing some startling 
fantasy effects in architectural design. In contrast to these innova- 
tors, the experimental poetic minimalism of Ando Tadao embod- 
ied the postmodernist concerns for a more balanced, humanistic 
approach than that of structural modernism's rigid formulations. 
Ando's buildings provide a variety of light sources, including ex- 
tensive use of glass bricks and opening up spaces to the outside 
air. He adapted the inner courtyards of traditional Osaka houses 



169 



Japan: A Country Study 

to new urban architecture, using open stairways and bridges to 
lessen the sealed atmosphere of the standard city dwelling. His ideas 
became ubiquitous in the 1980s, when buildings were commonly 
planned around open courtyards or plazas, often with stepped and 
terraced spaces, pedestrian walkways, or bridges connecting build- 
ing complexes. In 1989 Ando became the third Japanese to receive 
France's Prix de L'Academie d' Architecture, an indication of the 
international strength of the major Japanese architects, all of whom 
produced important structures abroad during the 1980s. Japanese 
architects were not only skilled practitioners in the modern idiom 
but also enriched postmodern designs worldwide with innovative 
spatial perceptions, subtle surface texturing, unusual use of indus- 
trial materials, and a developed awareness of ecological and topo- 
graphical problems. 

Sculpture 

Japanese sculpture derived from Shinto funerary and Buddhist 
religious arts, and developed portrait sculpture only as a memorial 
to a shrine patron or temple founder. Materials traditionally used 
were metal — especially bronze — and, more commonly, wood, often 
lacquered, gilded, or brightiy painted. By the end of the Tokugawa 
period, such traditional sculpture — except for miniaturized works — 
had largely disappeared because of the loss of patronage by Bud- 
dhist temples and the nobility. 

The stimulus of Western art forms returned sculpture to the 
Japanese art scene and introduced the plaster cast, outdoor heroic 
sculpture, and the school of Paris concept of sculpture as an "art 
form." Such ideas adapted in Japan during the late nineteenth cen- 
tury, together with the return of state patronage, rejuvenated sculp- 
ture. After World War II, sculptors turned away from the figurative 
French school of Rodin and Maillol toward aggressive modern and 
avant-garde forms and materials, sometimes on an enormous scale. 
A profusion of materials and techniques characterized these new 
experimental sculptures, which also absorbed the ideas of inter- 
national "op" (optical illusion) and "pop" (popular motif) art. 
A number of innovative artists were both sculptors and painters 
or printmakers, their new theories cutting across material boun- 
daries. 

In the 1970s, the ideas of contextual placement of natural ob- 
jects of stone, wood, bamboo, and paper into relationships with 
people and their environment were embodied in the mono-ha school. 
These artists emphasized materiality as the most important aspect 
of art and brought to an end the antiformalism that had dominated 
the avant-garde in the preceding two decades. This focus on the 



170 



Contemporary outdoor sculpture by Isamu Noguchi, Kagawa Prefecture 

Courtesy Asahi Shimbun 

relationships between objects and people was ubiquitous through- 
out the arts world and led to a rising appreciation of "Japanese" 
qualities in the environment and a return to native artistic princi- 
ples and forms. Among these precepts were a reverence for nature 
and various Buddhist concepts brought into play by architects to 
treat time/space problems. Western ideology was carefully re- 
examined, and much was rejected as artists turned to their own 
environment — both inward and outward — for sustenance and in- 
spiration. From the late 1970s through the late 1980s, artists began 
to create a vital new art, which was both contemporary and Asian 
in sources and expression but still very much a part of the interna- 
tional scene. These artists focused on projecting their own individu- 
alism and national styles rather than on adapting or synthesizing 
Western ideas exclusively. 

Outdoor sculpture, which came to the fore with the advent of the 
Hakone Open- Air Museum in 1969, was widely used in the 1980s, 
and cities supported enormous outdoor sculptures for parks and 
plazas, and major architects planned for sculpture in their build- 
ings and urban layouts. Outdoor museums and exhibitions 
burgeoned, stressing the natural placement of sculpture in the en- 
vironment. Since hard sculpture stone is not native to Japan, most 
outdoor pieces were created from stainless steel, plastic, or aluminum 



171 



Japan: A Country Study 



for "tension and compression" machine constructions of mirror- 
surfaced steel or for elegant, polished- aluminum, ultramodern 
shapes. The strong influence of modern high technology on the 
artists resulted in experimentation with kinetic, tensile forms, such 
as flexible arcs and "info-environmental" sculptures using lights. 
Video components and video art developed rapidly from the late 
1970s throughout the 1980s. The new Japanese experimental sculp- 
tors could be understood as working with Buddhist ideas of perme- 
ability and regeneration in structuring their forms, a contrast to 
the general Western conception of sculpture as something with finite 
and permanent contours. 

In the 1980s, wood and natural materials were used prominently 
by many sculptors, who now began to place their works in inner 
courtyards and enclosed spaces. Also, a Japanese feeling for rhyth- 
mic motion, captured in recurring forms as a "systematic gestural 
motion," was used by both long-established artists like Kiyomizu 
Kyubei and Nagasawa Hidetoshi and the younger generation 
spearheaded by Toya Shigeo. The 1970s search for a national iden- 
tity led to a renewed understanding of Japanese forms, spatial 
perceptions, rhythms, and philosophical conceptions, which re- 
invigorated Japanese sculpture in the 1980s. 

Painting 

Painting is one of the oldest and most highly refined of Japanese 
arts, stemming from classic continental traditions of the early histor- 
ical period (sixth- seventh centuries A.D.). Native Japanese tradi- 
tions reached their apex in the Heian period (794-1 185), producing 
many artistic devices still in use in the 1990s. During periods of 
strong Chinese influence, new art forms were adapted, such as 
Buddhist works in Nara, ink painting in the Muromachi period, 
and landscape painting by literati in the Tokugawa era. When 
Western painting theories were introduced in the Meiji period, 
Japan already had a long history of adaptation of imported ideas 
and had established a copy process ranging from emulation to syn- 
thesis. But it was not until well into the twentieth century that the 
Japanese were able to assimilate the new medium of oil paints with 
new ideas of three-dimensional projections on flat surfaces. 

Most contemporary Japanese artists could be divided into those 
who worked in a broadly international style and those who main- 
tained Japanese artistic traditions, though usually within a modern 
idiom. After World War II, painters, calligraphers, and printmakers 
flourished in the big cities, particularly Tokyo, and became pre- 
occupied with the mechanisms of urban life, reflected in the flick- 
ering lights, neon colors, and frenetic pace of their abstractions. All 



172 



Education and the Arts 



the "isms" of the New York-Paris art world were fervently em- 
braced. After the abstractions of the 1960s, the 1970s saw a return 
to realism strongly flavored by the "op" and "pop" art move- 
ments, embodied in the 1980s in the explosive works of Shinohara 
Ushio. Many such outstanding avant-garde artists worked both in 
Japan and abroad, winning international prizes. These artists felt 
that there was "nothing Japanese" about their works, and indeed 
they belonged to the international school. By the late 1970s, the 
search for Japanese qualities and a national style caused many art- 
ists to reevaluate their artistic ideology and turn away from what 
some felt were the empty formulas of the West. Contemporary 
paintings within the modern idiom began to make conscious 
use of traditional Japanese art forms, devices, and ideologies. A 
number of mono-ha artists turned to painting to recapture tradi- 
tional nuances in spatial arrangements, color harmonies, and 
lyricism. 

Japanese-style painting (nihongd) had continued in a modern 
fashion, updating traditional expressions while retaining their in- 
trinsic character. Some artists within this style still painted on silk 
or paper with traditional colors and ink, while others used new 
materials, such as acrylics. Many of the older schools of art, most 
notably those of the Tokugawa period, were still practiced. For ex- 
ample, the decorative naturalism of the rimpa school, character- 
ized by brilliant, pure colors and bleeding washes, was reflected 
in the work of many postwar artists and in the 1980s art of Hikosaka 
Naoyoshi. The realism of the Maruyama-Okyo school and the calli- 
graphic and spontaneous Japanese style of the gentlemen- scholars 
were both widely practiced in the 1980s. Sometimes all of these 
schools, as well as older ones, such as the Kano ink traditions, were 
drawn on by contemporary artists in the Japanese style and in the 
modern idiom. Many Japanese-style painters were honored with 
awards and prizes, as the late 1970s and the 1980s saw a renewed 
popular demand for Japanese-style art. More and more, the in- 
ternational modern painters also drew on the Japanese schools as 
they turned away from Western styles in the 1980s. The tendency 
had been to synthesize East and West. But new artistic approaches 
were less in favor of a conscious blending than of recapturing the 
Japanese spirit within a modern idiom. Thus, the 100-year split 
between Japanese-style and Western-style art began to heal. Some 
artists had already leapt the gap between the two, as did the out- 
standing painter, Shinoda Toko. Her bold sumi ink abstractions 
were inspired by traditional calligraphy but realized as lyrical ex- 
pressions of modern abstraction. 



173 



Japan: A Country Study 



Calligraphy 

Calligraphy, the art of beautiful writing, had long been highly 
esteemed, intensively studied, and avidly collected. The writing 
of Chinese ideograms (kanji) in a wide variety of styles was inherited 
from the Chinese scholarly tradition, which at one extreme became 
the nearly indecipherable grass-style writing and at the other geo- 
metric abstractions. There are famous exponents of all these styles 
in contemporary Japan who have spent lifetimes perfecting their 
skills. The most widely used mode is called kana, referring to the 
Japanese syllabary, which provides an opportunity to depict both 
ideograms and Japanese phonetic sounds in set phrases. There are 
many ways in which this kind of writing may be done: with fine, 
delicate strokes or bold, splashy ones, carefully controlled or in unin- 
hibited freedom, and on a scale ranging from large to minuscule. 
Traditional Japanese poetry is usually classified in the kana group, 
while modern poetry is placed in a group by itself. Zen Buddhism 
promoted a spontaneous style of writing in its koan, which includes 
some pictorial additions. 

Because calligraphy lends itself so well to modern abstract paint- 
ing, some artists have used it in this form; the Bokusho abstract 
school has developed some outstanding masters. Calligraphers are 
greatly revered not only for their skill and scholarship but also for 
their attainment of a high spiritual level, which produces the medita- 
tive calm considered necessary for truly creative brushwork. Calli- 
graphy is widely collected at enormous prices. Even those who 
cannot read the script, which is not uncommon because some is 
nearly abstract, treasure writing by well-known persons in vari- 
ous fields, such as politics or the military. 

Prints 

Outstanding among the contemporary arts for vitality and origi- 
nality are the works of the creative printmakers, which have brought 
worldwide recognition. The twentieth-century Japanese print 
evolved from the Western idea of a single artist's conceiving, ex- 
ecuting, and producing one individual work. In contrast, the clas- 
sic ukiyo-e (floating world art) print approach was of a team 
production by an artist designer, craftsman carver, colorist, printer, 
and publisher, who promoted sales of multiple copies. The modern 
print movement so stressed the creative process that even in the 
1980s, editions of prints were seldom very large and were apt to 
differ in color or even design elements from one printing to the next. 

In the late twentieth century, a broad spectrum of artistic styles 
from traditional to experimental was practiced in a multiplicity of 
media and techniques. Munakata Shiko, a major force in gaining 



174 



Aristocratic lady reading, early Edo period, ukiyo-e school, attributed to 

Iwasa Matabei (1578-1650) 
Courtesy Freer Gallery of Art (69. 15), Smithsonian Institution, Washington 



175 



Japan: A Country Study 

recognition for creative printmaking, drew deeply on Japanese 
artistic sources, from folk art to Zen poetry-paintings, combining 
kanji with free-floating Chagall-like figures. He influenced many 
other celebrated print artists who drew on folk art and used natu- 
ral earth and mineral colors to depict traditional village scenes and 
lively local festivals. Artists such as Sekino Jun'ichiro and Saito 
Kiyoshi were inspired to update famous views, as of the Tokaido, 
while others played with traditional themes derived from sumo, 
the theater, or geisha. At the opposite pole are the works of the 
abstractionists, the exponents of all the "isms" of the day, and 
the experimental essays of some consummate designers. Most avant- 
garde artists worked in mixed media, often using engraving tech- 
niques with silk-screened colors or monochromatic metal prints with 
soldered wires. They experimented freely with photomontage, 
photo-prints made with an electric scanner, and lithographs. Pho- 
tography as an art form came into its own in the 1980s, and major 
international exhibitions displayed the stunning products of artist 
photographers such as Namikawa Banri, Kurigama Kazumi, and 
Hashi. In the 1980s, a trend among many young printmakers was 
towards the use of black and white for somber, often superrealis- 
tic, themes, captured with exquisite technical and artistic precision. 

Ceramics 

One of Japan's oldest art forms, ceramics, reaches back to the 
Neolithic period (ca. 10,000 B.C.), when the earliest soft earthen- 
ware was coil-made, decorated by hand-impressed rope patterns 
(Jomon ware), and baked in the open. Continental emigrants of 
the third century B.C. introduced the use of the wheel along with 
the metal age (Yayoi) and, eventually (in the third to fourth cen- 
turies A.D.), a tunnel kiln in which stoneware fired at high tem- 
peratures embellished with natural ash glaze was produced. 
Medieval kilns enabled more refined production of stoneware, which 
was still produced in the late twentieth century at a few famous 
sites, especially in central Honshu around the city of Seto, the wares 
of which were so widely used that Seto-mono became the generic 
term for ceramics in Japan. The overlord Toyotomi Hideyoshi's 
Korean campaigns of the late sixteenth century were dubbed the 
"ceramic wars," since the importation of Korean potters appeared 
to be their major contribution. These potters introduced a variety 
of new techniques and styles in their artifacts that were greatly ad- 
mired for the tea ceremony. They also discovered in northern 
Kyushu the proper ingredients needed to produce porcelain and 
were soon dazzling the guests at daimyo banquets with the first 
Japanese-made porcelain (see Ashikaga Bakufu, ch. 1). 



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Education and the Arts 



The modern masters of these famous traditional kilns still bring 
the ancient formulas in pottery and porcelain to new heights of 
achievement at Shiga, Ige, Karatsu, Hagi, and Bizen. Yamamoto 
Masao of Bizen and Miwa Kyusetsu of Hagi were designated as 
mukei bunkazai. By 1989 only a half-dozen potters were so honored, 
either as representatives of famous kiln wares or for the creation 
of superlative techniques in glazing or decoration, while two groups 
were designated for preserving the wares of distinguished ancient 
kilns. 

In the old capital of Kyoto, the Raku family continued to pro- 
duce the famous rough tea bowls that had so delighted Hideyoshi, 
while experiments continued to reconstruct the classic formulas of 
Momoyama-era Seto-type tea wares at Mino, such as the famous 
Oribe copper- green glaze and Shino ware's prized milky glaze. 
Artist potters experimented endlessly at the Kyoto and Tokyo arts 
universities to recreate traditional porcelain and its decorations 
under such outstanding ceramic teachers as Fujimoto Yoshimichi, 
a mukei bunkazai. Ancient porcelain kilns around Arita in Kyushu 
were still maintained by the lineage of the famous Sakaida Kakie- 
mon and Imaizume Imaiemon, hereditary porcelain makers to the 
Nabeshima clan; both were heads of groups designated mukei 
bunkazai. 

By the end of the 1980s, many master potters no longer worked 
at major or ancient kilns, but were making classic wares in vari- 
ous parts of Japan or in Tokyo, a notable example being Tsuji 
Seimei, who brought his clay from Shiga but potted in the Tokyo 
area. A number of artists were engaged in reconstructing famous 
Chinese styles of decoration or glazes, especially the blue-green 
celadon and the watery- green qingbai. One of the most beloved 
Chinese glazes in Japan is the chocolate-brown tenmoku glaze that 
covered the peasant tea bowls brought back from Southern Song 
China (in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries) by Zen monks. For 
their Japanese users, these chocolate-brown wares embodied the 
Zen aesthetic of wabi (rustic simplicity). 

Interest in the humble art of the village potter was revived in 
a folk movement of the 1920s by such master potters as Hamada 
Shqji and Kawai Kanjiro. These artists studied traditional glaz- 
ing techniques to preserve native wares in danger of disappear- 
ing. The kilns at Tamba, overlooking Kobe, continued to produce 
the daily wares used in the Tokugawa period, while adding modern 
shapes. Most of the village wares were made anonymously by local 
potters for utilitarian purposes. Local styles, whether native or im- 
ported, tended to be continued without alteration into the present. 
In Kyushu, kilns set up by Korean potters in the sixteenth century, 



177 



Japan: A Country Study 



such as at Koishibara and its offshoot at Onta, perpetuated 
sixteenth-century Korean peasant wares. In Okinawa, the produc- 
tion of village ware continued under several leading masters, with 
Kaneshiro Jiro honored as a mukei bunkazai. 

Handicrafts 

The many and varied traditional handicrafts of Japan enjoyed 
official recognition and protection and, owing to the folk art move- 
ment, were much in demand. Each craft demanded a set of special- 
ized skills. Textile crafts, for example, included silk, hemp, and 
cotton, woven (after spinning and dyeing) in forms ranging from 
timeless folk designs to complex court patterns. Village crafts evolv- 
ing from ancient folk traditions also continued in weaving and in- 
digo dyeing in Hokkaido by the Ainu peoples, whose distinctive 
designs had prehistoric prototypes and by other remote farming 
families in northern Japan. Silk- weaving families can be traced to 
the fifteenth century in the famous Nishijin weaving center of 
Kyoto, where elegant fabrics worn by the emperor and the aristoc- 
racy were produced. In the seventeenth century, designs on tex- 
tiles were applied using stencils and rice paste, in the yuzen or 
paste-resist method of dyeing. The yuzen method provided an imi- 
tation of aristocratic brocades, which were forbidden to commoners 
by sumptuary laws. Moriguchi Kako of Kyoto has continued to 
create works of art in his yuzen-dyed kimonos, which were so sought 
after that the contemporary fashion industry designed an indus- 
trial method to copy them for use on Western- style clothing. Fa- 
mous designers, such as Hanae Mori, borrowed extensively from 
kimono patterns for their couturier collections. By the late 1980s, 
an elegant, handwoven, dyed kimono had become extremely costiy, 
running to US$25,000 for a formal garment. In Okinawa, the fa- 
mous yuzen-dyeing method was especially effective where it was 
produced in the bingata stencil-dyeing techniques, which produced 
exquisitely colored, striking designs as artistic national treasures. 

Lacquer, the first plastic, was invented in Asia, and its use in 
Japan can be traced to prehistoric finds. Lacquer ware is most often 
made from wooden objects, which receive multiple layers of re- 
fined lac juices, each of which must dry before the next is applied. 
These layers make a tough skin impervious to water damage and 
breakage-resistant, providing lightweight, easy to clean utensils 
of every sort. The decoration on such lacquers, whether carved 
through different colored layers or in surface designs, applied with 
gold or inlaid with precious substances, has been a prized art form 
since the Nara period (A.D. 710-94). 

Papermaking is another contribution of Asian civilization; the 
Japanese art of making paper from the mulberry plant is thought 



178 



Rimpa school painting, Edo period, showing a screen, 

garments, and other objects 
Courtesy Freer Fallery of Art (07. 127), Smithsonian Institution, Washington 

to have begun in the sixth century. Dyeing paper with a wide 
variety of hues and decorating it with designs became a major 
preoccupation of the Heian court, and the enjoyment of beauti- 
ful paper and its use has continued thereafter, with some modern 
adaptations. The traditionally made paper called Izumo (after the 
shrine area where it is made) was especially desired for fusuma 
(sliding panels) decoration, artists' papers, and elegant letter paper. 
Some printmakers have their own logo made into their papers, 
and since the Meiji period, another special application has been 
Western marbleized end papers (made by the Atelier Miura in 
Tokyo). 

Metalwork is epitomized in the production of the Japanese sword, 
of extremely high quality. These swords originated before the first 
century B.C. and reached their height of popularity as the chief 
possession of warlords and samurai. The production of a sword 
has retained something of the religious quality it once had in em- 
bodying the soul of the samurai and the martial spirit of Japan. 
For many Japanese, the sword, one of the "three jewels" of the 
nation, remained a potent symbol; possessors would treasure a 
sword and it would be maintained within the family, its loss sig- 
nifying their ruin (see Ancient Cultures, ch. 1). 



179 



Japan: A Country Study 

Performing Arts 

A remarkable number of the traditional forms of music, dance, 
and theater have survived in the contemporary world, enjoying 
some popularity through reidentification with Japanese cultural 
values. Traditional music and dance, which trace their origins to 
ancient religious use — Buddhist, Shinto, and folk — have been pre- 
served in the dramatic performances of No, Kabuki, and bunraku 
theater. Ancient court music and dance forms deriving from con- 
tinental sources were preserved through imperial household musi- 
cians and temple and shrine troupes. Some of the oldest musical 
instruments in the world have been in continuous use in Japan from 
the Jomon period, as shown by finds of stone and clay flutes and 
zithers with between two and four strings, to which Yayoi-period 
metal bells and gongs were added to create early musical ensem- 
bles. By the early historical period (sixth to seventh centuries A.D.), 
there were a variety of large and small drums, gongs, chimes, flutes, 
and stringed instruments, such as the imported mandolin-like biwa, 
and the flat six- stringed zither, which evolved into the thirteen- 
stringed koto. These instruments formed the orchestras for the 
seventh-century continentally derived ceremonial court music, 
which, together with the accompanying bugaku (a type of court 
dance), are the most ancient of such forms still performed at the 
imperial court, ancient temples, and shrines. Buddhism introduced 
the rhythmic chants, still used in the 1990s, that were joined with 
native ideas and underlay the development of vocal music, such 
as in No. 

The oldest dramatic form preserved in Japan is No theater, which 
attained its contemporary form at the fourteenth-century Ashikaga 
court. In the 1980s, there were five major No groups and a few 
notable regional troupes performing several hundred plays from 
a medieval repertoire for a popular audience, not just for an elite. 
A No play unfolds around the recitation and dancing of a prin- 
cipal and secondary figure, while a seated chorus chants a story, 
accentuated by solemn drum and flute music. The dramatic ac- 
tion is mimed in highly stylized gestures symbolizing intense emo- 
tions, which are also evoked by terse lyrical prose and dance. 
Standardized masks and brilliant costumes stand out starkly against 
the austere, empty stage with its symbolic pine tree backdrop. The 
stories depict legendary or historical events of a tragic cast, infused 
with Buddhist ideas. The foreboding atmosphere is relieved by 
comic interludes (kyogen) played during the intermission. A few ex- 
perimental plays have been developed by authors such as Mishima 
Yukio (1925-70), and in the 1980s a Christian No play was written 



180 



Shinoda Toko, a leading modern 
abstract painter, at work 
Courtesy The Phillips Collection, 
Washington 



''Unseen Forms, " a two-panel 
sumi screen by Shinoda Toko 
Courtesy Chase Manhattan Bank 





181 



Japan: A Country Study 

by a Sophia University philosophy professor and daringly performed 
at the Vatican for Pope John Paul II . The National No Theater 
has revived popular interest in this ancient art form by supporting 
experimental No plays in the late 1980s. 

Kabuki and bunraku theater developed as popular forms of en- 
tertainment in the seventeenth century. Kabuki combined contem- 
porary music, acrobatics, and mimicry like that of No, and was 
originally performed by troupes that included actresses. Women 
were soon barred from appearing, so the often large casts consisted 
entirely of male performers. Classical Kabuki somewhat resem- 
bles Western drama, except that dialogue is supplemented by chant- 
ing and accompanied by music provided by the samisen, a three- 
stringed lute perfected during the seventeenth century. The plot 
was often clarified by the use of a storyteller who recounted the 
major action, as was also customary in No. 

Kabuki conventions include the use of artificially high-pitched 
voices, exaggerated gestures and miming, and flamboyant costumes 
and makeup, but no masks. Elaborate stage devices — trapdoors, 
revolving stages, and runways through the theater — heighten the 
excitement. Historical and legendary themes were extended to in- 
clude events from the urban life of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, such as a townsman's dislike for the samurai. A com- 
mon theme in the late seventeenth-century and early eighteenth- 
century works of Chikamatsu Monzaemon, "the Shakespeare of 
Japan," is the conflict between personal desires and the Confu- 
cian sense of loyalty and duty. By the early 1990s, there were two 
national Kabuki theaters in Tokyo, as the major performance 
centers for this classical art, featuring a growing repertoire of 
lesser known as well as classic work. Among contemporary masters 
working to "update" Kabuki and attract modern audiences were 
Ichikawa Ennosuke III, whose deft acting, clever acrobatics, and 
swift costume changes evoked nearly magical illusions, and 
Tamasaburo Bando, the top player of a wide range of feminine 
roles. These and other superb Kabuki actors brought record au- 
diences to performances in the late_1980s. 

Bunraku, puppet theater native to Osaka, was regarded as a seri- 
ous dramatic medium for adults (unlike puppetry in many West- 
ern countries), and has flourished along with Kabuki since the 
Tokugawa period. Chikamatsu turned to writing for the bunraku 
when he became dissatisfied with the liberties some Kabuki actors 
took with his plays. A narrator, who sings all the parts, and a 
samisen-play'mg chorus are the main elements of bunraku. The 
narrator- singer conveys the emotional content of the play and gener- 
ates the illusion of life into the large puppets, who move realistically 



182 



Education and the Arts 



in complex roles, manipulated by a master and black-hooded, robed 
assistants. These narrator- singers derive from the ancient tradi- 
tion of storytellers, whose exponents continue to flourish in modern 
forms, now including women and such uproarish comics as Katsura 
Shijaku. 

Traditional music, song, and dance have been performed by 
women, notably the geisha of Tokyo and Kyoto. Theatrical per- 
formances by Kyoto geisha can be seen in the spring and autumn 
Miyako Odori dance performances. A nagauta (lyric music) sing- 
ing group has a full orchestral ensemble, consisting of drums, flutes, 
samisen, and koto. The traditional musical notation is based on a 
five-tone scale, with semitones often ending on a rising note. Fa- 
mous performers may play the samisen or koto only, or play together 
with a singer or dancer. The dances come from No, Kabuki, and 
folk sources, featuring large ensemble dances as highlights of these 
brilliant spectacles. 

Folk music and dance deriving from regional festivals and 
ceremonies began to become well-known in Japan through radio, 
television, and recordings. Folk festivals, concerts, and contests, 
and taverns specializing in folk singing contributed to the rising 
popularity of these ancient forms, revitalized by the growing desire 
of the young in the 1980s to learn traditional agrarian songs and 
dances, while the Japan Folkloric Dance Ensemble performed them 
internationally. Some thirty outstanding performers from all the 
traditional performing arts were designated as mukei bunkazai at the 
end of the 1980s. 

Classical Western music has become a fundamental part of 
Japanese musical education since its introduction in the nineteenth 
century. The Toho School of Music in Tokyo has produced many 
outstanding international performers on the piano and stringed in- 
struments. Children commonly studied piano or violin, and the 
famous Suzuki violin method of training children from the age of 
two had produced a generation of virtuosos, some, such as Midori, 
enjoyed an international reputation. 

Symphony orchestras played in Tokyo and most major cities, 
also making international tours. Japanese musicians and conduc- 
tors gained international recognition, some performing regularly 
with top foreign orchestras overseas and on tour in Japan. Con- 
temporary Japanese composers have experimented widely with in- 
struments: using Japanese and Western instruments together, using 
only Asian instruments, and capturing traditional sounds with elec- 
tronic synthesizers and Western instruments. The Ensemble 
Nipponica, Music Today, and Sound Space Ark were among the 
major groups promoting modern Japanese music. 



183 



Japan: A Country Study 

Classical Western opera enjoyed a boom, with many foreign com- 
panies performing, and even local companies rose to new heights 
with the development of leading operatic singers. Further evidence 
of interest in Japanese themes was shown by a major competition 
to write a new opera about Chikamatsu, with music composed by 
Hara Kazuko, a Doshisha University professor. 

Popular music was enjoyed in many forms. Musical comedies 
and revues were standard urban entertainment. Broadway and Lon- 
don hits were quickly adapted by Tokyo theater troupes, often using 
foreign directors for notable productions and sometimes featuring 
Western actors who spoke their lines in Japanese. Japanese youth 
everywhere enjoyed popular music: highly international jazz, rock, 
heavy metal, folk, new music, pop, synthesized music, instrumental 
music, and Japanese folk songs. Springing from popular music were 
the works of experimental composers like Hosono Haruomi and 
Sakamoto Ryuichi, who blended Middle Eastern or Chinese sounds 
for the huge recording industry and film sound tracks. In 1988 
Sakamoto was Japan's first Oscar-winning musician for his score 
for The Last Emperor. 

Live jazz in concert halls, open air, and hundreds of disco coffee 
shops and pianobars was enthusiastically embraced. While Ameri- 
can jazz greats were acclaimed, veteran Japanese instrumentalists 
Watanabe Sadao and Hino Teramasu also commanded major au- 
diences at jazz festivals. Kitaro was the leading composer in syn- 
thesized sounds, providing sometimes exotic, but generally soothing, 
music dear to the frazzled urbanite. While percussionist Tsuchitori 
Toshi recreated the Mahabharata and other ethnic works, an in- 
digenous kind of jazz poured from the Sado Island Kodo drum- 
mers, whose prodigious athletic performances mesmerized all and 
made their home a new music festival center. Singing and danc- 
ing at amateur open nights {karaoke) at a growing number of pubs 
was an activity in which everyone could shine by singing along with 
prerecorded tapes. In the late 1980s, the hawaiko-chan, the new girl 
singers, also were popular. Records, tapes, and compact discs spread 
every type of music nationwide and provided common experience 
for music appreciation. 

Twentieth-century Japanese dance draws on various traditional 
styles and Western classical and avant-garde forms, all interpretated 
with the high standards of Japanese schools. Many famous dance 
studios grew from training centers for Kabuki actor-dancers or 
derived from famous Kabuki families. Women dancers drawing 
their art from butoh (classical Japanese dance) were trained by the 
Hanayagi school, whose top dancers performed internationally. 
Ichinohe Sachiko choreographed and performed traditional dances 



184 



Kyogen master Shigeyama 
Sengoro in Kyoto, 1989 
Courtesy Asahi Shimbun 




in Heian court costumes, characterized by the slow, formal, and 
elegant motions of this classical age of Japanese culture. 

Western schools covered classical ballet, jazz-dance, and modern 
dance, and influenced the butoh avant-garde dance movement. Ballet 
was said to have replaced traditional Japanese arts, such as flower 
arrangement and the tea ceremony in the hearts of young girls. 
Prima ballerina Morishita Yoko sat on the jury for the Prix de 
Lausanne Ballet Competition in 1989, held for the first time in 
Tokyo, and marking the arrival of Japanese classical ballet in the 
international community. Horiuchi Gen, a 1980 Prix de Lausanne 
winner, became a major soloist with the New York City Ballet, 
and Japanese performers noted for their superb technique were 
members of many major international companies. Modern dance 
was performed early after the war and was later taught by such 
famous dancers as Eguchi Takaya. The Tokyo Modern Dance 
School and the Ozawa Hisako Modern Dance Company also 
promoted avant-garde modern dance. A wide experimental range 
within modern dance occurred from which choreographer 
Teshigawara Saburo skillfully drew to create multifaceted works 
for his KARAS Company. 

The vital avant-garde butoh dance was a major development after 
the war: at least five major schools performed in the 1985 Butoh 
Festival, and there were numerous creative offshoots. Hijikata 
Tatsumi was a charismatic dancer who experimented with different 



185 



Japan: A Country Study 

kinds of creative dance to capture expressive motions he considered 
expressly suited to the Japanese physiognomy and psyche. He com- 
bined eroticism, social criticism, and avant-garde theater ideas, and 
considered the body to be a repository for "stored memories," 
which could be metamorphosed into dance forms. His theories and 
choreography were carried on by a number of famous dancers, who 
eventually formed their own major companies, which were strong 
in the 1980s and made tours abroad. 

Modern drama in the late twentieth century consisted of shingeki 
(experimental Western- style theater), which employed natural- 
istic acting and contemporary themes in contrast to the stylized 
conventions of Kabuki and No. In the postwar period, there was 
a phenomenal growth in creative new dramatic works, which in- 
troduced fresh aesthetic concepts that revolutionized the orthodox 
modern theater. Challenging the realistic, psychological drama fo- 
cused on "tragic historical progress" of the Western-derived shingeki, 
young playwrights broke with such accepted tenets as conventional 
stage space, placing their action in tents, streets, and open areas, 
and, at the extreme, in scenes played out all over Tokyo. Plots be- 
came increasingly complex, with play-within-a-play sequences, 
moving rapidly back and forth in time, and intermingling reality 
with fantasy. Dramatic structure was fragmented, with the focus 
on the performer, who often used a variety of masks to reflect differ- 
ent personae. Playwrights returned to common stage devices per- 
fected in No and Kabuki to project their ideas, such as employing 
a narrator, who could also use English for international audiences. 
Major playwrights in the 1980s were Kara Joro, Shimizu Kunio, 
and Betsuyaku Minoru, all closely connected to specific compa- 
nies. In the 1980s, stagecraft was refined into a more sophisticated, 
complex format than in the earlier postwar experiments but lacked 
their bold critical spirit. 

Many Western plays, from those of the ancient Greeks to Shake- 
speare and from those of Fyodor Dostoevsky to Samuel Beckett, 
were performed in Tokyo. An incredible number of performances, 
perhaps as many as 3,000, were given each year, making Tokyo 
one of the world's leading theatrical centers. The opening of the 
replica of the Globe Theater was celebrated by importing an en- 
tire British company to perform all of Shakespeare's historical plays, 
while other Tokyo theaters produced other Shakespearean plays 
including various new interpretations of Hamlet and King Lear. 

Suzuki Tadashi's Togo troupe developed a unique kind of 
"method acting," integrating avant-garde concepts with classical 
No and Kabuki devices, an approach that became a major creative 



186 



Botoh dance group Sankai Juku performing "Jomon Sho" 
Courtesy Kiyomi Yamaji, Sankai Juku, and Jomon Sho 

force in Japanese and international theater in the 1980s. Another 
highly original East-West fusion occurred in the inspired produc- 
tion Nastasya, taken from Dostoevsky's The Idiot, in which Bando 
Tamasaburo, a famed Kabuki onnagata (female impersonator), 
played the roles of both the prince and his fiancee. 

Literature 

Japanese literature dates from about the fifth century A.D., when 
the Chinese writing system began to be used by scribes at the 
Yamato court. As soon as the Japanese courtiers learned to read, 
they began to write, compiling between the sixth century and the 
eighth century both a state history of epic proportions, the Kojiki 
(Record of Ancient Matters) and one of the world's oldest poetry 
anthologies, the Man'yoshu (Collection of Ten Thousand Leaves), 
both of which contain many older works. They also composed 
Chinese-style poetry, which they found suitable for more difficult, 
lengthy, and profound thoughts. By the eighth century, the elite 
had already come to grips with the problem of assimilating difficult 
foreign ideas in a complex new language. The dichotomy between 
native expression and the use of prestigious imported forms be- 
came a pattern of Japanese artistic life. Buddhist commentary ap- 
peared after several centuries of copying, translation, and study. 



187 



Japan: A Country Study 

In the ninth century it found a strong voice and skilled brush in 
the monk Kukai, through whose inspiration religious themes be- 
came a part of the literary fabric. 

Prose works had reached a high level by the tenth century, when 
the literary diary made its appearance, and in the eleventh the 
world's first novel, Genji monogatari (Tale of Genji), was composed 
by a court lady, Murasaki Shikibu. Her acute psychological ob- 
servations molded by a subtle feminine sensibility wove a deft pic- 
ture of the hothouse Heian court society. It remains a matchless 
source for all subsequent writers and an important part of the clas- 
sical education of every Japanese. In the medieval period, wom- 
en's vernacular writing dominated prose in the form of diaries of 
court ladies, supplemented by recollections of courtiers, the wry 
comments and musings of monks, and a wide variety of tales and 
legends, both secular and profane. Heike monogatari (Tale of the 
Heike) captured the samurai spirit of the Kamakura warriors' age, 
while the melancholy thirty-one syllable waka poems (in a five-seven- 
five- seven-seven syllables-per-line arrangement) of the twelfth- 
century monk Saigyo reflected the mood of a militant era. Exiles 
from the capital and monastic authors who contemplated the fleeting 
vanities of this world, and the theme of death and the spirit world 
characterized writing of the Muromachi period, setting the tone 
for the No plays of Zeami Motokiyo (1363-1443). Comic relief was 
provided by kyogen, using the vernacular to reveal something of 
the life of the commoner. 

The peace and prosperity of the Tokugawa age produced a new 
mercantile class — the chonin — whose antics were humorously de- 
scribed in the vigorous seventeenth-century novels of Ihara Saikaku, 
dispelling the lingering melancholy of the late feudal period. A major 
poet of this age, Matsuo Basho, lifted his voice to extol the quali- 
ties of loneliness, of getting away from the new crowded towns by 
taking the "narrow road to the deep north," a celebrated journey 
whose three-hundredth anniversary was widely commemorated in 
the late 1980s. Basho' s matchless renku (linked poems) of thirty-six 
verses and his lighthearted seventeen- syllable haiku (five- seven-five) 
set a norm for modern emulators. A third literary genius of this 
period was the great dramatist, Chikamatsu Monzaemon, whose 
historical and domestic plays formed the soul of the Kabuki thea- 
ter. In the eighteenth century, Chinese novels were translated into 
Japanese, the poet Yosa Buson infused a new romantic spirit into 
haiku poems, and Kobayashi Issa made interesting subjects out 
of the "ordinariness" of the common folk and the ugly, starveling 
sparrow. 



188 




A noble spying on two princesses playing a koto and a lute. Watercolor, 
nineteenth century, Tosa school, from Genji monogatari (Tale of Genji) 

Courtesy Barbara L. Dash 



Japanese literature clearly draws on a tradition rich in poetic 
and prose forms. The writing of poetry in both the classic thirty- 
one syllable waka and the seventeen- syllable haiku remained a na- 
tional pastime and a skill expected of the educated, among whom 
competitions were frequently held. Japanese renga parties, at which 
poets and the intelligentsia composed poetry in groups, continued 
as a major literary pursuit. Haiku poets were among the most hon- 
ored of all creative artists, and a haiku museum was established 
in 1976 as a public center for poetry study. The ancient waka in 
modern usage is called a tanka, or short song (also with a five-seven- 
five-seven-seven syllabic formula). Many writers continued to use 
this form for less profound thoughts. Even more striking were the 
modern permutations of older literary forms: such experiments as 
two syllable haiku, tanka in romaji (romanized form of kana), and 
Zen ideas expressed in Western-style "free verse." 

The introduction of European literature in the late nineteenth 
century brought "free verse" into the poetic repertoire; it became 
widely used for longer works embodying new intellectual themes. 
Young Japanese prose writers and dramatists have struggled with 
a whole galaxy of new ideas and artistic schools, but novelists were 
the first to successfully assimilate some of these concepts. A new 



189 



Japan: A Country Study 

colloquial literature developed centering around the "I novel," with 
some unusual protagonists as in Natsume Soseki's Wagahai wa neko 
de aru (I Am a Cat). Two modern literary giants whose works were 
deeply rooted in Japanese sensibilities were Tanizaki Jun'ichiro, 
who captured the East-West value struggle in Japanese life prior 
to World War II and Kawabata Yasunari, a master of psychological 
fiction during the mid-century and a Nobel Prize winner. Captur- 
ing the immediate postwar atmosphere were Dazai Osamu and 
Mishima Yukio, both of whom committed suicide. Dazai' s writ- 
ing reflected the quiet desperation of living with defeat, while 
Mishima provided a glowing vision of traditional morality, gradu- 
ally overcome by new Western values. 

Prominent writers of the 1970s and 1980s, such as Oe Kensaburo, 
were identified with intellectual and moral issues in their attempts 
to raise social and political consciousness. Inoue Mitsuaki had long 
been concerned with the atomic bomb and continued in the 1980s 
to write on problems of the nuclear age, while Endo Shusaku de- 
picted the religious dilemma of Roman Catholics in feudal Japan, 
as a springboard to address spiritual problems. Inoue Yasushi also 
turned to the past in masterful historical novels of Inner Asia and 
ancient Japan, in order to portray present human fate. 

Avant-garde writers, such as Abe Kobo, who wanted to express 
the Japanese experience in modern terms without using either in- 
ternational styles or traditional conventions, developed new inner 
visions. Furui Yoshikichi tellingly related the lives of alienated urban 
dwellers coping with the minutiae of daily life, while the psycho- 
dramas within such daily life crises have been explored by a rising 
number of important women novelists. The 1988 Naoki Prize went 
to Todo Shizuko for Ripening Summer, a story capturing the com- 
plex psychology of modern women. Other award-winning stories 
at the end of the decade dealt with current issues of the elderly in 
hospitals, the recent past {Pure-Hearted Shopping District in Koenji, 
Tokyo), and the life of a Meiji ukiyo-e artist. In international litera- 
ture, Ishiguro Kazuo, a native of Japan, had taken up residence 
in Britain and won Britain's prestigious Booker Prize. 

Although modern Japanese writers covered a wide variety of sub- 
jects, one particularly Japanese approach stressed their subjects' 
inner lives, widening the earlier novel's preoccupation with the nar- 
rator's consciousness. In Japanese fiction, plot development and 
action have often been of secondary interest to emotional issues. 
In keeping with the general trend toward reaffirming national 
characteristics, many old themes reemerged, and some authors 
turned consciously to the past. Strikingly, Buddhist attitudes about 
the importance of knowing oneself and the poignant impermanence 



190 



Education and the Arts 



of things formed an undercurrent to sharp social criticism of this 
material age. There was a growing emphasis on women's roles, 
the Japanese persona in the modern world, and the malaise of com- 
mon people lost in the complexities of urban culture. 

Popular fiction, nonfiction works, and children's literature all 
flourished in urban Japan in the 1980s. Many popular works fell 
between "pure literature" and pulp novels, including all sorts of 
historical serials, information-packed docudramas, science fiction, 
mysteries, business stories, war journals, and animal stories. Best- 
sellers in the late 1980s were several books by a young woman, 
"Banana" Yoshimoto, and Murakami Haruki's spectacularly suc- 
cessful Norwegian Wood and A Wild Sheep Chase. Nonfiction covered 
everything from crime to politics. Although factual journalism 
predominated, many of these works were interpretive, reflecting 
a high degree of individualism. Children's works reemerged in the 
1950s, and the newer entrants into this field, many of them younger 
women, brought new vitality to it in the 1980s. Manga (comic books) 
have penetrated almost every sector of the popular market. Widely 
used for soft pornography, they also have included a multivolume 
high- school history of Japan and, for the adult market, a manga 
introduction to economics, which was also available in English. 
Manga represented between 20 and 30 percent of annual publica- 
tions at the end of the 1980s, in sales of some ¥400 billion per year. 

Films and Television 

Reeling from television's overwhelming success, the cinema in- 
dustry retreated in the 1980s to the tried-and-true formulas, the 
comedies, romances, detective stories, and youth films that always 
had sure audiences. Production at the four major film companies 
dwindled to some 200 films a year, of which only a handful were 
quality productions. Pornographic films grew to constitute about 
half of films made. The animated format used for children's films 
did show promising originality, but truly creative productions could 
be found only among independent film directors. A burgeoning 
number of art films, both domestic and imported, found homes 
in intimate art theaters in the cities. Foreign films were often the 
major draws in urban areas, which had record runs for European 
and North American hits. Some top directors produced major films 
with foreign funding or in foreign locations. In a return to Japanese 
production at the end of the 1980s, Akira Kurosawa, the ac- 
knowledged old master of cinematic art, summarized his remem- 
brance of things past in his movie Dreams. A nostalgic look at past 
views of family life was seen in Ichikawa Kon's remake of Tanizaki 
Jun'ichiro's The Makioka Sisters, a visually beautiful color film 



191 



Japan: A Country Study 

portraying the nearly vanished world of early twentieth- century 
upper-class women. A major historical offering was Teshigawara 
Hiroshi's Rikyu (1989), which marked the return of this major direc- 
tor after a seventeen-year absence from films, in a pictorially mag- 
nificent presentation of the life of the famous Momoyama tea master 
and his moral conflict with the political overlord Hideyoshi. 

Although there was virtually no market in Japan for documen- 
taries, a major docudrama, Tokyo saiban (Tokyo Judgment), directed 
by Kobayashi Masaki, and taken directly from footage of tribunal 
proceedings against alleged Japanese war criminals, had a rapt au- 
dience. Outstanding among the newer independent directors were 
Itami Juzo and Morita Yoshimitsu, whose The Family Game set a 
new pattern for satirical comedies on urban dilemmas. By the 
mid-1980s, Itami 's savage new satires showed unprecedented origi- 
nality. Although these films addressed the anomalies and excesses 
of Japanese life, their subjects were mirrored around the world, 
and they had a strong international following. 

Popular comedy was led by the beloved Tora-san series about 
the travel adventures of an avuncular, bumbling everyman, played 
by the ever-popular Atsumi Kiyoshi, whose forty-first feature film 
in 1989 took the hero to Vienna in a telling display of internation- 
alization. Another hoary favorite was the monster series starring 
Godzilla. The most sophisticated youth movie of the 1980s may 
have been Yamakawa Naoto's The New Morning of Billy the Kid, 
a fantasy set in a Tokyo theme-bar, which was embraced by the 
young worldwide. A much-loved children's classic Kaze no matasaburo 
(Children of the Wind) written by Miyazawa Kenji, was filmed 
by award- winning director Ito Shunya as a skillful fantasy. Ani- 
mated full-length features ranged from a gorgeously interpreted 
selection from Tale of Genji to Otomoto Katsushiro's Akira, a vio- 
lent, provocative futuristic fantasy. Such animated features had 
their origins in the wildly popular manga action cartoons. Televi- 
sion also produced a substantial number of cartoons, including the 
ever popular ' 'Sazae-san, ' ' which had the highest rating in the late 
1980s. 

Television had attained virtually 100 percent penetration by 1990, 
and only 1 percent of households were without a color television 
set, making Japan a major information society. Programming con- 
sisted of about 50 percent pure entertainment and nearly 25 per- 
cent cultural shows, the remainder being news reports and 
educational programs. There were two main broadcasting systems: 
the public NHK and five private networks. The major system, 
NHK, was publicly subsidized by mandatory subscription fees. 
Leading newspapers were among the financial supporters of the 



192 



Education and the Arts 



most important private channels. International programs were 
transmitted by satellite for instant replay after the government, in 
1979, set up the Communications and Broadcasting Satellite Or- 
ganization. Japan's first operational broadcast satellite was launched 
in 1984. Commercial television stations had become a major vehi- 
cle for advertising in place of newspapers and received huge 
revenues, far surpassing those of NHK. 

Samurai and yakuza (Japanese underworld) themes were now 
almost solely the provenance of television, as were those of family 
life, ubiquitous in daytime soaps. The biggest hit of the 1980s overall 
was the television drama "Oshin," a tale of a mother's struggles 
and suffering. The longest-running series since 1981 was "From 
the North Country," in which a divorced father and his two chil- 
dren survive in the backwoods of Hokkaido. 

Criticisms continued concerning the vulgarity of some commer- 
cial programs, but these programs still appeared in the early 1990s. 
Major problems perceived were the high level of violence and the 
lack of moral values in children's shows. All television and radio 
stations, however, were required to devote a certain proportion of 
broadcast time to educational programs to retain their licenses, and 
these programs grew steadily in response to popular demand. All 
networks have to comply with the Broadcasting Law of 1950, while 
several councils oversee general programming, although compli- 
ance with their recommendations is voluntary. 

Japan's traditional arts and their modern counterparts found wide 
expression at home and internationally in the 1980s, reflecting the 
strong continuing creativity of its artists, performers, and writers. 
Major trends were seen in the search for characteristic cultural 
values and modes of expression, on the one hand, and the grow- 
ing awareness of internationalism, on the other, affirming Japan's 
strong economic position in the world. 

* * * 

A good general work on contemporary education is Japanese Edu- 
cation Today, by Robert Leestma and others. Both Benjamin Duke's 
The Japanese School and Educational Policies in Crisis, by William K. 
Cummings and others, offer useful insights into the Japanese educa- 
tional system and its differences from that of the United States. 
Historical information can be found in Ronald S. Anderson's Edu- 
cation in Japan and Ronald P. Dore's Education in Tokugawa Japan. 
Of particular interest is the winter 1989 special issue of the Journal 
of Japanese Studies, containing a symposium devoted largely to 
preschool and early education. On secondary education, Thomas P. 



193 



Japan: A Country Study 



Rohlen's Japan's High Schools provides excellent coverage. The 
Ministry of Education is a rich source of statistical data; in En- 
glish, information can be obtained from the annual Statistical Abstract 
of the Ministry of Education, Science, and Culture, but the Japanese- 
language annual Gakko kihon chosa hokokusho (Fundamental School 
Survey) is more complete. 

A useful work on the arts is Sources of Japanese Tradition, by 
Tsunoda Ryusaku and others, which translates primary materials 
on cultural and aesthetic values. Cultural Affairs and Administration 
in Japan, 1988 from the Agency for Cultural Affairs and Artist and 
Patron in Postwar Japan and "Government and the Arts in Contem- 
porary Japan" by Thomas R.H. Havens oudine the government's 
participation in the arts. Helpful specialized works include 
Takashina Shuji, Yoshiaki Tono, and Nakahara Yusuke's Art in 
Japan, David B. Stewart's The Making of a Modern Japanese Architec- 
ture, Kodansha's Contemporary Japanese Prints, the Library of Con- 
gress's Words in Motion: Contemporary Japanese Calligraphy, Hayashiya 
Seizo's Japanese Ceramics Today, J. Thomas Rimer's A Reader's Guide 
to Japanese Literature, the essays on Japan in Cinema and Cultural Identity 
edited by Wimal Dissanayake, Makoto Ueda's Modern Japanese Poets, 
the P.E.N. Club's Survey of Japanese Literature Today, edited by Isoda 
Koichi, and The Handbook of Japanese Popular Culture edited by 
Richard Gid Powers and Kato Hidetoshi. (For further informa- 
tion and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



194 



Chapter 4. The Character and Structure 

of the Economy 



Family crest with a flying phoenix (ho'o), the bird of immortality 



THE JAPANESE ECONOMY entered the 1990s in excellent 
shape. Japan had the world's second largest gross national product 
(GNP — see Glossary) throughout the 1970s and ranked first among 
major industrial nations in 1989 in per capita GNP, at US$23,616, 
up sharply from US$8,900 in 1980. After a mild economic slump 
in the mid-1980s, Japan's economy began a period of expansion 
in 1986 that was continuing in 1990. Economic growth averaging 
5 percent between 1987 and 1989 revived industries, such as steel 
and construction, which had been relatively dormant in the mid- 
1980s, and brought record salaries and employment (see table 9, 
Appendix). Unlike the economic booms of the 1960s and 1970s, 
however, when increasing exports played the key role in economic 
expansion, domestic demand propelled the Japanese economy in 
the late 1980s. This development involved fundamental economic 
restructuring, from export dependence to reliance on domestic de- 
mand. The boom that started in 1986 was generated by the deci- 
sions of companies to increase private plant and equipment spending 
and of consumers to go on a buying spree. Japan's imports grew 
at a faster rate than exports. 

During the 1980s, the Japanese economy shifted its emphasis 
away from primary and secondary activities (notably agriculture, 
manufacturing, and mining) to processing, with telecommunica- 
tions and computers becoming increasingly vital. Information be- 
came an important resource and product, central to wealth and 
power. The rise of an information-based economy was led by major 
research in highly sophisticated technology, such as advanced com- 
puters. The selling and use of information became very beneficial 
to the economy. Tokyo became a major financial center, home of 
some of the world's major banks, financial firms, insurance com- 
panies, and the world's largest stock exchange. 

A national effort in the 1980s involved both government and busi- 
ness in increasing Japan's influence in the area of high technol- 
ogy. One important development area was industrial automation. 
Automotive producers, such as Toyota and Nissan, relied increas- 
ingly on robotics in their factories. Japan planned a much-touted 
Fifth Generation artificial intelligence computer project, boasted 
a new but active space program, and designated new towns as 
research centers and production hubs for new technologies. In the 
area of semiconductors, by 1989 Japan was outproducing the United 
States, which had enjoyed a nearly two- to-one lead in world market 



197 



Japan: A Country Study 

share in the mid-1980s. Japan became a world leader in techno- 
logical research and production. 

Japanese postwar technological research was carried out for the 
sake of economic growth rather than military development. The 
growth in high-technology industries in the 1980s resulted from 
heightened domestic demand for high- technology products and for 
higher living, housing, and environmental standards, better health, 
medical, and welfare opportunities, better leisure- time facilities, 
and improved ways to accommodate a rapidly aging society. 

The development of a postindustrial economy did not mean the 
end of Japan's importance as a major manufacturing center. Tradi- 
tional industries, such as iron and steel, automobiles, and construc- 
tion, experienced strong growth in the late 1980s, and there was 
every indication that these industries would continue to grow in 
the 1990s. Only the primary sector (agriculture, forestry, and fish- 
ing) and mining showed signs of decline in the 1980s. 

Patterns of Development 

Revolutionary Change 

Since the mid-nineteenth century, when the Tokugawa govern- 
ment first opened the country to Western commerce and influence, 
Japan has gone through two periods of economic development (see 
Decline of the Tokugawa; The Emergence of Modern Japan, 
1868-1919; and World War II and the Occupation, 1941-52, ch. 1). 
The first began in 1854 and extended through World War II; the 
second began in 1945 and continued into the early 1990s. In both 
periods, the Japanese opened themselves to Western ideas and in- 
fluence; experienced revolutionary social, political, and economic 
changes; and became a world power with carefully developed spheres 
of influence. During both periods, the Japanese government en- 
couraged economic change by fostering a national revolution from 
above, planning and advising in every aspect of society. The na- 
tional goal each time was to make Japan so powerful and wealthy 
that its independence would never again be threatened. 

In the Meiji period (1868-1912), leaders inaugurated a new 
Western-based education system for all young people, sent thou- 
sands of students to the United States and Europe, and hired more 
than 3,000 Westerners to teach modern science, mathematics, tech- 
nology, and foreign languages in Japan (see Historical Background, 
ch. 3). The government also built railroads, improved roads, and 
inaugurated a land reform program to prepare the country for fur- 
ther development. 

To promote industrialization, government decided that, while 
it should help private business to allocate resources and to plan, 



198 



The Character and Structure of the Economy 

the private sector was best equipped to stimulate economic growth. 
The greatest role of government was to help provide the economic 
conditions in which business could flourish. In short, government 
was to be the guide, and business the producer. In the early Meiji 
period, the government built factories and shipyards that were sold 
to entrepreneurs at a fraction of their value. Many of these busi- 
nesses grew rapidly into the larger conglomerates that still domi- 
nated much of the business world in the early 1990s. Government 
emerged as chief promoter of private enterprise, enacting a series 
of probusiness policies, including low corporate taxes. 

Before World War II, Japan built an extensive empire that in- 
cluded Taiwan, Korea, Manchuria, and parts of northern China 
(see Diplomacy, ch. 1). The Japanese regarded this sphere of in- 
fluence as a political and economic necessity, preventing foreign 
states from strangling Japan by blocking its access to raw mate- 
rials and crucial sea-lanes. Japan's large military force was regarded 
as essential to the empire's defense. The colonies were lost as a 
result of World War II, but since then the Japanese have extended 
their economic influence throughout Asia and beyond. Japan's Con- 
stitution, promulgated in 1947, forbids an offensive military force, 
but Japan still maintained its formidable Self-Defense Forces and 
ranked third in the world in military spending behind the United 
States and the Soviet Union in the late 1980s (see The Postwar 
Constitution, ch. 6; Defense Spending, ch. 8). 

Rapid growth and structural change have characterized Japan's 
two periods of economic development since 1868. In the first pe- 
riod, the economy grew only moderately at first and relied heavily 
on traditional agriculture to finance modern industrial infrastruc- 
ture. By the time the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5) began, 65 per- 
cent of employment and 38 percent of gross domestic product 
(GDP — see Glossary) was still based on agriculture, but modern 
industry had begun to expand substantially. By the late 1920s, 
manufacturing and mining contributed 23 percent of GDP, com- 
pared to 21 percent for all of agriculture. Transportation and com- 
munications had developed to sustain heavy industrial development. 

In the 1930s, the Japanese economy suffered less from the Great 
Depression than other industrialized nations, expanding at the rapid 
rate of 5 percent of GDP per year, while manufacturing and min- 
ing came to account for more than 30 percent of GDP, more than 
twice the value for the agricultural sector. Most industrial growth, 
however, was geared toward expanding the nation's military power. 

World War II wiped out many of Japan's gains since 1868. About 
40 percent of the nation's industrial plants and infrastructure was 
destroyed, and production reverted to levels of about fifteen years 



199 



Japan: A Country Study 

earlier. The people were shocked by the devastation and swung 
into action. New factories were equipped with the best modern 
machines, giving Japan an initial competitive advantage over the 
victor states, who now had older factories. As Japan's second period 
of economic development began, millions of former soldiers joined 
a well-disciplined and highly educated work force to rebuild Japan. 

Japan's highly acclaimed postwar education system contributed 
strongly to the modernizing process. The world's highest literacy 
rate and high education standards were major reasons for Japan's 
success in achieving a technologically advanced economy. Japanese 
schools also encouraged discipline, another benefit in forming an 
effective work force. 

The early postwar years were devoted to rebuilding lost indus- 
trial capacity: major investments were made in electric power, coal, 
iron and steel, and chemical fertilizers. By the mid-1950s, produc- 
tion matched prewar levels. Released from the demands of military- 
dominated government, the economy not only recovered its lost 
momentum, but also surpassed the growth rates of earlier periods. 
Between 1953 and 1965, GDP expanded by over 9 percent per year, 
manufacturing and mining by 13 percent, construction by 1 1 per- 
cent, and infrastructure by 12 percent. In 1965 these sectors em- 
ployed over 41 percent of the labor force while only 26 percent 
remained in agriculture. 

The mid-1960s ushered in a new type of industrial development 
as the economy opened itself to international competition in some 
industries and developed heavy and chemical manufactures. 
Whereas textiles and light manufactures maintained their profita- 
bility internationally, other products, such as automobiles, ships, 
and machine tools, assumed new importance. Manufacturing and 
mining value-added grew at the rate of 17 percent per year be- 
tween 1965 and 1970. Growth rates moderated to about 8 percent 
and evened out between the industrial and service sectors between 
1970 and 1973, as retail trade, finance, real estate, information, 
and other service industries streamlined their operations. 

Japan faced severe economic challenge in the mid-1970s. The 
world oil crisis in 1973 shocked an economy that had become vir- 
tually dependent on foreign petroleum (see The Value of the Yen, 
ch. 5). Japan experienced its first postwar decline in industrial 
production together with severe price inflation. The recovery that 
followed the first oil crisis revived the optimism of most business 
leaders, but the maintenance of industrial growth in the face of 
high energy costs required shifts in the industrial structure. 

Changing price conditions favored conservation and alternative 
sources of industrial energy. Although the investment costs were 



200 



The Character and Structure of the Economy 

high, many energy-intensive industries successfully reduced their 
dependence on oil during the late 1970s and 1980s and enhanced 
their productivity. Advances in microcircuitry and semiconduc- 
tors in the late 1970s and 1980s also led to new growth industries 
in consumer electronics and computers and to higher productivity 
in already established industries. The net result of these adjust- 
ments was to increase the energy efficiency of manufacturing and 
to expand so-called knowledge-intensive industry. The service in- 
dustries expanded in an increasingly postindustrial economy. 

Structural economic changes, however, were unable to check the 
slowing of economic growth, as the economy matured in the late 
1970s and 1980s, attaining annual growth rates no better than 4 
to 6 percent. But, these rates were remarkable in a world of ex- 
pensive petroleum and in a nation of few domestic resources. 
Japan's average growth rate of 5 percent in the late 1980s, for ex- 
ample, was far higher than the 3.8 percent growth rate of the United 
States. 

Despite more petroleum price increases in 1979, the strength of 
the Japanese economy was apparent. It expanded without the 
double-digit inflation that afflicted other industrial nations and that 
had bothered Japan itself after the first oil crisis in 1973. Japan 
experienced slower growth in the mid-1980s, but its demand- 
sustained economic boom of the late 1980s revived many troubled 
industries. 

Complex economic and institutional factors affected Japan's post- 
war growth. First, the nation's prewar experience provided several 
important legacies. The Tokugawa period (1600-1867) bequeathed 
a vital commercial sector in burgeoning urban centers, a relatively 
well-educated elite (although one with limited knowledge of Euro- 
pean science), a sophisticated government bureaucracy, produc- 
tive agriculture, a closely unified nation with highly developed 
financial and marketing systems, and a national infrastructure of 
roads. The buildup of industry during the Meiji period to the point 
where Japan could vie for world power was an important prelude 
to postwar growth and provided a pool of experienced labor fol- 
lowing World War II. 

Second, and more important, was the level and quality of in- 
vestment that persisted through the 1980s. Investment in capital 
equipment, which averaged more than 1 1 percent of GNP during 
the prewar period, rose to some 20 percent of GNP during the 1950s 
and to more than 30 percent in the late 1960s and 1970s. During 
the economic boom of the late 1980s, the rate still kept to around 
20 percent. Japanese businesses imported the latest technologies 
to develop the industrial base. As a latecomer to modernization, 



201 



Japan: A Country Study 

Japan was able to avoid some of the trial and error earlier needed 
by other nations to develop industrial processes. In the 1970s and 
1980s, Japan improved its industrial base through technology licens- 
ing, patent purchases, and the imitation and improvement of for- 
eign inventions. In the 1980s, industry stepped up its research and 
development, and many firms became famous for their innova- 
tions and creativity. 

Japan's labor force contributed importandy to economic growth, 
not only because of its availability and literacy, but also because 
of its reasonable wage demands. Before and immediately after 
World War II, the transfer of numerous agricultural workers to 
modern industry resulted in rising productivity and only moder- 
ate wage increases. As population growth slowed and the nation 
became increasingly industrialized in the mid-1960s, wages rose 
significantly. But labor union cooperation generally kept salary in- 
creases within the range of productivity gains. 

High productivity growth played a key role in postwar economic 
growth. The highly skilled and educated labor force, extraordinary 
savings rates and accompanying levels of investment, and the low 
growth of Japan's labor force were major factors in the high rate 
of productivity growth. 

The nation has also benefited from economies of scale. Although 
medium- sized and small enterprises generated much of the nation's 
employment, large facilities were most productive. Many indus- 
trial enterprises consolidated to form larger, more efficient units. 
Before World War II, large holding companies formed wealth 
groups, or zaibatsu (see Glossary), which dominated most indus- 
try. The zaibatsu were dissolved after the war, but keiretsu — large 
and modern industrial enterprise groupings — emerged. The coor- 
dination of activities within these groupings and the integration 
of smaller subcontractors into the groups enhanced industrial effi- 
ciency. 

Japanese corporations developed strategies that contributed to 
their immense growth. Growth-oriented corporations that took 
chances competed successfully. Product diversification became an 
essential ingredient of the growth patterns of many keiretsu. Japanese 
companies added plant and human capacity ahead of demand. Seek- 
ing market share rather than quick profit was another powerful 
strategy. 

Finally, circumstances beyond Japan's direct control contributed 
to its success. International conflicts tended to stimulate the Japanese 
economy until the devastation at the end of World War II. The 
Russo-Japanese War (1904-5), World War I (1914-18), the Korean 
War (1950-53), and the Second Indochina War (1954-75) brought 



202 



The Character and Structure of the Economy 

economic booms to Japan. In addition, benign treatment from the 
United States after World War II facilitated the nation's recon- 
struction and growth. The United States occupation of Japan 
(1945-52) resulted in the rebuilding of the nation and the creation 
of a democratic state. United States assistance totaled about US$1 .9 
billion during the occupation, or about 15 percent of the nation's 
imports and 4 percent of GNP in that period. About 59 percent 
of this aid was in the form of food; 15 percent in industrial materi- 
als, and 12 percent in transportation equipment. United States grant 
assistance, however, tapered off quickly in the mid-1950s. United 
States military procurement from Japan peaked at a level equiva- 
lent to 7 percent of Japan's GNP in 1953 and fell below 1 percent 
after 1960. A variety of United States-sponsored measures during 
the occupation, such as land reform, contributed to the economy's 
later performance by increasing competition. In particular, the post- 
war purge of industrial leaders allowed new talent to rise in the 
management of the nation's rebuilt industries. Finally, the econ- 
omy benefited from foreign trade, as it was able to expand exports 
rapidly enough to pay for imports of equipment and technology 
without falling into debt as have a number of developing nations 
in the 1980s, (see Level and Commodity Composition of Trade, 
ch. 5). 

The consequences of Japan's economic growth were not always 
positive. Large advanced corporations existed side-by-side with the 
smaller and technologically less-developed firms, creating a kind 
of economic dualism in the late twentieth century. Often the smaller 
firms, which employed more than two-thirds of Japan's workers, 
worked as subcontractors directly for larger firms, supplying a nar- 
row range of parts and temporary workers. Excellent working con- 
ditions, salaries, and benefits, such as permanent employment, were 
provided by most large firms, but not by the smaller firms. Tem- 
porary workers, mostly women, received much smaller salaries and 
had less job security than permanent workers. Thus, despite the 
high living standards of many workers in larger firms, Japan in 
1990 remained in general a low- wage country whose economic 
growth was fueled by highly skilled and educated workers who ac- 
cepted poor salaries, often unsafe working conditions, and poor 
living standards (see table 10, Appendix). 

Additionally, Japan's preoccupation with boosting the rate of 
industrial growth during the 1950s and 1960s led to the relative 
neglect of consumer services and also to the worsening of indus- 
trial pollution. Housing and urban services, such as water and sew- 
age systems, and social security benefits, lagged behind the 
development of industry, and despite considerable improvement 



203 



Japan: A Country Study 

in the 1970s and 1980s, still lagged well behind other industrial- 
ized nations at the end of the 1980s. Agricultural subsidies and 
a complex and outmoded distribution system also kept the prices 
of some essential consumer goods very high by world standards 
(see Living Standards, this ch.). Industrial growth came at the ex- 
pense of the environment. Foul air, heavily polluted water, and 
waste disposal became critical political issues in the 1970s and again 
in the late 1980s (see Pollution, ch. 2). 

The Evolving Occupational Structure 

As late as 1955, some 40 percent of the labor force still worked 
in agriculture, but this figure had declined to 17 percent by 1970 
and to 8.3 percent by 1988. The government estimated in the late 
1980s that this figure would decline to 4.9 percent by 2000, as Japan 
imported more and more of its food and small family farms disap- 
peared. 

Japan's economic growth in the 1960s and 1970s was based on 
the rapid expansion of heavy manufacturing in such areas as au- 
tomobiles, steel, shipbuilding, chemicals, and electronics. The 
secondary sector (manufacturing, construction, and mining) ex- 
panded to 35.6 percent of the work force by 1970. By the late 1970s, 
however, the Japanese economy began to move away from heavy 
manufacturing toward a more service-oriented (tertiary sector) base. 
During the 1980s, jobs in wholesaling, retailing, finance and in- 
surance, real estate, transportation, communications, and govern- 
ment grew rapidly, while secondary sector employment remained 
stable. The tertiary sector grew from 47 percent of the work force 
in 1970 to 58 percent in 1987 and was expected to grow to 62 per- 
cent by 2000, when the secondary sector will probably employ 33 
percent of Japan's workers. 

The Role of Government and Business 

Although Japan's economic development was primarily the 
product of private entrepreneurship, the government has directly 
contributed to the nation's prosperity. Its actions have helped in- 
itiate new industries, cushion the effects of economic depression, 
create a sound economic infrastructure, and protect the living stan- 
dards of the citizenry. Indeed, so pervasive has government in- 
fluence in the economy seemed that many foreign observers have 
popularized the term ' 'Japan Incorporated' ' to describe its alliance 
of business and government interests. Whether Japan in 1990 ac- 
tually fit this picture seemed questionable, but there was little doubt 
that government agencies continued to influence the economy 
through a variety of policies. 



204 



The Character and Structure of the Economy 

Japanese attitudes towards government have historically been 
shaped by Confucianism (see Cultural Developments and the Es- 
tablishment of Buddhism, ch. 1; and Religious and Philosophical 
Traditions, ch. 2). Japan often has been defined as a Confucian 
country, but one in which loyalty is more important than benevo- 
lence. Leadership stemmed from the government and authority 
in general, and business looked to government for guidance. These 
attitudes, coupled with the view of the nation as a family, allowed 
government to influence business, and businesses worked hard not 
only for their own profits, but also for national well-being. There 
was a national consensus that Japan must be an economic power 
and that the duty of all Japanese was to sacrifice themselves for 
this national goal. Thus, the relationship between government and 
business was as collaborators rather than as mutually suspicious 
adversaries. 

Government-business relations were conducted in many ways 
and through numerous channels. The most important conduits in 
the postwar period were the economic ministries: the Ministry of 
Finance and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, 
known as MITI (see Trade and Investment Institutions, ch. 5). 
The Ministry of Finance had operational responsibilities for all fiscal 
affairs, including the preparation of the national budget (see table 
11, Appendix). It initiated fiscal policies and, through its indirect 
control over the Bank of Japan, the central bank, was responsible 
for monetary policy as well. The Ministry of Finance allocated pub- 
lic investment, formulated tax policies, collected taxes, and regu- 
lated foreign exchange. 

The Ministry of Finance established low interest rates, and by 
thus reducing the cost of investment funds to corporations, pro- 
moted industrial expansion. MITI was responsible for the regula- 
tion of production and the distribution of goods and services. It 
was the "steward" of the Japanese economy, developing plans con- 
cerning the structure of Japanese industry. MITI had several spe- 
cial functions in the late 1980s: controlling Japan's foreign trade 
and supervising international commerce, ensuring the smooth flow 
of goods in the national economy, promoting the development of 
manufacturing, mining, and distribution industries, and supervising 
the procurement of a reliable supply of raw materials and energy 
resources. 

The Ministry of Transportation was responsible for oversight 
of all land, sea, and air transport. The Ministry of Construction 
was charged with supervising all construction in Japan and Japa- 
nese-supported construction abroad. Its responsibilities also included 
land acquisition for public use and environmental protection as it 



205 



Japan: A Country Study 

related to construction. The Ministry of Health and Welfare was 
responsible for supervising and coordinating all health and wel- 
fare services, and the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications 
was responsible for the postal service and electronic communi- 
cations. 

Industrial Policy 

After World War II and especially in the 1950s and 1960s, the 
Japanese government devised a complicated system of policies to 
promote industrial development and cooperated closely for this pur- 
pose with private firms. The objective of industrial policy was to 
shift resources to specific industries, to gain international competi- 
tive advantage for Japan. These policies and methods were used 
primarily to increase the productivity of inputs and to influence, 
directly or indirectly, industrial investment. 

Administrative guidance (gydsei shido) was a principal instrument 
of enforcement used extensively throughout the Japanese govern- 
ment to support a wide range of policies. Influence, prestige, ad- 
vice, and persuasion were used to encourage both corporations and 
individuals to work in directions judged desirable. The persuasion 
was exerted and the advice was given by public officials, who often 
had the power to provide or withhold loans, grants, subsidies, 
licenses, tax concessions, government contracts, import permits, 
foreign exchange, and approval of cartel arrangements. The 
Japanese used administrative guidance to buffer market swings, 
anticipate market developments, and enhance market competition 
(see Foreign Trade Policies, ch. 5). 

Mechanisms used by the Japanese government to affect the econ- 
omy typically related to trade, labor markets, competition, and tax 
incentives. They included a broad range of trade protection mea- 
sures, subsidies, de jure and de facto exemptions from antitrust 
statutes, labor market adjustments, and industry- specific assistance 
to enhance the use of new technology. Rather than producing a 
broad range of goods, the Japanese selected a few areas in which 
they could develop high-quality goods that they could produce in 
vast quantities at competitive prices. A good example is the camera 
industry, which since the 1960s has been dominated by Japan. 

Historically, there have been three main elements in Japanese 
industrial development. The first was the development of a highly 
competitive manufacturing sector. The second was the deliberate 
restructuring of industry toward higher value-added, high-produc- 
tivity industries. In the late 1980s, these were mainly knowledge- 
intensive tertiary industries. The third element was aggressive 
domestic and international business strategies. 



206 



The Character and Structure of the Economy 

Japan has few natural resources and depends on massive im- 
ports of raw materials. It must export to pay for its imports, and 
manufacturing and the sales of its services, such as banking and 
finance, were its principal means of doing so. For these reasons, 
the careful development of the producing sector was a key con- 
cern of both government and industry throughout most of the twen- 
tieth century. Government and business leaders generally agreed 
that the composition of Japan's output must continually shift if living 
standards were to rise. Government played an active role in mak- 
ing these shifts, often anticipating economic developments rather 
than reacting to them. 

After World War II, the initial industries that policy makers and 
the general public felt Japan should have were iron and steel, ship- 
building, the merchant marine, machine industries in general, 
heavy electrical equipment, and chemicals. Later they added the 
automobile industry, petrochemicals, and nuclear power, and in 
the 1980s, such industries as computers and semiconductors. Since 
the late 1970s, the government has strongly encouraged the de- 
velopment of knowledge-intensive industries. Government support 
for research and development grew rapidly in the 1980s, and large 
joint government-industry development projects in computers and 
robotics were started. At the same time, government promoted the 
managed decline of competitively troubled industries, including 
textiles, shipbuilding, and chemical fertilizers, through such mea- 
sures as tax breaks for corporations that retrained workers to work 
at other tasks. 

Although industrial policy remained important in Japan in the 
1970s and 1980s, thinking began to change. Government seemed 
to intervene less and become more respective of price mechanisms 
in guiding future development. During this period, trade and direct 
foreign investment were liberalized, tariff and nontariff trade bar- 
riers were lowered, and the economies of the advanced nations be- 
came more integrated, with the growth of international trade and 
international corporations. In the late 1980s, knowledge-intensive 
and high-technology industries became prominent. The govern- 
ment showed little inclination to promote such booming parts of 
the economy as fashion design, advertising, and management con- 
sulting. The question at the end of the 1980s was whether the 
government would become involved in such new developments or 
whether it would let them progress on their own. 

Monetary and Fiscal Policy 

Monetary policy pertained to the regulation, availability, and cost 
of credit, while fiscal policy dealt with government expenditures, 



207 



Japan: A Country Study 

taxes, and debt. Through management of these areas, the Minis- 
try of Finance regulated the allocation of resources in the econ- 
omy, affected the distribution of income and wealth among the 
citizenry, stabilized the level of economic activities, and promoted 
economic growth and welfare. 

The Ministry of Finance played an important role in Japan's 
postwar economic growth. It advocated a "growth first" approach, 
with a high proportion of government spending going to capital 
accumulation, and minimum government spending overall, which 
kept both taxes and deficit spending down, making more money 
available for private investment. Most Japanese put money into 
savings accounts (see table 12, Appendix). 

In the postwar period, the government's fiscal policy centered 
on the formulation of the national budget, which was the respon- 
sibility of the Ministry of Finance. The ministry's Budget Bureau 
prepared expenditure budgets for each fiscal year (FY — see Glos- 
sary) based on the requests from government ministries and af- 
filiated agencies. The ministry's Tax Bureau was responsible for 
adjusting the tax schedules and estimating revenues. The minis- 
try also issued government bonds, controlled government borrow- 
ing, and administered the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program, 
which is sometimes referred to as the "second budget." 

Three types of budgets were prepared for review of the National 
Diet each year (see The Legislature, ch. 6). The general account 
budget included most of the basic expenditures for current govern- 
ment operations. Special account budgets, of which there were about 
forty, were designed for special programs or institutions where close 
accounting of revenues and expenditures was essential: for public 
enterprises, state pension funds, and public works projects financed 
from special taxes. Finally, there were the budgets for the major 
public enterprises, including public service corporations, loan and 
finance institutions, and the special public banks (see table 13, Ap- 
pendix). Although these budgets were usually approved before the 
start of each fiscal year, they were usually revised with supplemental 
budgets in the fall. Local jurisdiction budgets depended heavily 
on transfers from the central government. 

Government fixed investments in infrastructure and loans to pub- 
lic and private enterprises were about 15 percent of GNP. Loans 
from the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program, which were out- 
side the general budget and funded primarily from postal savings, 
represented more than 20 percent of the general account budget, 
but their total effect on economic investment was not completely 
accounted for in the national income statistics. Taxes, represent- 
ing 14 percent of GNP in 1987, were low compared to those in 



208 



The Character and Structure of the Economy 

other developed economies. Taxes provided 87.8 percent of 
revenues in 1990. Income taxes were graduated and progressive. 
The principal structural feature of the tax system was the tre- 
mendous elasticity of the individual income tax. Because inheritance 
and property taxes were low, there was a slowly increasing 
concentration of wealth in the upper tax brackets. In 1989, the 
government introduced a major tax reform, including a 3 percent 
consumption tax. 

The Financial System 

In the mid-1980s, while the United States was becoming a debtor 
nation, Japan became the world's largest creditor and Tokyo a 
major international financial center. Four of the biggest banks in 
the world were Japanese at that time and Japan had the world's 
largest insurance company, advertising firm, and stock market. 
In the remainder of the 1980s, Japan's financial and banking in- 
dustries grew at unprecedented rates. 

The main elements of Japan's financial system were much the 
same as those of other major industrialized nations: a commercial 
banking system, which accepted deposits, extended loans to busi- 
nesses, and dealt in foreign exchange; specialized government- 
owned financial institutions, which funded various sectors of the 
domestic economy; securities companies, which provided broker- 
age services, underwrote corporate and government securities, and 
dealt in securities markets; capital markets, which offered the means 
to finance public and private debt and to sell residual corporate 
ownership; and money markets, which offered banks a source of 
liquidity and provided the Bank of Japan with a tool to implement 
monetary policy. 

Japan's traditional banking system was segmented into clearly 
defined components in the late 1980s: commercial banks (thirteen 
major and sixty-four smaller regional banks), long-term credit banks 
(seven), trust banks (seven), mutual loan and savings banks (sixty- 
nine), and various specialized financial institutions. During the 
1980s, a rapidly growing group of nonbank operations, such as 
consumer loan, credit card, leasing, and real estate organizations 
began performing some of the traditional functions of banks, such 
as the issuing of loans. 

In the early postwar financial system, city banks provided short- 
term loans to major domestic corporations while regional banks 
took deposits and extended loans to medium-sized and small busi- 
nesses. Neither engaged much in international business. In the 
1950s and 1960s, a specialized bank, the Bank of Tokyo, took care 
of most of the government's foreign exchange needs and functioned 



209 



Japan: A Country Study 



as the nation's foreign banking representative. Long-term credit 
banks were intended to complement rather than to compete with 
the commercial banks. Authorized to issue debentures rather than 
take ordinary deposits, they specialized in long-term lending to 
major kaisha, or corporations. Trust banks were authorized to con- 
duct retail and trust banking and often combined the work of com- 
mercial and long-term credit banks. Trust banks not only managed 
portfolios but also raised funds through the sale of negotiable loan 
trust certificates. Mutual loan and savings banks, credit associa- 
tions, credit cooperatives, and labor credit associations collected 
individual deposits from general depositors. These deposits were 
then loaned to cooperative members and to the liquidity- starved 
city banks via the inter-bank money markets or were sent to cen- 
tral cooperative banks, which in turn loaned the funds to small busi- 
nesses and corporations. More than 8,000 agricultural, forestry, 
and fishery cooperatives performed many of the same functions 
for the cooperatives. Many of their funds were transmitted to their 
central bank, the Norinchukin Bank, which was the world's larg- 
est bank in terms of domestic deposits. 

A group of government financial institutions paralleled the pri- 
vate banking sector. The Japan Export-Import Bank, the Japan 
Development Bank, and a number of finance corporations, such 
as the Housing Loan Corporation, promoted the growth of special- 
ized sectors of the domestic economy. These institutions derived 
their funding from deposits collected by the postal savings system 
and deposited with the Trust Fund Bureau. The postal savings sys- 
tem, through the 24,000 post offices, accepted funds in various 
forms, including savings, annuities, and insurance. The post offices 
offered the highest interest rates for regular savings accounts (8 
percent for time deposits in 1990) and tax free savings until 1988, 
thereby collecting more deposits and accounts than any other in- 
stitution in the world. 

Japan's securities markets increased their volume of dealings 
rapidly during the late 1980s, led by Japan's rapidly expanding 
securities firms. There were three categories of securities compa- 
nies in Japan, the first consisting of the "Big Four" securities houses 
(among the six largest such firms in the world): Nomura, Daiwa, 
Nikko, and Yamaichi. The Big Four played a key role in interna- 
tional financial transactions and were members of the New York 
Stock Exchange. Nomura was the world's largest single securities 
firm; its net capital, in excess of US$10 billion in 1986, exceeded 
that of Merrill Lynch, Salomon Brothers, and Shearson Lehman 
combined. In 1986 Nomura became the first Japanese member of 
the London Stock Exchange. Nomura and Daiwa were primary 



210 



A busy moment on the Tokyo Securities and Stock Exchange 
Courtesy The Mainichi Newspapers 

dealers in the United States Treasury bond market. The second 
tier of securities firms contained ten medium-sized firms and the 
third all the smaller securities firms registered in Japan. Many of 
these smaller firms were affiliates of the Big Four, while some were 
affiliated with banks. In 1986 eighty-three of the smaller firms were 
members of the Tokyo Securities and Stock Exchange. Japan's secu- 
rities firms derived most of their incomes from brokerage fees, equity 
and bond trading, underwriting, and dealing. Other services in- 
cluded the administration of trusts. In the late 1980s, a number 
of foreign securities firms, including Salomon Brothers and Merrill 
Lynch, became players in Japan's financial world. 

Japanese insurance companies became important leaders in in- 
ternational finance in the late 1980s. More than 90 percent of the 
population owned life insurance, and the amount held per person 
was at least 50 percent greater than in the United States. Many 
Japanese used insurance companies as savings vehicles. Insurance 
companies' assets grew at a rate of over 20 percent per year in the 
late 1980s, reaching nearly US$694 billion in 1988. These assets 
permitted the companies to become major players in international 
money markets. Nippon Life Insurance Company, the world's larg- 
est insurance firm, was reportedly the biggest single holder of United 
States Treasury securities in 1989. 



211 



Japan: A Country Study 

The Tokyo Securities and Stock Exchange became the largest 
in the world in 1988, in terms of the combined market value of 
outstanding shares and capitalization, while the Osaka Stock Ex- 
change ranked third after those of Tokyo and New York. Although 
there are eight stock exchanges in Japan, the Tokyo stock exchange 
represented 83 percent of the nation's total equity in 1988. Of the 
1,848 publicly traded domestic companies in Japan at the end of 
1986, about 80 percent were listed on the Tokyo stock exchange. 

Two developments in the late 1980s helped in the rapid expan- 
sion of the Tokyo Securities and Stock Exchange. The first was 
a change in the financing of company operations. Traditionally, 
large firms obtained funding through bank loans rather than capi- 
tal markets, but in the late 1980s they began to rely more on direct 
financing. The second development came in 1986 when the Tokyo 
exchange permitted non-Japanese brokerage firms to become mem- 
bers for the first time. By 1988 the exchange had sixteen foreign 
members. The Tokyo Securities and Stock Exchange had 124 mem- 
ber companies all told in mid- 1990. 

Japan's stock market dealings exploded in the 1980s, with in- 
creased trading volume and rapidly rising stock prices. The Nikkei 
Stock Average grew from 6,850 in October 1982 to nearly 39,000 
in early 1990. During one six-month period in 1986, total trade 
volume on the Tokyo exchange increased by 250 percent with wild 
swings in the Nikkei average. After the plunge of the New York 
Stock Exchange in October 1987, the Tokyo average dropped by 
15 percent, but there was a sharp recovery by early 1988. In 1990 
five types of securities were traded on the Tokyo exchange: stocks, 
bonds, investment trusts, rights, and warrants alone. 

Public Corporations 

Although the Japanese economy is largely based on private en- 
terprise, it does have a number of government-owned (public) cor- 
porations, which are more extensive and, in some cases, different 
in function from what exists in the United States. In 1988 there 
were 97 public corporations, reduced from 111 in the early 1980s 
as a result of administrative reforms. Public companies at the na- 
tional level were normally affiliated with one of the economic minis- 
tries, although the extent of direct management and supervision 
varied. The government divided the national-level corporations into 
several categories. The first included the main public service and 
monopoly corporations: Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Cor- 
poration, Japanese National Railways, and Japan Tobacco and 
Salt Public Corporation. However, Nippon Telegraph and Tele- 
phone Corporation was privatized in 1985, the Japanese National 



212 



The Character and Structure of the Economy 

Railways in 1987, and the Japan Tobacco and Salt Corporation 
in 1988. The second category included the major development 
corporations devoted to housing, agriculture, highways, water re- 
sources, ports, energy resources, and urban development projects. 
Other categories of corporations included those charged with spe- 
cial government projects, loans and finance, and special types of 
banking. Local public corporations were involved with utilities. 

Public corporations benefited the economy in several ways. Some, 
like Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation before privati- 
zation, were important sources of technology development funds 
or centers around which private industry could cluster. Others 
provided vital public services that private industry would find im- 
possible to finance. The development banks, particularly the Japan 
Development Bank, were sources of long-term investment funds 
and instrumental in shaping the pattern of industry, especially in 
the early postwar period. Because public corporations also added 
revenue to the national budget and were, theoretically, self- financ- 
ing, they required litde from the government in the way of financial 
support. They also provided employment for retired bureaucrats. 
The reemployment of retired bureaucrats as advisors to these cor- 
porations as well as many private- sector firms was rather common, 
especially in the late 1960s and early 1970s, under the tide amakudari 
(descent from heaven). The practice was most prevalent in the high- 
regulated banking, steel, and transportation industries, but was 
found throughout the Japanese economy. 

Public corporations also had a negative side. Their operations 
were apt to be less efficient than those of the private sector, and 
in some corporations, close government supervision impeded cor- 
porate responsibility. Conflicts between corporate heads, who were 
retired from competing ministries, and envy among career em- 
ployees, who saw their advancement blocked by the influx of re- 
tired officials, also created frequent management problems. Labor 
relations were also less harmonious in the public sector than the 
private sector. Some of Japan's most debilitating strikes and work 
slowdowns have been launched by public transportation workers. 

Private Enterprise 

The engine of Japanese economic growth has been private in- 
itiative and enterprise, together with strong support and guidance 
from the government and from labor. The most numerous enter- 
prises were single proprietorships, of which there were over 4 mil- 
lion in the late 1980s. The dominant form of organization, however, 
was the corporation: in 1988 some 2 million corporations employed 
more than 30 million workers, or nearly half of the total labor force 



213 



Japan: A Country Study 

of 60.1 million people. Corporations ranged from large to small, 
but the favored type of organization was the joint- stock company, 
with directors, auditors, and yearly stockholders' meetings. 

Japan's postwar business order dates back to the dissolution of 
the zaibatsu during the Allied occupation. Central holding companies 
were dissolved and families and other owners were compensated 
with non-negotiable government bonds. Individual operating firms 
were then freed to act independentiy. At the same time, the govern- 
ment instituted antimonopoly legislation and formed the Fair Trade 
Commission. Together with agricultural land reform and the start 
of the labor movement, these measures helped introduce a degree 
of competition into markets that had not previously existed. 

It was not long, however, before the spirit and letter of these 
reform laws were neglected. During the 1950s, government guid- 
ance of industry often sidestepped the provisions of the law. While 
market forces determined the course of the vast majority of enter- 
prise activities, adjustments in the allocation of bank credit and 
the formation of cartels favored the reemergence of conglomerate 
groupings. These groups competed vigorously with one another 
for market shares both within and outside Japan, but they domi- 
nated lesser industry. 

In contrast to the dualism of the prewar era — featuring a giant 
gap between modern, large enterprises and the smaller, traditional 
firms — the postwar system was more graduated. Interlocking pro- 
duction and sales arrangements between greater and smaller en- 
terprises characterized corporate relations in most markets. The 
average Japanese business executive was well aware of the firms 
that led production and sales in each industry and sensitive to 
minute differentiations of rank among the many corporations. 

At the top of the corporate system were three general types of 
corporate groupings. The first included the corporate heirs of the 
zaibatsu (including many of the same firms), and the second con- 
sisted of corporations that formed around major commercial banks. 
The nation's six largest groupings were in these categories. Mitsui, 
Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo were former zaibatsu, while other group- 
ings were formed around the Fuji-Sankei, Sanwa, and Dai-Ichi 
Kangyo banking giants. A third type of corporate grouping devel- 
oped around large industrial producers. 

The relations among the members of the first two types of groups 
were flexible, informal, and quite different from the holding com- 
pany pattern of the prewar days. Coordination took place at peri- 
odic gatherings of corporation presidents and chief executive 
officers. The purpose of these meetings was to exchange informa- 
tion and ideas rather than to command group operations in a formal 



214 



The Character and Structure of the Economy 

way. The general trading firms associated with each group could 
also be used to coordinate group finance, production, and mar- 
keting policies although none of these relationships was entirely 
exclusive (see Trading Companies, ch. 5). The practice of cross- 
holding shares of group stock further cemented these groups, and 
such holdings usually made up about 30 percent of the total group 
equity. Member corporations would typically, though not exclu- 
sively, borrow from group banks. 

Similar relationships characterized the third type of corporate 
group, which established around a major industrial producer. Mem- 
bers of this group were often subsidiaries or affiliates of the parent 
firm, or regular subcontractors. Subsidiaries and contracting cor- 
porations normally built components for the parent firm and, be- 
cause of their smaller size, afforded several benefits to the parent. 
The larger firm could concentrate on final assembly and high value- 
added processes, while the smaller firm could perform specialized 
and labor-intensive tasks. Cash payments to the subcontractors were 
supplemented by commercial bills whose maturity could be post- 
poned when the need arose. In the late 1980s, subcontracting firms 
accounted for over 60 percent of Japan's 6 million small and 
medium-sized enterprises (those having fewer than 300 employees). 

This characterization of the economy as consisting of neat, hier- 
archical corporate groupings is somewhat simplistic. In the 1970s 
and 1980s, a number of independent middle-sized firms — especially 
in the services and retail trade — were busy catering to increasingly 
diversified and specialized markets. Unaffiliated with the nation's 
large conglomerates, these corporations dueled each other in a high- 
ly competitive market. Bankruptcies among such companies and 
the smaller firms were much more common than among the large 
enterprises. Small business was the main provider of employment 
for the Japanese — two-thirds of Japanese workers were employed 
by small firms throughout the 1980s — and thereby the source of 
consumer demand; it engaged in almost half of business invest- 
ment as well. 

The issue of who controlled the enterprise system was complex. 
While theoretically corporations were owned by stockholders, in- 
dividual stock-ownership fell throughout the 1970s and 1980s, and 
in 1990 was less than 30 percent. Financial corporations accounted 
for the remaining 70 percent or so. Relative to capital, almost all 
large corporations carried enormous debt, a phenomenon known 
as overborrowing. Such an unbalanced capital structure resulted 
from the easy availability of credit from the main group bank and 
the network of corporate relations, which reduced the need to resort 
to capital markets. Corporate shareholder meetings were often only 



215 



Japan: A Country Study 



window dressing. Thugs sometimes terrorized stockholders, de- 
manding payments to vote for management or refrain from ex- 
posing scandals. The auditing system also was not well developed. 
Until the late 1980s, few companies engaged outside auditors, and 
accounting practices gave corporations room to mislead both the 
public and shareholders. The law was changed in 1981 to control 
this kind of excess, to enhance the power of auditors, and to reduce 
the number of stockholders in the employ of management. But in 
general, it seemed that business management held the reins of cor- 
porate control, often with little public accountability. The corporate 
system maintained itself by smoothing relations with the govern- 
ment bureaucracy, expanding benefits to workers and consumers, 
and public relations and philanthropy. 

The Culture of Japanese Management 

The culture of Japanese management so famous in the West was 
generally limited to Japan's large corporations. These flagships of 
the Japanese economy provided their workers with excellent sala- 
ries and working conditions and secure employment. These com- 
panies and their employees were the business elite of Japan. A career 
with such a company was the dream of many young people in 
Japan, but only a select few attained the jobs. Qualification for 
employment was limited to the men and the few women who gradu- 
ated from the top thirty colleges and universities in Japan. 

In the late twentieth century, placement and advancement of 
Japanese workers was heavily based on educational background. 
Students who did not gain admission to the most highly rated col- 
leges only rarely had the chance to work for a large company. In- 
stead, they had to seek positions in small and medium- sized firms 
that could not offer comparable benefits and prestige. The quality 
of one's education and, more importantly, the college attended, 
played decisive roles in a person's career (see Higher Education, 
ch. 3). 

Few Japanese attended graduate school, and graduate training 
in business per se was rare in the 1980s. There were only a few 
business school programs in Japan. Companies provided their own 
training and showed a strong preference for young men who could 
be trained in the company way. Interest in a person whose atti- 
tudes and work habits were shaped outside the company was low. 
When young men were preparing to graduate from college, the 
attempt to find a suitable employer began. This process had been 
very difficult: there were only a few positions in the best govern- 
ment ministries, and quite often entry into a good firm was deter- 
mined by competitive examination. In the 1990s, the situation was 



216 



The Character and Structure of the Economy 

becoming less competitive with a gradual decrease in the number 
of candidates. New workers enter their companies as a group on 
April 1 each year. 

One of the prominent features of Japanese management was the 
practice of permanent employment {shushin koyo). Permanent em- 
ployment covered the minority of the work force that worked for 
the major companies. Management trainees, traditionally nearly 
all of whom were men, were recruited directly from colleges when 
they graduated in the late winter and, if they survived a six-month 
probationary period with the company, were expected to stay with 
the companies for their entire working careers. Employees were 
not dismissed thereafter on any grounds, except for serious breaches 
of ethics. 

Permanent employees were hired as generalists, not as specialists 
for a specific positions. A new worker was not hired because of 
any special skill or experience; rather, the individual's intelligence, 
educational background, and personal attitudes and attributes were 
closely examined. On entering a Japanese corporation, the new 
employee would train from six to twelve months in each of the firm's 
major offices or divisions. Thus, within a few years a young em- 
ployee would know every facet of company operations, knowledge 
which allowed companies to be more productive. 

Another unique aspect of Japanese management in the late twen- 
tieth century was the system of promotion and reward. An impor- 
tant criterion was seniority. Seniority was determined by the year 
an employee's class entered the company. Career progression was 
highly predictable, regulated, and automatic. Compensation for 
young workers was quite low, but they accepted low pay with the 
understanding that their pay would increase in regular increments 
and be quite high by retirement. Compensation consisted of a wide 
range of tangible and intangible benefits, including housing as- 
sistance, inexpensive vacations, good recreational facilities, and, 
most importantly, the availability of low-cost loans for such things 
as housing and a new car. Regular pay was often augmented by 
generous semiannual bonuses. Members of the same graduating 
class usually started with similar salaries, and salary increases and 
promotions each year were generally uniform. The purpose was 
to maintain harmony and avoid stress and jealousy within the 
group. 

Individual evaluation, however, did occur. Early in a worker's 
career (by age thirty) distinctions were made in pay and job as- 
signments. During the latter part of a worker's career another weed- 
ing took place: the best workers were selected for accelerated 
advancement into upper management. Those employees who failed 



217 



Japan: A Country Study 



to advance were forced to retire from the company in their mid-to 
late fifties. Retirement did not necessarily mean a life of leisure. 
Poor pension benefits and modest social security meant that many 
people had to continue working after retiring from a career. Many 
management retirees worked for the smaller subsidiaries of the large 
companies, with another company, or with the large company it- 
self at substantially lower salaries. 

A few major corporations in the late 1980s were experimenting 
with variations of permanent employment and automatic promo- 
tion. Some rewarded harder work and higher production with 
higher raises and more rapid promotions, but most retained the 
more traditional forms of hiring and advancement. A few compa- 
nies that experienced serious reverses laid off workers, but such 
instances were rare. 

Another aspect of Japanese management was the company union, 
which most regular company employees were obliged to join. The 
worker did not have a separate skill identification outside of the 
company. Despite federations of unions at the national level, the 
union did not exist as an entity separate from, or with an adver- 
sarial relationship to, the company. The linking of the company 
with the worker put severe limits on independent union action and 
the worker did not wish to harm the economic well-being of the 
company. Strikes were rare and usually brief. 

Japanese managerial style and decision making in large compa- 
nies emphasized the flow of information and initiative from the 
bottom up, making top management a facilitator rather than the 
source of authority, while middle management was both the impetus 
for and shaper of policy. Consensus was stressed as a way of arriv- 
ing at decisions, and close attention was paid to workers' well-being. 
Rather than serve as an important decision maker, the ranking 
officer of a company had the responsibility of maintaining harmony 
so that employees could work together. A Japanese chief execu- 
tive officer was a consensus builder. 

Employment and Labor Relations 

Rising labor productivity, particularly in the manufacturing 
industries, contributed significantly to the nation's economic 
development. Labor productivity was unusually high in the late 
1970s, when Japan's wages first became competitive with other 
industrialized nations. But, productivity rose at an annual average 
rate of only 2.6 percent between 1978 and 1987 (see table 14, Appen- 
dix). At the same time, Japan was able to keep its unemployment 
rate between 2.3 and 3.0 percent from 1985 to 1990. The struc- 
ture of the nation's employment system and relatively harmonious 



218 



The Character and Structure of the Economy 

labor-management relations were two of the reasons for this en- 
viable performance. 

Employment, Wages, and Working Conditions 

Japan's work force grew by less than 1 percent per year in the 
1970s and 1980s. In 1990 it stood at nearly 63 percent of the total 
population over fifteen years of age, a level little changed since 1970. 
Labor force participation differed within age and gender group- 
ings and was similar to that in other industrialized nations in its 
relative distribution among primary, secondary, and tertiary in- 
dustries. The percentage of people employed in the primary sec- 
tor (agriculture, forestry, and fishing) dropped from 17.4 in 1970 
to 8.3 in 1987 and was projected to fall to 4.9 by 2000. The per- 
centage of the Japanese labor force employed in heavy industry 
was 33.7 in 1970; it dropped to 33.1 in 1987 and was expected 
to be 27.7 in 2000. Light industry employed 47 percent of the work 
force in 1970 and 58 percent in 1987. The sector was expected to 
employ 62 percent by 2000. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, well 
over 95 percent of all men between the ages of twenty-five and fifty- 
four were in the work force, but the proportion dropped sharply 
after the usual retirement age of fifty-five (by 1990 the retirement 
age for most men had risen to sixty). Women participated most 
actively in the job market in their early twenties and between the 
ages of thirty-five and fifty-four (see Gender Stratification and the 
Lives of Women, ch. 2). The unemployment rate (2.3 percent in 
1989) was considerably lower than in the other industrialized 
nations. 

Wages varied by industry and type of employment. Regular 
workers in firms with more than thirty employees, those in finance, 
real estate, public service, petroleum, publishing, and emerging 
high-technology industries earned the highest wages. The lowest 
paid were those in textiles, apparel, furniture, and leather products 
industries. The average farmer fared even worse. During the period 
of strong economic growth from 1960 to 1973, wage levels rose 
rapidly. Nominal wages increased an average of 13 percent per 
year while real wages rose 7 percent each year. Wage levels then 
stagnated as economic growth slowed. Between 1973 and 1987 an- 
nual nominal and real wage increases dropped to 8 percent and 
2 percent, respectively. Wages began rising in 1987 as the value 
of the yen sharply appreciated. In 1989 salaried workers receiving 
the highest average pay hikes over the previous year were newspaper 
employees (6.7 percent), followed by retail and wholesale workers 
(6 percent) and hotel employees (5.7 percent). Workers in the steel 



219 



Japan: A Country Study 



(2.5 percent) and shipbuilding (4.2 percent) industries fared worse. 
The salaries of administrative and technical workers were about 
20 percent higher than those of production workers. In the late 
1980s, with wages in manufacturing firms having 500 or more work- 
ers indexed at 100, enterprises with 100 to 499 employees were 
indexed at 79, those with 30 to 99 employees at 64, and those with 
5 to 29 employees at 56.6. The gap between wages paid to second- 
ary school and college graduates was slight, but widened as they 
grew older and peaked at the age of fifty-five, when the former 
received only 60 to 80 percent of the wages of the latter. 

Workers received two fairly large bonuses as well as their regu- 
lar salary, one mid-year and the other at year's end. In 1988 work- 
ers in large companies received bonuses equivalent to their pay 
for 1 .9 months while workers in the smallest firms gained bonuses 
equal to 1 .2 months' pay. In addition to bonuses, Japanese work- 
ers received a number of fringe benefits, such as living allowances, 
incentive payments, remuneration for special job conditions, al- 
lowances for good attendance, and cost-of-living allowances. 

Working conditions varied from firm to firm. On average, em- 
ployees worked a forty-six-hour week in 1987; employees of most 
large corporations worked a modified five-day week with two Satur- 
days a month, while those in most small firms worked as much 
as six days each week. In the face of mounting international criti- 
cism of excessive working hours in Japan, in January 1989 public 
agencies began closing two Saturdays a month. Labor unions made 
reduced working hours an important part of their demands, and 
many larger firms responded in a positive manner. In 1986 the 
average employee in manufacturing and production industries 
worked 2,150 hours in Japan, compared to 1,924 hours in the 
United States and 1,643 in France. The average Japanese worker 
was entitled to fifteen days of paid vacation a year, but actually 
took only seven days. 

The Structure of Japan's Labor Market 

The structure of Japan's labor market was experiencing grad- 
ual change in the late 1980s and was expected to continue this trend 
throughout the 1990s. Labor market structure was affected by the 
aging of the working population, increasing numbers of women 
in the labor force, and workers' rising education level. There was 
the prospect of increasing numbers of foreign nationals in the labor 
force. And, finally, the labor market faced possible changes owing 
to younger workers who sought to break away from traditional 
career paths to those that stressed greater individuality and 
creativity. 



220 



11* 




Japan Airlines Boeing 747 
Courtesy Japan Airlines 

Working Women 

In the early 1990s, Japanese women were joining the labor force 
in unprecedented numbers. In 1987 there were 23.6 million work- 
ing women (40 percent of the labor force), and they accounted for 
59 percent of the increase in employment from 1975 to 1987. The 
participation rate for women in the labor force (the ratio of those 
working to all women aged fifteen and older) rose from 45.7 per- 
cent in 1975 to 48.6 percent in 1987 and was expected to reach 
50 percent by 2000. 

The growing participation of women reflected both supply and 
demand factors. Industries such as wholesaling, retailing, banking, 
and insurance have expanded, in large part because of the effective 
use of women as part-time employees (see Age Structure; ch. 2). 

Foreign Workers 

Traditionally Japan has had strict laws regarding the employ- 
ment of foreigners, although exceptions were made for certain 
occupational categories. Excepted categories have included execu- 
tives and managers engaged in commercial activities, full-time 
scholars associated with research and education institutions, profes- 
sional entertainers, engineers and others specializing in advanced 



221 



Japan: A Country Study 



technology, foreign-language teachers, and others with special skills 
unavailable among Japanese nationals. 

The problems of foreign workers in the labor force were expected 
to continue in the 1990s. Despite the long-term upward trend in 
the unemployment rate, many unpopular jobs went unfilled and 
the domestic labor market was sluggish. Imported labor was seen 
as a solution to this situation by some employers, who hired low- 
paid foreign workers, who were, in turn, enticed by comparatively 
high Japanese wages. The strict immigration laws were expected 
to remain on the books, however, although the influx of illegal aliens 
from nearby Asian countries to participate in the labor market was 
likely to increase (see table 16, Appendix). 

Workers 9 Changing Attitudes 

The success of corporations in Japan was attributable to the 
remarkable motivation of its workers. Also behind this corporate 
prosperity was the workers' strong sense of loyalty to and identifi- 
cation with their employers. While many theories have evolved to 
explain the extraordinary attitude of Japanese workers, perhaps 
the most noteworthy is that of personnel management. This view 
holds that loyalty to the company has developed as a result of job 
security and a wage system in which those with the greatest seniority 
reap the highest rewards. Such corporate structure presumably 
fostered not only a determined interest in the company, but a low 
percentage of workers who changed jobs. 

During the postwar economic reconstruction, the backbone of 
the labor force was, of course, made up of people born before World 
War II. These people grew up in a Japan that was still largely an 
agriculturally based economy and had little material wealth. 
Moreover, they suffered the hardships of war and accepted hard 
work as a part of their lives. In the late twentieth century, these 
people were being replaced by generations born after the war, and 
there were indications that the newcomers had different atti- 
tudes toward work. Postwar generations were accustomed to 
prosperity, and they were also much better educated than their 
elders. 

As might be expected, these socioeconomic changes have affected 
workers' attitudes. Prior to World War II, surveys indicated that 
the aspect of life regarded as most worthwhile was work. During 
the 1980s, the percentage of people who felt this way was declin- 
ing. Workers' identification with their employers was weakening 
as well. A survey by the Management and Coordination Agency 
revealed that a record 2.7 million workers changed jobs in the one- 
year period beginning October 1 , 1986, and the ratio of those who 



222 



The Character and Structure of the Economy 

switched jobs to the total labor force matched the previous high 
recorded in 1974. This survey also showed that the percentage of 
workers indicating an interest in changing jobs increased from 4.5 
percent in 1971 to 9.9 percent in 1987. 

Another indication of changing worker attitudes was the num- 
ber of people meeting with corporate scouts to discuss the possibil- 
ity of switching jobs. Corporations' treatment of older workers also 
affected attitudes: there were fewer positions for older workers, and 
many found themselves without the rewards that their predeces- 
sors had enjoyed. 

Aging and Retirement of the Labor Force 

Japan's population was aging in the late twentieth century. Dur- 
ing the 1950s, the percentage of the population in the sixty-five- 
and-over group remained steady at around 5 percent. Through- 
out subsequent decades, however, that age-group expanded, and 
by 1987 it had grown to almost 11 percent of the population. It 
was expected to have reached 16 percent by 2000 and almost 24 
percent by 2020 (see Population, ch. 2). Perhaps the most outstand- 
ing feature of this trend was the speed with which it was occurring 
in comparison to trends in other industrialized nations. In the 
United States, expansion of the sixty-five-and-over age-group from 
7 percent to 14 percent took seventy-five years; in Britain and the 
Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) this expansion took 
forty-five years. The same expansion in Japan was expected to take 
only twenty- six years. 

As Japan's population aged, so did its work force. In 1988 the 
Ministry of Labor projected that, by 1990, 20 percent of the work 
force would be made up of workers aged fifty-five and over. By 
2000, the ministry predicted, 24 percent of the working popula- 
tion (almost one in four workers) would be in this age-group. This 
demographic shift was expected to bring about both macroeconomic 
and microeconomic problems. At the national level, Japan may 
have trouble in financing the pension system. At the corporate level, 
problems will include growing personnel costs and the shortage of 
senior positions. If such problems become severe, government will 
be forced to develop countermeasures. 

In most Japanese companies, salaries rose with worker age. Be- 
cause younger workers were paid less, they were more attractive 
to employers, and the difficulty in finding employment increased 
with age. This pattern was evidenced by the unemployment rates 
for different age-groups and by the number of applicants per job 
vacancy for each age- group in openings handled by public employ- 
ment offices. As the Japanese population ages, such trends may grow. 



223 



Japan: A Country Study 



Most Japanese companies required that employees retire upon 
reaching a specified age. During most of the postwar period, that 
age was fifty-five. Since government social security payments nor- 
mally began at age sixty, workers were forced to find reemploy- 
ment to fill the five-year gap. However, in 1986 the Diet passed 
the Law Concerning the Stabilization of Employment for Elderly 
People, to provide various incentives for firms to raise their retire- 
ment age to sixty. Many Japanese companies raised the retirement 
age they set, partly in response to this legislation. And despite man- 
datory retirement policies, many Japanese companies allowed their 
employees to continue working beyond the age of sixty — although 
generally at reduced wages. Reasons that people over sixty con- 
tinued to work varied: some did so to supplement inadequate pen- 
sion incomes, while others simply wanted to give meaning to their 
lives or to keep in touch with society (see table 17, Appendix). 

As Japan's population aged, the financial health of the public 
pension plan deteriorated. To avoid massive premium increases, 
government reformed the system in 1986 by cutting benefit levels 
and raising the plan's specified age at which benefits began from 
sixty to sixty- five. Under the revised system, contributions paid 
in equal share by employer and employee were expected to be 
equivalent to about 30 percent of wages, as opposed to 40 percent 
of wages under the old system. However, problems now arose in 
securing employment opportunities for the sixty- to- sixty-five age- 
group. 

In 1990, some 90 percent of companies paid retirement benefits 
to their employees in the form of lump-sum payments and pen- 
sions. Some companies based the payment amount on the em- 
ployee's base pay, while others used formulas independent of base 
pay. Since the system was designed to reward long service, pay- 
ment rose progressively with the number of years worked. 

Social Insurance and Minimum Wage Systems 

Companies in Japan were responsible for enrolling their employees 
in various social insurance systems, including health insurance, em- 
ployee pension insurance, employment insurance, and workers' ac- 
cident compensation insurance. The employer covered all costs for 
workers' accident compensation insurance, but payments to the other 
systems were shared by both employer and employee. 

The Minimum Wage Law, introduced in 1947 but not enacted 
until 1959, was designed to protect low- income workers. Minimum 
wage levels have been determined, according to both region and 
industry, by special councils composed of government, labor, and 
employment representatives. 



224 



The Character and Structure of the Economy 

Labor Unions 

Japan's over 74,500 trade unions were represented by four main 
labor federations in the mid-1980s: the General Council of Trade 
Unions of Japan (Nihon Rodo Kumiai Sohyogikai, commonly 
known as Sohyo), with 4.4 million members — a substantial per- 
centage representing public sector employees; the Japan Confeder- 
ation of Labor (Zen Nihon Rodo Sodomei, or Domei for short), 
with 2.2 million members; the Federation of Independent Labor 
Unions (Churitsu Roren), with 1.6 million members; and the Na- 
tional Federation of Industrial Organizations (Shinsanbetsu), with 
only 61,000 members. In 1987 Domei and Churitsu Roren were 
dissolved and amalgamated into the newly established National Fed- 
eration of Private Sector Unions (Rengo); and in 1990 Sohyo af- 
filiates merged with Rengo to form a new entity, Shin Rengo. Local 
labor unions and work unit unions, rather than the federations, 
conducted the major bargaining. Unit unions often banded together 
for wage negotiations, but federations did not control their poli- 
cies or actions. Federations also engaged in political and public re- 
lations activities (see Interest Groups, ch. 6). 

The rate of labor union membership, which was 35.4 percent 
in 1970, had declined considerably by the end of the 1980s. The 
continuing long-term reduction in union membership was caused 
by several factors, including the restructuring of Japanese indus- 
try away from heavy industries. Many people entering the work 
force in the 1980s joined smaller companies in the tertiary sector, 
where there was a general disinclination toward joining labor or- 
ganizations. 

The relationship between the typical labor union and the com- 
pany was unusually close. Both white- and blue-collar workers 
joined the union automatically in most major companies. Tem- 
porary and subcontracting workers were excluded, and managers 
with the rank of section chief and above were considered part of 
management. In most corporations, however, many of the man- 
agerial staff were former union members. In general, Japanese 
unions were sensitive to the economic health of the company, and 
company management usually briefed the union membership on 
the state of corporate affairs. 

Any regular employee below the rank of section chief was eligi- 
ble to become a union officer. Management, however, often pres- 
sured the workers to select favored employees. Officers usually 
maintained their seniority and tenure while working exclusively 
on union activities and being paid from the union's accounts, and 
union offices were often located at the factory site. Many union 



225 



Japan: A Country Study 

officers went on to higher positions within the corporation if they 
were particularly effective (or troublesome), but few became ac- 
tive in organized labor activities at the national level. 

During prosperous times, the spring labor offensives were highly 
ritualized affairs, with banners, sloganeering, and dances aimed 
more at being a show of force than a crippling job action. Mean- 
while, serious discussions took place between the union officers and 
corporate managers to determine pay and benefit adjustments. If 
the economy turned sour, or if management tried to reduce the 
number of permanent employees, however, disruptive strikes often 
occurred. The number of working days lost to labor disputes peaked 
in the economic turmoil of 1974 and 1975 at around 9 million work- 
days in the two-year period. In 1979, however, there were fewer 
than 1 million days lost. Since 1981 the average number of days 
lost per worker each year to disputes was just over 9 percent of 
the number lost in the United States (see table 18, Appendix). After 
1975, when the economy entered a period of slower growth, an- 
nual wage increases moderated, and labor relations were concilia- 
tory. During the 1980s, workers received pay hikes that on average 
closely reflected the real growth of GNP for the preceding year. 
In 1989, for example, workers received an average 5.1 percent pay 
hike, while GNP growth had averaged 5 percent between 1987 and 
1989. The moderate trend continued in the early 1990s, as the coun- 
try's national labor federations were reorganizing themselves. 

Infrastructure and Technology 

A mountainous, insular nation, Japan has inadequate natural 
resources to support its growing economy and large population (see 
Energy, this ch.). Although many kinds of minerals were extracted 
throughout the country, most mineral resources had to be imported 
in the postwar era. Local deposits of metal-bearing ores were 
difficult to process because they were of a low grade. The nation's 
large and varied forest resources, which covered 70 percent of the 
country in the late 1980s, were not utilized extensively. Because 
of the precipitous terrain, underdeveloped road network, and high 
percentage of young trees, domestic sources were able to supply 
only between 25 and 30 percent of the nation's timber needs. 
Agriculture and fishing were the best developed resources, but only 
through years of painstaking investment and toil. The nation there- 
fore built up the manufacturing and processing industries to con- 
vert raw materials imported from abroad. This strategy of economic 
development necessitated the establishment of a strong economic 
infrastructure to provide the needed energy, transportation, com- 
munications, and technological know-how. 



226 



The Character and Structure of the Economy 

Construction 

The mainstay of infrastructure development was the construc- 
tion industry, which employed slightly less than 10 percent of the 
labor force in 1985 and contributed some 8.5 percent of GDP. After 
the two oil crises in the 1970s, construction investment turned slug- 
gish and the share of construction investment in GNP decreased 
gradually. In 1987, however, business expanded through inves- 
tors' confidence, continued increase in corporate earnings, improve- 
ment of personal income, and rapid rise in land prices. The share 
of construction investment in GNP rose sharply, especially for more 
sophisticated and higher value-added private housing and private 
nonhousing structures. 

Construction starts in FY 1988 covered a total area of 258 mil- 
lion square meters, the second highest area on record, while hous- 
ing starts numbered 1.66 million, the third highest on record. Total 
investment in construction exceeded US$483 billion. Growing de- 
mand for private housing and new industry plants and equipment 
led to Japan's fifty largest construction companies experiencing 
double-digit growth in FY 1988. 

Although demand for new private housing was expected to grow 
in the early 1990s, even greater growth was expected for new urban 
office buildings. A number of large urban development projects, 
including those for Tokyo's waterfront, other urban redevelopment, 
highway construction, and new or expanded airports, suggested 
continued work for the construction industry through the 1990s. 

Japan's construction technology, which includes advanced earth- 
quake-resistant designs, was among the most developed in the world 
(see Visual Arts, ch. 3). Major firms competed to improve quality 
control over all phases of design, management, and execution. 
Research and development focused especially on energy-related fa- 
cilities, such as nuclear power plants and liquid natural gas (LNG) 
storage tanks. The largest firms were also improving their under- 
water construction methods. 

Mining 

Mining was a rapidly declining industry in the 1980s. Domestic 
coal production shrank from a peak of 55 million tons in 1960 to 
slightly more than 16 million tons in 1985, while coal imports grew 
to nearly 91 million tons in 1987. Domestic coal mining compa- 
nies faced cheap coal imports and high production costs, which 
caused them chronic deficits in the 1980s. In the late 1980s, Japan's 
approximately 1 million tons of coal reserves were mostly hard coal 



227 



Japan: A Country Study 

used for coking. Most of the coal Japan consumed was used to 
produce electric power. 

Japanese coal is found at the extreme ends of the country, in 
Hokkaido and Kyushu, which have, respectively, 45 and 40 per- 
cent of the country's coal deposits. Kyushu's coal is generally of 
poor quality and hard to extract, but the proximity of the Kyushu 
mines to ports facilitates transportation. In Hokkaido, the coal 
seams are wider and can be worked mechanically, and the quality 
of the coal is good. Unfortunately, these mines are located well 
inland, making transportation difficult. In most Japanese coal 
mines, inclined galleries, which extended in some places to 9.7 
kilometers underground, were used instead of pits. This arrange- 
ment was costly, despite the installation of moving platforms. The 
result was that a miner's daily output was far less than in Western 
Europe and the United States and domestic coal cost far more than 
imported coal. 

Energy 

Japan lacks any significant domestic sources of energy except 
coal and must import substantial amounts of crude oil, natural gas, 
and other energy resources, including uranium. In 1986 the coun- 
try's dependence on imports for primary energy stood at nearly 
92 percent. Its rapid industrial growth since the end of World War 
II had doubled energy consumption every five years. The use of 
power had also changed qualitatively. In 1950, coal supplied half 
of Japan's energy needs, hydroelectricity one-third, and oil the rest. 
In 1987 oil provided Japan with 56.6 percent of energy needs. Coal 
provided 18 percent of energy needs, natural gas 9.7 percent, 
nuclear power 10 percent, hydroelectic power 4.1 percent, geother- 
mal 0.1 percent, and 1.5 percent came from other sources. Dur- 
ing the 1960-72 period of accelerated growth, energy consumption 
grew much faster than GNP, doubling Japan's consumption of 
world energy. By 1976, with only 3 percent of the world's popula- 
tion, Japan was consuming 6 percent of global energy supplies. 

After the two oil crises of the 1970s, the pattern of energy con- 
sumption in Japan changed from heavy dependence on oil to some 
diversification to other forms of energy resources. Japan's domes- 
tic oil consumption dropped slightly, from around 5.1 million barrels 
of oil per day in the late 1970s to 4.9 million barrels per day in 
1990. While the country's use of oil was declining, its consump- 
tion of nuclear power and LNG rose substantially. Because domestic 
natural gas production is minimal, rising demand was met by 
greater imports. Japan's main LNG suppliers in 1987 were Indone- 
sia (51.3 percent), Malaysia (20.4 percent), Brunei (17.8 percent), 



228 



The Character and Structure of the Economy 

Abu Dhabi (7.3 percent), and the United States (3.2 percent). 
Several Japanese industries, including electric power companies 
and steelmakers, switched from petroleum to coal, most of which 
was imported. 

In 1987, the latest year for which complete statistics were avail- 
able, Japan's total energy requirements were tabulated at 372 mil- 
lion tons of petroleum equivalent. Of this total, 85 percent was 
imported. Consumption totalled 263.8 million tons, 45.9 percent 
of which was used by industry; 23.6 percent by the transportation 
sector; 26.8 percent for agricultural, residential, services, and other 
uses; and 3.7 percent for non-energy uses, such as lubricating oil 
or asphalt. 

In 1989 Japan was the world's third largest producer of electric- 
ity. Most of the more than 3,300 power plants were thermoelec- 
tric. About 75 percent of the available power was controlled by 
the ten major regional power utilities, of which Tokyo Electric 
Power Company was the world's largest. Electricity rates in Japan 
were among the world's highest. 

The Japanese were working to increase the availability of nuclear 
power in 1985. Although Japan was a late starter in this field, it 
finally imported technology from the United States and obtained 
uranium from Canada, France, South Africa, and Australia. By 
1987 the country had thirty-three nuclear reactors in operation, 
with seventeen additional reactors planned or under construction. 
The ratio of nuclear power generation to total electricity produc- 
tion increased from 2 percent in 1973 to 26 percent in 1987. 

During the 1980s, Japan's nuclear power program was strongly 
opposed by environmental groups, particularly after the Three Mile 
Island accident in the United States. Other problems for the pro- 
gram were the rising costs of nuclear reactors and fuel, the huge 
investments necessary for fuel enrichment and reprocessing plants, 
reactor failures, and nuclear waste disposal. Nevertheless, Japan 
continued to build nuclear power plants. Of alternative energy 
sources, Japan has effectively exploited only geothermal energy. 
The country had six geothermal power stations with a combined 
capacity of 133,000 kilowatts per hour in 1989 (see table 19, Ap- 
pendix). 

Research and Development 

As its economy matured in the 1970s and 1980s, Japan gradu- 
ally shifted away from dependence on foreign research. Japan's 
ability to conduct independent research and development became 
a decisive factor in boosting the nation's competitiveness. As early 
as 1980, the Science and Technology Agency, a component of the 



229 



Japan: A Country Study 



Office of the Prime Minister, announced the commencement of 
"the era of Japan's technological independence." By 1986 Japan 
had come to devote a higher proportion of its GNP to research and 
development than the United States. In 1989 nearly 700,000 
Japanese were engaged in research and development, more than 
the number of French, Britons, and West Germans combined. At 
the same time Japan was producing more engineers than any coun- 
try except the Soviet Union and the United States. Similar trends 
were seen in the use of capital resources. Japan spent US$39. 1 bil- 
lion on government and private research and development in 1987, 
equivalent to 2.9 percent of its national income (the highest ratio 
in the world). Although the United States spent around US$108.2 
billion on research and development in 1987, only 2.6 percent of 
its income was devoted to that purpose, ranking it third behind 
Japan and West Germany. 

The Japanese reputation for originality also increased. Of the 
1.2 million patents registered worldwide in 1985, 40 percent were 
Japanese, and Japanese citizens took out 19 percent of the 120,000 
patent applications made in the United States. In 1987, around 
33 percent of computer-related patents in the United States were 
Japanese, as were 30 percent of aviation-related and 26 percent 
of communications patents. 

Despite its advances in technological research and development 
and its major commitment to applied research, however, Japan 
significantly trailed other industrialized nations in basic scientific 
research. In 1989 around 13 percent of Japanese research and de- 
velopment funds were devoted to basic research. The proportion 
of basic research expenses borne by government was also much 
lower in Japan than in the United States, as was Japan's ratio of 
basic research expenses to GNP. In the late 1980s, the Japanese 
government attempted to rectify national deficiencies in basic 
research through a broad "originality" campaign in schools, gener- 
ously funding research, and encouraging private cooperation in 
various fields. 

Most research and development was private, although govern- 
ment support to universities and laboratories aided industry gready. 
In 1986, private industry provided 76 percent of the funding for 
research and development, which was especially strong in the late 
1980s in electrical machinery (with a ratio of research costs to total 
sales of 5.5 percent in 1986), precision instruments (4.6 percent), 
chemicals (4.3 percent), and transportation equipment (3.2 per- 
cent). 

As for government research and development, the national com- 
mitment to greater defense spending in the 1980s translated into 



230 



The Character and Structure of the Economy 

increased defense-related research and development. Meanwhile, 
government moved away from supporting large-scale industrial 
technology, such as shipbuilding and steel. Research emphases in 
the 1980s were in alternative energy, information processing, life 
sciences, and modern industrial materials. 

Industry 

The nation's industrial activities (including mining, manufac- 
turing, and power, gas, and water utilities) contributed 46.6 of total 
domestic industrial production in 1989, up slightly from 45.8 per- 
cent in 1975. This steady performance of the industrial sector in 
the 1970s and 1980s was a result of the growth of high- technology 
industries (see table 20, Appendix). During this period, some of 
the older heavy industries, such as steel and shipbuilding, either 
declined or simply held stable. Together with the construction in- 
dustry, those older heavy industries employed 34.9 of the work force 
in 1989 (relatively unchanged from 34.8 percent in 1980). The ser- 
vice industry sector grew the fastest in the 1980s in terms of GNP, 
while the greatest losses occurred in agriculture, forestry, mining, 
and transportation. Most industry catered to the domestic mar- 
ket, but exports were important for several key commodities. In 
general, industries relatively geared toward exports over imports 
in 1988 were transportation equipment (with a 24.8 percent ratio 
of exports over imports), motor vehicles (54 percent), electrical 
machinery (23.4 percent), general machinery (21.2 percent), and 
metal and metal products (8.2 percent). 

Industry was concentrated in several regions, which were in order 
of importance: the Kanto region surrounding Tokyo, especially 
the prefectures of Chiba, Kanagawa, Saitama, and Tokyo (the 
Keihin industrial region); the Nagoya metropolitan area, includ- 
ing Aichi, Gifu, Mie, and Shizuoka prefectures (the Chukyo-Tokai 
industrial region); Kinki (the Keihanshin industrial region); the 
southwestern part of Honshu and northern Shikoku around the 
Inland Sea (the Setouchi industrial region); and the northern part 
of Kyushu (Kitakyushu). In addition, a long narrow belt of indus- 
trial centers was found between Tokyo and Hiroshima, established 
by particular industries, that had developed as mill towns. These 
included Toyota City, near Nagoya, the home of the automobile 
manufacturer. 

The fields in which Japan enjoyed relatively high technological 
development included semiconductor manufacturing, optical fibers, 
optoelectronics, video discs and videotex, facsimile and copy ma- 
chines, industrial robots, and fermentation processes. Japan lagged 
slightly in such fields as satellites, rockets, and large aircraft, where 



231 



Japan: A Country Study 



advanced engineering capabilities were required, and in such fields 
as computer-aided design and computer-aided manufacturing 
(CAD/CAM), databases, and natural resources exploitation, where 
basic software capabilities were required. 

Basic Manufactures 

Japan's major export industries included automobiles, consumer 
electronics, computers, semiconductors, and iron and steel (see 
Major International Industries, ch. 5). Additionally, key indus- 
tries in Japan's economy were mining, nonferrous metals, petro- 
chemicals, pharmaceuticals, bioindustry, shipbuilding, aerospace, 
textiles, and processed foods. 

As the coal-mining industry declined, so did the general impor- 
tance of domestic mining in the whole economy. Only 0.2 percent 
of the labor force was engaged in mining operations in 1988, and 
the value added from mining was about 0.3 percent of the total 
for all mining and manufacturing. Domestic production contributed 
most to the supply of such nonmetals as silica sand, pyrophyllite 
clay, dolomite, and limestone. Domestic mines were contributing 
declining shares of the requirements for the metals zinc, copper, 
and gold. Almost all of the ores used in the nation's sophisticated 
processing industries were imported. 

The nonferrous metals industry fared very well in the late 1980s, 
as domestic demand for these metals reached record levels. Japan's 
consumption of the main nonferrous metals, such as copper, lead, 
zinc, and aluminum, was the second highest in the noncommunist 
world after the United States. In 1989, sales of copper products 
exceeded 1.5 million tons for the first time. Production of electric 
wire and cable, which accounted for 70 percent of Japan's copper 
demand, and brass mills, which use the other 30 percent, ex- 
perienced sharp growth, as did the demand for aluminum. 

The petrochemical industry experienced moderate growth in the 
late 1980s because of steady economic expansion. The highest 
growth came in the production of plastics, polystyrene, and poly- 
propylene. Prices for petrochemicals remained high because of in- 
creased demand in the newly developing economies of Asia, but 
the construction of factory complexes to make ethylene-based 
products in the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and Thailand 
by 1990 was expected to increase supplies and reduce prices. In 
the long term, the Japanese petrochemical industry was likely to 
face intensifying competition due to the integration of domestic and 
international markets, and efforts by other Asian countries to catch 
up with Japan. 



232 



The Character and Structure of the Economy 

The pharmaceutical industry and bioindustry experienced strong 
growth in the late 1980s. Pharmaceuticals production grew an es- 
timated 8 percent in 1989, because of increased expenditures by 
Japan's rapidly aging population. Leading producers actively de- 
veloped new drugs, such as those for degenerative and geriatric 
diseases, while internationalizing operations. Pharmaceutical com- 
panies were establishing tripolar networks connecting Japan, the 
United States, and Western Europe to coordinate product develop- 
ment. They also increased merger and acquisition activity over- 
seas. Biotechnology research and development was progressing 
steadily, including the launching of marine biotechnology projects, 
with full-scale commercialization expected to take place in the early 
1990s. Biotechnology research covered a wide variety of fields: 
agriculture, animal husbandry, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, food 
processing, and fermentation. Human hormones and proteins for 
pharmaceutical products were sought through genetic recombina- 
tion using bacteria. Biotechnology also was used to enhance bac- 
terial enzyme properties to further improve amino-acid fermentation 
technology, a field in which Japan was the world leader. The gov- 
ernment cautioned Japanese producers, however, against over- 
optimism regarding biotechnology and bioindustry. The research 
race both in Japan and abroad intensified in the 1980s, leading 
to patent disputes and forcing some companies to abandon research. 
Also, researchers began to realize that such drug development con- 
tinually showed new complexities, requiring more technical break- 
throughs than first imagined. Yet despite these problems, research 
and development, especially in leading companies, were still ex- 
pected to be successful and end in product commercialization in 
the mid-term. 

Japan dominated world shipbuilding in the late 1980s, filling 
more than half of all orders worldwide. Its closest competitors were 
South Korea and Spain, with 9 percent and 5.2 percent of the mar- 
ket, respectively. Japan's shipyards replaced their West European 
competitors as world leaders in production, through advanced de- 
sign, fast delivery, and low production costs. The Japanese ship- 
building industry was hit by a lengthy recession from the late 1970s 
through most of the 1980s, which resulted in a drastic cutback in 
the use of facilities and in the work force, but there was a sharp 
revival in 1989. The industry was helped by a sudden rise in de- 
mand from other countries that needed to replace their aging fleets 
and from a sudden decline in the South Korean shipping indus- 
try. In 1988 Japanese shipbuilding firms received orders for 4.8 
million gross tons of ships, but this figure grew to 7.1 million tons 
in 1989. 



233 



Japan: A Country Study 

The aerospace industry received a major boost in 1969 with the 
establishment of the National Space Development Agency, which 
was charged with the development of satellites and launch vehi- 
cles (see Telecommunications, this ch.). Japan's aircraft industry 
was only one-twentieth the size of that of the United States and 
one-twelfth that of Western Europe, and its technological level 
lagged as well. However, in the late 1980s Japan began to partici- 
pate in new international aircraft development projects as its tech- 
nical capabilities developed. The Asuka fanjet-powered short takeoff 
and landing (STOL) aircraft made a successful test flight in 1985. 
In 1988 Japan signed an accord with the United States to cooper- 
ate in building Japan's next- generation fighter aircraft, the FSX 
(see Defense Industry, ch. 8). 

The textile industry showed a strong revival in the late 1980s 
because of increased domestic demand from the construction, au- 
tomobile, housing, and civil engineering industries for various syn- 
thetic fibers. The clothing industry also fared well in the late 1980s, 
thanks to the expansion of consumer demand, especially in the area 
of women's apparel. Production of high value-added fashionable 
clothes became the mainstay of this industry. 

The production value of the food industry ranked third among 
manufacturing industries after electric and transport machinery. 
It produced a great variety of products, ranging from traditional 
Japanese items, such as soybean paste (miso) and soy sauce, to 
beer and meat. The industry as a whole experienced mild growth 
in the 1980s, primarily from the development of such new products 
as "dry beer" and precooked food, which was increasingly used 
because of the tendency of family members to dine separately, the 
trend toward smaller families, and convenience. A common fea- 
ture of all sectors of the food industry was their internationaliza- 
tion. As domestic raw materials lost their price competitiveness 
following the liberalization of imports, food makers more often 
produced foodstuffs overseas, promoted tie-ups with overseas firms, 
and purchased overseas firms. 

Domestic Trade and Services 

The nation's service industries were the major contributor to 
GNP and employment, generating about 58 percent of the national 
totals in 1987. Moreover, services were the fastest growing sector, 
outperforming manufacturing in the 1980s. The service sector cov- 
ered many diverse activities. Wholesale and retail trade was 
dominant, but advertising, data processing, publishing, tourism, 
leisure industries, entertainment, and other industries grew rapidly 
in the 1980s. Most service industries were small and labor-intensive, 



234 



The Character and Structure of the Economy 

but became more technologically sophisticated as computer and 
electronic products were incorporated by management. 

The operation of wholesale and retail trades has often been 
denigrated by other nations as a barrier to foreign participation 
in the Japanese market, as well as being called antiquated and in- 
efficient. Small retailers and "mom-and-pop" stores predominated. 
In 1985 there were 1 .6 million retail outlets in Japan, slightly more 
than the total number of retail outlets in the United States (1.5 
million in 1982), even though Japan has only half the population 
of the United States and is smaller than California. 

There were several changes in wholesaling and retailing in the 
1980s. Japan's distribution system was becoming more efficient. 
Retail outlets and wholesale establishments both peaked in num- 
ber in 1982 and were down 5.4 percent and 3.7 percent, respec- 
tively, in 1985. The main casualties were sole proprietorships, 
especially mom-and-pop stores and wholesale locations with fewer 
than ten employees. Almost 96,000 of the 1,036,000 mom-and- 
pop stores in operation in 1982 were out of business three years 
later. Government estimates for the late 1980s show additional con- 
solidation in both wholesale and retail sectors, including a continued 
sharp decline in mom-and-pop store operations. A further decline 
in mom-and-pop stores was expected as a result of the Large-Scale 
Retail Store Law of 1990, which greatly reduced the power of small 
retailers to block the establishment of large retail stores. Soaring 
land prices were a major cause of the decline of mom-and-pop 
stores, but an even more important reason was the growth of con- 
venience and discount stores. Discount stores were not much big- 
ger than the traditional small shops, but their distribution networks 
gave them a big pricing edge. Moreover, Japanese consumers were 
discovering the advantages of catalog shopping, which offered not 
only convenience, but also greater selection and lower prices. Ac- 
cording to a Nikkei survey, the mail-order business expanded 13 
percent between April 1987 and March 1988 to more than US$8.9 
billion in annual sales. Specialty chains, particularly those handling 
men's and women's clothing, shoes, and consumer electronics, were 
also doing better than the overall industry. Department stores, su- 
permarkets, and superstores (hybrid supermarket-discount stores) 
and other big retail operations were gaining business at the expense 
of small retailers, although their progress was quite slow. Between 
1980 and 1988, department stores increased their share of total retail 
sales by only 1 percentage point to 8.4 percent. Supermarkets and 
superstores increased in market share from 6.5 to 7.3 percent. Be- 
tween 1980 and 1988, the number of department stores grew from 



235 



Japan: A Country Study 



325 to just 371, and other big self-service stores only increased in 
number by 62 units between 1984 and 1988. 

Among service industries, the restaurant, advertising, real es- 
tate, hotel and leisure business, and data-processing industries grew 
rapidly in the 1980s. The fast-food industry has been profitable 
for both foreign and domestic companies. By 1989 family restau- 
rants and fast-food chains had grown into a US$138 billion busi- 
ness. Overall growth declined in the late 1980s because of the sharp 
rise of rents and a proliferation of restaurants in many areas. The 
number of hotel and guest rooms grew from 189,654 in 1981 to 
342,695 in 1988. 

Because much of the sales competition in Japan was of the non- 
price variety, advertising was extremely important. Consumers had 
to see the suitability of products and services for their lifestyles. 
The intense competition for the domestic market spurred the growth 
of the world's largest advertising agency, Dentsu, as well as other 
advertisers. 

Transportation and Communications 
Railroads and Subways 

Railroads were long the most important means of passenger and 
freight transportation, ever since they were established in the late 
nineteenth century, but from the 1960s they were rivalled in usage 
by road transportation (see Roads, this ch.; table 21, Appendix). 
The relative share of railroads in total passenger-kilometers fell from 
66.7 percent in 1965 to 42 percent in 1978, and to 37.1 percent 
in 1987. By contrast, passenger cars and domestic airlines were 
carrying ever-larger shares of the passenger traffic in the late 1980s 
(see Civil Aviation, this ch.; table 22, Appendix). 

At the heart of Japan's railroad system is the Japan Railways 
Group, a government- subsidized group of eight companies that took 
over most of the assets, operations, and liabilities of the government- 
owned Japanese National Railways in 1987. Initially, the compa- 
nies remained in the public domain with privatization planned, at 
least for some of the companies, by the early 1990s. There were 
six passenger companies: the East Japan, West Japan, and Central 
Japan railway companies, which operated in Honshu, and the 
Kyushu, Shikoku, and Hokkaido railway companies, which oper- 
ated on the islands for which the companies were named. In addi- 
tion, the East Japan Railway Company, since the opening of the 
Seikan Tunnel between Honshu and Hokkaido in 1988, also pro- 
vided express service to Sapporo. Similarly, the Central Japan Rail- 
way Company started serving Shikoku after the 1990 completion 



236 




A trunk line of the Japan Railways Group, opened in 1986 
Courtesy The Mainichi Newspapers 

The Tokyo subway, one of the world's busiest metro systems 
Courtesy The Mainichi Newspapers 



237 



Japan: A Country Study 



of the Seto-Ohashi bridges, a system of seven bridges linking Honshu 
and Shikoku. The six companies had 18,800 kilometers of routes 
(mosdy 1.1-meter track) in use in the late 1980s. About 25 percent 
of the routes were in double-track and multi- track sections, and the 
rest were single-track. In 1988, 51 percent of the six companies' 
1,000 locomotives were diesel and the rest were electric. Another 
company, Japan Freight Railway Company, owned its locomotives 
(295 diesel and 569 electric locomotives in 1988), rolling stock, and 
stations but hired track from the six passenger companies. It ran 
fewer trains on less track than Japanese National Railways freight 
service did before its demise but at increased revenues and higher 
productivity. The eighth company, the Shinkansen Property Cor- 
poration, leased Shinkansen ("bullet" train) railroad facilities — 
including 2,100 kilometers of 1.4-meter gauge high-speed track — to 
the passenger companies on Honshu. Some of the Shinkansen 
electric-powered trains operated at speeds up to 240 kilometers per 
hour. 

Another nearly 3,400 kilometers of routes, mostly 1.1 -meter- 
gauge, were operated by major private railroads, and by what are 
known in Japan as third sector railroads — new companies, financed 
with private and local government funds — that absorbed some of 
Japanese National Railways' rural lines. There were twenty-seven 
private and third sector companies in 1989. 

What remained of the debt-ridden Japanese National Railways 
after its 1987 breakup was named the Japanese National Railways 
Setdement Corporation. Its purpose was to dispose of assets not ab- 
sorbed by the successor companies and to execute other activities 
relating to the breakup, such as reemployment of former person- 
nel. The demise of the government-owned system came after charges 
of serious management inefficiencies, profit losses, and fraud. By 
the early 1980s, passenger and freight business had declined, and 
fare increases failed to keep up with higher labor costs. The new 
companies introduced competition, cut their staffing, and made re- 
form efforts. Initial public reaction to these moves was good: the 
combined passenger travel on the Japan Railways Group passenger 
companies in 1987 was 204.7 billion passenger-kilometers, up 3.2 
percent from 1986, while the passenger sector previously had been 
stagnant since 1975. The growth in passenger transport of private 
railroads in 1987 was 2.6 percent, which meant that the Japan Rail- 
ways Group's rate of increase was above that of the private-sector 
railroads for the first time since 1974. Demand for rail transport 
was improved, although it still accounted for only 37 percent of pas- 
senger transportation and only 5 percent of cargo transportation in 
1987. Rail passenger transportation was superior to automobiles in 



238 



The Character and Structure of the Economy 

terms of energy efficiency and on speed of long-distance transpor- 
tation. 

In addition to its extensive railroads, Japan has an impressive 
number of subway systems. The largest was in Tokyo, where the 
subway network in 1989 consisted of 21 1 kilometers of track serv- 
ing 205 stations. Two subway systems served the capital: one run 
by the Teito Rapid Transit Authority, with seven lines (the oldest 
of which was built in 1927), and the other operated by the Tokyo 
metropolitan government's Transportation Bureau, with three lines. 
Outlying and suburban areas were served by seven private rail- 
road companies whose lines intersected at major stations with the 
subway system. More than sixty additional kilometers of subway 
were under construction in 1990 by the two companies. As of 1989, 
there also were full subway systems in Fukuoka, Kobe, Kyoto, 
Nagoya, Osaka, Sendai,_and Yokohama. Hiroshima and Kobe had 
light rail systems, and Osaka, in addition to its subway, had an 
intermediate capacity transit system (rubber-tired motor cars run- 
ning on concrete guideways). Like Tokyo, all of these cities also 
were well served by public and private railroads. 

Roads 

Road passenger and freight transport expanded considerably dur- 
ing the 1980s as private ownership of motor vehicles greatly in- 
creased along with the quality and extent of the nation's roads. 
Passenger transport by motor vehicles in 1987 totaled 540.7 bil- 
lion passenger-kilometers, up 8.2 percent over the previous year. 
The Japan Railways Group companies operated long-distance bus 
service in the late 1980s on the nation's expanding expressway net- 
work. In addition to relatively low fares and deluxe seating, the 
buses were well utilized because they continued service during the 
night when air and train services were limited. The cargo sector 
also grew rapidly in the 1980s, recording 224. 1 billion ton-kilometers 
in 1987. The freight handled by motor vehicles, mainly trucks, in 
1989, was over 5 billion tons, accounting for 90 percent of domes- 
tic freight tonnage and about 50 percent of ton-kilometers. 

The total length of roads in Japan reached about 1 ,098,900 kilo- 
meters in 1987 (see fig. 6). Sixty-five percent of the roads were 
paved, compared to only about 40 percent in 1978. Efforts to up- 
grade roads, however, have not kept up with increases in automo- 
bile ownership. In the late 1980s, many roads had reached a 
saturation point and traffic jams were especially serious in large 
urban areas. There was a vigorous government plan to improve 
the situation by constructing an additional 14,000 kilometers of 



239 



Japan: A Country Study 

highways in the 1990s. The 1988 opening of the Seto-Ohashi section 
of the Honshu-Shikoku Bridge project provided a long-awaited 
direct link between Honshu and relatively undeveloped Shikoku. 

Maritime Transportation 

In 1986 the Japanese merchant fleet included 10,011 ships with 
a total displacement of 38.5 million gross tons, a steady decrease 
from 10,425 ships with a total gross tonnage of 40.4 million in 1984. 
Of the nearly 1 ,200 Japanese ships of 1,000 gross registered tons 
and over, there were more than 300 bulk carriers; more than 250 
petroleum, oils, and lubricants tankers; some 240 vehicle and cargo 
carriers; and more than 150 refrigerated cargo ships. The remainder 
were passenger and passenger-cargo ships, container ships, roll- 
on/roll-off cargo ships, chemical tankers, combination ore and oil 
carriers, and other specialized types of large ships. 

Japanese ports, mainly Yokohama, Nagoya, and Kobe, received 
40,129 ships in 1986, loaded 88.1 million tons of cargo, and un- 
loaded 598.9 million tons. Other major ports included Chiba, Hako- 
date, Kitakyushu, Kushiro, Osaka, Tokyo, and Yokkaichi. 

Almost all shipping operated from coastal ports. Japans' rivers 
were short and were unnavigable except in the lower reaches. 

Civil Aviation 

The civil aviation industry grew steadily during the 1980s, with 
increased demand for both domestic and international services. In- 
creases in the number of passengers on each type of route reached 
more than 10 percent per year. Direct service was provided be- 
tween the New Tokyo International Airport at Narita-Sanrizuka, 
seventy kilometers northeast of Tokyo, and nearly every country 
in the world via Japan Airlines, All Nippon Airways, and most 
other international carriers. Tokyo International Airport at Haneda 
and Osaka, Nagoya, Nagasaki, Fukuoka, Kagoshima, and Naha 
airports also handled some international flights in the late 1980s, 
and the new Kansai International Airport was under construction 
in Osaka Bay with a projected completion date of 1993. Japan 
Airlines, All Nippon Airways, and Japan Air System also provided 
connections between most major Japanese cities, and South- West 
Air Lines operated scheduled flights to major islands in the Ryukyus. 
In 1986 Japanese carriers served more than 53.6 million passengers. 
Although air cargo accounted for only for a small proportion of all 
cargo transported both domestically and internationally — approxi- 
mately 3.5 trillion ton-kilometers in 1986 — the rate of air cargo 
growth was very high. 



240 




pacific 



International boundary 

® National capital 

• Populated place 

Road 

Railroad 

Major port 
4* Airport 

Occupied by the Soviet Union 
since 1945, claimed by Japan 

100 200 Kilometers 

100 200 Miles 



The Character and Structure of the Economy 

Telecommunications 

In 1990 no other nation in the world was as literate (with a liter- 
acy rate of 99 percent) and dominated by the mass media as Japan 
(see Literature; Films and Television, ch. 3; The Mass Media and 
Politics, ch. 6). Japan's telecommunications system is excellent both 
in domestic and foreign service. The rapid spread of television sets 
in the 1960s, and advances in satellite communications in the 1970s, 
which permitted rapid improvements in television broadcasting, 
were major postwar factors in Japan's new information society. 

The broadcast industry has been dominated by the Japan Broad- 
casting Corporation (Nippon Hoso Kyokai — NHK) since its found- 
ing in 1925. It operated two public television and three radio 
networks nationally, producing about 1,700 programs per week 
in the late 1980s. Its general and education programs were broad- 
cast through more than 6,900 television and nearly 330 AM and 
more than 500 FM radio transmitting stations. Comprehensive ser- 
vice in twenty-one languages was available throughout the world. 
Although NHK's budget and operations are under the purview 
of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, the Broadcast- 
ing Law of 1950 provides for independent management and pro- 
gramming by NHK. 

Television broadcasting began in 1953, and color television was 
introduced in 1960. Cable television was introduced in 1969. In 
1978 an experimental broadcast satellite with two color television 
channels was launched. Operational satellites for television use were 
launched between 1984 and 1990. Television viewing spread so 
rapidly that, by 1987, 99 percent of Japan's households had color 
television sets and the average family had its set on at least five 
hours a day. Starting in 1987, NHK began full-scale experimen- 
tal broadcasting on two channels using satellite-to-audience sig- 
nals, thus bringing service to remote and mountainous parts of the 
country that earlier had experienced poor reception. The new sys- 
tem also provided twenty-four hours a day, nonstop service. 

In the late 1980s, Japan also had more than 100 commercial tele- 
vision companies, which operated more than 6,300 stations, and 
the country had more than 140 commercial radio companies oper- 
ating about 630 medium wave, short wave, and FM stations, in- 
cluding several national as well as many local stations. Broadcasting 
innovations in the 1980s included sound multiplex (two-language 
or stereo) broadcasting, satellite broadcasting, and in 1985 the 
University of the Air and teletext services were inaugurated. 

Rapid improvements, innovations, and diversification in com- 
munications technology, including optical fiber cables, communi- 
cations satellites, and facsimile machines, led to rapid growth of 



243 



The Character and Structure of the Economy 

Telecommunications 

In 1990 no other nation in the world was as literate (with a liter- 
acy rate of 99 percent) and dominated by the mass media as Japan 
(see Literature; Films and Television, ch. 3; The Mass Media and 
Politics, ch. 6). Japan's telecommunications system is excellent both 
in domestic and foreign service. The rapid spread of television sets 
in the 1960s, and advances in satellite communications in the 1970s, 
which permitted rapid improvements in television broadcasting, 
were major postwar factors in Japan's new information society. 

The broadcast industry has been dominated by the Japan Broad- 
casting Corporation (Nippon Hoso Kyokai — NHK) since its found- 
ing in 1925. It operated two public television and three radio 
networks nationally, producing about 1,700 programs per week 
in the late 1980s. Its general and education programs were broad- 
cast through more than 6,900 television and nearly 330 AM and 
more than 500 FM radio transmitting stations. Comprehensive ser- 
vice in twenty-one languages was available throughout the world. 
Although NHK's budget and operations are under the purview 
of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, the Broadcast- 
ing Law of 1950 provides for independent management and pro- 
gramming by NHK. 

Television broadcasting began in 1953, and color television was 
introduced in 1960. Cable television was introduced in 1969. In 
1978 an experimental broadcast satellite with two color television 
channels was launched. Operational satellites for television use were 
launched between 1984 and 1990. Television viewing spread so 
rapidly that, by 1987, 99 percent of Japan's households had color 
television sets and the average family had its set on at least five 
hours a day. Starting in 1987, NHK began full-scale experimen- 
tal broadcasting on two channels using satellite-to-audience sig- 
nals, thus bringing service to remote and mountainous parts of the 
country that earlier had experienced poor reception. The new sys- 
tem also provided twenty-four hours a day, nonstop service. 

In the late 1980s, Japan also had more than 100 commercial tele- 
vision companies, which operated more than 6,300 stations, and 
the country had more than 140 commercial radio companies oper- 
ating about 630 medium wave, short wave, and FM stations, in- 
cluding several national as well as many local stations. Broadcasting 
innovations in the 1980s included sound multiplex (two-language 
or stereo) broadcasting, satellite broadcasting, and in 1985 the 
University of the Air and teletext services were inaugurated. 

Rapid improvements, innovations, and diversification in com- 
munications technology, including optical fiber cables, communi- 
cations satellites, and facsimile machines, led to rapid growth of 



243 



Japan: A Country Study 

the communications industry in the 1980s. Nippon Telegraph and 
Telephone Corporation, government- owned until 1985, had domi- 
nated the communications industry until April 1985, when new 
common carriers, including Daini Denden, were permitted to enter 
the field. Kokusai Denshin Denwa Company lost its monopoly hold 
on international communications activities in 1989, when Nihon 
Kokusai Tsushin and other private overseas communications firms 
began operations. 

Japan's first satellite was launched in 1970, followed by subse- 
quent launches of experimental and applications satellites in fields 
such as communications, broadcasting, meteorology, and earth ob- 
servation. Satellites were launched from Japan's Tanegashima 
Space Center on the island of Tanegashima in Kagoshima Prefec- 
ture. Japanese space scientists have successfully launched three H-I 
rockets that accommodate a payload of 550 kilograms each. Japan 
also cooperated with the United States, Western Europe, and Can- 
ada to construct an earth-orbiting space station. In 1990 a consor- 
tium of Japanese firms led by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries was 
planning to enter the commercial rocket industry by the mid-1990s, 
but unexpectedly high costs and the need to further improve the 
H-II booster, the first rocket designed and developed entirely in 
Japan, meant that Japanese commercial launch services would prob- 
ably not begin until the late 1990s. 

Japan's burgeoning high-technology communications system in- 
cluded the widespread use of telephones. In 1989 there were 64 
million telephones in Japan, nearly one for every two people. 

Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing 

Agriculture, forestry, and fishing dominated the Japanese econ- 
omy through the 1940s, but thereafter declined in relative impor- 
tance. In the 1870s, these sectors accounted for more than 82 percent 
of employment. Employment in agriculture declined in the prewar 
period, but the sector was still the largest employer (about 50 per- 
cent of the work force) by the end of World War II. It further 
declined to 23.5 percent in 1965, 11.9 percent in 1977, and to 8.3 
percent in 1988. The importance of agriculture in the national econ- 
omy later continued its rapid decline, with the share of net agricul- 
tural production in GNP finally reduced between 1975 and 1989 
from 4.1 to 3 percent. In the late 1980s, 85.5 percent of Japan's 
farmers were also engaged in occupations outside of farming, and 
most of these part-time farmers earned most of their income from 
nonfarming activities (see table 23, Appendix). 

Japan's economic boom that began in the 1950s left farmers far 
behind both in income and agricultural technology. Farmers were 



244 



The Character and Structure of the Economy 

determined to close this income gap as quickly as possible. They 
were attracted to the government's food control policy under which 
high rice prices were guaranteed and farmers were encouraged to 
increase the output of any crops of their own choice. Farmers be- 
came mass producers of rice, even turning their own vegetable 
gardens into rice fields. Their output swelled to over 14 million 
tons in the late 1960s, a direct result of greater cultivated acreage 
and increased yield per unit area owing to improved cultivation 
techniques. 

Three types of farm households developed: those engaging ex- 
clusively in agriculture (14.5 percent of the 4.2 million farm house- 
holds in 1988, down from 21.5 percent in 1965); those deriving 
more than half their income from the farm (14.2 percent, down 
from 36.7 percent in 1965); and those mainly engaged in jobs other 
than farming (71.3 percent, up from 41 .8 percent in 1965). As more 
and more farm families turned to nonfarming activities, the farm 
population declined (down from 4.9 million in 1975 to 4.8 million 
in 1988). The rate of decrease slowed in the late 1970s and 1980s, 
but the average age of farmers rose to fifty-one years by 1980, twelve 
years older than the average industrial employee. 

The most striking feature of Japanese agriculture was the short- 
age of farmland. The 4.9 million hectares under cultivation con- 
stituted just 13.2 percent of the total land area in 1988. However, 
the land was intensively cultivated. Rice paddies occupied most 
of the countryside, whether on the alluvial plains, the terraced 
slopes, or the swampland and coastal bays. Nonrice farmlands 
shared such terraces and lower slopes and were planted with wheat 
and barley in the autumn and with sweet potatoes, vegetables, and 
dry rice in the summer. Intercropping was common: such crops 
were alternated with beans and peas. 

Japanese agriculture has been characterized as a "sick" sector 
because it must contend with a variety of constraints, such as the 
rapidly diminishing availability of arable land and falling agricul- 
tural incomes. Nevertheless, the Japanese managed production at 
high levels. Agriculture was maintained through the use of techni- 
cally advanced fertilizers and farm machinery, and a vast array 
of price supports. The nation's many agricultural cooperatives were 
in charge of purchasing grain according to prices indexed to the 
average wage rates in the nonagricultural sector. As a result, rice, 
wheat, and barley prices followed productivity trends in industry 
rather than in agriculture. This type of support system, enacted 
in 1960 along with the Basic Agricultural Law, resulted in large 
government rice stockpiles and high agricultural prices. Excessive 
rice production had an adverse effect on other crop production. 



245 



Japan: A Country Study 

Japan's self-sufficiency ratio for grains other than rice fell below 
10 percent in the 1970s and but rose to 14 percent in the mid- to 
late 1980s. The problem of surplus rice was further aggravated by 
extensive changes in the diets of many Japanese in the 1970s and 
1980s. Even a major rice crop failure did not reduce the accumu- 
lated stocks by more than 25 percent of the reserve. In 1987, Japan 
was 71 percent self-sufficient in food, but only provided about 30 
percent of its cereals and fodder needs. 

Livestock raising was a minor activity. Demand for beef rose 
strongly in the 1980s and farmers often shifted from dairy farm- 
ing to production of high-quality (and high-cost) beef. Through- 
out the 1980s, domestic beef production met over 60 percent of 
demand. In 1991, as a result of heavy pressure from the United 
States, Japan ended import quotas on beef as well as citrus fruit 
(see Import Policies, ch. 5). Milk cows were numerous in Hokkaido, 
where 25 percent of farmers ran dairies, but milk cows were also 
raised in Iwate, in Tohoku, and near Tokyo and Kobe. Beef cat- 
tle were mostly concentrated in western Honshu, and Kyushu. 
Hogs, the oldest domesticated animals raised for food, were found 
everywhere. Pork was the most popular meat. 

The nation's forest resources, although abundant, had not been 
well developed to sustain a large lumber industry. Of the 24.5 mil- 
lion hectares of forests, 19.8 million were classified as active forests. 
Most often forestry was a part-time activity for farmers or small 
companies. About a third of all forests were owned by the govern- 
ment. Production was highest in Hokkaido and in Aomori, Iwate, 
Akita, Fukushima, Gifu, Miyazaki, and Kagoshima prefectures. 
Nearly 33.5 million cubic meters of roundwood were produced in 
1986, of which 98 percent was destined for industrial uses. 

Japan was the world's largest fishing nation in tonnage of fish 
caught — 12.5 million tons in 1987, up from 9.3 million tons in 1970 
and 11.12 million tons in 1980. After the 1973 energy crisis, deep- 
sea fishing in Japan declined, with the annual catch in the 1980s 
averaging 2 million tons. Offshore fisheries accounted for an average 
of 50 percent of the nation's total fish catches in the late 1980s, 
although they experienced repeated ups and downs during that pe- 
riod. Coastal fisheries had smaller catches than northern sea fish- 
eries in 1986 and 1987. As a whole, Japan's fish catches registered 
a slower growth in the late 1980s. By contrast, Japan's import of 
marine products increased greatly in the 1980s, surpassing 2 mil- 
lion tons in 1987. Japan also introduced the "culture and breed" 
fishing system or sea farming. In this system, artificial insemina- 
tion and hatching techniques are used to breed fish and shellfish, 



246 



Mechanized agriculture at harvesttime 
Courtesy The Mainichi Newspapers 

which are then released into rivers or seas. These fish and shellfish 
are caught after they grow bigger. Salmon was one cultured fish. 
Japan is also one of the world's few whaling nations. As a mem- 
ber of the International Whaling Commission, the government 
pledged that its fleets would restrict their catch to international 
quotas, but it attracted international opprobrium for its failure to 
sign an agreement placing a moratorium on sperm whaling. Japan 
has more than 2,000 fishing ports, including Nagasaki, in south- 
west Kyushu; Otaru, Kushiro, and Abashiri in Hokkaido; and 
Yaezu and Misaki on the east coast of Honshu. 

Living Standards 

In general, Japanese consumers have benefited from the nation's 
economic growth, while in turn they have stimulated the econ- 
omy through demand for sophisticated products, loyalty to domes- 
tically produced goods, and saving and pooling investment funds. 
But personal disposable income has not risen as fast as the econ- 
omy as a whole in many years — at 1 percentage point less than 
average GNP growth in the late 1980s. Despite the hard work and 
sacrifice that have made Japan one of the wealthiest nations in the 
world, some Japanese feel they are "a rich nation, but a poor peo- 
ple." Such a negative view of the economy was prompted by the 



247 



Japan: A Country Study 



fact that the average consumer had to pay dearly for goods and 
services that were much cheaper elsewhere. 

Real household expenditures did rise during Japan's economic 
growth. Living standards improved sharply in the 1970s and 1980s. 
The share of total family living expenses devoted to food dropped 
from 35 percent in 1970 to 27 percent in 1986, while net house- 
hold savings, which averaged slightly over 20 percent in the 
mid-1970s, averaged between 15 and 20 percent in the 1980s. 
Japanese households thus had greater disposable income to pay for 
improved housing and other consumer items. The increase in dis- 
posable income partly explained the economic boom of the 1980s, 
which was pushed by explosive domestic demand. 

Japanese income distribution in the 1980s, both before and after 
taxes, was among the most equitable in the world. An important 
factor in income distribution was that the lower income group was 
better off than in most industrialized countries. 

Japanese homes, although they were relatively new, were much 
smaller and often had fewer amenities than those in other indus- 
trialized nations. Even though the percentage of residences with 
flush toilets jumped from 31.4 percent in 1973 to 65.8 percent in 
1988, this figure was still far lower than in other industrialized states. 
In some primarily rural areas of Japan, it was still under 30 per- 
cent. Even 9.7 percent of homes built between 1986 and 1988 did 
not have flush toilets. People in other industrialized countries took 
central heating and either a shower or bath for granted, but many 
Japanese homes were lacking in all three. However, by 1988 only 
9 percent of Japanese residences had no bathtub, a figure that had 
improved from nearly 27 percent in 1973. The alternative for many 
Japanese remained public baths, although these were gradually dis- 
appearing. Additionally, 81 percent of Japanese households used 
kerosene heaters as the main source of heat. 

Japanese housing in the early 1990s was very expensive relative 
to annual income, but the high cost was somewhat offset by low 
interest rates and probable future income gains, making Japanese 
housing more affordable than it might appear. There were also 
many urban apartments found near public transportation that 
rented for as little as US$600 to US$800 a month in early 1990. 

The Westernization of many areas of Japanese life included con- 
suming a greater diversity of foods. After World War II, Japanese 
dietary patterns changed radically and came to resemble those of 
the West. While older Japanese still preferred a breakfast with tradi- 
tional dishes — boiled rice, miso soup, and pickled vegetables — 
younger Japanese had toast and coffee. The Japanese diet improved 
along with other living standards. Average intake per day was 2,084 



248 



With more than 5 million units in use, vending machines have 
become a ubiquitous feature of Japanese daily life. 

Courtesy Kenji Nachi and Hitachi 

calories and 77.9 grams of protein, in the late 1980s. Of total pro- 
tein intake, 26.5 percent came from cereals (including 18.4 per- 
cent from rice), 9.6 percent from pulses, 23.1 percent from fish, 
14.8 percent from livestock products, 11 percent from eggs and 
milk, and 15 percent from other sources. Before World War II, 
the average annual consumption of rice was 1 40 kilograms per cap- 
ita, but it fell to 72 kilograms in 1987. This development further 
exacerbated the problem of rice oversupply, leading to a huge rice 
stock and creating great deficits in the government's foodstuff con- 
trol account. The government inaugurated several policies to switch 
to nonrice crops, but they met with limited success and rice re- 
mained in oversupply. 

A negative aspect of Japan's economic growth was industrial pol- 
lution. Until the mid-1970s, both public and private sectors pur- 
sued economic growth with such single-mindedness that prosperity 
was accompanied by severe degradation of both the environment 
and quality of life (see Pollution, ch. 2). 

Typically, Japanese consumers have been savers as well as buy- 
ers, partly because of habit, but by 1980 the consumer credit in- 
dustry began to flourish. Younger families were particularly prone 
to take on debt. Housing was the largest single item for which 



249 



Japan: A Country Study 

consumers contracted loans. In 1989 families annually borrowed 
an estimated US$17,000 or about 23 percent of their average sav- 
ings. Those who wished to buy houses and real estate needed an 
average US$242,600, of which they borrowed about US$129,000. 
But many younger families in the 1980s were giving up the idea 
of ever buying a house. This change led many young Japanese to 
spend part of their savings on trips abroad, expensive consumer 
items, and other luxuries. As one young worker put it, "If I can 
never buy a house, at least I can use my money to enjoy life now. ' ' 
As credit card and finance agency facilities expanded, the use of 
credit to procure other consumer durables was spreading. By 1989 
the number of credit cards issued in Japan reached virtual parity 
with the population. 

Japanese families still feel that saving for retirement is critical 
because of the relative inadequacy of official social security and 
private pension plans. The average family in 1989 had US$76,500 
in savings, a figure far short of what was needed to cover the liv- 
ing expenses for retired individuals, although official pensions and 
retirement allowances did help cover the financial burdens of senior 
citizens. The annual living expenses for retired individuals in 1989 
were estimated at US$22,800, half of which was received from 
government pensions and the rest from savings and retirement al- 
lowances. Senior citizens in their seventies had the largest savings, 
including deposits, insurance, and negotiable securities worth an 
estimated US$1 13,000 per person. In 1989 individuals in their twen- 
ties had savings amounting to US$23,800, while salaried workers 
in their thirties had US$66,000 in savings. 

The Japanese consumer benefited most from the availability of 
compact, sophisticated consumer products that were popular ex- 
ports. Television sets, watches, clothing, automobiles, household 
appliances, and personal computers were quality items that industry 
provided in quantity. In the late 1980s, virtually every Japanese 
family had one or more television sets, a washing machine, a 
refrigerator, small space heaters, and cameras. Sixty percent of 
Japanese homes in 1989 had air conditioning of some kind. Other 
popular items in the 1980s included electric ranges, video cassette 
recorders, video cameras, compact disc players, and personal com- 
puters. Most families had an automobile. 

It is difficult to make cross-cultural comparisons, but one Japa- 
nese social scientist ranked Japan among a group of ten other in- 
dustrialized nations according to a variety of variables. In this 
comparison, for which there is data from the mid-1970s to the late 
1980s, Japan was better than average in terms of overall income 
distribution, per capita disposable income, traffic safety and crime, 



250 



The Character and Structure of the Economy 

life expectancy and infant mortality, proportion of owner-occupied 
homes, work stoppages and labor unrest, worker absenteeism, and 
air pollution. Japan was below average for wage differentials by 
gender and firm size, labor's share of total manufacturing income, 
social security and unemployment benefits, weekly workdays and 
daily work hours, overall price of land and housing, river pollu- 
tion, sewage facilities, and recreational park areas in urban centers. 
Some of these variables, especially pollution and increased leisure 
time, improved in the 1980s, and, in general, living standards in 
Japan were comparable to those of the world's wealthiest economies. 

* * * 

There are numerous excellent works on the Japanese economy 
from a variety of perspectives. Studies charting the nation's moder- 
nization from the prewar era include William W. Lockwood's The 
State and Economic Enterprise in Japan, G. C. Allen's Japan's Eco- 
nomic Policy, and Allen's A Short Economic History of Modern Japan. 
The best source for prewar data is Patterns of Japanese Economic De- 
velopment, edited by Ohkawa Kazushi and Miyohei Shinohara. 
Among general works on the postwar economy are Asia 's New Giant, 
edited by Hugh Patrick and Henry Rosovsky, and The Japanese Eco- 
nomic System, by Haitani Kanji. Both works are out of date, but 
give an accurate appraisal of the Japanese economy through the 
1970s. More up-to-date works include The Political Economy of Japan, 
edited by Kozo Yamamura and Yasukichi Yasuba, Frank Gibney's 
Miracle by Design, Daniel A. Metraux's The Japanese Economy and 
the American Businessman, Edward J. Lincoln's Japan: Facing Economic 
Maturity, and Kunio Yoshihara's Japanese Economic Development. 
Rodney Clark's The Japanese Company is an excellent summary of 
research on the Japanese corporate system and labor-management 
relations. Some of the better books on Japanese management and 
labor include Michael A. Cusumano's The Japanese Automobile In- 
dustry, W. Mark Fruin's Kikkoman: Company, Clan, and Community, 
R. P. Dore's classic, British Factory, Japanese Factory, Andrew Gordon's 
The Evolution of Labor Relations in Japan, and Taishiro Shirai's Con- 
temporary Industrial Relations in Japan. An excellent study of govern- 
ment-business relations is found in Industrial Policy of Japan, edited 
by Ryutaro Komiya, Masahiro Okuno, and Kotaro Suzumura. An 
equally comprehensive work is Chalmers Johnson's MITI and the 
Japanese Miracle. Excellent coverage of Japan's financial and corporate 
worlds is found in Robert J. Ballon and Iwao Tomita's The Finan- 
cial Behavior of Japanese Corporations, Aron Viner's Inside Japan 3 s Finan- 
cial Markets, and James C. Abeggleu and George Stalk, Jr.' s Kaisha: 



251 



Japan: A Country Study 



The Japanese Corporation. The Japan Statistical Yearbook produced by 
Japan's Management and Coordination Agency provides up-to- 
date statistics. For up-to-date and sophisticated analyses, see the 
publications of the Washington-based Japan Economic Institute 
of America (JEI). Regular JEI publications include the monthly 
Japan Economic Survey and the weekly JEI Report. For a Japanese 
perspective on the economy, see articles in the English-language 
Japan Economic Journal, Journal of Japanese Trade & Industry, Mitsubishi 
Bank Review, Japan Times Weekly, Japan Echo, and The Japan Eco- 
nomic Review [all published in Tokyo] . There are frequent articles 
on the Japanese economy in Far Eastern Economic Review [Hong 
Kong] and Asian Survey. (For further information and complete ci- 
tations, see Bibliography). 



252 



Chapter 5. International Economic Relations 



Family crest using bamboo (take) leaves and stems, symbols of endurance 
and resilience 



JAPAN IS BOTH a major trading nation and one of the largest 
international investors in the world. In many respects, international 
trade is the lifeblood of Japan's economy, and it is the window 
through which most people in the United States view Japan. Im- 
ports and exports totaling the equivalent of US$452 billion in 1988 
meant that Japan was the world's third largest trading nation after 
the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Ger- 
many). Trade was once the primary form of Japan's international 
economic relationships, but in the 1980s, its rapidly rising foreign 
investments added a new and increasingly important dimension, 
broadening the horizons of Japanese businesses and giving Japan 
new world prominence. 

Japan's international economic relations in the first three de- 
cades after World War II were shaped largely by two factors: a 
relative lack of domestic raw materials and a determination to catch 
up with the industrial nations of the West. Because of Japan's lack 
of raw materials, its exports have consisted almost exclusively of 
manufactured goods, and raw materials have represented a large 
share of its imports. The country's sense of dependency and vul- 
nerability has also been strong because of its lack of raw materials. 
Japan's determination to catch up with the West encouraged poli- 
cies to move away from simple labor-intensive exports toward more 
sophisticated export products (from textiles in the 1950s to automo- 
biles and consumer electronics in the 1980s), and pursue protec- 
tionist policies to limit foreign competition for domestic industries. 

The sense of dependence on imported raw materials was espe- 
cially strong in Japan during the 1970s, when crude petroleum and 
other material prices rose and supply was uncertain. Throughout 
much of the postwar period, in fact, Japanese government policy 
has aimed at generating sufficient exports to pay for raw material 
imports. During the 1980s, however, raw material prices fell and 
the feeling of vulnerability lessened. The 1980s also brought rapidly 
rising trade surpluses, so that Japan could export far more than 
was needed to balance its imports. With these developments, some 
of the resistance to manufactured imports, long considered luxu- 
ries in the relative absence of raw materials, began to dissipate. 

By the 1980s, Japan had caught up. Now an advanced indus- 
trial nation, it faced new changes in its economy, on both domes- 
tic and international fronts, including demands to supply more 
foreign aid and to open its markets for imports. It had become a 



255 



Japan: A Country Study 

leader in the international economic system, through its success 
in certain export markets, its leading technologies, and its growth 
as a major investor around the world. These were epochal changes 
for Japan, after a century in which the main national motivation 
was to catch up with the West. These dramatic changes also fed 
domestic developments that were lessening the society's insularity 
and parochialism. 

The processes through which Japan was becoming a key mem- 
ber of the international economic community were expected to con- 
tinue in the 1990s — productivity continued to grow at a healthy 
pace, the country's international leadership in a number of indus- 
tries remained unquestioned, and investments abroad continued 
to expand. Pressures were likely to lead to further openness to im- 
ports, increased aid to foreign countries, and involvement in the 
running of major international institutions, such as the Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund (IMF — see Glossary). As Japan achieved 
a more prominent international position during the 1980s, it also 
generated considerable tension with its trade partners, and espe- 
cially with the United States. These tensions will likely remain, 
but should be manageable as both sides continue to see economic 
benefits from the relationship. 

Postwar Development 

After the end of World War II, Japan's economy was in a sham- 
bles, and its international economic relations almost completely dis- 
rupted. Initially, imports were limited to essential food and raw 
materials, mostly financed by economic assistance from the United 
States. Because of extreme domestic shortages, exports did not begin 
to recover until the Korean War (1950-53), when special procure- 
ment by United States armed forces created boom conditions in 
indigenous industries. By 1954 economic recovery and rehabilita- 
tion were essentially complete. For much of the 1950s, however, 
Japan had difficulty exporting as much as it imported, leading to 
chronic trade and current account deficits. Keeping these deficits 
under control, so that Japan would not be forced to devalue its 
currency under the Bretton Woods System (see Glossary) of fixed 
exchange rates that prevailed at the time, was a primary concern 
of government officials. Stiff quotas and tariffs on imports were 
part of the policy response. By 1960, Japan accounted for 3.6 per- 
cent of all exports of noncommunist countries. 

During the 1960s, the dollar value of exports grew at an aver- 
age annual rate of 16.9 percent, more than 75 percent faster than 
the average rate of all noncommunist countries. By 1970 exports 
had risen to nearly 6.9 percent of all noncommunist-world exports. 



256 



International Economic Relations 



The rapid productivity growth in manufacturing industries made 
Japanese products more competitive in world markets at the fixed 
exchange rate for the yen (for value of the yen — see Glossary) during 
the decade, and the chronic deficits that the nation faced in the 
1950s had disappeared by the middle of the 1970s. International 
pressure to dismantle quota and tariff barriers mounted, and Japan 
began moving in this direction. 

The 1970s brought major, wrenching changes for Japan's ex- 
ternal relations. The decade began with the end of the fixed ex- 
change rate for the yen (a change brought about mainly by rapidly 
rising Japanese trade and current account surpluses) and with a 
strong rise in the value of the yen under the new system of floating 
rates. Japan also faced sharply higher bills for imports of energy 
and other raw materials. The new exchange rates and the rise in 
raw material prices meant that the surpluses of the decade's be- 
ginning were lost, and large trade deficits followed in the wake of 
the oil price shocks of 1973 and 1979. Expanding the country's 
exports remained a priority in the face of these raw material sup- 
ply shocks, and during the decade exports continued to expand at 
a high annual average rate of 2 1 percent (see Balance of Merchan- 
dise Trade, this ch.). 

Most of the concerns of the 1970s diminished in the 1980s. Oil 
and other raw material prices fell dramatically, and Japan's trade 
deficits turned quickly to enormous trade surpluses by the middle 
of the decade. In response to these surpluses, the value of the yen 
rose against that of other currencies in the last half of the decade, 
but the surpluses proved surprisingly resilient to this change. The 
large surpluses, combined with foreign perceptions that Japan's 
import markets were still relatively closed, exacerbated tension 
between Japan and a number of its principal trading partners, es- 
pecially the United States. A rapid increase in imports of manufac- 
tured goods after 1987 eased some of these tensions, but as the 
decade ended friction still continued. 

Through most of the postwar period, foreign investment was not 
a significant part of Japan's external economic relations. Both in- 
ward and outward investments were carefully controlled by govern- 
ment regulations, which kept the investment flows small. These 
controls applied to direct investment in the creation of subsidiaries 
under the control of a parent company, portfolio investment, and 
lending. Controls were motivated by the desire to prevent foreigners 
(mainly Americans) from gaining ownership of the economy when 
Japan was in a weak position after World War II, and by concerns 
over the balance of payments deficits (see Capital Flows, this ch.). 
Beginning in the late 1960s, these controls were gradually loosened, 



257 



Japan: A Country Study 

and the process of deregulation accelerated and continued through- 
out the 1980s. The result was a dramatic increase in capital move- 
ments, with the biggest change occurring in outflows — investments 
by Japanese in other countries. By the end of the 1980s, Japan had 
become a major international investor. Because the country was 
a newcomer to the world of overseas investment, this development 
led to new forms of tension with other countries, including criti- 
cism of highly visible Japanese acquisitions in the United States 
and elsewhere. 

Trade and Investment Institutions 

The Ministry of International Trade and Industry 

Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) 
was formed in 1949 from the union of the Trade Agency and the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry, in an effort to curb postwar 
inflation and provide government leadership and assistance for the 
restoration of industrial productivity and employment. 

MITI has held primary responsibility for formulating and im- 
plementing international trade policy, although it has done so by 
seeking a consensus among interested parties, including the Minis- 
try of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Finance (see The Role 
of Government and Business, ch. 4). MITI has also coordinated 
trade policy with the Economic Planning Agency, the Bank of 
Japan, and the ministries of agriculture, forestry and fisheries, 
health and welfare, construction, transportation, and posts and 
telecommunications on issues affecting their interests. As trade is- 
sues broadened in scope, these other ministries became more im- 
portant in international negotiating, so that in the late 1980s MITI 
had less control in formulating international trade policy than it 
had had in the 1950s and 1960s. The prime minister, the National 
Diet (Japan's legislature), and the Fair Trade Commission have 
also circumscribed MITI's operations. 

MITI has been responsible not only in the areas of exports and 
imports, but also for all domestic industries and businesses not spe- 
cifically covered by other ministries, for investments in plant and 
equipment, pollution control, energy and power, some aspects of 
foreign economic assistance, and consumer complaints. This span 
has allowed MITI to integrate conflicting policies, such as those 
on pollution control and export competitiveness, to minimize dam- 
age to export industries. 

MITI has served as an architect of industrial policy, an arbiter 
on industrial problems and disputes, and a regulator. A major 
objective of the ministry has been to strengthen the country's 



258 



International Economic Relations 



industrial base. It has not managed Japanese trade and industry 
along the lines of a centrally planned economy, but it has provided 
industries with administrative guidance and other direction, both 
formal and informal, on modernization, technology, investments 
in new plants and equipment, and on domestic and foreign com- 
petition. 

The close relationship between MITI and Japanese industry has 
led to foreign trade policy that often complements the ministry's 
efforts to strengthen domestic manufacturing interests. MITI facili- 
tated the early development of nearly all major industries by provid- 
ing protection from import competition, technological intelligence, 
help in licensing foreign technology, access to foreign exchange, 
or assistance in mergers. 

These policies to promote domestic industry and to protect it 
from international competition were strongest in the 1950s and 
1960s. As industry became stronger and as MITI lost some of its 
policy tools, such as control over allocation of foreign exchange, 
MITFs policies also changed. The success of Japanese exports and 
the tension it has caused in other countries led MITI to provide 
guidance on limiting exports of particular products to various coun- 
tries. Starting in 1981, MITI presided over the establishment of 
voluntary restraints on automobile exports to the United States, 
to allay criticism from American manufacturers and their unions. 

Similarly, MITI was forced to liberalize import policies, despite 
its traditional protectionist focus. During the 1980s, the ministry 
helped to craft a number of market-opening and import-promoting 
measures, including the creation of an import promotion office 
within the ministry. The close relationship between MITI and in- 
dustry allowed the ministry to play such a role in fostering more 
open markets but conflict remained between the need to open mar- 
kets and the desire to continue promoting new and growing domes- 
tic industries. 

The Japan External Trade Organization 

The Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) was estab- 
lished by MITI in 1958 to consolidate Japan's efforts in export pro- 
motion. The government has provided more than half of JETRO 's 
annual operating budget. As of 1989, JETRO maintained seventy- 
eight offices in fifty-seven countries, as well as thirty offices in Japan, 
with a total staff of 1,200. 

Initially, JETRO 's activities focused mainly on promoting ex- 
ports to other countries. As exporters established themselves in 
world markets and the balance of trade turned from deficit to sur- 
plus, however, JETRO 's role shifted to encompass more varied 



259 



Japan: A Country Study 

activities. These have included the furtherance of mutual under- 
standing with trading partners, import promotion, liaison between 
small businesses in Japan and their overseas counterparts, and data 
dissemination. Import promotion services have included publica- 
tions, promotion of trade fairs, seminars, and trade missions. 

Trading Companies 

A major Japanese innovation in international trade has been the 
development of large integrated general trading companies. These 
corporations were first organized during the late nineteenth cen- 
tury as part of the effort to replace the foreign companies dominating 
Japan's trade and to provide foreign marketing services to Japanese 
firms unfamiliar with the outside world. 

At first, trading companies acted as specialized wholesalers for 
Japanese manufacturers in domestic and foreign markets and 
bought raw materials and other inputs for manufacturing opera- 
tions. Later, trading companies also served as financial intermedi- 
aries, absorbed foreign exchange risk for their customers, provided 
technical advice to small firms whose products might be exported, 
and engaged in direct investment overseas, often to secure stable 
sources of supply. 

After World War II, the trading companies developed some third- 
country trade, some of which did not involve Japanese products 
or firms. Such transactions included arranging for the sale of a 
United States chemical plant to the Soviet Union and importing 
Romanian urea into Bangladesh. By 1988, such offshore trade ac- 
counted for almost 20 percent of total sales of the nine largest trading 
companies in Japan. 

In the 1980s, several thousand trading companies existed in 
Japan. The top nine companies, however, accounted for the bulk 
of the transactions. In fiscal year (FY — see Glossary) 1988, C. Itoh 
led with sales of ¥15.6 trillion, followed by Mitsui (¥14.8 trillion), 
Sumitomo (¥14.6 trillion), Marubeni (¥14.2 trillion), and Mi- 
tsubishi (¥13.8 trillion). Others in the top nine were Nissho Iwai, 
Tomen, Nichimen, and Kanematsu-Gosho. These companies were 
very important in Japan's foreign trade: in 1988 they together han- 
dled 42 percent of exports and 74 percent of imports. 

These companies were best at handling large-volume bulk 
products, such as raw materials. They faced some difficulties in 
the 1970s and 1980s with fluctuations in international raw mate- 
rial markets, but they continued to play a very important role in 
Japan's international trade. During the 1980s, they increasingly 
acted through direct investment. 



260 



International Economic Relations 



Financial Institutions 

For most of the postwar period, Japan's financial institutions 
operated in a severely regulated environment: most interest rates 
were controlled, the type of business these institutions could en- 
gage in was narrowly circumscribed, and few international trans- 
actions were possible. Beginning in the 1970s, these controls began 
to loosen, and financial institutions rapidly expanded their inter- 
national activities. By the end of the 1980s, they were major inter- 
national players. 

The major international players were "city" banks (the thirteen 
largest banks in Japan, which operated nationwide branches), in- 
vestment houses, and life insurance companies, which invested 
heavily in pension funds abroad in the 1980s (see The Financial 
System, ch. 4). In 1988, the nine largest banks in the world, mea- 
sured by total assets, were Japanese banks. These banks opened 
branches abroad, acquired existing foreign banks, and became en- 
gaged in new activities, such as underwriting Euro-yen bond is- 
sues. The investment houses also increased overseas activities, 
especially participating in the United States Treasury bond mar- 
ket (where as much as 25 to 30 percent of each new issue was pur- 
chased by Japanese investors in the late 1980s). The life insurance 
companies moved heavily into foreign investments as deregulation 
allowed them to do so and as their resources increased through the 
spread of fully funded pension funds. 

As of March 1989, the five largest city banks in Japan (in order 
of total fund volume) were Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, Sumitomo Bank, 
Fuji Bank, Mitsubishi Bank, and Sanwa Bank. The four largest 
investment houses, which dominated the securities business, were 
Nomura, Daiwa, Nikko, and Yamaichi. 

Besides these private institutions, there were a number of gov- 
ernment-owned financial institutions in the late 1980s. Of these, 
the Japan Export-Import Bank (Exim Bank) was the only one with 
an international focus. The Exim Bank provided financing for trade 
between Japan and developing countries, performing the function 
of export-import banks run by governments in other countries (in- 
cluding the United States), although its participation was possibly 
greater. 

As Japan became a more important international financial power, 
Tokyo became a world financial center. In April 1989, the aver- 
age daily volume of transactions in the Tokyo foreign exchange 
market was US$115 billion, not far behind the US$129 billion in 
New York. The Tokyo Securities and Stock Exchange also rivaled 
the New York Stock Exchange in daily volume, overtaking New 



261 



Japan: A Country Study 



York in 1988 to become the world's largest stock exchange in terms 
of the combined market value of outstanding shares and capitali- 
zation. 

Foreign Aid Institutions 

In 1990 Japan had three government institutions involved in dis- 
bursing foreign aid: the Japan International Cooperation Agency 
QIC A), the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF), and 
the Exim Bank. JICA was responsible for technical cooperation; 
the OECF was responsible for soft loans; and the Exim Bank had 
not only a trade-financing role but also became increasingly in- 
volved in lending for aid programs. The Exim Bank, for example, 
was the government agency chosen to carry out US$10 billion in 
cofinancing with the World Bank (see Glossary) and IMF in the 
1989 Brady Plan for partial relief of Mexico's international debt. 

International Trade and Development Institutions 

Japan was a member of the United Nations (UN), IMF, Or- 
ganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT — see Glos- 
sary). It also participated in the international organizations focus- 
ing on economic development, including the World Bank and the 
Asian Development Bank. 

As a member of the IMF and World Bank, for example, Japan 
played a role in the effort during the 1980s to address the interna- 
tional debt crisis brought on by the inability of certain developing 
countries to service their foreign debts as raw material prices fell 
and their economies stagnated. As a member of the IMF, Japan 
also cooperated with other countries in moderating the short-run 
volatility of the yen and participated in discussions on strengthen- 
ing the international monetary system. 

Japan's membership in the OECD has constrained its foreign 
economic policy to some extent. When Japan joined the OECD 
in 1966, it was obliged to agree to OECD principles on capital liber- 
alization, an obligation that led Japan to begin the process of liber- 
alizing its many tight controls on investment flows into and out 
of Japan. Japan was also a participant in the OECD's "gentle- 
men's agreement" on guidelines for government- supported export 
credits, which placed a floor on interest rates and other terms for 
loans to developing countries from government- sponsored export- 
import banks. 

GATT has provided the basic structure through which Japan 
has negotiated detailed international agreements on import and 



262 



A Japanese tuna-fishing ship on the open sea 
Courtesy The Mainichi Newspapers 

export policies. Although Japan had been a member of GATT since 
1955, it retained reservations to some GATT articles, permitting 
it to keep in place stiff quota restrictions until the early 1960s. Japan 
took its GATT obligations seriously, however, and a number of 
American disputes with Japan over its import barriers were suc- 
cessfully resolved by obtaining GATT rulings, with which Japan 
complied. Japan also negotiated bilaterally with countries on eco- 
nomic matters of mutual interest. 

The international organization with the strongest Japanese pres- 
ence has been the Asian Development Bank, the multilateral lending 
agency established in 1966 that made soft loans to developing Asian 
countries. Japan and the United States have had the largest vot- 
ing rights in the Asian Development Bank and Japan has tradi- 
tionally filled the presidency. 

As Japan became a greater international financial power in the 
1980s, its role in financing these trade and development institu- 
tions grew. Previously, the government had been a very quiet par- 
ticipant in these organizations, but as its financial role increased, 
pressure to expand voting rights and play a more active policy role 
mounted. By the end of the 1980s, Japan's voting rights in the 
World Bank had increased, and discussions were proceeding on 
a similar change in the IMF. 



263 



Japan: A Country Study 

Foreign Trade Policies 
Export Policies 

For many years, export promotion was a large issue in Japanese 
government policy. Government officials recognized that Japan 
needed to import to grow and develop, and it needed to generate 
exports to pay for those imports. After the war, Japan had difficulty 
exporting enough to pay for its imports until the mid-1960s, and 
resulting deficits were the justification for export promotion pro- 
grams and import restrictions. 

The belief in the need to promote exports was strong and part 
of Japan's self-image as a "processing nation." A processing na- 
tion must import raw materials, but is able to pay for the imports 
by adding value to them and exporting some of the output. Na- 
tions grow stronger economically by moving up the industrial lad- 
der to produce products with greater value added to the basic inputs. 
Rather than letting markets accomplish this movement on their 
own, the Japanese government felt the economy should be guided 
in this direction through industrial policy. 

Japan's methods of promoting exports took two paths. The first 
was to develop world-class industries that could initially substitute 
for imports and then compete in international markets. The sec- 
ond was to provide incentives for firms to export. 

During the first two decades after World War II, export incen- 
tives took the form of a combination of tax relief and government 
assistance to build export industries. After joining the IMF in 1964, 
however, Japan had to drop its major export incentive — the total 
exemption of export income from taxes — to comply with IMF proce- 
dures. It did maintain into the 1970s, however, special tax treat- 
ment of costs for market development and export promotion. 

Once chronic trade deficits came to an end in the mid-1960s, 
the need for export promotion policies diminished. Virtually all 
export tax incentives were eliminated over the course of the 1970s. 
Even JETRO, whose initial function was to assist smaller firms 
with overseas marketing, saw its role shift toward import promo- 
tion and other activities. In the 1980s, Japan continued to use in- 
dustrial policy to promote the growth of new, more sophisticated 
industries, but direct export promotion measures were no longer 
part of the policy package. 

The 1970s and 1980s saw the emergence of policies to restrain 
exports in certain industries. The great success of some Japanese 
export industries created a backlash in other countries, either be- 
cause of their success per se or because of allegations of unfair 
competitive practices. Under GATT guidelines, nations have been 



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International Economic Relations 



reluctant to raise tariffs or impose import quotas — quotas violate 
the guidelines and raising tariffs goes against the general trend 
among industrial nations. Instead, they have resorted to convinc- 
ing the exporting country to "voluntarily" restrain exports of the 
offending product. In the 1980s, Japan was quite willing to carry 
out such export restraints. Among Japan's exports to the United 
States, steel, color television sets, and automobiles all were sub- 
ject to such restraints at various times. 

Import Policies 

Japan began the postwar period with heavy import barriers. Vir- 
tually all products were subject to government quotas, many faced 
high tariffs, and MITI had authority over the allocation of the for- 
eign exchange companies needed to pay for any import. These poli- 
cies were justified at the time by the weakened position of Japanese 
industry and the country's chronic trade deficits. 

By the late 1950s, Japan's international trade had regained its 
prewar level, and its balance of payments displayed sufficient 
strength for its rigid protectionism to be increasingly difficult to 
justify. The IMF and GATT strongly pressured Japan to free its 
commerce and international payments system. Beginning in the 
1960s, the government adopted a policy of gradual trade liberali- 
zation, easing import quotas, reducing tariff rates, freeing trans- 
actions in foreign exchange, and admitting foreign capital into 
Japanese industries, which has continued through the 1980s. 

The main impetus for change throughout has been international 
obligation, response to foreign, rather than domestic, pressure. The 
result has been a prolonged, reluctant process of reducing barriers, 
which has frustrated many of Japan's trading partners. 

Japan has been a participant in the major rounds of tariff-cutting 
negotiations under the GATT framework — the Kennedy Round 
completed in 1967, the Tokyo Round completed in 1979, and the 
Uruguay Round, which began in the 1980s and was scheduled for 
completion in 1990. As a result of these agreements, tariffs in Japan 
fell to a low level on average. Upon complete implementation of 
the Tokyo Round agreement, Japan had the lowest average tariff 
level among industrial countries — 2.5 percent, compared with 4.2 
percent for the United States and 4.6 percent for the European 
Community. 

Japan's quotas also dropped. From 490 items under quota in 
1962, Japan had only 27 items under quota in the mid-1980s, and 
that number dropped again late in the decade to 22 with further 
agreements scheduled to come into effect in the early 1990s, which 
would reduce the number again. But those products still under 



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Japan: A Country Study 

quota proved to be highly visible and were the object of complaints 
by exporting countries. The reduction of controlled items in the 
late 1980s resulted from Japan's loss of a GATT case brought by 
the United States concerning import restrictions on twelve agricul- 
tural products. In addition, heavy pressure from the United States 
led to an agreement that Japan would end import quotas on beef 
and citrus fruit in 1991. The one restricted product that continued 
to prompt objections from other countries at the end of the decade 
was rice, imports of which were prohibited. Rice has traditionally 
been the mainstay of the Japanese diet, and farm organizations 
have played upon the theme's deep cultural importance as a rea- 
son for prohibiting imports. Farm organizations also have a dis- 
proportionate political voice because of the shift of the population 
to the cities without any significant redistricting for seats in the 
Diet (see The Electoral System, ch. 6). Even on rice, however, it 
appeared by 1990 that political forces were moving, under foreign 
pressure, in the direction of a gradually opening to trade. 

Despite Japan's rather good record on tariffs and quotas, it con- 
tinued to be the target of complaints and pressure from its trading 
partners during the 1980s. Many complaints revolved around non- 
tariff barriers other than quotas — standards, testing procedures, 
government procurement, and other policies that could be used 
to restrain imports. These barriers, by their very nature, were often 
difficult to document, but complaints were frequent. 

In 1984 the United States government initiated intensive talks 
with Japan on four product areas: forest products, telecommuni- 
cations equipment and services, electronics, and pharmaceuticals 
and medical equipment. The Market Oriented Sector Selective 
(MOSS) talks aimed at routing out all overt and informal barriers 
to imports in these areas. The negotiations lasted throughout 1985 
and achieved modest success. 

Supporting the view that Japanese markets remained difficult to 
penetrate, statistics showed that the level of manufactured imports 
in Japan as a share of gross national product (GNP — see Glossary) 
was still far below the level in other developed countries during the 
1980s. Frustration with the modest results of the MOSS process and 
similar factors led to provisions in the United States Trade Act of 
1988 aimed at Japan. Under the "Super 301" provision, na- 
tions were to be named as unfair trading partners and specific 
products chosen for negotiation, as appropriate, with retaliation 
against the exports of these nations should negotiations fail to provide 
satisfactory results. Japan was named an unfair trading nation in 
1989, and negotiations began on forest products, supercomputers, 



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International Economic Relations 



and telecommunications satellites (see United States and Canada, 
this ch.). 

By the end of the 1980s, however, some internally generated 
changes in import policy appeared to be under way in Japan. The 
rapid appreciation of the yen after 1985, which made imports more 
attractive, stimulated a domestic debate over nontariff barriers and 
other structural features of the economy impeding imports. Greater 
openness in policies and structures began to be sought in response 
to domestic pressures rather than in response to foreign pressure 
and international obligation. 

External pressure for change also increased when the United 
States initiated a series of bilateral talks in 1989 parallel to negoti- 
ations under the "Super 301" provision. These new talks, known 
as the Structural Impediments Initiative, focused on structural fea- 
tures in Japan that seemed to impede imports in ways outside the 
normal scope of trade negotiations. Issues raised in the Structural 
Impediments Initiative, and by the Japanese themselves in domestic 
discussions, included the distribution system (in which manufac- 
turers continued to have unusually strong control over wholesalers 
and retailers handling their products, inhibiting newcomers, es- 
pecially foreign ones) and investment behavior that made it very 
difficult for foreign firms to acquire Japanese firms. These discus- 
sions highlighted some of the fundamental differences in the 
Japanese and United States economies, but how quickly change 
might result from the talks was unclear. 

Level and Commodity Composition of Trade 
Exports 

Japanese exports grew rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s, but growth 
slowed considerably during the 1980s. Over these decades, both 
the composition and the reputation of products from Japan changed 
profoundly. 

Because of the success of certain exports, Japan was often viewed 
as a heavily export-dependent nation. As a percentage of GNP, 
however, the country exports less than other major trading coun- 
tries of the world. In 1988, for example, it exported 9.3 percent 
of its GNP compared with 15.6 percent for Italy, 16.9 percent for 
France, 17.8 percent for Britain, 24.4 percent for Canada, 26.8 
percent for West Germany, and 43.4 percent for the Netherlands. 
The United States exported a smaller share of its GNP at 6.6 
percent. Japan was, therefore, less dependent on foreign trade than 
many other industrialized countries of the world. In certain 
industries, however, export dependence was high. In 1988, for 



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Japan: A Country Study 

example, just over half of all automobiles produced in Japan were 
exported. 

The growth of Japanese exports during the 1960s and 1970s was 
truly phenomenal. Beginning in 1960 at US$4.1 billion, merchan- 
dise exports grew at an average annual rate of 16.9 percent in the 
1960s and at one of 21 percent in the 1970s. From 1981 to 1988, 
however, export growth was 7.4 percent, about one-third the level 
of the 1970s. By 1988 merchandise exports reached US$264.9 bil- 
lion (see table 24, Appendix). 

The growth in exports can be viewed in terms of both pull and 
push factors. The pull came from increasing demand for Japanese 
products as the United States and other foreign markets grew and 
as trade barriers in major market countries were reduced. Another 
pull factor was the price competitiveness of Japanese products. From 
1960 to 1970, Japan's export price index increased by only 4 per- 
cent, reflecting the high rate of productivity growth in the manufac- 
turing industries producing export products. Inflation was higher 
in the 1970s, but export prices were still only 45 percent higher 
in 1980 than in 1970 (growing at an average annual rate of less 
than 4 percent), considerably lower than world inflation. The 1980s 
began with another short burst of inflation because of oil price in- 
creases in 1979, but by 1988 Japanese export prices were actually 
23 percent lower than in 1980, offsetting much of the price increase 
of the 1980s. This record enhanced the international price com- 
petitiveness of Japanese products. 

During the 1950s, Japanese export products had a reputation 
for poor quality. However, this image changed dramatically dur- 
ing the 1970s. Japanese steel, ships, watches, television receivers, 
automobiles, semiconductors, and many other goods developed a 
reputation for being manufactured to high standards and under 
strict quality control. The Japanese were the acknowledged world 
leaders for quality and design in the 1980s for some of these 
products. This rise in product quality also increased demand for 
Japanese exports. 

The push behind Japan's exports came from manufacturers. 
Many recognized that to reach efficient levels of production they 
needed to adopt a global approach. Manufacturers concentrated 
on the domestic market (often protected from foreign products) until 
they reached internationally competitive levels and domestic mar- 
kets were saturated. Often helped by the large general trading com- 
panies, manufacturers aggressively attacked foreign markets when 
they felt able to compete globally. This push factor partially ac- 
counted for the extraordinarily high level of export growth in the 
1970s, when the domestic economy slowed; increasing exports was 



268 



JT-60 critical plasma equipment used in nuclear fusion testing 
Courtesy Embassy of Japan, Washington 

a way for manufacturers to continue expanding despite the more 
sluggish domestic market. 

Exports included a wide variety of products, virtually all of which 
were processed to some degree (see table 25; table 26, Appendix). 
After the war, the composition of exports shifted through techno- 
logical progression. Primary products, light manufactures, and 
crude items, which predominated during the 1950s, were gradu- 
ally eclipsed by heavy industrial goods, complex machinery and 
equipment, and consumer durables, which required large capital 
investments and advanced technology to produce. This process was 
illustrated vividly in the case of textiles, which composed more than 
30 percent of Japanese exports in 1960, but less than 3 percent by 
1988. Iron and steel products, which grew rapidly in the 1960s to 
become nearly 15 percent of exports by 1970, also declined to less 
than 6 percent of exports by 1988. Over the same period, however, 
exports of motor vehicles rose from under 2 percent to over 18 per- 
cent of the total. In 1988 Japan's major exports were motor vehi- 
cles, office machinery, iron and steel, semiconductors and other 
electronic components, and scientific and optical equipment. 

Imports 

During the 1960s and 1970s, imports grew in tandem with 



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Japan: A Country Study 

exports, at an average annual rate of 15.4 percent during the 1960s 
and 22.2 percent during the 1970s. In a sense, import growth over 
much of this period was constrained by exports because exports 
generated the foreign exchange to purchase the imports. During 
the 1980s, however, import growth lagged far behind exports, at 
an average annual rate of only 2.9 percent from 1981 to 1988. This 
low level of import growth led to the large trade surpluses that 
emerged in the 1980s. 

In general, Japan has not imported an unusually large amount 
as a share of its GNP, but it has been highly dependent on im- 
ports for a variety of critical raw materials. Japan has by no means 
been the only industrialized nation dependent on imported raw 
materials, but it has depended on imports for a wider variety of 
materials, and often for a higher share of its needs for these materi- 
als. The country imported, for example, 50 percent of its caloric 
intake of food and about 30 percent of the total value of food con- 
sumed in the late 1980s. It also depended on imports for about 
85 percent of its total energy needs (including all of its petroleum 
and 89 percent of its coal) and nearly all of its iron, copper, and 
lead ore and nickel. 

The long-term growth in imports was facilitated by several major 
factors. The most important was general growth in the Japanese 
economy and income levels. Rising real incomes increased demand 
for imports, both those consumed directly and those entering into 
production. Another factor was the shift in the economy toward 
greater reliance on imported raw materials. Primary energy sources 
in the late 1940s, for example, were domestic coal and charcoal. 
The shift to imported oil and coal as major energy sources did not 
come until the late 1950s and 1960s. The small size and poor quality 
of many of the mineral deposits in Japan, combined with innova- 
tions in ocean transportation, such as bulk ore carriers, meant that 
as the economy grew, demand outstripped domestic supply and 
cheaper imports were utilized. 

The price of imports was also a factor in their growth. In 1973 
Japan's import price index was at essentially the same level as in 
1955, partly because of the appreciation of the yen after 1971 , which 
reduced the yen price of imports, but also because of the reduced 
costs of ocean shipping and stable prices for food and raw materi- 
als. For the rest of the 1970s, however, import prices skyrocketed, 
climbing 219 percent from 1973 to 1980. This dramatic price rise, 
especially for petroleum but by no means confined to it, was respon- 
sible for the rapid growth of the dollar value of imports during the 
1970s, despite the slower growth of the economy. During the 1980s, 
import prices fell again, especially for petroleum, dropping by 44 



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International Economic Relations 



percent from 1980 to 1988. Reflecting these price movements, the 
dollar value of petroleum imports rose from about US$2.8 billion 
in 1970 to nearly US$58 billion in 1980, and then fell by half, to 
less than US$26 billion by 1988 (see table 27; table 28, Appendix). 

A third factor affecting imports was trade liberalization. Reduced 
tariff rates and a weakening of other overt trade barriers meant 
that imports should have been able to compete more fully in Japan's 
markets. The extent to which this was true, however, was subject 
to much debate among analysts. The share of manufactured im- 
ports in the GNP changed very little from 1970 to 1985, suggest- 
ing that falling import barriers had little impact on the propensity 
to purchase foreign products. Falling trade barriers might become 
more significant in the 1990s as liberalization continues. 

Yet another factor determining import levels was the exchange 
rate. After the ending of the Bretton Woods System in 1971, the 
yen appreciated against the dollar and other currencies. The ap- 
preciation of the yen made imports less expensive to Japan, but 
it had a complex effect on total imports. Demand for raw material 
imports was not affected much by price changes (at least in the 
short run). Demand for manufactured goods, however, was more 
responsive to price changes. Much of the rapid increase in imports 
of manufactures after 1985, when the yen began to appreciate rap- 
idly, can be attributed to this exchange rate effect. 

All factors combined led to the rapid growth of imports in the 
1960s and 1970s and their very slow growth in the 1980s. Rapid 
economic growth combined with stable import prices and the shift 
toward imported raw materials brought high import growth in the 
1960s. The big jump in raw material prices in the 1970s kept im- 
port growth high despite lower economic growth. In the 1980s, fall- 
ing raw material prices, a relatively weak yen, and continued modest 
economic growth kept import growth low in the first half of the 
decade. Import growth finally accelerated in the second half of the 
1980s, when raw material prices stopped falling and as the rise in 
the value of the yen encouraged manufactured imports. 

Japan imported a wide range of products, although energy 
sources, raw materials, and food were the major items. Mineral 
fuels, for example, rose from under 17 percent of all imports in 
1960 to a high of nearly 50 percent in 1980. They had declined 
to under 21 percent by 1988. These shifts show the enormous im- 
pact of price changes on imports. Swings in imports of other raw 
materials were far less dramatic, and many declined over time as 
a share of total imports. Metal ores and scrap, for example, declined 
steadily from 15 percent in 1960 to less than 5 percent in 1988, 
reflecting the changing structure of the economy, which moved away 



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Japan: A Country Study 

from basic metal manufactures to higher value-added industries. 
Textile materials also dropped from 1 7 percent of total imports in 
1960 to under 2 percent in 1988, as the textile industry became 
less important and imports of finished textiles increased. Foodstuffs, 
on the other hand, were relatively steady as a share of imports, 
rising from just over 12 percent in 1960 to less than 16 percent 
in 1988. 

Manufactured goods — chemicals, machinery and equipment, and 
miscellaneous commodities — gained as a share of imports, but the 
variation among them was considerable. Manufactures were about 
22 percent of total imports in 1960, remained at just under 23 per- 
cent in 1980, and then expanded to 49 percent by 1988. Imports 
of textiles, nonferrous metals, and iron and steel products all showed 
significant gains, for the same reasons that the raw material im- 
ports to produce them had declined. However, chemical and ma- 
chinery and equipment imports showed little increase in share until 
after 1985. 

The heavy dependency on raw materials that characterized Japan 
until the mid-1980s reflected both their absence in Japan and the 
process of import- substitution in which Japan favored domestic in- 
dustries over imports. The desire to restrict manufactured imports 
was intensified by the knowledge that the nation needed strong 
manufacturing industries to generate exports to pay for needed raw 
material imports. Only with the appreciation of the yen after 1985, 
and the drop in petroleum and other raw material prices, did this 
sense of vulnerability ease. These trends were reflected in the ris- 
ing share of manufactures in imports in the late 1980s. 

Balance of Merchandise Trade 

Between 1960 and 1964, Japan incurred annual trade deficits 
(based on a customs clearance for imports) ranging from US$0.4 
billion to US$1.6 billion. The era of chronic trade deficit ended 
in 1965, and by 1969, with a positive balance of almost US$1 bil- 
lion, Japan was widely regarded as a surplus trading nation. In 

1971 the surplus reached US$4 billion, and its rapid increase was 
a main factor behind the United States decision to devalue the dollar 
and pressure Japan to revalue the yen — events that led quickly to 
the end of the Bretton Woods System of fixed exchange rates. By 

1972 Japan's surplus had climbed to US$5 billion, despite the 
revaluation of the yen in 1971. 

The jump in prices of petroleum and other raw materials dur- 
ing 1973 plunged the balance of trade into deficit, and in 1974 the 
deficit reached US$6.6 billion. With strong export growth, however, 
this was reversed to a surplus of US$2.4 billion by 1976. The surplus 



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International Economic Relations 



reached a record US$18.2 billion in 1978, promoting considerable 
tension between the United States and Japan. 

In 1979 petroleum prices jumped again, and Japan's trade 
balance again turned to deficit, reaching US$10.7 billion in 1980. 
Once again rapid export growth and stagnant imports returned 
Japan quickly to surplus by 1981. From that time through 1986, 
Japan's trade surplus grew explosively, to a peak of US$82.7 bil- 
lion. This unprecedented trade surplus resulted from the moderate 
annual rise in exports and drop in imports noted above. Under- 
lying these trade developments was the weakness of the yen against 
other currencies, which enhanced export price competitiveness and 
dampened import demand. 

After 1986 the dollar value of Japan's trade surplus declined, 
to US$77.6 billion in 1988. This decline came as the yen finally 
appreciated strongly against the dollar (beginning in 1985) and as 
a rapid rise in manufactured imports began to offset the large drop 
in the value of raw material imports. Nevertheless, the surplus 
showed surprising resilience in the face of the strengthening of the 
yen. 

Underlying trends throughout the 1970s and 1980s was the fun- 
damental strength of Japan's export sector. Under the fixed ex- 
change rates of the 1960s, exports became progressively more 
competitive on world markets, lifting the country out of the per- 
sistent trade deficits that had continued into the early years of the 
decade. During the 1970s, rapid export expansion extricated the 
country from the deficits immediately following the two oil price 
shocks of 1973 and 1979. Continuing export strength then drove 
the nation to the extraordinary trade surpluses of the 1980s, as the 
temporary burden of costly oil imports waned. 

Japan's fundamental strength in world markets required its fear 
of vulnerability and opposition to manufactured imports to be re- 
assessed. In the early 1980s, fear of vulnerability remained strong 
and fed the continuation of policies and behavior that kept manufac- 
tured imports unusually low compared with those of other indus- 
trial nations. Only with the large decline in raw material prices 
and the explosion of trade surpluses did policies and behavior begin 
to change. These changes would not necessarily bring down the 
trade surplus, but would help diminish tension between Japan and 
its trading partners. 

Balance of Payments Accounts 

Services and the Current Account 

Japan has traditionally run a deficit in services. Trade in services 
includes transportation (freight and passenger fares), insurance, travel 



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Japan: A Country Study 

expenditures, royalties, licensing fees, and income from invest- 
ments. The steadily rising deficit in services from 1960 through 
1980, from US$99 million in 1960, to nearly US$1.8 billion in 1970 
and to more than US$11 billion in 1980, can be attributed to ris- 
ing royalty and licensing payments for Japan's acquisition of tech- 
nology from other industrial countries and to rising deficits in the 
trade-related services of transportation and insurance. The trans- 
portation deficit rose after the 1960s, as rapidly climbing labor costs 
made Japanese-flag vessels less competitive, leading to greater use 
of foreign-flag carriers (including many flag-of-convenience ves- 
sels actually owned by Japanese interests). 

Beginning in the late 1970s, however, rapidly growing overseas 
investments began to increase the inflow of investment income. 
The investments themselves are part of capital flows in the balance 
of payments, but repatriation of earnings on those investments is 
part of the services account. From a small surplus of US$900 mil- 
lion in 1978, the balance on investment income (earnings from 
abroad minus the earnings of foreigners in Japan) grew to US$21 
billion by 1988. The tremendous growth in Japanese investments 
abroad had not been matched by any such growth of foreign in- 
vestment in Japan. 

Despite the rapid growth in Japan's investment income surplus, 
the country's total services account remained in deficit in the 1980s. 
It did diminish in the first half of the decade, but then total deficits 
increased again, from US$4.9 billion in 1986 to nearly US$11.2 
billion in 1988. Offsetting the rising surpluses in investment in- 
come were an enormous jump in the deficit on overseas travel and 
purchases by Japanese citizens while abroad. The net balance on 
passenger transportation deteriorated from a net deficit of US$1.3 
billion in 1985 to US$3.7 billion by 1988, and foreign travel and 
spending (purchases of goods and services by individuals while 
abroad) increased from US$3.7 billion to US$15.8 billion over the 
same short time. This burst of overseas travel and spending came 
as the movement in the exchange rate made foreign travel more 
attractive to the Japanese. It also reflected the rising perception 
among Japanese consumers that prices for a wide range of manufac- 
tured items were substantially lower abroad than at home, giving 
them an incentive to purchase these items while out of their coun- 
try. By the end of the decade, the number of Japanese taking over- 
seas trips approached 10 million annually. 

One other nonmerchandise transaction is included in the cur- 
rent account balance — net transfers. These represent the flow of 
foreign aid from Japan. As the country supplied more foreign aid, 
the deficit in this account rose. Much of the change occurred in 
the 1980s, with the deficit growing from US$1.5 billion in 1980 



274 



7T 




to US$4.1 billion by 1988. It was expected to grow further, with 
Japan's foreign aid expanding in the 1990s. 

Adding net exports of services and net transfers to the merchan- 
dise trade balance, with imports measured free on board (f.o.b.), 
rather than as customs, insurance, and freight (c.i.f.), gives the 
balance on current account. Movements in Japan's current account 
balance have generally mirrored those of the merchandise trade 
balance considered above, although deficits in services and net trans- 
fers have offset the surpluses somewhat. Japan began to register 
surpluses in the current account in 1965, which later continued 
to rise, though they were punctuated by short-term deficits following 
the two oil price hikes in 1973 and 1979. 

During the 1980s Japan's current account balance shot from a 
record deficit of US$10.7 billion in 1980 to a record surplus of 
US$87 billion in 1987. As a share of GNP, this surplus reached 
a peak of 4.4 percent in 1985, a large value for a current account 
surplus. The appreciation of the yen against the dollar and other 
currencies beginning in 1985 was slow to have any impact on the 
dollar value of the current account surplus, although it did decline 
by US$8 billion in 1988. 

Capital Flows 

Capital movements offset the surpluses or deficits in the current 
account. A current account surplus, for example, implies that rather 



275 



Japan: A Country Study 

than using all the foreign currency earned by selling exports to buy 
imports, corporations and individuals chose to invest the money 
in foreign-currency-denominated assets instead. As measured in 
Japan's balance of payments data, capital movements consist of 
long- and short-term investments, and movements in official for- 
eign exchange reserves and private bank accounts. Capital move- 
ments include loans, portfolio investments in corporate stock, and 
direct investment (establishment or purchase of subsidiaries abroad). 
A capital outflow occurs when a Japanese individual or corpora- 
tion makes a loan, buys foreign stock, or establishes a subsidiary 
abroad. A capital inflow occurs when foreigners engage in these 
operations in Japan. 

After World War II, Japan's return to world capital markets 
as a borrower was slow and deliberate. Even before the war, Japan 
did not participate in world capital markets to the same extent as 
the United States or West European countries. Caution and con- 
trol remained strong until well into the 1970s, when the nation was 
no longer a net debtor. Since that time, deregulation has proceeded 
steadily and capital flows have grown rapidly. The rapid growth 
of investment abroad in the 1980s had made Japan the largest net 
investor in the world by the end of the decade. 

As might be expected of a country recovering from a major war- 
time defeat, Japan remained a net debtor nation until the mid- 
1960s, although it was never as far in debt as many of the more 
recently developing countries. By 1967, however, Japanese invest- 
ments overseas had begun to exceed foreign investments in Japan, 
changing Japan from a net debtor to a net creditor nation. The 
country remained a modest net creditor until the 1980s, when its 
creditor position expanded explosively, altering Japan's relation- 
ship to the rest of the world. 

In the Japanese balance of payments data, these changes are most 
readily seen in the long-term capital account. During the first half 
of the 1960s, this account generally showed small net inflows of 
capital (as did the short-term capital account). From 1965 on, 
however, the long-term capital account consistently showed an out- 
flow, ranging from US$1 billion to US$12 billion during the 1970s. 
The sharp shift in the balance of payments brought about by the 
oil price hike at the decade's end produced an unusual net inflow 
of long-term capital in 1980 of US$2.3 billion, but thereafter the 
outflow resumed and grew enormously. From nearly US$10 bil- 
lion in 1981, the annual net outflow of long-term capital reached 
nearly US$137 billion in 1987 and then dropped slightly, to just 
over US$130 billion, in 1988 (see table 29, Appendix). 



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International Economic Relations 



Short-term capital flows in the balance of payments do not show 
so clear a picture. These more volatile flows have generally added 
to the net capital outflow, but in some years movements in inter- 
national differentials in interest rates or other factors led to a net 
inflow of short-term capital. 

The other significant part of capital flows in the balance of pay- 
ments is the movement in gold and foreign exchange reserves held 
by the government, which represent the funds held by the Bank 
of Japan to intervene in foreign exchange markets to affect the value 
of the yen. In the 1970s, the size of these markets became so large 
that any government intervention was only a small share of total 
transactions, but Japan and other governments used their reserves 
to influence exchange rates when necessary. In the second half of 
the 1970s, for example, foreign exchange reserves rose rapidly, from 
a total of US$12.8 billion in 1975 to US$33 billion by 1978, as 
the Bank of Japan sold yen to buy dollars in foreign exchange mar- 
kets to slow or stop the rise in the yen's value, fearful that such 
a rise would adversely affect Japanese exports. The same opera- 
tion occurred on a much larger scale after 1985. From US$26.5 
billion in 1985 (a level little changed from the decade's beginning), 
exchange reserves had climbed to almost US$98 billion by 1988. 
This intervention was similarly inspired by concern about the yen's 
high value. 

The combination of net outflows of long- and short-term capital 
and rising holdings of foreign exchange by the central government 
produced enormous change in Japan's accumulated holdings of for- 
eign assets, compared to foreigners' holdings of assets in Japan. 
As a result, from a net asset position of US$11.5 billion in 1980 
(meaning that Japanese investors held US$1 1.5 billion more in for- 
eign assets than foreigners held in Japan), Japan's international 
net assets had grown to nearly US$292 billion by 1988 (see table 
30, Appendix). Japanese assets abroad grew from nearly US$160 
billion in 1980 to almost US$1.5 trillion by 1988, a ninefold in- 
crease. Liabilities — investments by foreigners in Japan — expanded 
somewhat more slowly, about sevenfold, from US$148 billion in 
1980 to US$1 . 1 trillion in 1988. Dramatic shifts were seen in port- 
folio securities purchases — stocks and bonds — in both directions. 
Japanese purchases of foreign securities went from only US$4.2 
billion in 1976 to over US$21 billion in 1980 and to US$427 bil- 
lion by 1988. Although foreign purchases of Japanese securities 
also expanded, the growth was much slower, and the total was still 
under US$255 billion in 1988. 

Capital flows have been heavily affected by government policy. 
During the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s, when Japan faced 



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Japan: A Country Study 

chronic current account deficits, concern over maintaining a high 
credit rating in international capital markets and fear of having 
to devalue the currency and of foreign ownership of Japanese com- 
panies all led to tight controls over both inflow and outflow of cap- 
ital. As part of these controls, for example, government severely 
restricted foreign direct investment in Japan, but encouraged licens- 
ing agreements with foreign firms to obtain access to their tech- 
nology. As Japan's current account position strengthened in the 
1960s, however, the nation came under increasing pressure to liber- 
alize its tight controls. 

When Japan became a member of the OECD in 1966, it also 
had to agree to liberalize its capital markets. This process began 
in 1967 and continued in the early 1990s. Decontrol of interna- 
tional capital flows was aided in 1980, when the new Foreign Ex- 
change and Foreign Control Law went into effect. In principle, 
all external economic transactions were free of control, unless speci- 
fied otherwise. In practice, a wide range of transactions continued 
to be subject to some form of formal or informal control by the 
government. 

Because of continuing capital controls, negotiations between 
Japan and the United States were held, producing an agreement 
in 1984, the Yen-Dollar Accord. This agreement led to additional 
liberalizing measures that were implemented over the next several 
years. Many of these changes concerned the establishment and func- 
tioning of markets for financial instruments in Japan (such as a 
short-term treasury bill market) rather than the removal of inter- 
national capital controls per se. This approach was taken because 
of American concerns that foreign investment in Japan was impeded 
by a lack of various financial instruments in the country and by 
the government's continued control of interest rates for many of 
those instruments that did exist. As a result of the agreement, for 
example, interest rates on large bank deposits were decontrolled, 
and the minimum denomination for certificates of deposit was 
lowered. 

By the end of the 1980s, barriers to capital flow were no longer 
a major issue in United States-Japan relations. However, im- 
balances in the flows and in accumulated totals of capital invest- 
ment, with Japan becoming a large world creditor, were emerging 
as new areas of tension. This tension was exacerbated by the fact 
that the United States became the world's largest net debtor at the 
same time that Japan became its largest net creditor. Neverthe- 
less, no policy decisions had been made by the end of the 1980s 
that would restrict the flow of Japanese capital to the United States. 



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One important area of capital flows is direct investment — outright 
ownership or control (as opposed to portfolio investment). Japan's 
direct foreign investment has grown rapidly, although not as dra- 
matically as portfolio investment. Data collected by its Ministry 
of Finance show the accumulated value of Japanese foreign direct 
investment growing from under US$3.6 billion in 1970 to US$36.5 
billion in 1980 and to over US$186 billion by 1988 (see table 31, 
Appendix). Direct investment tends to be very visible, and the rapid 
increase of Japan's direct investments in countries such as the 
United States, combined with the large imbalance between Japan's 
overseas investment and foreign investment in Japan was a primary 
cause of tension at the end of the 1980s. 

The location of Japan's direct investments abroad has been shift- 
ing. In 1970, 21 percent of its investments were in Asia and nearly 
22 percent in the United States. By 1988, the share of investments 
in Asia had dropped slightly, to under 18 percent, while that in 
the United States had risen sharply, to nearly 39 percent of the 
total. During this period, Japan's share of investments in Latin 
America held rather steady (from nearly 16 percent in 1970 to nearly 

17 percent in 1988), as it did in Europe (down slightly from nearly 

18 percent to over 16 percent in that period), and Africa (where 
it was under 3 percent in both years). Both the Middle East (down 
from over 9 percent to under 2 percent) and the Pacific (down from 
roughly 8 percent to 5 percent) became relatively less important 
locations for Japanese investments. However, because of the rapid 
growth in the dollar amounts of the investments, these shifts were 
all relative. Even in the Middle East, the dollar value of Japanese 
investments had grown. 

The drive to invest overseas stemmed from several motives. A 
major reason for many early investments was to obtain access to 
raw materials. As Japan became more dependent on imported raw 
materials, energy, and food during the 1960s and 1970s, direct in- 
vestments were one way of ensuring supply. The Middle East, Aus- 
tralia, and some Asian countries (such as Indonesia) were major 
locations for such investments by 1970. Second, rising labor costs 
during the 1960s and 1970s led certain labor-intensive industries, 
especially textiles, to move abroad. 

Investment in other industrial countries, such as the United 
States, was often motivated by barriers to exports from Japan. The 
restrictions on automobile exports to the United States, which went 
into effect in 1981, became a primary motivation for Japanese auto- 
makers to establish assembly plants in the United States. The same 
situation had occurred earlier, in the 1970s, for plants manufac- 
turing television sets. Japanese firms exporting from developing 



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Japan: A Country Study 

countries, moreover, often received preferential tariff treatment in 
developed countries (under the Generalized System of Preferences). 
In short, protectionism in developed countries often motivated 
Japanese foreign direct investment. 

After 1985, a new and important incentive materialized for such 
investments. The rapid rise in the value of the yen seriously under- 
mined the international competitiveness of many products manufac- 
tured in Japan. While this situation had been true for textiles in 
the 1960s, it now also affected a much wider range of more sophisti- 
cated products. Japanese manufacturers began actively seeking 
lower cost production bases. This factor, rather than any increase 
in foreign protectionism, appeared to lie behind the acceleration 
of overseas investments after 1985. 

This cost disadvantage also led more Japanese firms to think of 
their overseas factories as a source of products for the Japanese 
market itself. Except for the basic processing of raw materials, 
manufacturers had previously regarded foreign investments as a 
substitute for exports rather than as an overseas base for home mar- 
kets. The share of output from Japanese factories in the lower- wage- 
cost countries of Asia that was destined for the Japanese market 
(rather than for local markets or for export) rose from 10 percent 
in 1980 to 16 percent in 1987. 

The Value of the Yen 

The relative value of the yen is determined in foreign exchange 
markets by the forces of demand and supply. The demand for the 
yen is governed by the desire of foreigners to buy goods and ser- 
vices in Japan and by their interest in investing in Japan (buying 
yen-denominated real and financial assets). The supply of the yen 
in the market is governed by the desire of yen holders to exchange 
their yen for other currencies to purchase goods, services, or assets. 

In 1949 the value of the yen was set at ¥360 per US$1 through 
an American plan, which was part of the Bretton Woods System, 
to stabilize prices in the Japanese economy. That exchange rate 
was maintained until 1971 , when the United States abandoned the 
convertibility of the dollar to gold, which had been a key element 
of the Bretton Woods System, and imposed a 10 percent surcharge 
on imports, and set in motion changes that eventually led to float- 
ing exchange rates in 1973. 

By 1971 the yen had become undervalued (see table 32, Appen- 
dix). Japanese exports were costing too little in international mar- 
kets, and imports from abroad were costing the Japanese too much. 
This undervaluation was reflected in the current account balance, 
which had risen from the deficits of the early 1960s to a then-large 



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International Economic Relations 

surplus of US$5.8 billion in 1971 . The belief that the yen, and sev- 
eral other major currencies, were undervalued motivated the United 
States actions in 1971. 

Following the United States measures to devalue the dollar in 
the summer of 1971, the Japanese government agreed to a new, 
fixed exchange rate as part of the Smithsonian Agreement, signed 
at the end of the year. This agreement set the exchange rate at 
¥308 per US$1 . However, the new fixed rates of the Smithsonian 
Agreement were difficult to maintain in the face of supply and de- 
mand pressures in the foreign exchange market. In early 1973, the 
rates were abandoned, and the major nations of the world allowed 
their currencies to float. 

In the 1970s, Japanese government and business people were 
very concerned that a rise in the value of the yen would hurt ex- 
port growth by making Japanese products less competitive and 
would damage the industrial base. The government, therefore, con- 
tinued to intervene heavily in foreign exchange marketing (buy- 
ing or selling dollars), even after the 1973 decision to allow the yen 
to float. 

Despite intervention, market pressures caused the yen to con- 
tinue climbing in value, peaking temporarily at an average of ¥271 
per US$1 in 1973 before the impact of the oil crisis was felt. The 
increased costs of imported oil caused the yen to depreciate to a 
range of ¥290 to ¥300 between 1974 and 1976. The reemergence 
of trade surpluses drove the yen back up to ¥211 in 1978. This 
currency strengthening was again reversed by the second oil shock, 
with the yen dropping to ¥227 by 1980. 

During the first half of the 1980s, the yen failed to rise in value 
even though current account surpluses returned and grew quickly. 
From ¥221 in 1981 , the average value of the yen actually dropped 
to ¥239 in 1985. The rise in the current account surplus gener- 
ated stronger demand for yen in foreign exchange markets, but 
this trade-related demand for yen was offset by other factors. A 
wide differential in interest rates, with United States interest rates 
much higher than those in Japan, and the continuing moves to 
deregulate the international flow of capital, led to a large net out- 
flow of capital from Japan. This capital flow increased the supply 
of yen in foreign exchange markets, as Japanese investors changed 
their yen for other currencies (mainly dollars) to invest overseas. 
This situation kept the yen weak relative to the dollar and fostered 
the rapid rise in the Japanese trade surplus that took place in the 
1980s. 

In 1985 a dramatic change began. Finance officials from major 
nations signed an agreement (the Plaza Accord) affirming that the 



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Japan: A Country Study 

dollar was overvalued (and, therefore, the yen undervalued). This 
agreement, and shifting supply and demand pressures in the mar- 
kets, led to a rapid rise in the value of the yen. From its average 
of ¥239 per US$1 in 1985, the yen rose to a peak of ¥128 in 1988, 
virtually doubling its value relative to the dollar. After 1988 the 
yen's value declined slightly to ¥145 in September 1989, but re- 
mained much stronger than in 1985. 

The yen's increased value made Japanese exports less price com- 
petitive and imports more price competitive, which should have 
brought down the value of trade and current account surpluses. 
The current account figures discussed above, however, indicated 
that such a response was slow. The strong appreciation of the yen 
began in 1985, but the current account continued to rise until 1987, 
and its decline in 1988 was rather small. 

Trade and Investment Relations 

Japan was engaged in trade and investment with nearly every 
country in the world. Generally speaking, however, its greatest eco- 
nomic interaction was with other developed countries, and over 
time this interaction grew. 

In 1988 about 61 percent of exports went to developed coun- 
tries, 34 percent to developing countries, and 5 percent to com- 
munist countries. The largest single destination of Japanese exports 
was the United States, which accounted for an extraordinary 33.8 
percent of all exports. The United States was the major growth 
market for Japanese exports in the 1980s; it had accounted for only 
24 percent of the total in 1980. West Germany, Britain, the Repub- 
lic of Korea (South Korea), and Taiwan were the next largest mar- 
kets, at the much lower level of about 6 percent each (see table 
33, Appendix). 

Of imports, 51 percent came from developed countries in 1988, 
42 percent from developing countries, and 7 percent from com- 
munist countries, with the developed countries' share rising over 
the course of the 1980s as raw materials, which predominate in 
developing country sales to Japan, declined in price. Despite Japan's 
dependence on foreign sources of energy and raw materials, the 
United States was the largest single source of imports, accounting 
for 22.4 percent in 1988, larger than the combined share (10 per- 
cent) for all Middle Eastern countries, the suppliers of much of 
Japan's oil. Over time, however, dependence on United States im- 
ports had slipped rather steadily, from 34.6 percent in 1960, as 
sources of supply diversified. Other major sources of 1988 imports 
were South Korea (6.3 percent), Australia (5.5 percent), China (5.3 



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International Economic Relations 



percent), Indonesia (5.1 percent), Taiwan (4.7 percent), Canada 
(4.4 percent), and West Germany (4.3 percent). 

Historically, Japan has had trade deficits with raw material sup- 
pliers and surpluses with other countries. In the 1980s, however, 
balances with all trading partners shifted somewhat in Japan's favor. 
Its surplus in trade with developed countries rose from US$12 bil- 
lion in 1980 to US$67 billion by 1988, while the balance with de- 
veloping countries shifted from a deficit of US$25 billion in 1980 
to a surplus of nearly US$11 billion in 1988. Its deficit in trade 
with the Middle East, peaked at about US$30 billion in 1980, sink- 
ing to only US$10.5 billion by 1988. 

Partly because of this rapid shift toward surplus, and because 
of continued problems of access to Japanese markets, Japan faced 
increased tensions with a number of its trading partners during 
the 1980s. The decade was marked by contentious negotiations es- 
pecially with the United States. Complicating the nature of all these 
relationships was the very swift rise of Japan as a major investor 
in the domestic assets of its major trading partners. 

United States and Canada 

The United States has been Japan's largest economic partner, 
taking 33.8 percent of its exports, supplying 22.4 percent of its im- 
ports, and accounting for 38.6 percent of its direct investment 
abroad in 1988. The United States also supplied 47 percent ac- 
cumulated direct investment by foreign firms in Japan. 

Japanese imports from the United States included both raw 
materials and manufactured goods. American agricultural products 
were a leading import in 1988 (US$9.1 billion as measured by 
United States export statistics), made up of meat (US$1 .4 billion), 
fish (US$1 .6 billion), grains (US$2.3 billion), and soybeans (US$1 .0 
billion). Imports of manufactured goods were mainly in the category 
of machinery and transportation equipment, rather than consumer 
goods. In 1988 Japan imported US$6.9 billion of machinery from 
the United States, of which computers and computer parts (US$2.4 
billion) formed the largest single component. In the category of 
transportation equipment, Japan imported US$2.2 billion of air- 
craft and parts (automobiles and parts accounted for only US$500 
million). 

Japanese exports to the United States were almost entirely 
manufactured goods. Automobiles were by far the largest single 
category, amounting to US$21 billion in 1988, or 23 percent of 
total Japanese exports to the United States. Automotive parts ac- 
counted for another US$5 billion. Other major items were office 
machinery (including computers), which totaled US$10.6 billion 



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Japan: A Country Study 

in 1988, telecommunications equipment (US$10.4 billion), power 
generating equipment (US$3.3 billion), iron and steel (US$2.9 bil- 
lion), and metalworking machinery (US$1.7 billion). 

From the mid-1960s, the trade balance has been in Japan's favor. 
According to Japanese data, its surplus with the United States grew 
from US$380 million in 1970 to nearly US$48 billion in 1988. 
United States data on the trade relationship (which differ slightly 
because each nation includes transportation costs on the import 
but not the export side) also show a rapid deterioration of the im- 
balance in the 1980s, from a Japanese surplus of US$10 billion 
in 1980 to one of US$60 billion in 1987, with a slight improve- 
ment, to one of US$55 billion, in 1988. 

This general deterioration, and the very modest improvement 
in trade balance after the yen rose in value after 1985, contributed 
greatly to strained economic relations. The United States had pres- 
sured Japan to open its markets since the early 1960s, but the in- 
tensity of the pressure increased through the 1970s and 1980s. 

Tensions were exacerbated by issues specific to particular indus- 
tries perhaps more than by the trade imbalance in general. Begin- 
ning with textiles in the 1950s, a number of Japanese exports to 
the United States were subject to opposition from American in- 
dustry. These complaints generally alleged unfair trading practices, 
such as dumping (selling at a lower cost than at home, or selling 
below the cost of production) and patent infringement. The result 
of negotiations was often Japan's agreement "voluntarily" to re- 
strain exports to the United States. Such agreements applied to 
a number of products, including color television sets in the late 
1970s and automobiles in the 1980s. 

Some innovative approaches emerged in the 1980s as United 
States companies strove to achieve greater access to Japanese mar- 
kets. MOSS negotiations in 1985 addressed access problems re- 
lated to four industries: forest products, pharmaceuticals and 
medical equipment, electronics, and telecommunications equipment 
and services. 

Problems of access to Japanese markets were among the moti- 
vations for the United States Trade Act of 1988, which included 
a provision calling on the president to identify unfair trading part- 
ners of the United States and to specify products for negotiation 
with these countries. In the spring of 1989, Japan was named under 
this provision and three areas — forest products, telecommunica- 
tions satellites, and supercomputers — were selected for negotiations. 
This action exemplified the continuing mood of dissatisfaction over 
access to Japanese markets at the end of the decade (see Import 
Policies, this ch.). 



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International Economic Relations 



At the same time, the United States initiated broad talks con- 
cerning the structural factors inhibiting manufactured imports in 
Japan, in the Structural Impediments Initiative. These talks ad- 
dressed such areas as the law restraining the growth of large dis- 
count store chains in Japan, weak antitrust law enforcement, land 
taxation that encouraged inefficient farming, and high real estate 
prices. 

As elsewhere, Japanese direct investment in the United States 
expanded rapidly and had become an important new dimension 
in the countries' relationship. The total value of cumulative in- 
vestments of this kind was US$8.7 billion in 1980; it had grown 
by more than eight times by 1988 to US$71.9 billion. United States 
data identified Japan as the second largest investor in the United 
States; it had about half the value of investments of Britain, but 
more than those of the Netherlands, Canada, or West Germany. 
Much of Japan's investment in the United States in the late 1980s 
was in the commercial sector, providing the basis for distribution 
and sale of Japanese exports to the United States. Wholesale and 
retail distribution accounted for 35 percent of all Japanese invest- 
ments in the United States in 1988, while manufacturing accounted 
for 23 percent. Real estate became a popular investment during 
the 1980s, with cumulative investments rising to US$10 billion by 
1988, 20 percent of the total. 

Japan's balance of trade with Canada tended to be in deficit be- 
cause Canada was a supplier of raw materials to Japan. In 1988 
Canada was the destination for 2.4 percent of Japan's exports and 
the source of 4.4 percent of its imports. Canada was a major sup- 
plier of food (particularly wheat), wood and wood pulp, and coal. 
Japan's deficit with Canada in 1988 was US$1.9 billion. 

Noncommunist Asia 

The developing nations of Asia grew rapidly as suppliers to and 
buyers from Japan. In 1988 these countries (including South Korea, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Indonesia, and other countries 
in Southeast Asia) accounted for 25 percent of Japan's exports, 
a share well below the 34 percent value of 1960, but one that had 
been roughly constant since 1970. In 1988 developing Asian coun- 
tries provided 26 percent of Japan's imports, a share that had risen 
slowly, from 16 percent in 1970 and 23 percent in 1980. 

As a whole, Japan had run a surplus with noncommunist Asia, 
and this surplus rose quickly in the 1980s. From a minor deficit 
in 1980 of US$841 million (mostly caused by a peak in the value 
of oil imports from Indonesia), Japan showed a surplus of nearly 
US$3 billion with these countries in 1985 and of over US$19 billion 



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Japan: A Country Study 

in 1988. The shift was caused by the fall in the prices of oil and 
other raw materials that Japan imported from the region and to 
the rapid growth in Japanese exports as the region's economic 
growth continued at a high rate. 

Indonesia and Malaysia both continued to show a trade surplus 
because of their heavy raw material exports to Japan. However, 
falling oil prices caused trade in both directions between Japan and 
Indonesia to decline in the 1980s. Trade similarly declined with 
the Philippines, owing to the political turmoil and economic con- 
traction there in the 1980s. 

South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore constituted 
the newly industrialized economies (NIEs) in Asia, and all four 
exhibited high economic growth during the 1970s and 1980s. Like 
Japan, they lacked many raw materials and mainly exported 
manufactured goods. Their deficits with Japan increased from 1980 
to 1988 when the deficits of all four were sizeable. Over the 1970s 
and 1980s, they evolved a pattern of importing components from 
Japan and exporting assembled products to the United States. 

Japanese direct investment in Asia also expanded, with the total 
cumulative value reaching over US$32 billion by 1988. Indone- 
sia, at US$9.8 billion in 1988 was the largest single location for 
these investments. As rapid as the growth of investment was, 
however, it did not keep pace with Japan's global investment, so 
the share of Asia in total cumulative investment slipped, from 26.5 
percent in 1975 to 17.3 percent in 1988. 

Western Europe 

Japan's trade with Western Europe grew steadily, but had been 
relatively small well into the 1 980s considering the size of this mar- 
ket. In 1980 Western Europe supplied only 7.4 percent of Japan's 
imports and took 16.6 percent of its exports. However, the rela- 
tionship began to change very rapidly after 1985. West European 
exports to Japan increased two and one-half times in just the three 
years from 1985 to 1988 and rose as a share of all Japanese im- 
ports to 16 percent. (Much of this increase came from growing 
Japanese interest in European consumer items, including luxury 
automobiles.) Likewise, Japan's exports to Europe rose rapidly after 
1985, more than doubling by 1988 and accounting for 21 percent 
of all Japanese exports. 

In 1988 the major European buyers of Japanese exports were 
West Germany (US$15.8 billion) and Britain (US$10.6 billion) (see 
table 34, Appendix). The largest European suppliers to Japan were 
West Germany (US$8. 1 billion), France (US$4 billion), and Brit- 
ain (US$4.2 billion) (see table 35, Appendix). Traditionally, West 



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International Economic Relations 



European countries had trade deficits with Japan, and this con- 
tinued to be the case in 1988, despite the surge in Japan's imports 
from them after 1985. From 1980 to 1988, the deficit of the West 
European countries as a whole expanded from US$11 billion to 
US$25 billion, with much of the increase coming after 1985. 

Trade relations with Western Europe were strained during the 
1980s. Policies varied among the individual countries, but many 
imposed restrictions on Japanese imports. Late in the decade, as 
discussions proceeded on the trade and investment policies that 
would prevail with European economic integration in 1992, many 
Japanese officials and business people became concerned that pro- 
tectionism directed against Japan would increase. Domestic con- 
tent requirements (specifying the share of local products and value 
added in a product) and requirements on the location of research 
and development facilities and manufacturing investments appeared 
likely. 

Fear of a protectionist Western Europe accelerated Japanese 
direct investment in the second half of the 1980s. Total accumu- 
lated Japanese direct investments in the region grew from US$4.5 
billion in 1980 to over US$30 billion in 1988, from 12.2 percent 
to more than 16 percent of such Japanese investments. Rather than 
being discouraged by protectionist signals from Europe, Japanese 
businesses appeared to be determined to play a significant role in 
what promised to be a large, vigorous, and integrated market in 
the 1990s. Investment offered the surest means of circumventing 
protectionism, and Japanese business appeared to be willing to com- 
ply with whatever domestic content or other performance require- 
ments the European Communities might impose. 

The Middle East 

The importance of the Middle East expanded dramatically in 
the 1970s with the jumps in crude oil prices. Japan was deeply con- 
cerned with maintaining good relations with these oil-producing 
nations to avoid a debilitating cut in oil supplies. During the 1980s, 
however, oil prices fell and Japan's concerns over the security of 
its oil supply diminished greatly. 

The Middle East represented only 7.5 percent of total Japanese 
imports in 1960 and 12.4 percent in 1970, with the small rise result- 
ing from the rapid increase in the volume of oil consumed by the 
growing Japanese economy. By 1980, however, this share had 
climbed to a peak of 31.7 percent because of the two rounds of 
price hikes in the 1970s. Falling oil prices after 1980 brought this 
share back down to 10.5 percent by 1988 — actually a lower per- 
centage than in 1970, before the price hikes had started. The major 



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Japan: A Country Study 

oil suppliers to Japan in 1988 were Saudi Arabia and the United 
Arab Emirates. Iran, Iraq, and Kuwait were also significant, but 
smaller, sources. These three countries became less important oil 
suppliers after 1980 because of the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88) and 
resulting damage to loading facilities and shipping. 

As imports from the Middle East surged in the 1970s, so did 
Japanese exports to the region. Paralleling the pattern for imports, 
however, this share fell in the 1980s. Equalling 1.8 percent in 1960, 
exports to this region rose to 11.1 percent of total Japanese exports 
in 1980, but then declined to 3.6 percent by 1988. 

Part of Japan's strategy to assure oil supplies was to encourage 
investment in oil-supplying countries. However, such investment 
never kept pace with Japan's investments in other regions. The 
country's expanding need for oil helped push direct investment in 
the Middle East to 9.3 percent of total direct investments abroad 
by Japanese companies in 1970, but this share had fallen to 6.2 
percent by 1980 and to only 1.8 percent by 1988. The Iran-Iraq 
war was a major factor in the declining interest of Japanese inves- 
tors, exemplified by the fate of a large US$3 billion petrochemical 
complex in Iran, which was almost complete when the revolution 
took place in 1979. Completion was delayed first by political con- 
cerns (when United States embassy personnel were held hostage) 
and then by repeated Iraqi bombing raids. The project was finally 
cancelled in 1989, with losses for both Japanese companies and the 
Japanese government, which had provided insurance for the project. 

Oceania 

Australia and New Zealand were predominantly sources of food 
and raw materials for Japan. In 1988 Australia accounted for 5.5 
percent of total Japanese imports, a share that held relatively steady 
in the late 1980s, while New Zealand accounted for less than 1 per- 
cent. Because they provided raw materials, both nations had trade 
surpluses with Japan. Australia was the largest single supplier of 
coal, iron ore, wool, and sugar to Japan in 1988, while New Zealand 
was the second largest supplier of wool. 

Resource development projects in Australia attracted Japanese 
capital, as did trade protectionism by necessitating local produc- 
tion for the Australian market. Investments in Australia totaled 
US$8. 1 billion in 1988, accounting for 4.4 percent of Japanese direct 
investment abroad. But, because of the broadening reach of Japan's 
foreign investment, this share had been declining, down from 5.9 
percent in 1980. During the 1980s, Japanese real estate investment 
increased in Australia, particularly in the ocean resort area known 



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International Economic Relations 



as the Gold Coast, where Japanese presence was strong enough 
to create some backlash. 

The trade of both Australia and New Zealand had shifted away 
from other Commonwealth of Nations countries toward Asia. Japan 
in particular had emerged as the leading trading partner for these 
two countries. Faced with growing interdependence with Asia, Aus- 
tralia joined Japan in actively calling for greater consultation and 
cooperation among Pacific nations. Still, Australia and New Zea- 
land faced quotas, high tariffs, and unusual standards barriers in 
exporting agricultural products including beef, butter, and apples, 
to Japan. 

Latin America 

In the 1970s, Japan briefly showed enthusiasm over Brazilian 
prospects. A vast territory richly endowed with raw materials and 
with a sizable Japanese-Brazilian minority in the population, Brazil 
appeared to Japanese business to offer great opportunities for trade 
and investment. However, none of those expectations have been 
realized, and Japanese financial institutions became caught up in 
the international debt problems of Brazil and other Latin Ameri- 
can countries. 

In 1988 Japan received US$8.3 billion of imports from Latin 
America as a whole, and exported US$9.3 billion to the region, 
for a surplus of US$1 billion. Although the absolute value of both 
exports and imports had grown over time, Latin America had 
declined in importance as a Japanese trading partner. The share 
of Japan's total imports coming from this region dropped from 7.3 
percent in 1970 to 4.1 percent in 1980, remaining at 4.4 percent 
in 1988. Japanese exports to Latin America also declined, from 
6.9 percent in 1980 to 3.5 percent in 1988. 

Despite this relative decline in trade, Japanese direct investment 
in the region continued to grow quickly, reaching US$31 .6 billion 
in 1988, or 16.9 percent of Japan's total foreign direct investment. 
This share was only slightly below that ofl975(18.1 percent) and 
was almost equal to the share in Asian countries. However, over 
US$11 billion of this investment was in Panama — mainly for 
Panamanian-flag shipping, which does not represent true invest- 
ment in the country. The Bahamas also attracted US$1.9 billion 
in investment, mainly from Japanese financial institutions, but in 
arrangements to secure favorable tax treatment rather than real 
investments. Brazil absorbed US$5 billion in Japanese direct in- 
vestment, Mexico US$1 .6 billion, and other Latin American coun- 
tries amounts below US$1 billion in the late 1980s. 



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Japan: A Country Study 

Latin American countries lie at the heart of the Third World 
debt problems that plagued international financial relations in the 
1980s. Japanese financial institutions became involved as lenders 
to these nations, although they were far less exposed than United 
States banks. Because of this financial involvement, the Japanese 
government was actively involved in international discussions of 
how to resolve the crisis. In 1987, Minister of Finance Miyazawa 
Kiichi put forth a proposal on resolving the debt issue. Although 
that initiative did not go through, the Brady Plan that emerged 
in 1989 contained some elements of the Miyazawa Plan. The 
Japanese government supported the Brady Plan by pledging US$10 
billion in cofinancing with the World Bank and IMF. 

Africa 

Africa has been the least important world region for Japanese 
trade and investment. Japan had little historical experience with 
Africa and little interest in economic ties with the region, except 
for development of raw material supplies. 

In 1988 Africa accounted for just over 1 percent of Japan's im- 
ports and for 1 percent of its exports. Japan's largest trading part- 
ner in Africa in 1988 was South Africa, which accounted for 34 
percent of Japanese exports to Africa and 45 percent of Japan's 
imports from the region. Because of trading sanctions imposed on 
South Africa by the United States and other countries, Japan 
emerged as South Africa's largest trading partner during the 1980s. 
This position proved embarrassing to Japan and led it to down- 
grade some diplomatic and economic relations with the country. 
Despite the fact that South Africa remained Japan's largest trad- 
ing partner in the region, both exports and imports in 1988 had 
declined by more than one-third from their value in 1980. 

Africa was the location of only US$4.6 billion or 2.5 percent of 
Japanese foreign direct investment in 1988, of which most (US$3.6 
billion) was in Liberia. As in Panama, this investment was mainly 
in the form of flag-of-convenience shipping. Japanese data showed 
virtually no direct investment in South Africa (US$1 million), and 
no new investment in this country during the 1980s. 

Communist Countries 

Japan's experience with communist countries was quite limited 
in the years after the war. In the 1980s, its patterns of interaction 
with China and the Soviet Union diverged sharply, its relations 
with China growing quickly, those with the Soviet Union stagnat- 
ing. Other communist areas, such as Eastern Europe, continued 
to be only tiny trade and investment partners for Japan. 



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International Economic Relations 



Exports to communist countries totaled US$13.8 billion in 1988, 
or 5.2 percent of Japan's exports. Imports from these countries 
totaled nearly US$13.9 billion, yielding a virtual balance in trade. 
Imports from the Soviet Union declined during the first half of the 
1980s, from nearly US$1.9 billion to less than US$1.5 billion, and 
then recovered to almost US$2.8 billion by 1988, representing a 
modest growth for the entire period. Imports from China, on the 
other hand, more than doubled in this time, from just over US$4.3 
billion in 1980 to nearly US$9.9 billion in 1988. Export trade fol- 
lowed a similar pattern: exports to the Soviet Union stagnated and 
then grew modestly, to over US$3.1 billion in 1988, while those 
to China expanded rapidly, from nearly US$5.1 billion in 1980 
to just under US$9.5 billion in 1988. 

China and Japan have geographic proximity, extensive cultural 
ties, and a long history of commercial relations. However, Japan's 
trade relationship with China was severely constrained in the 1950s 
and 1960s because of its support for the United States policy of 
containment. Japanese business did not expand such commercial 
relations significantly until the United States-China rapprochement 
in the early 1970s and Japan's subsequent establishment of diplo- 
matic relations with China (see Relations with China, ch. 7). Japan 
recognized the Beijing government in 1972. After Mao Zedong's 
death in 1976, China pursued economic contacts with the West, 
and trade with Japan expanded rapidly. The new relationship was 
reinforced by the signing of a Long-Term Trade Agreement in 
1978. In 1980 Japan granted China reduced tariff treatment under 
the Generalized System of Preferences. 

Investment in China also expanded once relations improved in 
the 1970s. Japanese data show some US$2 billion of cumulative 
direct investment in China by 1988. China also became the larg- 
est single recipient of foreign aid from Japan during the 1980s. 
However, a treaty establishing a firm legal framework for direct 
investment, remained to be completed at the end of the 1980s. Fur- 
thermore, the massacre of Chinese prodemocracy demonstrators 
in Beijing's 1989 Tiananmen Incident, and subsequent political 
and economic tightening in China discouraged new Japanese in- 
vestment. 

Commercial relations with the Soviet Union also paralleled stra- 
tegic developments. Japan was very interested in Siberian raw 
materials in the early 1970s as prices were rising and detente per- 
sisted. The challenges to detente, especially the invasion of Af- 
ghanistan in 1979 and falling raw material prices, put strong 
constraints on Japanese trade and investment relations with the 
Soviet Union. Only after Soviet policy began to change under 



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Japan: A Country Study 

Mikhail Gorbachev's leadership, beginning in 1985, did Japanese 
trade resume its growth. 

Further complicating economic relations with the Soviet Union 
was the dispute over four small northern islands occupied by the 
Soviets toward the end of World War II. No progress had taken 
place on this issue during three decades of intermittent negotia- 
tions. However, the 1980s ended with new hope that a settlement 
would emerge. Were this to occur, economic relations with the 
Soviet Union might expand more rapidly (see Relations with the 
Soviet Union, ch. 7). 

Japan's trade was also constrained by the Coordinating Com- 
mittee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom), which controlled 
exports of strategic high technology. In 1987 the United States dis- 
covered that Toshiba Machine Tool had shipped machine tools on 
the restricted list to the Soviet Union, tools used to manufacture 
quieter submarine propellers. Although the Japanese government 
moved reluctantly to punish Toshiba (and the United States im- 
posed sanctions on Toshiba exports to the United States in 
response), the final outcome was stronger surveillance and punish- 
ment for CoCom violations in Japan. 

Japanese investment loans and trade credits went mainly to 
Siberian resource development. But this development never ex- 
panded as originally expected. Soviet interest in revitalizing the 
economy in the late 1980s suggested that future Japanese invest- 
ment would be concentrated in the western regions of the Soviet 
Union rather than in Siberia. 

Japan's trade and investment relations with other communist 
countries in Eastern Europe and Asia were very limited. In 1988 
exports to Eastern Europe were less than US$1 billion, as were 
imports from the region. The reunification of Germany and the 
rapid disintegration of communist regimes in other East European 
countries may open the prospect of expanded trade and investment 
during the 1990s, but economic problems within the region as these 
nations grappled with moving toward market-oriented economies 
were likely to continue to limit trade with Japan. Trade with other 
Asian communist countries was even less significant. The Demo- 
cratic Republic of Korea (North Korea) is geographically close to 
Japan, but that nation's default on trade debt in the 1960s, com- 
bined with the political tension between it and the Republic of Korea 
(South Korea) kept North Korean trade with Japan at a minimum. 

International Economic Cooperation and Aid 

Japan emerged as one of the largest aid donors in the world dur- 
ing the 1980s. In 1988 Japan was the second largest foreign aid 



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donor worldwide, behind the United States. Japan's ratio of for- 
eign aid to GNP in this year was 0.32 percent behind the 0.35 per- 
cent average for the OECD's Development Assistance Committee 
member countries, but ahead of the United States ratio of 0.20 
percent. 

The foreign aid program began in the 1960s out of the repara- 
tions payments Japan was obliged to pay to other Asian countries 
for war damage. The program's budget remained quite low until 
the late 1970s, when Japan came under increasing pressure from 
other industrial countries to play a larger role. During the 1980s, 
Japan's foreign aid budget grew quickly, despite the budget con- 
straints imposed by the effort to reduce the fiscal deficit. From 1984 
to 1988, the Official Development Assistance (ODA) budget in- 
creased at an average annual rate of 22.5 percent, reaching US$9. 1 
billion by 1988. Part of this rise was due to exchange rate move- 
ments (with given yen amounts committed in the budget becom- 
ing larger dollar amounts). In the Japanese government budget, 
foreign aid rose at a lower, but still strong rate, of between 4 per- 
cent and 12 percent each year during the 1980s, with an average 
annual rate of growth from 1979 to 1988 of 8.6 percent. 

Such assistance consisted of grants and loans, and support for 
multilateral aid organizations. In 1988 Japan allocated US$6.4 bil- 
lion of its aid budget to bilateral assistance and US$2.7 billion to 
multilateral agencies. Of the bilateral assistance, US$2.9 billion 
went for grants and US$3.5 billion for concessional loans. 

Japan's foreign aid program has been criticized for better serv- 
ing the interests of Japanese corporations than those of develop- 
ing countries. In the past, tied aid (grants or loans tied to the 
purchase of merchandise from Japan) was high, but untied aid ex- 
panded rapidly in the 1980s, reaching 71 percent of all aid by 1986. 
This share compared favorably with other Development Assistance 
Committee countries and with the United States corresponding 
figure of 54 percent. Nevertheless, complaints continued that even 
Japan's untied aid tended to be directed toward purchases from 
Japan. Aid in the form of grants (the share of aid disbursed as grants 
rather than as loans) was low relative to other Development As- 
sistance Committee countries, and remained so late in the 1980s. 

Bilateral assistance was concentrated in the developing countries 
of Asia, although modest moves took place in the 1980s to expand 
the geographical scope of aid. In 1988 some 62.8 percent of bilateral 
development assistance was allocated to Asia, 13.8 percent to Africa, 
9.1 percent to the Middle East, and 6.2 percent to Latin America. 
Asia's share was down somewhat, from 75 percent in 1975 and 
70 percent in 1980, but still accounted for by far the largest share 



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Japan: A Country Study 

of bilateral aid. During the 1980s, increased aid went to Pakistan 
and Egypt, partly in response to pressure from the United States 
to provide such aid for strategic purposes. Japan had little involve- 
ment in Africa, but the severe drought of the 1980s brought an 
increase in the share of development assistance for that continent. 

The five largest recipients of Japanese ODA in 1988 were in Asia: 
Indonesia (US$985 million), China (US$674 million), the Philip- 
pines (US$535 million), Thailand (US$361 million), and Bangla- 
desh (US$342 million). Earlier in the 1980s, China had been the 
largest single recipient for several successive years. These large aid 
amounts made Japan the largest single source of development as- 
sistance for most Asian countries. For the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, for example, Japan supplied 
55 percent of net ODA received in 1987, compared with 11 per- 
cent from the United States and only 10 percent from the multi- 
lateral aid agencies. 

The largest use of Japan's bilateral aid was for economic infra- 
structure (transportation, communications, river development, and 
energy development), which accounted for 39 percent of the total 
in 1988. Smaller shares went to development of the production sec- 
tor (19 percent) and social infrastructure (16 percent). In general, 
large construction projects predominated in Japan's bilateral for- 
eign aid. Even within the category of social infrastructure, water 
supply and sanitation, which involved major construction projects, 
absorbed the largest amount of money (5.8 percent of the bilateral 
aid in 1988, compared with 4.7 percent for education and only 2 
percent for health). Food aid (0.5 percent of total bilateral aid in 
1988) and debt relief (2.7 percent) were not important parts of 
Japan's official development assistance. 

Major International Industries 

As in most countries, a relatively small number of industries 
dominated Japan's trade and investment interaction with the rest 
of the world. In the late 1980s, those industries were motor vehi- 
cles, consumer electronics, computers, semiconductors and other 
electronic components, and iron and steel. 

Motor Vehicles 

The motor vehicle industry was the most successful industry in 
Japan in the 1980s. In 1988 Japan produced 8.2 million passenger 
cars, making it the largest producer in the world (the United States 
in that year produced 7.1 million), and 54 percent of that output 
was exported. Passenger cars, other motor vehicles, and automo- 
tive parts were the largest class of Japanese exports throughout the 



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International Economic Relations 



1980s. In 1988 they accounted for 18 percent of all Japanese ex- 
ports, a meteoric rise from only 1.9 percent in 1960. 

Fear of protectionism in the United States also led to major direct 
foreign investments there by Japanese auto producers. By the end 
of the decade, all the major Japanese producers had automotive 
assembly lines operating in the United States: Honda, Toyota, Nis- 
san, Mazda, and Isuzu (in a joint plant with Subaru). Following 
the major assembly firms, Japanese auto parts producers also began 
investing in the United States in the late 1980s. 

Automobiles were a major area of contention for the United 
States-Japan relationship during the 1980s. When the price of oil 
rose in 1979, demand for small automobiles increased, which 
worked to the advantage of Japanese exports in the United States 
market. As the Japanese share of the market increased, to 21.8 
percent in 1981, pressures rose to restrict imports from Japan. The 
result of these pressures was a series of negotiations in early 1981 , 
which produced a "voluntary" export agreement limiting Japanese 
shipments to the United States to 1 .68 million units (excluding cer- 
tain kinds of specialty vehicles and trucks). This agreement re- 
mained in effect for the rest of the decade, with the limit reset at 
2.3 million units in 1985. As Japanese assembly lines in the United 
States came on line, imports of Japanese automobiles in 1988 ac- 
tually fell below the limit. 

Similar restraints on Japanese exports were imposed by Can- 
ada and several West European countries. Japan's investment in- 
creased in Western Europe as well, but it faced pressure to achieve 
high local value added as discussion proceeded on the European 
Economic Community unification slated for 1992. 

Foreign penetration of the automotive market in Japan was less 
successful. Imports of foreign automobiles were very low during 
the forty years prior to 1985, never exceeding 60,000 units annu- 
ally, or 1 percent of the domestic market. Trade and investment 
barriers restricted imported cars to an insignificant share of the 
market in the 1950s, and as barriers were finally lowered, strong 
control over the distribution networks made penetration difficult. 
The major American automobile manufacturers acquired minor- 
ity interests in some Japanese firms when investment restrictions 
were relaxed, Ford obtaining a 25 percent interest in Toyo Kogyo 
(Mazda), General Motors a 34 percent interest in Isuzu, and Chrys- 
ler a 15 percent interest in Mitsubishi Motors. This ownership did 
not provide a means for American cars to penetrate the Japanese 
market until the end of the 1980s. 

After the strong appreciation of the yen in 1985, however, 
Japanese demand for foreign automobiles increased. The greater 



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Japan: A Country Study 

sense of affluence in Japanese society was accompanied by a ris- 
ing interest in European design. In 1988 automobile imports to- 
taled 150,629 units, of which 127,309 were European, mostly West 
German. Only 21 , 124 units were imported from the United States 
in 1988. 

Consumer Electronics 

The industries producing consumer electronics — audio receivers, 
compact disc players, and other audio components; tape recorders, 
television receivers, video cassette recorders, and video cameras — 
were major exporters, and in the 1980s they invested overseas as 
well. In 1988, 34 percent of color televisions produced in Japan 
were exported, as were 79 percent of video cassette recorders. Some 
of these products had too small an export share to show up separately 
in summary trade data, but audio tape recorders represented 2.9 
percent of total Japanese exports in 1988, video cassette recorders 
2.3 percent, radio receivers 0.8 percent, and television receivers 
0.7 percent, for a total of 6.7 percent. 

All of these industries built on Japan's success in developing com- 
mercial applications for the transistor in the 1950s and the suc- 
ceeding generations of semiconductor devices of the 1970s and 
1980s. Most of this output came from large integrated electronics 
firms, which manufactured semiconductor devices, consumer elec- 
tronics, and computers. Their international success came from con- 
tinually pushing miniaturization and driving down manufacturing 
costs through innovations in the manufacturing process. 

Mainly because of Japanese industry's success, the American 
consumer electronics industry withered. During the 1970s, Japanese 
inroads in the American market for color television receivers sparked 
charges of dumping and other predatory practices. These disputes 
led to an orderly marketing agreement or voluntary export restraint 
by Japan in 1977, which limited exports of color televisions to 1 .75 
million units annually between 1977 and 1980. While this agree- 
ment afforded some protection to the domestic industry, Japanese 
firms responded by investing in the United States. By the end of 
the 1980s, only one American-owned television manufacturer re- 
mained; the others had disappeared or been bought by West Eu- 
ropean or Japanese firms. 

Other products for the consumer electronics market did not 
become as controversial as color televisions, partly because the 
Japanese had pioneered the products. Video cassette recorders, 
video cameras, and compact disc players were all developed for 
the consumer market by Japanese firms, and no American-owned 
firms were involved in their manufacture in the 1980s. 



296 




297 



Japan: A Country Study 

Japanese overseas investment in the consumer electronics indus- 
try was motivated by protectionism and labor costs. Protectionism 
was the main motivation for Japanese firms to establish color tele- 
vision plants in the United States. By 1980, after the three years 
of voluntary export restraints, seven Japanese firms had located 
plants in the United States. In addition, Japanese firms retained 
production of the most technologically advanced products at home, 
while shifting production of less advanced products to developing 
countries such as Taiwan. For these reasons, Japanese export of 
color televisions fell during the 1980s, from 2 percent of total ex- 
ports in 1970 to only 0.7 percent in 1988. 

Computers 

Japan was a latecomer to computer manufacturing. IBM Japan, 
a wholly owned subsidiary of IBM, along with other foreign sub- 
sidiaries, originally dominated the Japanese market. Until the 
1980s, Japanese computer manufacturers viewed their marketing 
battle as one of capturing Japan's domestic market from IBM 
Japan, not of penetrating world markets. However, Japan's in- 
dustry developed with extraordinary speed and moved into inter- 
national markets. The leading computer manufacturers in Japan 
at the end of the 1980s (by sales in the domestic market) were 
Fujitsu, IBM Japan, Hitachi, NEC, and Unisis, in mainframes, 
and NEC, Fujitsu, Seiko Epson, Toshiba, and IBM Japan in per- 
sonal computers. Despite the benefits extended by Japanese indus- 
trial policy to the domestic computer industry, IBM was able to 
maintain a significant market position in Japan — a 24 percent share 
of the mainframe market and a 6 percent share of the personal com- 
puter market in 1988. 

In 1988 Japan exported US$1.5 billion of computer equipment, 
up more than twelve-fold from the US$122 million in 1980. 
Japanese firms were not very successful in exporting mainframe 
computers, but did very well in peripheral equipment, such as 
printers and tape drives. In the rapidly growing personal computer 
market, the Japanese achieved a modest market share in the United 
States during the 1980s. Imports of computer equipment, in 1988, 
came to US$3.2 billion (including parts). However, much of the 
computer equipment produced by foreign-owned firms that was 
used in Japan was manufactured domestically by subsidiaries rather 
than imported. 

The special treatment extended to the computer industry became 
the subject of trade disputes with the United States in the 1980s, 
in particular, government procurement practices for supercom- 
puters (the fastest, top-of-the-line computers). At issue was the 



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International Economic Relations 



inability of American manufacturers to sell these machines to 
government-funded agencies in Japan. Some rules were changed 
in 1987, but supercomputers remained one of three products sin- 
gled out for further negotiation by the United States in 1989 under 
the provisions of the 1988 Trade Act. Earlier, conflict ensued over 
a Japanese proposal to protect computer software under patent law 
rather than under copyright law, a move that the United States 
felt would reduce protection for American-designed software in the 
Japanese market. This issue was resolved when the patent law 
proposal was dropped. 

Semiconductors 

Semiconductor devices are the key components of computers and 
of a wide variety of other electronic equipment. Inasmuch as the 
entire electronics industry was considered vital to the health and 
growth of the economy, semiconductors received significant atten- 
tion in Japan during the 1970s and 1980s. By the end of the 1980s, 
Japanese firms dominated world production and trade in certain 
segments of the semiconductor industry. In particular, they came 
to dominate the world market in dynamic random-access memory 
units (DRAMs). The Japanese share of the world merchant mar- 
ket for 1 -megabit DRAMs at the end of the decade, for example, 
was estimated at 90 percent, while other estimates put the Japanese 
share of all semiconductor devices at 48 percent. Trade data showed 
that in 1988 Japan exported more than US$12 billion in semicon- 
ductor devices (and vacuum tubes), representing a dramatic in- 
crease from US$6 million in 1960 and just over US$2 billion in 
1980. Such imports, on the other hand, totaled only US$2.2 bil- 
lion in the same year. 

The rise of Japanese competition and the decline in the world 
market share held by American manufacturers, coupled with alle- 
gations of unfair trade practices, made semiconductors a conten- 
tious issue between the United States and Japan throughout the 
1980s. The allegations included charges of dumping in the United 
States market and of import barriers artificially limiting the mar- 
ket share of American firms selling in Japan. Negotiations in 1986 
produced an agreement that led to an increase in Japanese DRAM 
export prices and that also included a provision to increase the 
American share of the Japanese market (from the 10 percent that 
prevailed at that time to 20 percent by 1991). United States com- 
plaints that the Japanese failed to carry out the agreement in good 
faith led to retaliation, the imposition of punitive 100 percent tariffs 
on US$300 million of Japanese exports to the United States. Evi- 
dence that the export prices of DRAMs had risen led to partial 



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Japan: A Country Study 

elimination of the sanctions, but others remained until compliance 
was seen in increasing the American market share in Japan. This 
entire episode remained very controversial at the end of the de- 
cade, particularly the question of specifying an acceptable market 
share for American products in Japan. 

Iron and Steel 

Iron and steel had been a leading industry in Japan and had 
been considered critical to economic growth by the Japanese govern- 
ment in the 1950s. This attitude, exemplified by government loans 
offered at favorable rates, led to rapid modernization and expan- 
sion of the domestic industry. By 1970 iron and steel were the lead- 
ing exports from Japan, accounting for over US$2.8 billion or 14.7 
percent of total exports. This export share peaked in 1974, at 19 
percent. Because of both the domestic industry's strength and im- 
port barriers, imports of iron and steel represented a minimal 
US$276 million in 1974. Japan's success in this industry, however, 
did generate large imports of raw materials — iron ore and concen- 
trates, and coking coal. Iron and steel were a classic case of a 
processing trade, with Japan importing raw materials, building 
state-of-the-art, integrated steel plants at harborside, and export- 
ing part of the output to the rest of the world. 

Iron and steel products were the object of major trade disputes 
in the 1970s. The United States steel industry alleged that the 
Japanese engaged in dumping to increase their market share in 
the United States. These disputes led to various responses. In 1978, 
the United States government instituted the "trigger price mech- 
anism": when iron and steel imports reached a certain low price 
it would initiate dumping investigations, effectively setting a mini- 
mum price for imports. These prices were based on estimates of 
Japanese production costs because the Japanese were assumed to 
be the lowest-cost producer in the world. This system lasted until 
the early 1980s and was replaced in 1984 by a set of voluntary ex- 
port restraints negotiated separately with major suppliers of iron 
and steel to the United States. Japanese shipments to the United 
States remained subject to these restraints for the rest of the decade. 

Despite the emphasis placed on the iron and steel industry in 
the Japanese economy and its export success, the industry proved 
to be mature and declining in the 1980s. Its share of total Japanese 
exports slipped to only 5.8 percent by 1988. Imports of iron and 
steel to Japan rose rapidly in the 1980s, reaching US$4.6 billion 
or 2.5 percent of total imports. South Korea, for example, was 
rapidly moving into certain parts of the industry and managed to 
penetrate Japanese markets despite opposition from the Japanese 



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International Economic Relations 

industry. As a leader in steelmaking technology by the late 1970s, 
Japan had also become an important source of technology for South 
Korea, China, and other developing nations building their own 
steel industries. 

Industries of the Future 

The Japanese government remained actively involved in shap- 
ing Japan's economic future. Electronics were in the forefront in 
the 1980s, but the importance of other industries appeared to be 
rising by the end of the decade. These industries included compos- 
ite materials, industrial ceramics, space development (including 
satellites and launch vehicles), and superconductors (and products 
using them, such as magnetic levitation trains). The government's 
strong belief that such industries will be critical for the nation's 
future will likely foster active participation in these industries by 
Japanese firms. As these industries develop, they are also likely 
to become the subject of trade disputes insofar as industrial policy 
concerns might limit imports and result in an export push that other 
nations would resent. On the other hand, because Japan is at the 
technological frontier with other nations in these industries, Japa- 
nese development might produce more original technologies that 
other nations would be eager to acquire, perhaps creating greater 
mutual dependence. 

* * * 

Information and analysis in English on Japanese international 
economic relations are widely available. Excellent survey articles 
can be found in The Political Economy of Japan: Vol. 2, The Interna- 
tional Dimension, edited by Takeshi Inoguchi and Daniel Okimoto. 
Bela Belassa and Marcus Noland's Japan in the World Economy dis- 
cusses both macroeconomic and microeconomic dimensions of 
Japan's foreign economic relations, and Edward J. Lincoln's Japan's 
Unequal Trade focuses on Japanese import behavior. Each year the 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry publishes a review 
of international economic relations in its Tsusho Hakusho (Trade 
White Paper), abridged versions of which are available in English 
translation. 

Current information is also available in a variety of specialized 
periodicals, including the Japan Economic Journal, Tokyo Business 
Today, Far Eastern Economic Review, and Asian Wall Street Journal. 

Detailed trade and other international data are published in both 
Japanese and English in the Bank of Japan's Economic Statistics An- 
nual, and the Japan Statistical Yearbook of the Prime Minister's Office. 



301 



Japan: A Country Study 

Balance of payments data are available through the Bank of Japan's 
Balance of Payments Monthly (which also gives annual data), and trade 
data are available in the Japan Tariff Association's Summary Report, 
Trade of Japan. More detailed trade data are provided by the Japan 
Tariff Association's Japan's Exports and Imports. (For further infor- 
mation and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



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Chapter 6. The Political System 



Family crest of a double-petal chrysanthemum (kiku), a blossom that symbolizes 
nobility and purity; used by the imperial family 



IN 1990, JAPAN'S oldest living person was Fujisawa Mitsu, 113 
years old. In the year of her birth, 1876 (the ninth year of the 
1868-1912 Meiji era), the government ended the special status of 
the samurai, taking away their stipends and prohibiting them from 
wearing swords. Members of the new ruling elite traveled to Europe 
and the United States to study Western political ideas and institu- 
tions. Mitsu was thirteen when the Meiji Constitution was promul- 
gated, a constitution combining traditional nationalistic thought 
with German legal and political concepts. The most influential 
Meiji-era advocate of Anglo-American liberalism, Fukuzawa 
Yukichi, died in 1901 when Mitsu was twenty-five. She was middle- 
aged when political parties controlled the government during the 
"Taisho democracy" era of the early to middle 1920s and revolu- 
tionary Marxism was popular among university students and in- 
tellectuals. The "Showa fascism" of the 1930s and 1940s was in 
large measure a reaction against these Westernizing trends. When 
General Douglas MacArthur landed in Japan and began the United 
States occupation in 1945, Mitsu was sixty-nine years old. Her 
robust old age witnessed the reintroduction of Western-style 
liberalism, the emergence of a stable parliamentary system under 
the dominance of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP — Jiyu- 
Minshuto), the rise of the new left, and postwar Japan's most dra- 
matic episode of romantic rightist theater, writer Mishima Yukio's 
self-immolation in 1970. 

That the lifespan of a single person could encompass such dra- 
matic and abrupt changes suggests the heterogeneity of contem- 
porary Japanese political values. The country has been host to a 
wide range of often conflicting foreign influences: Prussian sta- 
tism, French radicalism, Anglo-American liberalism, Marxism and 
Marxism-Leninism, and European fascism. Mitsu lived to see the 
kokutai (national polity) ideology enshrined in the Meiji Constitu- 
tion and overthrown in the postwar Constitution. The fact that a 
person living in 1990 had been born in the twilight of Japan's feu- 
dal regime suggests that some of the older values remained viable. 
Certainly Japan's economic dynamism is often explained in terms 
of the coupling of feudal values with the efficiency of modern or- 
ganization. Political scientists seeking to describe the distinctive 
features of Japanese politics also point to the feudal legacy behind 
them. These features include the nature of decision making, the 
generally pragmatic spirit of Japanese politics and, especially, the 



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Japan: A Country Study 

post- 1955 successes of the conservative LDP, which has epitomized 
feudal personalism. 

Maintaining power uninterruptedly for nearly four decades, the 
LDP was able to promote a highly stable policy-making process. 
Its leaders functioned as brokers, joining the expertise of the elite 
civil service with the demands of important interest groups. The 
role of these leaders, however, was not passive. Since the 1960s, 
the party's policy-making power has increased while that of the 
bureaucracy has declined. Although political scandals were frequent, 
tarnishing the general image of politicians, the system succeeded 
in providing most groups in society with adequate representation 
and a share of prosperity. The Japanese middle-class in the early 
1990s was large and stable. 

At the same time, opposition parties were divided and gener- 
ally ineffectual. Although they performed an important monitor- 
ing function, they seemed in the early 1990s incapable of joining 
forces or providing a credible alternative to the ruling party. The 
general election of February 18, 1990 still gave the scandal- shaken 
LDP a stable majority in the lower house, making it likely that 
not only Mitsu's great- great- grandchildren, but also her great-great- 
great grandchildren, would grow to maturity under a LDP prime 
minister. 

The Postwar Constitution 

On July 26, 1945, Allied leaders Winston Churchill, Harry S. 
Truman, and Joseph Stalin issued the Potsdam Declaration, which 
demanded Japan's unconditional surrender. This declaration also 
defined the major goals of the postsurrender Allied occupation: 
"The Japanese government shall remove all obstacles to the revival 
and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese 
people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as 
respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established" (Sec- 
tion 10). In addition, this document stated: "The occupying forces 
of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objec- 
tives have been accomplished and there has been established in ac- 
cordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a 
peacefully inclined and responsible government" (Section 12). The 
Allies sought not merely punishment or reparations from a milita- 
ristic foe, but fundamental changes in the nature of its political 
system. In the words of political scientist Robert Ward: "The oc- 
cupation was perhaps the single most exhaustively planned opera- 
tion of massive and externally directed political change in world 
history." 



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The Political System 



The wording of the Potsdam Declaration — "The Japanese 
Government shall remove all obstacles . . ." — and the initial post- 
surrender measures taken by MacArthur, the Supreme Commander 
for the Allied Powers (SCAP), suggest that neither he nor his 
superiors in Washington intended to impose a new political sys- 
tem on Japan unilaterally. Instead, they wished to encourage new 
Japanese leaders to initiate democratic reforms on their own. But 
by early 1946, MacArthur' s staff and Japanese officials were at 
odds over the most fundamental issue, the writing of a new consti- 
tution. Prime Minister Shidehara Kijuro and many of his colleagues 
were extremely reluctant to take the drastic step of replacing the 
1889 Meiji Constitution with a more liberal document. In late 1945, 
Shidehara appointed Matsumoto Joji, state minister without port- 
folio, head of a blue-ribbon committee of constitutional scholars 
to suggest revisions. The Matsumoto Commission's recommen- 
dations, made public in February 1946, were quite conservative 
(described by one Japanese scholar in the late 1980s as "no more 
than a touching-up of the Meiji Constitution"). MacArthur re- 
jected them outright and ordered his staff to draft a completely new 
document. This was presented to surprised Japanese officials on 
February 13, 1946. 

The MacArthur draft, which proposed a unicameral legislature, 
was changed at the insistence of the Japanese to allow a bicameral 
legislature, both houses being elected. In most other important 
respects, however, the ideas embodied in the February 13 docu- 
ment were adopted by the government in its own draft proposal 
of March 6. These included the Constitution's most distinctive fea- 
tures: the symbolic role of the emperor, the prominence of guaran- 
tees of civil and human rights, and the renunciation of war. The 
new document was approved by the Privy Council, the House of 
Peers, and the House of Representatives, the major organs of 
government in the 1889 constitution, and promulgated on Novem- 
ber 3, 1946, to go into effect on May 3, 1947. Technically, the 
1947 Constitution was an amendment to the 1889 document rather 
than its abrogation. 

The new Constitution would not have been written as it was had 
MacArthur and his staff allowed Japanese politicians and constitu- 
tional experts to resolve the issue as they wished. The document's 
foreign origins have, understandably, been a focus of controversy 
since Japan recovered its sovereignty in 1952. Yet in late 1945 and 
1946, there was much public discussion on constitutional reform, 
and the MacArthur draft was apparently greatly influenced by the 
ideas of certain Japanese liberals. The MacArthur draft did not 
attempt to impose an American- style presidential or federal system. 



307 



Japan: A Country Study 



Instead, the proposed Constitution conformed to the British model 
of parliamentary government, which was seen by the liberals as 
the most viable alternative to the European absolutism of the Meiji 
Constitution. 

After 1952 conservatives and nationalists attempted to revise the 
Constitution to make it more ' 'Japanese," but these attempts were 
frustrated for a number of reasons. One was the extreme difficulty 
of amending it. Amendments require approval by two-thirds of 
the members of both houses of the National Diet (see Glossary; 
The Legislature, this ch.), before they can be presented to the people 
in a referendum (Article 96). Also, opposition parties, occupying 
more than one- third of the Diet seats, were firm supporters of the 
constitutional status quo. Even for members of the ruling LDP, 
the Constitution was not disadvantageous. They had been able to 
fashion a policy-making process congenial to their interests within 
its framework. Nakasone Yasuhiro, a strong advocate of constitu- 
tional revision during much of his political career, for example, 
downplayed the issue while serving as prime minister between 1982 
and 1987. 

The Status of the Emperor 

In the Meiji Constitution, the emperor was sovereign and the 
locus of the state's legitimacy: as the preamble stated, "The rights 
of sovereignty of the State, We have inherited from Our Ances- 
tors, and We shall bequeath them to Our descendants." In the 
postwar Constitution, the emperor's role in the political system was 
drastically redefined. A prior and important step in this process 
was Emperor Hirohito's 1946 New Year's speech, made at the 
prompting of MacArthur, renouncing his status as a divine ruler. 
Hirohito declared that relations between the ruler and his people 
cannot be based on "the false conception that the emperor is di- 
vine or that the Japanese people are superior to other races." 

In the first article of the new Constitution, the newly "hu- 
manized" ruler is described as "the symbol of the State and of 
the unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the 
people with whom resides sovereign power. " The authority of the 
emperor as sovereign in the 1 889 constitution was broad and un- 
defined. His functions under the postwar system are narrow, spe- 
cific, and largely ceremonial, confined to such activities as convening 
the Diet bestowing decorations on deserving citizens, and receiv- 
ing foreign ambassadors (Article 7). He does not possess "powers 
related to government" (Article 4). The change in the emperor's 
status was designed to preclude the possibility of military or 
bureaucratic cliques exercising broad and irresponsible powers "in 



308 




Emperor Akihito and Empress Michiko at a press conference, 1989 

Courtesy The Mainichi Newspapers 

the emperor's name" — a prominent feature of 1930s extremism. 
The Constitution defines the Diet as the "highest organ of state 
power" (Article 41), accountable not to the monarch but to the 
people who elected its members. 

The use of the Japanese word shocho, meaning symbol, to describe 
the emperor is unusual and — depending upon one's viewpoint — 
conveniently or frustratingly vague. The emperor is neither head 
of state nor sovereign, as are many European constitutional 
monarchs, although in October 1988 Japan's Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs claimed, controversially, that the emperor is the country's 
sovereign in the context of its external relations. Nor does the em- 
peror have an official priestly or religious role. Although he con- 
tinues to perform ancient rituals, such as ceremonial planting of 
the rice crop in spring, he does so in a private capacity. 

Laws relating to the imperial house must be approved by the 
Diet. Under the old system, the Imperial House Law was separate 
from and equal with the constitution. After the war, the imperial 
family's extensive estates were confiscated and its finances placed 
under control of the Imperial Household Agency, part of the Office 
of the Prime Minister and theoretically subject to the Diet. In prac- 
tice, the agency in the early 1990s remained a bastion of conser- 
vatism, its officials shrouding the activities of the emperor and his 



309 



Japan: A Country Study 

family behind a "chrysanthemum curtain" (the chrysanthemum 
being the crest of the imperial house) to maintain an aura of sanc- 
tity. Despite knowledge of his illness among the press corps and 
other observers, details about the late Emperor Hirohito's state of 
health in 1988 and 1989 were tightly controlled. In the early 1990s, 
the use of the masculine pronoun to describe the emperor was ap- 
propriate because the Imperial Household Law still restricted the 
succession to males — despite the fact that in earlier centuries some 
of Japan's rulers had been women (see Nara and Heian Periods, 
A.D. 710-1185, ch. 1). 

The emperor's constitutional status became a focus of renewed 
public attention following news of Hirohito's serious illness in late 
1988. Crown Prince Akihito became the first person to ascend the 
throne under the postwar system. One important symbolic issue 
was the choice of a new reign title under the gengo system — bor- 
rowed originally from imperial China and used before 1945 — which 
enumerates years beginning with the first year of a monarch's reign. 
Thus 1988 was Showa 63, the sixty-third year of the reign of 
Hirohito, the Showa Emperor. The accession of a new monarch 
is marked by the naming of a new era that consists of two auspi- 
cious Chinese characters. Showa, for example, means bright har- 
mony. Critics deplored the secrecy with which such titles were 
chosen in the past, the decision being left to a government-appointed 
committee of experts, and advocated public discussion of the choice 
as a reflection of Japan's democratic values. Although the gengo 
system was accorded official status by a bill the Diet passed in June 
1979, some favored the system's abandonment altogether in 
favor of the Western calendar. But on January 7, 1989, the day 
of Hirohito's death, the government announced that Heisei (Achiev- 
ing Peace) was the new era name. The first year of Heisei thus 
was 1989, and all official documents were so dated. 

Still more controversial were the ceremonies held in connection 
with the late emperor's funeral and the new emperor's accession. 
State support of these activities would have violated Article 20 of 
the Constitution on the separation of state and religious activities. 
Rightists, such as members of the Society to Protect Japan (Nihon 
o Mamoru Kai), a nationwide lobbying group, demanded full pub- 
lic support of the ceremonies as expression of the people's love for 
their monarch. Walking a tightrope between pro-Constitution and 
rightist groups, the government chose to divide Hirohito's state 
funeral, held February 24, 1989, into official and religious com- 
ponents. Akihito 's accession to the throne in November 1990 also 
had religious (Shinto) and secular components: the Sokui-no- 
rei, or Enthronement Ceremony, was secular; the Daijosai, or Great 



310 



The Political System 



Thanksgiving Festival — traditionally, a communion between the 
new monarch and the gods in which the monarch himself became 
a deity — was religious. The government's decision to use public 
funds not only for the Sokui-no-rei but also for the Daijosai, justi- 
fied in terms of the "public nature" of both ceremonies, was seen 
by religious and opposition groups as a serious violation of Article 
20. 

In the early 1990s, an array of such symbolic political issues 
brought attention to the state's role in religious or quasi-religious 
activities. Defenders of the Constitution, including Japanese Chris- 
tians, followers of new religions, leftists, and many members of 
the political opposition, considered any government involvement 
in religious aspects of the enthronement to be a conservative at- 
tempt to undermine the spirit, if not the letter, of the Constitu- 
tion. They also strongly criticized the 1989 Ministry of Education, 
Science, and Culture's controversial directive, which called for the 
playing of the prewar national anthem ("Kimigayo," or "The 
Sovereign's Reign") and display of the rising sun flag (Hinomaru, 
the use of which dates to the early nineteenth century) at public 
school ceremonies. Although since the late 1950s, these activities 
had been described by the ministry as "desirable," neither had 
legal status under the postwar Constitution. 

Another issue was state support for the Yasukuni Shrine. This 
shrine, located in Tokyo near the Imperial Palace, was established 
during the Meiji era as a repository for the souls of soldiers and 
sailors who died in battle, thus a holy place rather than simply a 
war memorial. Conservatives introduced bills five times during the 
1970s to make it a "national establishment," but none was adopted. 
On the fortieth anniversary of the end of World War II, August 15, 
1985, Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro and members of his cabi- 
net visited the shrine in an official capacity, an action viewed as 
a renewed conservative effort, outside the Diet, to invest the shrine 
with official status. 

Despite the veneer of Westernization and Article 20 's prohi- 
bition of state support of the emperor's religious or ceremonial 
activities, his postwar role was in some ways more like that 
of traditional rather than prewar emperors. During the Meiji 
(1868-1912), Taisho (1912-26), and early Showa (1926-89) eras, 
the emperor himself was not actively involved in politics. His po- 
litical authority, however, was immense, and military and bureau- 
cratic elites acted in his name. The "symbolic" role of the emperor 
after 1945, however, recalled feudal Japan, where political power 
was monopolized and exercised by the shoguns, and the imperial 
court carried on a leisurely, apolitical existence in the ancient capital 



311 



Japan: A Country Study 

of Kyoto and served as patrons of culture and the arts (see 
Kamakura and Muromachi Periods, 1185-1573, ch. 1; Religious 
and Philosophical Traditions, ch. 2). 

Emperor Akihito, in an effort to put a modern face on the 
Japanese monarchy, held a press conference on August 7, 1989, 
his first since ascending to the throne. He expressed his determi- 
nation to respect the Constitution and promote international un- 
derstanding. 

The Article 9 "No War" Clause 

Another distinctive feature of the Constitution, and one that has 
generated as much controversy as the status of the emperor, is the 
Article 9 "No War" clause. It contains two paragraphs: the first 
states that the Japanese people "forever renounce war as a sover- 
eign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means 
of settling international disputes," the second that "land, sea, and 
air forces, as well as other war potential will never be maintained. " 
Some historians attribute the inclusion of Article 9 to Charles Kades, 
one of MacArthur's closest associates, who was impressed by the 
spirit of the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact renouncing war (see 
Diplomacy, ch. 1). MacArthur himself claimed that the idea had 
been suggested to him by Prime Minister Shidehara. The article's 
acceptance by the Japanese government may in part be explained 
by the desire to protect the imperial throne. Some Allied leaders 
saw the emperor as the primary factor in Japan's warlike behavior. 
His assent to the "No War" clause weakened their arguments in 
favor of abolishing the throne or trying the emperor as a war crim- 
inal. 

Article 9 has had broad implications for foreign policy, the in- 
stitution of judicial review as exercised by the Supreme Court, the 
status of the Self-Defense Forces, and the nature and tactics of op- 
position politics (see Major Foreign Policy Goals and Strategies, 
ch. 7; The Self-Defense Forces, ch. 8). During the late 1980s, in- 
creases in government appropriations for the Self-Defense Forces 
averaged more than 5 percent per year. By the early 1990s, Japan 
was ranked third, behind the Soviet Union and the United States, 
in total defense expenditures, and the United States urged Japan 
to assume a larger share of the burden of defense of the western 
Pacific. Given these circumstances, some have viewed Article 9 as 
increasingly irrelevant. It has remained, however, an important 
brake on the growth of Japan's military capabilities. Despite the 
fading of bitter wartime memories, the general public, according 
to opinion polls, continued to show strong support for this con- 
stitutional provision. 



312 



The cenotaph for victims of the atomic bomb, Peace Memorial Park, 
Hiroshima. The Atomic Bomb Dome, at the epicenter of the 1945 

detonation, is seen through the arch. 

Courtesy Jane T. Griffin 

Rights and Duties of Citizens 

"The rights and duties of the people" are prominently featured 
in the postwar Constitution. Altogether, 31 of its 103 articles are 
devoted to describing them in considerable detail, reflecting the 
commitment to "respect for the fundamental human rights" of 
the Potsdam Declaration. Although the Meiji Constitution had a 
section devoted to the "rights and duties of subjects," which guaran- 
teed "liberty of speech, writing, publication, public meetings, and 
associations," these rights were granted "within the limits of law." 
Freedom of religious belief was allowed "insofar as it does not in- 
terfere with the duties of subjects" (all Japanese were required to 
acknowledge the emperor's divinity, and those, such as Christians, 
who refused to do so out of religious conviction were accused of 
lese-majeste). 

Such freedoms are delineated in the postwar Constitution without 
qualification. In addition, the later Constitution guarantees free- 
dom of thought and conscience; academic freedom; the prohibi- 
tion of discrimination based on race, creed, social status, or family 
origin; and a number of what could be called welfare rights: the 



313 



Japan: A Country Study 



right to "minimum standards of wholesome and cultured living," 
the right to "equal education," the "right and obligation to work" 
according to fixed standards of labor and wages, and the right of 
workers to organize. Equality of the sexes and the right of mar- 
riage based on mutual consent (in contrast to arranged marriage 
in the most traditional sense, in which families decide on the match) 
are also recognized. Limitations are placed on personal freedoms 
only insofar as they are not abused (Article 12) or interfere with 
public welfare (Article 13). The bestowal of the power of judicial 
review on the Supreme Court (Article 81) is in part meant to serve 
as a means of defending individual rights from infringement by 
public authorities (see The Judicial System, this ch.). 

Some United States origins of the Constitution are revealed in 
the phraseology of Article 13, which states that the right of the people 
to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" shall be the "supreme 
consideration in legislation and other governmental affairs." It was 
with some awkwardness that such concepts were translated into 
Japanese. Yet the document goes further in enumerating rights 
than do the United States and many other Western constitutions. 
For example, the article pertaining to equality of the sexes (Arti- 
cle 14) bans sexual (as well as racial, religious, and social) discrimi- 
nation "in political, economic, or social relations" as clearly as 
the proposed United States equal rights amendment, which failed 
to be ratified during the 1970s and 1980s. Unlike their Japanese 
counterparts, United States schoolteachers and university profes- 
sors are not protected by a special provision on academic freedom 
(Article 23). Instead, American teaching and research activities are 
subsumed under the more general guarantee of freedom of speech 
in the First Amendment. 

The Structure of Government 

The Legislature 

Article 41 of the Constitution describes the National Diet, or 
national legislature, as "the highest organ of state power" and "the 
sole law-making organ of the State" (see fig. 7). This statement 
is in forceful contrast to the Meiji Constitution, which described 
the emperor as the one who exercised legislative power with the 
consent of the Diet. The Diet's responsibilities include not only 
the making of laws but also the approval of the annual national 
budget that the government submits and the ratification of treaties. 
It can also initiate draft constitutional amendments, which, if ap- 
proved, must be presented to the people in a referendum. The Diet 
may conduct "investigations in relation to government" (Article 



314 



The Political System 



62). The prime minister must be designated by Diet resolution, 
establishing the principle of legislative supremacy over executive 
government agencies (Article 67). The government can also be dis- 
solved by the Diet if it passes a motion of no confidence introduced 
by fifty members of the House of Representatives, the lower cham- 
ber. Government officials, including the prime minister and cabi- 
net members, are required to appear before Diet investigative 
committees and answer inquiries. The Diet also has the power to 
impeach judges convicted of criminal or irregular conduct. 

Japan's legislature is bicameral. Both the upper house, the House 
of Councillors, and the lower house, the House of Representatives, 
are elective bodies. The Constitution's Article 14 declares that 
' 4 peers and peerages shall not be recognized." Upon its enactment, 
the old House of Peers was abolished. Members of the two new 
houses are elected by universal adult suffrage, and secrecy of the 
ballot is guaranteed (Article 15). The term of the House of Repre- 
sentatives is four years. It may be dissolved earlier, however, if 
the prime minister or members of the House of Representatives 
decide to hold a general election before the expiration of that term 
(Article 7). Multiple representatives are elected from 130 con- 
stituencies based theoretically on population (see The Electoral 
System, this ch.). In 1990 the House of Representatives had 512 
members. 

Members of the House of Councillors have six-year terms. One 
half of these terms expire every three years. There are two types 
of constituencies in the upper house: prefectural constituencies, for 
the forty-seven prefectures and districts, represented by 152 coun- 
cillors, apportioned according to the district populations; and a na- 
tional "proportional representation" constituency, represented by 
100 councillors, which yields a total of 252. The proportional 
representation system, introduced in 1982, was the first major elec- 
toral reform under the postwar Constitution. Instead of choosing 
national constituency candidates as individuals, as had previously 
been the case, voters cast ballots for parties. Individual council- 
lors, listed officially by the parties before the election, are selected 
on the basis of the parties' proportions of the total national constit- 
uency vote. The system was introduced to reduce the excessive 
money spent by candidates for the national constituencies. Critics 
charged, however, that this new system benefited the two largest 
parties, the LDP and Japan Socialist Party (Nihon Shakaito), which 
in fact had sponsored the reform. 

The House of Representatives has the greater power of the two 
contemporary houses, in contrast to the prewar system in which 
the two houses had equal status. According to Article 59, a bill 



315 



Japan: A Country Study 



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316 



The Political System 



that is approved by the House of Representatives but turned down 
by the House of Councillors returns to the House of Representa- 
tives. If the latter passes the bill with a two- thirds or higher majority 
on this second ballot, the bill becomes law. However, three im- 
portant exceptions to the principle exist, covering the approval of 
the budget, adoption of treaties with foreign countries, and the selec- 
tion of the prime minister. In all three cases, if the upper and lower 
houses have a disagreement that is not resolved by a joint com- 
mittee of the two houses, then after a lapse of thirty days "the de- 
cision of the House of Representatives shall be the decision of the 
Diet" (Articles 60, 61, and 67). Budgeting is an important annual 
political function, setting both taxes and the allowable expenditures 
of all segments of the central government, and the impotence of 
the upper house has been demonstrated on a number of occasions. 
Nevertheless, the House of Councillors, with its fixed terms, can- 
not be dissolved by the prime minister. In times of emergency, 
the cabinet may convene the House of Councillors rather than the 
House of Representatives (Article 54). 

In the July 23, 1989, election for half the members of the House 
of Councillors, the LDP lost its majority. It won only 36 of the 
126 seats contested in the prefectural and national constituencies, 
while the opposition parties together won 90; the largest opposi- 
tion party, the Japan Socialist Party, won 46 (see table 36, Ap- 
pendix). This result gave an admittedly unstable coalition of 
opposition groups the opportunity to use the limited powers of the 
upper house to delay or frustrate initiatives taken in the LDP- 
dominated lower house. On August 9, 1989, for the first time in 
forty-one years, the two houses nominated two different candidates 
for prime minister — Kaifu Toshiki of the LDP and Doi Takako 
of the Japan Socialist Party. Although Kaifu was finally chosen 
because of the principle of lower house supremacy, the events 
showed how opposition control of the upper house could compli- 
cate the political process. In March 1990, the upper house rejected 
a supplementary budget bill for fiscal year (FY — see Glossary) 1989 
that had been proposed by the lower house. Although the bill was 
eventually approved despite upper house rejection, the wrangling 
caused some minor inconvenience to the country's more than 1 
million national civil servants whose monthly salary payments were 
delayed. The more serious upheaval, that might have occurred had 
there been a real deadlock or a potential shift in fiscal policies 
brought about by the opposition parties, was avoided. 

The Cabinet and Ministries 

In the postwar political system, executive power is vested in the 
cabinet. The cabinet head is the prime minister, responsible for 



317 



Japan: A Country Study 

appointing and dismissing other cabinet members. Cabinet 
ministers include those appointed to head the ministries, twelve 
in number, and ministers of state placed in charge of the commis- 
sions and agencies of the Office of the Prime Minister, which itself 
has the status of a ministry. They include the director general of 
the Defense Agency, equivalent to a minister of defense but lack- 
ing ministerial status (a reflection of the Article 9 renunciation of 
war). Also among the ministers of state are the chief cabinet secre- 
tary, who coordinates the activities of the ministries and agencies, 
conducts policy research, and prepares materials to be discussed 
at cabinet meetings, and the director of the Cabinet Legislative 
Bureau, who advises cabinet members on drafting the legislation 
to be proposed to the Diet. Although the chief cabinet secretary 
does not have ministerial rank, the position is influential within 
the cabinet because of its coordination role. 

The Board of Audit reviews government expenditures and sub- 
mits an annual report to the Diet. The 1947 Board of Audit Law 
gives this body substantial independence from both cabinet and 
Diet control. The Security Council advises the prime minister on 
salaries and other matters pertaining to national government civil 
servants. Semiautonomous public corporations — including public 
housing corporations, financial institutions, and Japan Broadcasting 
Corporation (Nippon Hoso Kyokai — NHK, which was the sole, 
noncommercial public radio and television broadcasting system) — 
had been reduced in number by the privatization of Japan Airlines, 
the Japanese National Railways, the Japan Tobacco and Salt Public 
Corporation, and Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation 
during the 1980s, but there still remained ninety-seven such or- 
ganizations in 1988. 

National government civil servants are divided into "special" 
and "regular" categories. Appointments in the special category 
are governed by political or other factors and do not involve ex- 
aminations. This category includes cabinet ministers, heads of in- 
dependent agencies, members of the Self-Defense Forces, Diet 
officials, and ambassadors. The core of the civil service is com- 
posed of members of the regular category, who are recruited through 
competitive examinations. This group is further divided into junior 
service and upper professional levels, the latter forming a well- 
defined civil service elite (see The Civil Service, this ch.). 

Local Government 

As of 1990, Japan was divided into forty-seven administrative 
divisions: one metropolitan district {to — Tokyo), two urban prefec- 
tures (fu — Kyoto and Osaka), forty-three regular prefectures (ken), 



318 



The Political System 



and one district (do — Hokkaido) (see fig. 8). Large cities were sub- 
divided into wards (ku), and further split into precincts (machi or 
cho), or subdistricts (shicho) and counties (gun). 

Each of the forty-seven local jurisdictions has a governor and 
a unicameral assembly, both elected by popular vote every four 
years. All are required by national law to maintain departments 
of general affairs, finance, welfare, health, and labor. Departments 
of agriculture, fisheries, forestry, commerce, and industry are op- 
tional, depending on local needs. The governor is responsible for 
all activities supported through local taxation or the national 
government. 

Cities (shi) are self-governing units administered independently 
of the larger jurisdictions within which they are located. In order 
to attain shi status, a jurisdiction must have at least 30,000 inhabi- 
tants, 60 percent of whom are engaged in urban occupations. City 
government is headed by a mayor elected for four years by popu- 
lar vote. There are also popularly elected city assemblies. The wards 
(ku) of larger cities also elect their own assemblies, which select ward 
superintendents . 

The terms machi and cho designate self-governing towns outside 
the cities as well as precincts of urban wards. Like the cities, each 
has its own elected mayor and assembly. Villages (son or mura) are 
the smallest self-governing entities in rural areas. They often con- 
sist of a number of rural hamlets (buraku) containing several thou- 
sand people connected to one another through the formally imposed 
framework of village administration. Villages have mayors and 
councils elected to four-years terms. 

Japan has a unitary rather than federal system of government, 
in which local jurisdictions largely depend on national government 
both administratively and financially. Although much less power- 
ful than its prewar counterpart, the Home Ministry, the postwar 
Ministry of Home Affairs, and other national ministries as well, 
have the authority to intervene significandy in regional and local 
government. The result of this power is a high level of organiza- 
tional and policy standardization among the different local govern- 
ments. Because local tax revenues are insufficient to support 
prefectural and city governments, these bodies depend on central 
government for subsidies. The term "30 percent autonomy" is fre- 
quently used to describe local government because that amount 
of revenues is derived from local taxation. Yet local governments 
are not entirely passive. People have a strong sense of local com- 
munity, are highly suspicious of central government, and wish to 
preserve the uniqueness of their prefecture, city, or town. Some 
of the more progressive jurisdictions, such as Tokyo and Kyoto, 



319 



Japan: A Country Study 



NATIONAL 
GOVERNMENT 



METROPOLIS 

(TO) 
TOKYO 



(KU) 



WARDS | SUBDISTRjCTS 



(SHICHO) 









f 






CITIES 


| COUNTIES 




(SHI) 


| (GUN) 



URBAN 
PREFECTURES 

_ (FU) 
KYOTO, OSAKA 



CITIES 

(SHI) 



COUNTIES 

(GUN) 




SUBDISTRJCTS 

(SHICHO) 



COUNTIES 

(GUN) 



TOWNS 

(CHO or 
MACHI) 



CHOKA1 



VILLAGES 


r 1 


(SON or 


"4 BURAKU \ 


MURA) 


L j 



L.J 

INDICATES 
ADMINISTRATIVE 
UNITS THAT LACK 
LEGAL STATUS 



Figure 8. Structure of Local Government, 1990 



have experimented with policies in such areas as social welfare that 
later were adopted by the national government. 

The Electoral System 

The Japanese political system has three types of elections: general 
elections to the House of Representatives held every four years (un- 
less the lower house is dissolved earlier), elections to the House 
of Councillors held every three years to choose one-half of its mem- 
bers, and local elections held every four years for offices in prefec- 
tures, cities, and villages. Elections are supervised by election 
committees at each administrative level under the general direc- 
tion of the Central Election Administration Committee. The mini- 
mum voting age for persons of both sexes is twenty years; voters 
must satisfy a three-month residency requirement before being 



320 



The Political System 



allowed to cast a ballot. For those seeking office, there are two sets 
of age requirements: twenty-five years of age for admission to the 
House of Representatives and most local offices, and thirty years 
of age for admission to the House of Councillors and the prefec- 
tural governorship. 

In the general election of February 18, 1990, the thirty-ninth 
held since the first parliamentary election in July 1890, the 130 
multiple-seat election districts of the House of Representatives 
returned two to five representatives, depending on their popula- 
tion. There were two exceptions: the district encompassing the 
Amami Islands, south of Kyushu, elected only one representative 
to the lower house, while the first district of Hokkaido elected six. 
Successful candidates were those who won at least the fifth largest 
aggregation of votes in a five-person district, the fourth largest in 
a four-person district, and so on. Voters cast their ballots for only 
one candidate. Competition for lower house seats in the February 
1990 general election varied from district to district. Tokyo's fourth 
district had seventeen candidates running for five seats, while the 
second district in Ibaraki Prefecture had only four persons run- 
ning for three seats. In Okinawa Prefecture's single five- seat dis- 
trict, there were only six candidates. 

In House of Councillors elections, the prefectural constituencies 
elect from two to eight councillors depending on their population. 
Each voter casts one ballot for a prefectural candidate and a sec- 
ond one for a party in the national constituency system. 

Percentages of eligible voters casting ballots in postwar elections 
for the House of Representatives have varied within a rather nar- 
row range, from 76.9 percent in May 1958 to 67.9 percent in De- 
cember 1983. The figure for the February 18, 1990, general election 
was 72.4 percent. Although interest in politics is greater in urban 
than rural areas, voter turnout in the latter is generally higher, 
probably because constituents have a greater personal stake in such 
elections. 

Elections and Political Funding 

Partly as a result of revelations following the Recruit scandal 
of 1988-89, the problem of political funding was intensely debated 
during the late 1980s and early 1990s. The scandal arose through 
the dealings of Ezoe Hiromasa, ambitious chairman of the board 
of the Recruit Corporation (a professional search service that had 
diversified into finance and real estate, and had become involved 
in politics), who sold large blocks of untraded shares in a subsidi- 
ary, Recruit Cosmos, to seventy-six individuals. When the stock 



321 



Japan: A Country Study 

was traded over the counter in 1986, its price jumped, earning 
individual investors as much as ¥100 million (for value of the 
yen — see Glossary) in after-sales profits. The persons involved in- 
cluded the most influential leaders of the LDP (usually through 
their aides or spouses) and a smaller number of opposition party 
figures. Although such insider trading was not strictly illegal, it 
caused public outrage at a time when the ruling party was con- 
sidering a highly controversial consumption tax. Before the scan- 
dal ran its weary course, Takeshita Noboru was obliged to resign 
as prime minister in April 1989, a senior aide committed suicide 
in expiation for his leader's humiliation, and former Prime Minister 
Nakasone Yasuhiro resigned from the LDP — becoming an ''in- 
dependent" Diet member — to spare the much-tainted party fur- 
ther shame. 

Regarding the background issue of political funding, a group 
of parliamentarians belonging to the ruling LDP estimated in 1987 
that annual expenses for ten newly elected members of the Diet 
averaged ¥120 million each, or about $US800,000 (see table 34, 
Appendix). This figure, which included expenses for staff and con- 
stituent services in a member's home district, was less than the aver- 
age for Diet members as a whole, because long-term incumbents 
tend to incur higher expenses. Yet in the late 1980s, the govern- 
ment provided each Diet member with only ¥20 million for an- 
nual operating expenses, leaving ¥100 million to be obtained 
through private contributions, political party faction bosses, or other 
means (see The Liberal Democratic Party, this ch.). The lack of 
public funding meant that politicians — especially, but not exclu- 
sively, members of the LDP — needed constant infusions of cash 
to stay in office. 

Maintaining staff and offices in Tokyo and the home district con- 
stituted the biggest expense. Near-obligatory attendance at the wed- 
dings and funerals of constituents and their families, however, was 
another large financial drain: the Japanese custom requires that 
attendees contribute cash, handed over discreetly in elaborately 
decorated envelopes, to the parents of the bride and groom or to 
the bereaved. 

After revelations of corrupt activities forced the resignation of 
Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei, postwar Japan's most skillful prac- 
titioner of "money politics," in 1974, the 1948 Political Funds Con- 
trol Law was amended to establish ceilings for contributions from 
corporations, other organizations, and individuals. This change 
forced Diet members to seek a larger number of smaller contribu- 
tions to maintain cash flow. Fund-raising parties to which tickets 
were sold were a major revenue source during the 1980s, and the 



322 



The Political System 



abuse of these ticket sales became a public concern. Another re- 
lated problem was the secrecy surrounding political funds and their 
use. Although many politicians, including members of newly ap- 
pointed cabinets, voluntarily disclosed their personal finances, such 
disclosure was not compulsory in the early 1990s and many sources 
of revenue remained obscure. 

Proposals for system reform in the early 1990s included com- 
pulsory full disclosure of campaign funding, more generous pub- 
lic allowances for Diet members to reduce (or, ideally, to eliminate) 
their reliance on under-the-table contributions, and stricter penalties 
for violators, including lengthy periods of being barred from run- 
ning for public office. Some commentators advocated replacement 
of the lower house's multiple-seat election district system with single- 
seat constituencies like those found in Britain and the United States. 
It was argued that the multiple- seat districts made election cam- 
paigning more expensive because party members from the same 
district had to compete among themselves for the votes of the same 
constituents. It was hoped that the smaller size of single-seat districts 
would also reduce the expense of staff, offices, and constituent ser- 
vices. Critics argued, however, that the creation of single- seat con- 
stituencies would virtually eliminate the smaller opposition parties 
and would either create a United States-style two-party system or 
give the LDP an even greater majority in the lower house than 
it enjoyed under the multiple-seat system. 

In contrast with multimillion-dollar United States political cam- 
paigns, direct expenses for the comparatively short campaigns before 
Japanese general, upper house, and local elections were relatively 
modest. The use of posters and pamphlets was strictly regulated, 
and candidates appeared on the noncommercial public television 
station, NHK, to give short campaign speeches. Most of this ac- 
tivity was publicly funded. Campaign sound-trucks wove their way 
through urban and rural streets, often bombarding residents with 
earsplitting harangues from candidates or their supporters. No poli- 
tician, however, could expect to remain in office without considering 
expenses for constituent services the most important component 
of campaign expenses. 

Electoral Districts 

The apportionment of electoral districts in the early 1990s still 
reflected the distribution of the population in the years following 
World War II, when only one-third of the people lived in urban 
areas and two-thirds lived in rural areas. In the next forty- five years, 
the population became more than three-quarters urban, as people 
deserted rural communities to seek economic opportunities in Tokyo 



323 



Japan: A Country Study 

and other large cities (see Migration, ch. 2). The lack of reappor- 
tionment led to a serious underrepresentation of urban voters. Urban 
districts in the House of Representatives were increased by five in 
1964, bringing nineteen new representatives to the lower house; in 
1975, six more urban districts were established, with a total of twenty 
new representatives allocated to them and to other urban districts. 
Yet great inequities remained between urban and rural voters. 

In the early 1980s, as many as five times the votes were needed 
to elect a representative from an urban district, as compared to 
a rural district. Similar disparities existed in the prefectural con- 
stituencies of the House of Councillors. The Supreme Court had 
ruled on several occasions that the imbalance violated the constitu- 
tional principle of one person-one vote. The Supreme Court man- 
dated the addition of eight representatives to urban districts and 
the removal of seven from rural districts in 1986. Several lower 
house districts' boundaries were redrawn. Yet the disparity was 
still as much as three urban votes to one rural vote in the early 1990s. 

After the 1986 change, the average number of total persons per 
lower house representative was 236,424. However, the figure varied 
from 427,761 persons per representative in the fourth district of 
Kanagawa Prefecture, which contains the large city of Yokohama, 
to 142,932 persons in the third district of largely rural and moun- 
tainous Nagano Prefecture. A major reapportionment seemed un- 
likely in the near future, since rural voters remained a major source 
of support for the LDP (see Interest Groups, this ch.). 

The Judicial System 

In contrast to the prewar system, in which executive bodies had 
much control over the courts, the postwar Constitution guaran- 
tees that "all judges shall be independent in the exercise of their 
conscience and shall be bound only by this Constitution and the 
Laws" (Article 76). They cannot be removed from the bench "un- 
less judicially declared mentally or physically incompetent to per- 
form official duties" and they cannot be disciplined by executive 
agencies (Article 78). A Supreme Court justice, however, may be 
removed by a majority of voters in a referendum that occurs at 
the first general election following the justice's appointment and 
every ten years thereafter. As of the early 1990s, however, the elec- 
torate had not used this unusual system to dismiss a justice. 

The Supreme Court, the highest court, is the final court of ap- 
peal in civil and criminal cases. The Constitution's Article 81 desig- 
nates it "the court of last resort with power to determine the 
constitutionality of any law, order, regulation, or official act." The 
Supreme Court is also responsible for nominating judges to lower 
courts, determining judicial procedures, overseeing the judicial 



324 



fiiii 



77z£ Zh>/ building completed in 1936; the House of Representatives is in 
the left wing, the House of Councillors in the right. 

Courtesy Jane T. Griffin 

system including the activities of public prosecutors, and disciplining 
judges and other judicial personnel. It renders decisions from either 
a grand bench of fifteen justices or a petty bench of five. The grand 
bench is required for cases involving constitutionality. The court 
includes twenty research clerks, whose function is similar to that 
of the clerks of the United States Supreme Court. 

The judicial system is unitary: there is no independent system 
of prefectural level courts equivalent to the state courts of the United 
States. Below the Supreme Court, the Japanese system included 
eight high courts, fifty district courts, and fifty family courts in the 
late 1980s. Four of each of the last two types of courts were located 
in Hokkaido, and one of each in the remaining forty- six rural prefec- 
tures, urban prefectures, and the Tokyo Metropolitan District. 
Summary courts, located in 575 cities and towns in the late 1980s, 
performed the functions of small courts and justices of the peace 
in the United States, having jurisdiction over minor offenses and 
civil cases. 

Judicial Review 

The Supreme Court was generally reluctant to exercise the 
powers of judicial review given to it by the Constitution, in large 



325 



Japan: A Country Study 

part because of unwillingness to become involved in politically sen- 
sitive issues. When decisions were rendered on such matters as the 
constitutionality of the Self-Defense Forces, the sponsorship of 
Shinto ceremonies by public authorities, or the Ministry of Edu- 
cation, Science, and Culture's right to determine the content of 
school textbooks or teaching curricula, the court generally took a 
conservative, progovernment stance. 

In the words of political scientist T.J. Pempel, the Supreme Court 
4 'has been an important, if frequently unrecognized, vehicle for 
preserving the status quo in Japan and for reducing the capacity 
of the courts to reverse executive actions." Important exceptions 
to this conservative trend, however, were the rulings on the un- 
constitutionality of the electoral district apportionment system, dis- 
cussed above. 

The Role of Law in Japanese Society 

As in other industrialized countries, law plays a central role in 
Japanese political, social, and economic life. Fundamental differ- 
ences between Japanese and Western legal concepts, however, have 
often led Westerners to believe that Japanese society is based more 
on quasi-feudalistic principles of paternalism (the oyabun-kobun rela- 
tionship) and social harmony, or wa, (see Values, ch. 2). Japan 
has a relatively small number of lawyers, about 13,000 practicing 
in the mid-1980s compared with 667,000 in the United States, a 
country with only twice Japan's population. This fact has been 
offered as evidence that the Japanese are strongly averse to upset- 
ting human relationships by taking grievances to court. In cases 
of liability, such as the crash of a Japan Airlines jetliner in August 
1985, which claimed 520 lives, Japanese victims or their survivors 
were more willing than their Western counterparts would be to ac- 
cept the ritualistic condolences of company presidents (including 
officials' resignations over the incident) and nonjudicially deter- 
mined compensation, which in many cases was less than they might 
have received through the courts. 

Factors other than a cultural preference for social harmony, 
however, explain the court-shy behavior of the Japanese. The 
Ministry of Justice closely screened university law faculty gradu- 
ates and others who wished to practice law or serve as judges. Only 
about 2 percent of the approximately 25,000 persons who applied 
annually to the Ministry's Legal Training and Research Institute 
two-year required course were admitted in the late 1980s. The in- 
stitute graduated only a few hundred new lawyers each year. 
Plagued by shortages of attorneys, judges, clerks, and other per- 
sonnel, the court system was severely overburdened. Presiding 



326 



The Political System 



judges often strongly advised plaintiffs to seek out-of-court settle- 
ments. The progress of cases through even the lower courts was 
agonizingly slow, and appeals carried to the Supreme Court could 
take decades. Faced with such obstacles, most individuals chose 
not to seek legal remedies. If legal personnel were dramatically in- 
creased, which seemed unlikely in the early 1990s, use of the courts 
might approach rates found in the United States and other Western 
countries. 

In the English-speaking countries, law has been viewed tradi- 
tionally as a framework of enforceable rights and duties designed 
to protect the legitimate interests of private citizens. The judiciary 
is viewed as occupying a neutral stance in disputes between in- 
dividual citizens and the state. Legal recourse is regarded as a fun- 
damental civil right. The reformers of the Meiji era (1868-1912), 
however, were strongly influenced by legal theories that had evolved 
in Germany and other continental European states. The Meiji 
reformers viewed the law primarily as an instrument through which 
the state controls a restive population and directs energies to achiev- 
ing the goals of fukoku kyohei (wealth and arms). 

The primary embodiment of the spirit of the law in modern Japan 
has not been the attorney representing private interests but the 
bureaucrat who exercises control through what the sociologist Max 
Weber has called "legal-rational" methods of administration. Com- 
petence in law, acquired through university training, consists of 
implementing, interpreting, and, at the highest levels, formulat- 
ing law within a bureaucratic framework. Many functions per- 
formed by lawyers in the United States and other Western countries 
are the responsibility of civil servants in Japan. The majority of 
the country's ruling elite, both political and economic, has been 
recruited from among the graduates of the Law Faculty of the 
University of Tokyo and other prestigious institutions, people who 
have rarely served as private attorneys. 

Legal-bureaucratic controls on many aspects of Japanese soci- 
ety were extremely tight. The Ministry of Education, Science, and 
Culture, for example, closely supervised both public and private 
universities. Changes in undergraduate or graduate curricula, the 
appointment of senior faculty, and similar actions required minis- 
try approval in conformity with very detailed regulations. Although 
this "control-oriented" use of law did not inhibit the freedom of 
teaching or research (protected by Article 23 of the Constitution), 
it severely limited the universities' scope for reform and innova- 
tion. Controls were even tighter on primary and secondary schools 
(see Education, ch. 3). 



327 



Japan: A Country Study 
Human Rights 

Compared to most of its Asian neighbors and countries in most 
other parts of the world, Japan's record on human rights was com- 
mendable, if not exemplary. With some important exceptions, most 
observers considered informal social pressures a greater factor in 
limiting individual freedom than the coercive actions of the author- 
ities. The ancient Japanese adage that "the nail that sticks up gets 
hammered down" captures the sense that Japanese people are 
pressured more to conform than are people in the more "individu- 
alistic" societies of the West. Some Japanese lower- and upper- 
secondary schools, for example, have adopted extremely strict dress 
codes, determining not only apparel but also the length of hair to 
the exact centimeter. Although defended by conservative educators 
as a way of cultivating discipline and self-control, these codes have 
been widely criticized as violations of students' rights. In another 
example, shopkeepers and local community groups throughout 
Japan canceled sales promotions and festivals in the wake of Em- 
peror Hirohito's illness in late 1988, for fear of being labelled un- 
patriotic. This self-restraint movement cost them billions of yen. 

Although freedom of expression was, for the most part, respected, 
certain matters — particularly those relating to the emperor — were 
widely considered taboo subjects for public figures. Nagasaki City 
mayor Motoshima Hitoshi, a member of the LDP, said in Decem- 
ber 1988 that Hirohito bore some responsibility for World War 
II; he was later ostracized by influential, mainstream politicians, 
his life was threatened on several occasions, and in January 1990, 
he was seriously wounded outside his office by a right-wing ex- 
tremist. Despite the affront to his father, Emperor Akihito visited 
Motoshima after the attempt on his life. 

Despite Article 14's guarantee of sexual equality, women faced 
systematic discrimination in the workplace. They were generally 
expected to quit work after getting married or having children. 
However, the number of lifelong career women grew steadily during 
the 1980s and early 1990s. The Diet's passage of the Law for Equal 
Opportunity in Employment for Men and Women in 1985 was 
of some help in securing women's rights, even though the law was 
a "guideline" and entailed no legal penalties for employers who 
discriminated. The law has, however, been used by women in sev- 
eral court cases seeking equal treatment in such areas as retire- 
ment age (see Gender Stratification and the Lives of Women, ch. 2). 

Human rights had also become an issue because of the police 
practice of obtaining confessions from criminal suspects. Although 
torture was rarely used, suspects were placed under tremendous 



328 



The Political System 



psychological and physical pressures to confess. In several cases, 
the courts acknowledged that confessions were forced and ordered 
prisoners released (see The Criminal Justice System, ch. 8). 

The greatest controversy concerning human rights, however, has 
focused on the social and legal treatment of minorities. Although 
the Japanese considered themselves to be a homogeneous people, 
minorities did exist, and they often suffered severe discrimination. 
The largest group, numbering from 2 million to 4 million in the 
1980s, was the burakumin, descendants of the outcast communi- 
ties of feudal Japan. The Ainu, indigenous inhabitants of north- 
ern Japan; the people of Okinawa; and ethnic Koreans also have 
suffered discrimination (see Minorities, ch. 2). 

Contemporary Political Values 

Japanese politics are generally described as pragmatic, limited 
by particularistic loyalties, and based on human relations rather 
than ideology or principles. The quintessential Japanese leader is 
a network builder rather than the embodiment of charisma or ideals; 
more like the crafty and resourceful founder of the Tokugawa bakufu, 
Tokugawa Ieyasu, than the ruthless but heroic Oda Nobunaga (see 
Reunification, 1573-1600; Tokugawa Period, 1600-1867, ch. 1). 
Such political dynamics are evident, for example, in the workings 
of the LDP, which has held power without interruption since 1955. 

Yet the pragmatic, personalistic view of politics cannot explain 
Japan's militaristic past, the political crises of the 1960s, the con- 
troversies surrounding the emperor, Article 9, or the unwilling- 
ness of many in the Japan Socialist Party, despite a huge political 
cost, to abandon their antiwar and revolutionary commitment in 
the early 1990s. It also fails to account for the apparently sincerely 
held ideological beliefs of the wartime period. The "New Order 
in Greater East Asia' ' was legitimized on the basis of universal prin- 
ciples, such as "pan-Asianism," "international justice," and "per- 
manent peace," even if the results were quite the opposite (see The 
Rise of the Militarists, ch. 1). The nonideological nature of main- 
stream Japanese politics in the postwar period reflects defeat in war, 
the failure after 1945 to find a national ideological consensus to 
replace discredited wartime beliefs, and the commitment of both 
elite and ordinary Japanese to expanding the economy and rais- 
ing living standards. As these goals were attained, a complacent, 
largely apolitical "middle mass society" (a term coined by econo- 
mist Murakami Yasusuke) emerged, in which 90 percent of the 
people in opinion polls consistently classified themselves as "mid- 
dle class." 



329 



Japan: A Country Study 

Community and Leadership 

Certain distinctive features of Japanese politics can be iden- 
tified, although this is not to say that they are unique to Japan. 
Rather, qualities also found in other political systems, such as the 
importance of personal connections and consensus building, played 
an extraordinarily important role in Japanese politics. These fea- 
tures have deep historical roots and reflect values that pervade the 
society as a whole. 

In both feudal and modern eras, a major problem for Japanese 
political leaders has been reconciling the goals of community sur- 
vival and the welfare and self-respect of individuals in an environ- 
ment of extreme scarcity. In recent centuries, Japan lacked the 
natural resources and space to accommodate its population com- 
fortably. With the exception of Hokkaido and colonial territories 
in Asia between 1895 and 1945, there was no "frontier" to ab- 
sorb excess people. One solution was to ignore the welfare of large 
sectors of the population (poor peasants and workers) and to use 
force when they expressed their discontent. Such coercive measures, 
common during both the Tokugawa and World War II periods, 
largely, although not entirely, disappeared in the postwar "wel- 
fare state" (for example, farmers were evicted from their land to 
construct the New Tokyo International Airport at Narita-Sanrizuka 
in the 1970s after long negotiations failed). But noncoercive, or 
mostly noncoercive, methods of securing popular compliance had 
developed to an extraordinary degree in social and political life. 

The most important such method is the promotion of a strong 
sense of community consciousness and group solidarity. Japanese 
individuals are often characterized as having a strong sense of self- 
sacrifice and community dedication. Historians and sociologists note 
that both traditional and modern Japanese communities — the 
buraku, the feudal domain with its retinue of samurai, the large com- 
mercial houses found in Edo (the future Tokyo), Osaka, and Kyoto 
before 1868, and modern corporations and bureaucracies with their 
cohorts of lifetime employees — have striven to be all-inclusive. Such 
groups serve a variety of functions for the individual, providing 
not only income and sustenance but also emotional support and 
individual identity. Japanese called such community inclusive- 
ness the "octopus-pot way of life" (takotsubo seikatsu). Large pots 
with narrow openings at the top are used by fishermen to capture 
octopuses, and the term is used to refer to people so wrapped up 
in their particular social group that they cannot see the world out- 
side its confines. 

The "group consciousness" model of Japanese social life, how- 
ever, has been overstressed at times. A person may often go along 



330 




Grass-roots politics, a candidate's parade in Iwate Prefecture 

Courtesy Eliot Frankeberger 

with group demands because they serve self-interest in the long 
run (for example, political contributions may help secure future 
favors from those in office). Historically, democratic concepts of 
individual rights and limited government have been deeply appeal- 
ing because they, too, promise protection of individual autonomy. 
Despite very different ethical and political traditions, the Japanese 
people were very receptive to imported liberal ideas both before 
and after 1945. John Stuart Mill's essay On Liberty, for example, 
was extremely popular during the Meiji era. 

Because individual, usually passive, resistance to group demands 
occurred, Japanese leaders have found the creation of a strong com- 
munity sense to be a difficult and time-consuming task. Harmony 
(wa), that most prized social value, is not easily attained. One 
mechanism for achieving wa is the use of rituals to develop a psy- 
chological sense of group identity. Political parties and factions, 
the offices of national and local governments, businesses, univer- 
sity departments, research groups, alumni associations, and other 
groups sponsor frequent ceremonies and more informal parties 
for this purpose. A group's history and identity are carefully con- 
structed through the use of songs and symbols (often resembling, 
in miniature, the Meiji government's creation of symbols of kokutai 
in the late nineteenth century). Often, an organization's founder, 



331 



Japan: A Country Study 

especially if deceased, is regarded as something of a Confucian sage 
or a Shinto kami (deity). Group members, however, may find that 
pervasive ritualism allows them to "go through the motions" (such 
as the chanting of banzai (ten thousand years) at the end of politi- 
cal rallies, without having to make a deeper commitment to the 
group. 

A second mechanism to promote community solidarity is the 
building of hierarchical relationships. In this practice, the influence 
of premodern ethics is readily apparent. In what the anthropolo- 
gist Nakane Chie calls Japan's "vertical society," human relation- 
ships are defined in terms of inequality, and people relate to each 
other as superiors and inferiors along a minutely differentiated 
gradient of social status, not only within bureaucratic organiza- 
tions, where it might be expected, but also in academic, artistic, 
and especially, political worlds. 

Hierarchy expresses itself along two dimensions: first, an inter- 
nal community differentiation of rank by seniority, education, and 
occupational status; and second, the distinction between "insiders" 
and "outsiders," between members and nonmembers of the com- 
munity, along with the ranking of whole groups or communities 
along a vertical continuum. Although internal hierarchy can cause 
alienation as inferiors chafe under the authority of their superiors, 
the external kind of hierarchy tends to strengthen group cohesion 
as individual members work to improve their group's relative rank- 
ing. The Japanese nation as a whole has been viewed as a single 
group by its people in relation to other nations. Intense national- 
ism has frequently been a manifestation of group members' desire 
to "catch up and overtake" the advanced ("superior") nations of 
the West, while the rights of non-Western nations, like China or 
Korea, often viewed as "inferior," have been ignored. 

Like group consciousness, however, the theme of hierarchy has 
been overstressed. Contemporary Japanese politics show a strong 
consciousness of equality, and even traditional communities, such 
as rural villages, were often egalitarian rather than hierarchical. 
Citizens' movements of the 1960s and 1970s differed from older 
political organizations in their commitment to promoting intragroup 
democracy. In addressing the nation, Emperor Akihito used col- 
loquial Japanese terms that stressed equality, rather than the for- 
mal, hierarchy-laden language of his predecessors. 

Two mechanisms for lessening the hierarchy- generated tensions 
are the seniority principle and early retirement. As men or women 
grow older, gaining seniority within an organization, they acquire 
authority and higher status. The seniority principle is reinforced 
by the traditional reluctance to place younger persons in positions 



332 



The Political System 



of authority over older ones. The institution of early retirement 
(top-ranked businesspeople and bureaucrats commonly retired at 
age fifty-five or sixty) helps to the keep the promotion of others 
smooth and predictable. The system also helps to enable talented 
individuals to succeed to the most responsible positions and pre- 
vents a small group of older persons (what the Japanese call "one- 
man leaders") from monopolizing leadership positions and impos- 
ing increasingly outmoded ideas on the organization. Elite retirees, 
however, often continue to wield influence as advisers and usually 
pursue second careers in organizations affiliated with the one from 
which they retired. 

The circulation of elites that results from the seniority and early 
retirement principles ensures that everyone within the upper ranks 
of the hierarchy has a turn at occupying a high- status position, such 
as a cabinet post in the national government. This principle, in 
turn, enables people to reward their followers. There has been, for 
example, a regular turnover of LDP leaders. No individual has 
served as party president (and prime minister) longer than Sato 
Eisaku, the incumbent between 1964 and 1972. The average ten- 
ure of party presidents/prime ministers between 1964 and 1987 was 
slightly more than three years. Frequent cabinet reshuffling meant 
that the average tenure of other cabinet ministers in the same period 
was a little less than a year. Japan has not been beset with leaders 
in their seventies and eighties unwilling to give up their powerful 
positions. 

Another mechanism reducing intragroup tensions is the strong 
personal, rather than legalistic or ideological, ties between supe- 
rior and subordinate. These ties are typically characterized in terms 
of fictive familial relationships, analogous to the bonds between 
parents and children (the oyabun-kobun relationship). The ideal leader 
is viewed as a paternalistic one, with a warm and personal con- 
cern for the welfare of his followers. For followers, loyalty is both 
morally prescribed and emotionally sustained by the system. In 
the political world, oyabun-kobun relationships are pervasive despite 
the formal commitment to universalistic, democratic values. At the 
same time, younger people find such relationships less appealing 
than their elders. The so-called shinjinrui (new human beings), born 
in the affluent 1960s and 1970s, were often criticized by older 
Japanese for being self-absorbed, egoistic, and "cool," in the 1980s. 
The younger generation is inclined to view with disdain the emo- 
tional expression of paternalistic ties, such as in the 1989 televi- 
sion broadcasts of former Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei's 
supporters weeping profusely over his political retirement. 



333 



Japan: A Country Study 

Consensus Building 

The community is often demanding, but it is also fragile, be- 
cause social ties are sustained not only through legal norms and 
common self-interest, but also through the affective patron-client 
relationship. Open conflict poses a danger to the survival of this 
sort of community, and thus policy making requires elaborate con- 
sultation and consensus building, usually involving all the parties 
concerned. According to political scientist Lewis Austin, "Every- 
one must be consulted informally, everyone must be heard, but 
not in such a way that the hearing of different opinions develops 
into opposition. The leader and his assistants 'harmonize opin- 
ion'. . . in advance, using go-betweens to avert the confrontation 
of opposing forces. ' ' After a preliminary agreement among all has 
been reached, a formal meeting is held in which the agreed-upon 
policy will be proposed and adopted. 

This process is called nemawashi (root trimming or binding), evok- 
ing the image of a gardener preparing a tree or shrub for trans- 
planting, that is, a change in policy. Austin points out that a 
common Japanese verb meaning "to decide" (matomeru) literally 
means to gather or bring together. Decisions are "the sum of the 
contributions of all." Although consensus building is, for leaders, 
a time-consuming and emotionally exhausting process, it is nec- 
essary not only to promote group goals but also to respect and 
protect individual autonomy. In fact, the process represents recon- 
ciliation of the two. In the political system as a whole, most groups 
played some role in the nemawashi process in the early 1990s. Ex- 
ceptions were those groups or individuals, such as Koreans or 
burakumin, who were viewed as outsiders. 

Political leaders have to maintain solidarity and harmony within 
a single group and also secure the cooperation of different groups 
who are often in bitter conflict. Takotsubo seikatsu can promote de- 
structive sectionalism. During World War II, rivalry between the 
Imperial Army and the Imperial Navy was so intense that it was 
nearly impossible to coordinate their strategic operations. In the 
postwar political system, prime ministers have often been unable 
to persuade different ministries, all self-sufficient and intensely 
jealous "kingdoms," to go along with reforms in such areas as trade 
liberalization. Observers such as journalist Karel G. van Wolferen, 
have concluded that Japan's political system is empty at the center, 
lacking real leadership or a locus of responsibility: "Statecraft in 
Japan is quite different from that in the rest of Asia, Europe, and 
the Americas. For centuries it has entailed the preservation of a 
careful balance of semiautonomous groups that share power. . . . 



334 



The Political System 



These semiautonomous components, each endowed with great dis- 
cretionary powers, are not represented in one central ruling body." 
This view is probably exaggerated. Leadership in other countries, 
including the United States, has been paralyzed from time to time 
by powerful interest groups and some policies in Japan requiring 
decisive leadership, such as the creation of social welfare and energy 
conservation policies in the 1970s and the privatization of state 
enterprises in the 1980s, have been reasonably successful. 

Interest Groups 

The emphasis on consensus in Japanese politics is seen in the 
role of interest groups in policy making. In the early 1990s, these 
groups ranged from those with economic interests, such as occupa- 
tional and professional associations, to those with strong ideologi- 
cal commitments, such as the right-wing Society to Protect Japan 
and the left-wing Japan Teachers Union (Nihon Kyoshokuin 
Kumiai — Nikkyoso). There were groups representing minorities 
(the Burakumin Liberation League, the Central Association of 
Korean Residents in Japan [Chosoren], and Utari Kyokai in 
Hokkaido, representing the Ainu community), groups represent- 
ing war veterans and postwar repatriates from Japan's overseas 
colonies (the Military Pensions Association and the Association of 
Repatriates), the victims of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, and women opposed to prostitution and the threat to 
public morals posed by businesses offering "adult" entertainment 
(the Japan Mothers League). Mayors' and prefectural governors' 
associations promoted regional development. Residents' movements 
near United States military installations in Okinawa and elsewhere 
pressured local authorities to support reductions in base areas and 
to exert more control over United States military personnel off base. 
The great majority of Japanese were connected, either directly or 
indirectly, to one or more of these bodies. 

In the postwar period, extremely close ties emerged among major 
interest groups, political parties, and the bureaucracy. Many groups 
identified so closely with the ruling LDP that it was often difficult 
to discern the borders between party and group membership. 
Officers of agricultural, business, and professional groups were 
elected to the Diet as LDP legislators. Groups of LDP parliamen- 
tarians formed zoku (tribes), which represented the interests of 
occupational constituencies, such as farmers, small businesses, and 
the construction industry. The zoku, interest groups, and bureau- 
crats worked together closely in formulating policy in such areas 
as agriculture (see Bureaucrats and the Policy-making Process, this 
ch.). 



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Japan: A Country Study 



In the case of the Japan Socialist Party, Democratic Socialist 
Party, Japan Communist Party (Nihon Kyosanto), and Komeito 
(Clean Government Party), the links with interest groups were even 
more intimate. Before the Japanese Trade Union Confederation 
(Shin Rengo) was established in 1989, most leaders of the Japan 
Socialist Party and Democratic Socialist Party and many socialist 
Diet members had been officers of the confederation's predeces- 
sors, the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (Nihon Rodo 
Kumiai Sohyogikai, or Sohyo for short) founded in 1950, and the 
Japan Confederation of Labor (Zen Nihon Rodo Sodomei, or 
Domei for short), established in 1964. Despite repeated disavowals, 
the Komeito remained, in the early 1990s, related to its parent body, 
the Soka Gakkai (Value Creation Society), an organization of lay 
followers of the Buddhist sect, Nichiren Shoshu, founded before 
World War II and one of Japan's most successful new religions 
(see Komeito, this ch.; Religious and Philosophical Traditions, 
ch. 2). The communists had their own unions and small business 
groups, which competed with conservative small business associa- 
tions. Japan's relatively few lawyers divided their allegiance among 
three professional groups separately affiliated with the LDP, the 
Japan Socialist Party, and the Japan Communist Party. 

Both the LDP and the opposition parties, which had weak re- 
gional organizations, depended on the interest groups to win elec- 
tions. The interest groups provided funding, blocks of loyal voters 
(although these could not be manipulated as easily as in the past), 
and local organizational networks. 

One important question concerning interest groups in any coun- 
try is how well they represent the diverse concerns of all the citizens. 
A second is whether government responds evenhandedly to their 
demands. Japan's postwar record on both counts was generally 
good. Both major and minor groups in society were well repre- 
sented. And the government has implemented policies to spread 
the blessings of economic growth among the population at large. 
Such arrangements helped to ensure political stability, and to ex- 
plain why, in repeated public opinion polls, 90 percent of respon- 
dents viewed themselves as "middle class." 

After the war, for example, there were major policy changes on 
agriculture. Despite prewar nationalistic idealization of the rural 
village, the government at that time squeezed the farmers for taxes 
and rice. Political scientist Kent C alder observed that "the prewar 
state took heavily from the countryside, without providing much 
in return." Historians describe how many farm families starved, 
or were forced to sell their daughters into prostitution. Respond- 
ing to the threat of vigorous leftist movements in the countryside, 



336 



The Political System 



conservative governments after 1945 initiated price supports for 
rice and other measures that brought the farmers not just a decent 
standard of living but affluence. By the 1970s, it was not uncom- 
mon to encounter group tours of farmers who had never visited 
Tokyo taking holidays in Hawaii or New York City. In Calder's 
view, conservative governments were stoutly probusiness but were 
also willing to coopt other interests such as agriculture at the ex- 
pense of business to ensure social stability and prevent socialist elec- 
toral victories. Sometimes government adopted policies first 
espoused by the opposition (for example, medical insurance and 
other social welfare policies). 

Business Interests 

Links between the corporate world and government were main- 
tained through three national organizations: the Federation of Eco- 
nomic Organizations (Keizai Dantai Rengokai — Keidanren), 
established in 1946; the Japan Committee for Economic Devel- 
opment (Keizai Doyu Kai), established in 1946; and the Japan 
Federation of Employers Association (Nihon Keieishadantai 
Renmei — Nikkeiren), established in 1948. In the early 1990s, 
Keidanren was considered the most important. Its membership in- 
cluded 750 of the largest corporations and 110 manufacturers as- 
sociations. Its Tokyo headquarters served as a kind of "nerve 
center" for the country's most important enterprises, and it worked 
closely with the powerful Ministry of International Trade and In- 
dustry (MITI). There was evidence, however, suggesting that the 
federation's power in the 1990s was not what it had been, partly 
because major corporations, which had amassed huge amounts of 
money by the late 1980s, were increasingly capable of operating 
without its assistance. 

Nikkeiren was concerned largely with labor-management rela- 
tions and with organizing a united business front to negotiate with 
labor unions on wage demands during the annual "Spring Strug- 
gle." The Keizai Doyu Kai, composed of younger and more liberal 
business leaders, assigned itself the role of promoting business' s 
social responsibilities. Whereas Keidanren and Nikkeiren were 
"peak organizations," whose members themselves were associa- 
tions, members of the Keizai Doyu Kai, were individual business 
leaders (see Labor Unions, ch. 4). 

Because of financial support from companies, business interest 
groups were generally more independent of political parties than 
other groups. Both Keidanren and the Keizai Doyu Kai, for ex- 
ample, indicated a willingness to talk with the socialists in the wake 
of the political scandals of 1 988-89 and also suggested that the LDP 



337 



Japan: A Country Study 

might form a coalition government with an opposition party. Yet 
through an organization called the People's Politics Association 
(Kokumin Seiji Kyokai), they and other top business groups pro- 
vided the LDP with its largest source of party funding. 

Small Business 

Japan's streets are lined with small shops, grocery stores, restau- 
rants, and coffeehouses. Although supermarkets and large discount 
department stores were more common in the early 1990s than a 
decade earlier, the political muscle of small business associations 
was reflected in the success with which they blocked the rationali- 
zation of the country's distribution system. The Large-Scale Re- 
tail Store Law of 1973, amended in 1978, made it very difficult 
in the late 1980s for either Japanese or foreign retailers to estab- 
lish large, economically efficient outlets in local communities. 

Many light industrial goods, such as toys, footwear, pencils, and 
kitchen utensils, were still manufactured by small local companies 
rather than imported from the Republic of Korea (South Korea), 
Taiwan, or Hong Kong. Traditional handicrafts, such as pottery, 
silk weaving, and lacquerware, produced using centuries-old 
methods in small workshops, flourished in every part of the coun- 
try. Apart from protectionism of the "nontariff barrier" variety, 
the government assured the economic viability of small enterprises 
through lenient tax policies and access to credit on especially favora- 
ble terms. 

Major associations representing small and medium-sized enter- 
prises included the generally pro-LDP Japan Chamber of Com- 
merce and Industry (Nihon Shoko Kaigisho, or Nissho for short), 
which was established in 1922 but whose origins are traced to the 
establishment of the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
in 1878, the National Central Association of Medium and Small 
Enterprise Associations, the Japan League of Medium and Small 
Enterprise Organizations, and the Japan Communist Party- 
sponsored Democratic Merchants and Manufacturers Association. 

Although small enterprises in services and manufacturing 
preserved cultural traditions and enlivened urban areas, a major 
motivation for government nurture of small business was social wel- 
fare. In Kent Calder's words, "Much of small business, particu- 
larly in the distribution sector, serves as a labor reservoir. Its 
inefficiencies help absorb surplus workers who would be unem- 
ployed if distribution, services, and traditional manufacturing were 
uniformly as efficient as the highly competitive and modernized 
export sectors." 



338 



The Political System 



Agricultural Cooperatives 

Observers have suggested that the great influence of the Cen- 
tral Union of Agricultural Cooperatives (Nokyo) in policy making 
partly resulted from a widespread feeling of gratitude to the dwin- 
dling agricultural sector, which in the past supported the country's 
industrial modernization. Nokyo spokespersons were vociferous in 
their claims that agriculture is somehow intimately connected with 
the spirit of the nation. They argued that self-sufficiency, or near 
self-sufficiency, in food production, resulting from government sup- 
port of the nation's farmers, was central to Japan's security. The 
public in general was receptive to their arguments: an opinion poll 
in 1988, for example, revealed that 70 percent of respondents 
preferred paying a higher price for rice to importing it. 

Nokyo, organized in 1947 at the time of the land reform, had 
local branches in every rural village in the late 1980s. Its constit- 
uent local agricultural cooperatives included practically all of the 
population for which farming was the principal occupation. Since 
its founding, Nokyo had been preoccupied with maintaining and 
increasing government price supports on rice and other crops and 
with holding back the import of cheaper agricultural products from 
abroad. Self-sufficient in rice, Japan in the late 1980s imported 
only a tiny quantity. A special variety of Thai rice, for example, 
is used specifically to make the traditional Okinawan liquor, 
awamori. Nokyo's determination to preserve "Fortress Japan" in 
the agricultural realm had brought it into conflict with business 
groups such as Keidanren, which advocated market liberalization 
and cheaper food prices. 

Although closely allied to the LDP in the past, Nokyo and other 
agricultural groups were outraged by the government's concessions 
to the United States on imports of oranges and beef in 1988. Local 
cooperatives threatened to defect to the Japan Socialist Party if 
government continued to give in to American demands. The Japan 
Socialist Party chairwoman, Doi Takako, made agricultural pro- 
tectionism a major component of her party's platform. 

Labor Organizations 

Postwar labor unions were established with the blessings of the 
occupation authorities. The mechanism for collective bargaining 
was set up, and unions were organized by enterprise: membership 
was determined by company affiliation rather than by skill or in- 
dustry type. In general, membership was also limited to perma- 
nent, nonsupervisory personnel. Observers in the late 1980s viewed 
labor unions' role in the policy-making process as less powerful 



339 



Japan: A Country Study 



than that of business and agricultural organizations because the 
unions' enterprise-based structure made national federations weak 
and unions were closely associated with parties that remained out 
of power. 

The Japan Socialist Party largely depended on Sohyo for fund- 
ing, organizational support, and membership during most of the 
postwar period. Domei performed similar functions for the Dem- 
ocratic Socialist Party. Sohyo was composed primarily of public 
sector unions such as those organized for national civil servants, 
municipal workers, and public school teachers. Domei 's constituent 
unions were principally in the private sector. In the late 1980s, 
however, the labor movement saw significant change. In Novem- 
ber 1987, the National Federation of Private Sector Trade Unions 
(Rengo), an amalgamation of Domei and smaller groups, was 
formed with a membership of 5.5 million workers. After two years 
of intense negotiations, it joined with 2 . 5 million members of public 
sector unions largely affiliated with Sohyo to establish a new en- 
tity, Shin Rengo. With 8 million members, Shin Rengo included 
65 percent of Japan's unionized workers and was, after the Ameri- 
can Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations 
(AFL-CIO) and the British Trades Union Congress, the world's 
third largest noncommunist union federation. 

Shin Rengo was a moderate, nonideological movement that 
shunned involvement with Marxist Japan Communist Party- 
affiliated unions. Two leftist union confederations emerged in the 
wake of Shin Rengo: the 1.2 -million-member Japan Confedera- 
tion of Trade Unions (Zenroren), and the 500,000-member Na- 
tional Trade Union Council (Zenrokyo). The powerful Nikkyoso, 
with 675,000 members in the country's public primary and second- 
ary schools, was divided between adherents and opponents of Shin 
Rengo. 

In the early 1990s, the relationship of Shin Rengo to the socialist 
political parties remained somewhat unclear. It was likely that many 
old support networks would remain in place. Some noted the new 
confederation's potential for promoting opposition party unity be- 
cause it encompassed supporters of the two socialist parties and 
the small Social Democratic League. In the House of Councillors 
election on July 23, 1989, the three parties agreed to support twelve 
Shin Rengo candidates. Eleven of them won. 

Professional Associations and Citizen and Consumer Movements 

Physicians, dentists, lawyers, academics, and other profession- 
als organized associations for the exchange of knowledge, supervi- 
sion of professional activities, and influence of government policy, 



340 



The Political System 



like those found in other developed countries. The Japan Medical 
Association has used its influence to preserve a highly profitable 
system in which physicians, rather than pharmacists, sell prescrip- 
tion drugs. 

Citizens and consumer movements, which became prominent 
during the 1960s and 1970s, were organized around issues relat- 
ing to the quality of life, the protection of the environment from 
industrial pollution, and the safety (although not the cost) of con- 
sumer goods. In the late 1960s, industrial pollution, symbolized 
by the suffering of victims of mercury poisoning caused by the pol- 
lution of Minamata Bay in Kumamoto Prefecture by a chemical 
company, was viewed as a national crisis. The Sato government 
responded by establishing the Environmental Agency in the Office 
of the Prime Minister in 1970, instituting tough penalties for pol- 
luters, and extending compensation to the victims of pollution. In 
the early 1990s, environmental issues continued to be the focus of 
intense local activity. Communities on Ishigaki Island in Okinawa 
Prefecture were divided over whether to construct a new airport 
to handle wide-bodied aircraft on land reclaimed from the sea. Sup- 
porters viewed the project as essential to the island's tourist de- 
velopment, while opponents claimed that construction would 
destroy offshore colonies of rare blue coral and would ruin the local 
fishing industry. Another environmental issue in many parts of 
Japan was the use of powerful chemicals on golf courses, which 
in some cases harmed nearby residents (see Pollution, ch. 2). 

Women's groups were in the forefront of the consumer move- 
ment. In the early 1990s, they included the National Federation 
of Regional Women's Associations, the Housewives Association, 
and the National Association of Consumer Cooperatives. Their 
activities depended on the support of neighborhood women's as- 
sociations, the women's sections of local agricultural and fishing 
cooperatives, and government- sponsored consumer education 
groups. Although boycotts had been organized against companies 
making products that the groups viewed as dangerous (for exam- 
ple, canned foods containing carcinogenic cyclamates), they did 
not, for the most part, demand lower prices for food or other goods. 
In tandem with agricultural interests, consumer groups opposed 
increased food imports on the grounds that supply was unpredic- 
table and that they were laced with dangerous additives. 

The Mass Media and Politics 

Japan is a society awash in information. In the early 1990s, 
newspaper readership was, by a wide margin, the highest in the 
world. The six largest and most influential newspapers were Yomiuri 



341 



Japan: A Country Study 



Shimbun, Mainichi Shimbun, Asahi Shimbun, Seikyo Shimbun, Sankei 
Shimbun, and Nihon Keizai Shimbun. There were also more than 100 
local newspapers. The population, almost 100 percent literate, also 
consumed record numbers of books and magazines. The latter 
ranged from high-quality comprehensive general circulation intellec- 
tual periodicals such as Sekai (World), Chuo Koron (Central Review), 
and Bungei Shunju (Literary Annals) to sarariman manga (salaryman 
comics), comic books for adults that depict the vicissitudes and fan- 
tasies of contemporary office workers, and weeklies specializing 
in scandals. Japan probably also led the world in the translation 
of works by foreign scholars and novelists. Most of the classics of 
Western political thought, such as The Republic by Plato and 
Leviathan by Thomas Hobbes, for example, were available in 
Japanese. 

News programs and special features on television, moreover, gave 
viewers detailed reports on political, economic, and social develop- 
ments both at home and abroad. The sole noncommercial public 
radio and television broadcasting network, the Japan Broadcast- 
ing Corporation (Nippon Hoso Kyokai — NHK) provided gener- 
ally balanced coverage. Unlike their counterparts in the United 
States, however, Japanese newscasters on NHK and commercial 
stations usually confined themselves to relating events and did not 
offer opinions or analysis. 

The major magazines and newspapers were vocal critics of 
government policies and took great pains to map out the person- 
nel and financial ties that held the conservative establishment 
together. Readers were regularly informed of matrimonial alliances 
between families of top politicians, civil servants, and business lead- 
ers, which in some ways resembled those of the old European 
aristocracy. The important print media were privately owned. 

Observers in the early 1990s, however, pointed out that the in- 
dependence of the established press had been compromised by the 
pervasive "press club" system. Politicians and government agen- 
cies each had one of these clubs, which contained from 12 to almost 
300 reporters from the different newspapers, magazines, and broad- 
cast media. Club members were generally described as being closer 
to each other than they were to their employers. They also estab- 
lished a close and collaborative working relationship with the po- 
litical figures or government agencies to which they were attached. 
There was little opportunity for reporters to establish a genuinely 
critical, independent stance because reporting distasteful matters 
might lead to exclusion from the club and thus inability to gain 
information and write. Although the media has played a major role 
in exposing political scandals, some critics have accused the large 



342 



The Political System 



newspapers, ostensibly oppositionist, of being little more than a 
conduit of government ideas to the people. Free-lance reporters, 
working outside the press club system, often made the real break- 
throughs in investigative reporting. For example, a free-lance jour- 
nalist published the first public accounts of Tanaka Kakuei's 
personal finances in a monthly magazine in 1974, even though the 
established press had access to this information. 

The Liberal Democratic Party 

The LDP has dominated the political system since 1955, when 
it was established as a coalition of smaller conservative groups. All 
of Japan's prime ministers since then have come from its ranks 
as have, with one exception, other cabinet ministers. The party's 
fortunes have risen and ebbed: a low point was reached in the July 
23, 1989, election to the upper house, when it became, for the first 
time, a minority party (see The Structure of Government, The 
Liberal Democratic Party in National Elections, this ch.). But no 
opposition party, whether singly or in coalition, was able to oust 
the LDP from power and form a government of its own. 

By the early 1990s, the LDP's nearly four decades in power al- 
lowed it to establish a highly stable process of policy formation. 
This process would not have been possible if other parties had se- 
cured parliamentary majorities. LDP strength was based on an en- 
during, although not unchallenged, coalition of big business, small 
business, agriculture, professional groups, and other interests. Elite 
bureaucrats collaborated closely with the party and interest groups 
in drafting and implementing policy. In a sense, the party's suc- 
cess was a result not of its internal strength but of its weakness. 
It lacked a strong, nationwide organization or consistent ideology 
with which to attract voters. Its leaders were rarely decisive, charis- 
matic, or popular. But it has functioned efficiently as a locus for 
matching interest group money and votes with bureaucratic power 
and expertise. This arrangement resulted in a great deal of cor- 
ruption, but the party could claim credit for helping to create eco- 
nomic growth and a stable, middle-class Japan. 

Party History and Basic Principles 

The LDP has a complex genealogy. Its roots can be traced to 
the groups established by Itagaki Taisuke and Okuma Shigenobu 
in the 1880s (see The Development of Representative Government, 
ch. 1). It attained its present form in November 1955, when the 
conservative Liberal Party (Jiyuto) and Japan Democratic Party 
(Nihon Minshuto) united in response to the threat posed by a uni- 
fied Japan Socialist Party, which had been established the month 



343 



Japan: A Country Study 



before. The union of the two has often been described as a "shot- 
gun marriage. ' ' Both had strong leaders and had previously com- 
peted with each other. The Japan Democratic Party, which had 
been established only a year before, in November 1954, was itself 
a coalition of different groups in which farmers were prominent. 
The result of the new amalgamation was a large party that repre- 
sented a broad spectrum of interests but had minimal organiza- 
tion compared with the socialist and other leftist parties. In 1976, 
in the wake of the Lockheed bribery scandal, a handful of youn- 
ger LDP Diet members broke away and established their own party, 
the New Liberal Club (Shin Jiyu Kurabu). A decade later, however, 
it was reabsorbed by the LDP. 

Unlike the leftist parties, the LDP did not espouse a well-defined 
ideology or political philosophy. Its members held a variety of po- 
sitions that could be broadly defined as being to the right of the 
opposition parties, yet more moderate than those of Japan's numer- 
ous rightist splinter groups (see Political Extremists, this ch.). The 
LDP traditionally identified itself with a number of general goals: 
rapid, export-based economic growth, close cooperation with the 
United States in foreign and defense policies, and several newer 
issues, such as administrative reform. Administrative reform en- 
compassed several themes: simplification and streamlining of 
government bureaucracy, privatization of state-owned enterprises, 
and the adoption of measures, including tax reform, needed to pre- 
pare for the strain on the economy posed by an aging society. Other 
priorities in the early 1990s included promoting a more active and 
positive role for Japan in the rapidly developing Asia-Pacific region, 
internationalizing Japan's economy by liberalizing and promot- 
ing domestic demand, creating a high- technology information 
society, and promoting scientific research. A business-inspired com- 
mitment to free enterprise was tempered by the insistence of im- 
portant small business and agricultural constituencies on some form 
of protectionism. 

Party Structure 

At the apex of the LDP's formal organization was the president, 
who served a two-year renewable term. Because of the party's 
parliamentary majority, the president has been the prime minister. 
The choice was formally that of a party convention composed of 
Diet members and local LDP figures, but in most cases, they merely 
approved the joint decision of the most powerful party leaders. To 
make the system more democratic, Prime Minister Miki Takeo 
introduced a "primary" system in 1978, which opened the ballot- 
ing to some 1.5 million LDP members. The process was so costly 



344 



The Political System 



and acrimonious, however, that it was subsequently abandoned 
in favor of the old "smoke-filled room" method. 

The LDP was the most "traditionally Japanese" of the political 
parties because it relied on a complex network of patron-client 
(pyabun-kobun) relationships on both national and local levels. Na- 
tionally, a system of factions in both the House of Representatives 
and the House of Councillors tied individual Diet members to power- 
ful party leaders. Locally, Diet members had to maintain koenkai 
(local support groups) to keep in touch with public opinion and gain 
votes and financial backing. The importance and pervasiveness of 
personal ties between Diet members and faction leaders and between 
citizens and Diet members gave the party a pragmatic, "you scratch 
my back, I'll scratch yours" character. Its success depended less 
on generalized mass appeal than on jiban (a strong, well-organized 
constituency), kaban (a briefcase full of money), and kanban (presti- 
gious appointment, particularly on the cabinet level). 

Factions 

In a sense, the LDP was not a single organization but a con- 
glomeration of competitive factions, which, despite the traditional 
emphasis on consensus and harmony, engaged in bitter infight- 
ing. Over the years, factions numbered from 6 to 13, with as few 
as 4 members and as many as 120, counting those in both houses. 
The system was operative in both houses, although it was more 
deeply entrenched in the House of Representatives than in the less 
powerful House of Councillors. Faction leaders usually were vet- 
eran LDP politicians. Many, but not all, had served as prime 
minister. 

Faction leaders offered their followers services without which the 
followers would have found it difficult, if not impossible, to sur- 
vive politically. Leaders provided funds for the day-to-day opera- 
tion of Diet members' offices and staff as well as financial support 
during expensive election campaigns. As discussed earlier, the oper- 
ating allowances provided by the government were inadequate. The 
leader also introduced his followers to influential bureaucracts and 
business people, which made it much easier for the followers to 
satisfy their constituents' demands. 

Historically, the most powerful and aggressive faction leader in 
the LDP was Tanaka Kakuei, whose dual-house strength in the 
early 1980s exceeded 110. His followers remained loyal despite the 
fact that he had been convicted of receiving ¥500 million (nearly 
US$4 million) in bribes from the American aircraft manufacturer, 
Lockheed, to facilitate the purchase of its passenger aircraft by All 
Nippon Airways, and had formally withdrawn from the LDP. 



345 



Japan: A Country Study 

Tanaka and his bitterest factional rival, Fukuda Takeo, were a study 
in contrasts. Tanaka was a rough-hewn wheeler-dealer with a 
primary school education who had made a fortune in the construc- 
tion industry; Fukuda was an elite product of the University of 
Tokyo Law Faculty and a career bureaucrat. 

In the face of Fukuda's strong opposition, Tanaka engineered 
the selections of prime ministers Ohira Masayoshi (1978-80) and 
Suzuki Zenko (1980-82). The accession of Nakasone Yasuhiro to 
the prime ministership in 1982 would also not have occurred without 
Tanaka' s support and, as a result, Nakasone, at that time a politi- 
cally weak figure, was nicknamed "Tanakasone." But Tanaka's 
faction was dealt a grave blow when one of his subordinates, 
Takeshita Noboru, decided to form a breakaway group. Tanaka 
suffered a stroke in November 1985, but four years passed before 
he formally retired from politics. 

The LDP faction system was closely fitted to the House of 
Representatives' medium-sized, multiple-member election districts. 
The party usually ran more than one candidate in each of these 
constituencies to maintain its lower house majority, and these can- 
didates were from different factions. During an election campaign, 
the LDP, in a real sense, ran not only against the opposition but 
also against itself. In fact, intraparty competition within one elec- 
tion district was often more bitter than interparty competition, with 
two or more LDP candidates vying for the same block of conser- 
vative votes. For example, in the general election of February 18, 
1990, three LDP and three opposition candidates competed for five 
seats in a southwestern prefecture. Two of the LDP candidates pub- 
licly expressed bitterness over the entry of the third, a son of the 
prefectural governor. Local television showed supporters of one 
of the LDP candidates cheering loudly when the governor's son 
was edged out for the fifth seat by a Komeito candidate. 

Local Support Groups 

In the early 1990s, kdenkai (local support groups) were perhaps 
even more important than faction membership to the survival of 
LDP Diet members. These kdenkai served as pipelines through which 
funds and other support were conveyed to legislators and through 
which the legislators could distribute favors to constituents in return. 
To avoid the stringent legal restrictions on political activity out- 
side of designated campaign times, kdenkai sponsored year-round 
cultural, social, and "educational" activities. In the prewar years, 
having an invincible, or "iron," constituency depended on gain- 
ing the support of landlords and other local notables. These peo- 
ple delivered blocks of rural votes to the candidates they favored. 



346 



The Political System 



In the more pluralistic postwar period, local bosses were much weak- 
er and building a strong constituency base much more difficult and 
costly. Tanaka used his "iron constituency" in rural Niigata Prefec- 
ture to build a formidable, nationwide political machine; but other 
politicians, like Ito Masayoshi, were so popular in their districts 
that they could refrain, to some extent, from money politics and 
promote a "clean" image. Kdenkai remained particularly impor- 
tant in the overrepresented rural areas, where paternalistic, old- 
style politics flourished and where the LDP, despite disaffection 
during the late 1980s over agricultural liberalization policies, had 
its strongest support. 

In the classic oyabun-kobun manner, local people who were con- 
sistently loyal to a figure like Tanaka become favored recipients 
of government largesse. In the 1980s, his own third electoral dis- 
trict in Niigata was the nation's top beneficiary in per capita pub- 
lic works spending. Benefits included stops on the Shinkansen bullet 
train to Tokyo and the cutting of a tunnel through a mountain to 
serve a hamlet of sixty people (see Transportation and Communi- 
cations, ch. 4). Another fortunate area was Takeshita Noboru's 
district in Shimane Prefecture on the Sea of Japan. 

The importance of local loyalties was also reflected in the 
widespread practice of a second generation's "inheriting" Diet seats 
from fathers or fathers-in-law. This trend was found predominandy, 
though not exclusively, in the LDP. In the February 1990 general 
election, for example, forty- three second- generation candidates ran: 
twenty- two, including twelve LDP candidates, were successful. 
They included the sons of former prime ministers Suzuki Zenko 
and Fukuda Takeo, although a son-in-law of Tanaka Kakuei lost 
in a district different from his father-in-law's. 

The Liberal Democratic Party in National Elections 

Election statistics show that, while the LDP had been able to 
secure a majority in the twelve House of Representatives elections 
from May 1958 to February 1990, with only three exceptions (De- 
cember 1976, October 1979, and December 1983), its share of the 
popular vote had declined from a high of 57.8 percent in May 1958 
to a low of 41 .8 percent in December 1976, when voters expressed 
their disgust with the party's involvement in the Lockheed scan- 
dal (see fig. 9; table 37, Appendix). The LDP vote rose again be- 
tween 1979 and 1990. Although the LDP won an unprecedented 
300 seats in the July 1986 balloting, its share of the popular vote 
remained just under 50 percent. The figure was 46.2 percent in 
February 1990. Following the three occasions when the LDP found 
itself a handful of seats shy of a majority, it was obliged to form 



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Japan: A Country Study 




348 



The Political System 



alliances with conservative independents and the breakaway New 
Liberal Club. In a cabinet appointment after the October 1983 bal- 
loting, a non-LDP minister, a member of the New Liberal Club, 
was appointed for the first time. 

In the upper house, the July 1989 election represented the first 
time that the LDP was forced into a minority position. In previ- 
ous elections, it had either secured a majority on its own or recruited 
non-LDP conservatives to make up the difference of a few seats. 

The political crisis of 1988-89 was testimony to both the party's 
strength and its weakness. In the wake of a succession of issues — 
the pushing of a highly unpopular consumption tax through the 
Diet in late 1988, the Recruit insider trading scandal, which tainted 
virtually all top LDP leaders and forced the resignation of Prime 
Minister Takeshita Noboru in April (a successor did not appear 
until June), the resignation in July of his successor, Uno Sosuke, 
because of a sex scandal, and the poor showing in the upper house 
election — the media provided the Japanese with a detailed and em- 
barrassing dissection of the political system. By March 1989, popu- 
lar support for the Takeshita cabinet as expressed in public opinion 
polls had fallen to 9 percent. Uno's scandal, covered in magazine 
interviews of a "kiss and tell" geisha, aroused the fury of female 
voters. 

Yet Uno's successor, the eloquent if obscure Kaifu Toshiki, was 
successful in repairing the party's battered image. By January 1990, 
talk of the waning of conservative power and a possible socialist 
government had given way to the realization that, like the Lock- 
heed affair of the mid-1970s, the Recruit scandal did not signal 
a significant change in who ruled Japan. The February 1990 general 
election gave the LDP, including affiliated independents, a com- 
fortable, if not spectacular, majority: 286 of 512 total represen- 
tatives. 

In light of radical changes in other parts of the world during the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, particularly the collapse of the com- 
munist status quo in Eastern Europe, the LDP's durability seemed 
odd to outsiders. One explanation is that the LDP has grown quite 
skillful in manipulating the rituals of repentance. In 1989 Takeshita 
and other leaders expressed kejime (a very difficult term to trans- 
late, although "knowing how to act under the circumstances" in- 
dicates some of its meaning), begging the voters to accept their 
promise that they would do better in the future and would imple- 
ment "political reform." Before the general election, the ruling 
party also promised to consider revision, although not abolition, 
of the consumption tax. The overall economic well-being of most 
of the population, particularly in comparison with their own lives, 



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Japan: A Country Study 

or those of their parents, in the immediate postwar period, is another 
factor contributing to LDP sustainability. But the election results 
suggested to many that, despite the furor, the voters were less in- 
terested in "throwing the rascals out" than, in the quintessentially 
Confucian way, having them "reflect" on their errors. 

An additional factor of major importance was the perceived in- 
ability of the opposition parties, some of whom were also tarnished 
by the Recruit scandal, to form a competent alternative govern- 
ment (see The Opposition Parties, this ch.). The strongly interest- 
oriented nature of Japanese politics, moreover, meant that many 
people were tied to local patronage networks that would suffer if 
the socialists or other opposition groups gained power. Many voters 
admitted, "I don't like the LDP, but I really had no choice." 

Bureaucrats and the Policy-Making Process 

The Japanese had been exposed to bureaucratic institutions at 
least by the early seventh century A.D., when the imperial court 
adopted the laws and government structure of Tang China (see 
Nara and Heian Periods, A.D. 710-1185, ch. 1). The distinctive 
Chinese institution of civil service examinations never took root, 
and the imported system was never successfully imposed on the 
country at large. But by the middle of the Tokugawa period 
(1600-1867), the samurai class functions had evolved from war- 
rior to clerical and administrative functions. Following the Meiji 
Restoration (1868), the new elite, which came from the lower ranks 
of the samurai, established a Western-style civil service (see The 
Emergence of Modern Japan, 1868-1919, ch. 1). 

Although the United States occupation dismantled both the mili- 
tary and zaibatsu (see Glossary) establishments, it did little, out- 
side of abolishing the prewar Home Ministry, to challenge the power 
of the bureaucracy. There was considerable continuity — in insti- 
tutions, operating style, and personnel — between the civil service 
before and after the occupation, partly because MacArthur's staff 
ruled indirectly and depended largely on the cooperation of civil 
servants. A process of mutual cooptation occurred. Also, United 
States policy planners never regarded the civil service with the same 
opprobrium as the military or economic elites. The civil service's 
role in Japan's militarism was generally downplayed. Many of the 
occupation figures themselves were products of President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt's New Deal and had strong faith in the merits of civil 
service "professionalism." Finally, the perceived threat of the Soviet 
Union in the late 1940s created a community of interests for the 
occupiers and conservative, social order-conscious administrators. 



350 



The Political System 



The Civil Service 

In trying to discover "who's in charge here," many analysts have 
pointed to the elite bureaucracy as the people who really governed 
Japan, although they composed only a tiny fraction of the coun- 
try's more than 1 million national government employees. In the 
early 1990s, several hundred of the elite were employed at each 
national ministry or agency. Although entry into the elite through 
open examinations did not require a college degree, the majority 
of its members were alumni of Japan's most prestigious universi- 
ties. The University of Tokyo Law Faculty remained in the early 
1990s the single most important source of elite bureaucrats. After 
graduation from college and, increasingly, some graduate-level 
study, applicants took a series of extremely difficult higher civil 
service examinations: in 1988, for example, 28,833 took the tests, 
but only 1,814, or 6.3 percent, were successful. Of the successful 
number, 721 were actually hired. Like the scholar-officials of im- 
perial China, successful candidates were hardy survivors of a gruel- 
ing education and testing process that necessarily began in early 
childhood and demanded total concentration. The typical young 
bureaucrat, who in the early 1990s was in most cases male, was 
an intelligent, hardworking, and dedicated individual. Some bu- 
reaucrats lacked imagination and, perhaps, compassion for peo- 
ple whose way of life was different from their own. 

The public's attitude toward the elite was ambivalent. The elite 
enjoyed tremendous social prestige, but members were also re- 
sented. They lived in a realm that was at least partly public yet 
far removed from the lives of ordinary people. Compared with poli- 
ticians, they were generally viewed as honest. Involvement of top 
officials in scandals such as the Recruit affair, however, had, to 
some extent, tarnished their image. 

Japan's elite bureaucrats were insulated from direct political pres- 
sure because there were very few political appointments in the civil 
service. Cabinet ministers were usually career politicians, but they 
were moved in and out of their posts quite frequentiy (with an aver- 
age tenure of under a year), and usually had little opportunity to 
develop a power base within a ministry or force their civil service 
subordinates to adopt reforms. Below the cabinet minister was the 
administrative vice minister. Administrative vice ministers and their 
subordinates were career civil servants whose appointments were 
determined in accordance with an internally established principle 
of seniority. 

In a 1975 article, political scientist Chalmers Johnson quotes a 
retired vice minister of the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI), who said that the Diet was merely "an extension 



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Japan: A Country Study 

of the bureaucracy." The official claimed that "the bureaucracy 
drafts all the laws. . . . All the legislature does is to use its powers 
of investigation, which for about half the year keeps most of the 
senior officials cooped up in the Diet." 

In the years since this official made his proud boast, however, 
it has become apparent that there are limits to the bureaucrats' 
power. The most important check was the LDP's growing role in 
policy formation. Political scientist B.C. Koh suggested that in many 
cases members of the LDP policy-oriented tribes (zoku) had greater 
expertise in their fields than elite bureaucrats. Before the latter 
drafted legislation, they had to consult and follow the initiatives 
of the party's Policy Research Council. Many analysts consider 
the role of the bureaucracy in drafting legislation to be no greater 
than that of its counterparts in France, the Federal Republic of 
Germany (West Germany), and other countries. Also, the deci- 
sion of many retired bureaucrats to run as LDP candidates for the 
Diet might not reflect, as had been previously assumed, the power 
of the officials but rather the impatience of ambitious men who 
wanted to locate themselves, politically, "where the action is." 

An intense rivalry among the ministries came into play whenever 
major policy decisions were formulated. Elite civil servants were 
recruited by and spent their entire careers in a single ministry. As 
a result, they developed a strong sectional solidarity and zealously 
defended their turf. Nonbureaucratic actors — the politicians and 
interest groups — could use this rivalry to their own advantage. 

The Ministry of Finance was generally considered the most 
powerful and prestigious of the ministries. Its top officials were 
regarded as the cream of the elite. Although it was relatively un- 
successful in the 1970s when the deficit rose, the ministry was very 
successful in the 1980s in constraining government spending and 
raising taxes, including a twelve-year battle to get a consumption 
tax passed. The huge national debt in the early 1990s, however, 
may turn out to be evidence that this budget-minded body had been 
unsuccessful in the previous decade in curbing demands for popu- 
lar policies such as health insurance, rice price supports, and the 
unprofitable nationwide network of the privatized Japan Railways 
Group. MITI frequently encountered obstacles in its early post- 
occupation plans to reconsolidate the economy. It was not always 
successful in imposing its will on private interests, politicians, or 
other ministries. According to law professor John O. Haley, writ- 
ing in the late 1980s, MITI's practice of gyosei shido, or adminis- 
trative guidance, often described as evidence of the bureaucracy's 
hidden power, was in fact a second-best alternative to "express 
statutory authority that would have legitimated its exercise of 



352 



The Political System 



authority." Administrative reform policies in the 1980s imposed 
ceilings on civil service staff and spending that probably contributed 
to a deterioration of morale and working conditions. 

Still another factor limiting bureaucratic power was the emer- 
gence of an affluent society. In the early postwar period, the scar- 
city of capital made it possible for the Ministry of Finance and MITI 
to exert considerable influence over the economy through control 
of the banking system (see The Financial System, ch. 4). To a 
decreasing extent, this scarcity remained until the 1980s because 
most major companies had high debt-equity ratios and depended 
on the banks for infusions of capital. Their huge profits and in- 
creasing reliance on securities markets in the late 1980s, however, 
meant that the Ministry of Finance had less influence. The wealth, 
technical sophistication, and new confidence of the companies also 
made it difficult for MITI to exercise administrative guidance. The 
ministry could not restrain aggressive and often politically con- 
troversial purchases by Japanese corporate investors in the United 
States, for example, Mitsubishi Estate's October 1989 purchase 
of Rockefeller Center in New York City, which, along with the 
Sony Corporation's acquisition of Columbia Pictures several weeks 
earlier, heated up trade friction between the two countries. 

The whole issue of trade friction and foreign pressure tended 
to politicize the bureaucracy and promote unprecedented divisive- 
ness in the late 1980s and early 1990s. During the Structural Im- 
pediments Initiative talks held by Japan and the United States in 
early 1990, basic changes in Japan's economy were discussed: re- 
forms of the distribution and pricing systems, improvement of the 
infrastructure, and elimination of official procedures that limited 
foreign participation in the economy (see Trade and Investment 
Relations, ch. 5). Although foreign pressure of this sort was resented 
by many Japanese as an intrusion on national sovereignty, it also 
provided an opportunity for certain ministries to make gains at the 
expense of others. There was hardly a bureaucratic jurisdiction in 
the economic sphere that was not in some sense affected. 

Repeatedly, internationally minded political and bureaucratic 
elites found their market-opening reforms, designed to placate 
American demands, sabotaged by other interests, especially agricul- 
ture. Such reactions intensified American pressure, which in turn 
created a sense of crisis and a siege mentality within Japan. The 
"internationalization" of Japan's society in other ways also divided 
the bureaucratic elite. MITI, the Ministry of Labor, and the Minis- 
try of Justice had divergent views on how to respond to the influx 
of unskilled, usually South Asian and Southeast Asian, laborers 
into the labor-starved Japanese economy. An estimated 300,000 



353 



Japan: A Country Study 

to 400,000 of them worked illegally for small Japanese firms in the 
late 1980s. Ministry of Education, Science, and Culture revision 
of guidelines on the writing of history textbooks, ostensibly a domes- 
tic matter, aroused the indignation of Japan's Asian neighbors be- 
cause the changes tended to soften accounts of wartime atrocities. 

Policy-Making Dynamics 

Despite an increasingly unpredictable domestic and international 
environment, policy making in the early 1990s conformed to well- 
established postwar patterns. The close collaboration of the ruling 
party, the elite bureaucracy, and important interest groups often 
made it difficult to tell who exactly was responsible for specific policy 
decisions. The tendency for insiders to guard information on such 
matters carefully compounded the difficulty, especially for foreigners 
wishing to understand how domestic decision making could be in- 
fluenced to reduce trade problems. 

The Human Factor 

The most important human factor in the policy-making process 
was the homogeneity of the political and business elites. In the early 
1990s, they still tended to be graduates of a relatively small num- 
ber of top-ranked universities. Regardless of these individuals' 
regional or class origins, their similar educational backgrounds en- 
couraged their feeling of community, as was reflected in the finely 
meshed network of marriage alliances between top official, LDP 
and financial circle (zaikai) families. The institution of early retire- 
ment also fostered homogeneity. In the practice of amakudari, or 
descent from heaven, as it is popularly known, bureaucrats retir- 
ing in their fifties often assumed top positions in public corpora- 
tions and private enterprise. They also became LDP politicians. 
By the late 1980s, most postwar prime ministers had had civil service 
backgrounds. 

This homogeneity facilitated the free flow of ideas among mem- 
bers of the elite in informal settings. Bureaucrats and business people 
associated with a single industry, such as electronics, often held 
regular informal meetings in Tokyo hotels and restaurants. Politi- 
cal scientist T.J. Pempel has pointed out that the concentration 
of political and economic power in Tokyo — particularly the small 
geographic area of its central wards — made it easy for leaders, who 
were almost without exception denizens of the capital, to have 
repeated personal contact. Another often overlooked factor was the 
tendency of elite males not to be family men. Late night work and 
bar-hopping schedules gave them ample opportunity to hash and 
rehash policy matters and engage in haragei (literally, belly art), 



354 



The Political System 



or intimate, often nonverbal communication. Like the warriors of 
ancient Sparta, who lived in barracks apart from their families dur- 
ing much of their adulthood, the business and bureaucratic elites 
were expected to sacrifice their private lives for the national good. 

Formal Policy Development 

After a largely informal process within elite circles in which ideas 
were discussed and developed, steps might be taken to institute 
more formal policy development. This process often took place in 
deliberation councils {shingikai). There were about 200 shingikai, 
each attached to a ministry; their members were both officials and 
prominent private individuals in business, education, and other 
fields. The shingikai played a large role in facilitating communica- 
tion among those who ordinarily might not meet. Given the ten- 
dency for real negotiations in Japan to be conducted privately (in 
the nemawashi, or root binding, process of consensus building), the 
shingikai often represented a fairly advanced stage in policy formu- 
lation in which relatively minor differences could be thrashed out 
and the resulting decisions couched in language acceptable to all. 
These bodies were legally established, but had no authority to ob- 
lige governments to adopt their recommendations. 

The most important deliberation council during the 1980s was 
the Provisional Commission for Administrative Reform, established 
in March 1981 by Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko. The commission 
had nine members, assisted in their deliberations by six advisers, 
twenty- one "expert members," and around fifty "councillors" 
representing a wide range of groups. Its head, Keidanren pres- 
ident Doko Toshio, insisted that government agree to take its 
recommendations seriously and commit itself to reforming the ad- 
ministrative structure and the tax system. In 1982 the commission 
had arrived at several recommendations that by the end of the de- 
cade had been actualized. These implementations included tax re- 
form; a policy to limit government growth; the establishment, in 
1984, of the Management and Coordination Agency to replace the 
Administrative Management Agency in the Office of the Prime 
Minister; and privatization of the state-owned railroad and tele- 
phone systems. In April 1990, another deliberation council, the 
Election Systems Research Council, submitted proposals that in- 
cluded the establishment of single- seat constituencies in place of 
the multiple- seat system. 

Another significant policy-making institution in the early 1990s 
was the LDP's Policy Research Council. It consisted of a number 
of committees, composed of LDP Diet members, with the commit- 
tees corresponding to the different executive agencies. Committee 



355 



Japan: A Country Study 

members worked closely with their official counterparts, advanc- 
ing the requests of their constituents, in one of the most effective 
means through which interest groups could state their case to the 
bureaucracy through the channel of the ruling party. 

The Budget Process 

Despite the increasingly apparent limits of bureaucratic power, 
the Budget Bureau of the Ministry of Finance was at the heart of 
the political process because it drew up the national budget each 
year. This responsibility made it the ultimate focus of interest 
groups, through the medium of the LDP and of other ministries 
that competed for limited funds. The budgetary process generally 
began soon after the start of a new fiscal year on April 1 . Minis- 
tries and government agencies prepared budget requests in con- 
sultation with the Policy Research Council. In the fall of each year, 
Budget Bureau examiners reviewed these requests in great detail, 
while top Ministry of Finance officials worked out the general con- 
tours of the new budget and the distribution of tax revenues. Dur- 
ing the winter, after the release of the ministry's draft budget, 
campaigning by individual Diet members for their constituents and 
different ministries for revisions and supplementary allocations be- 
came intense. LDP and Ministry of Finance officials consulted on 
a final draft budget, which was generally passed by the Diet in late 
winter. 

In broad outline, the process revealed a basic characteristic of 
Japanese political dynamics: that despite the oft-stated ideals of 
"harmony" and "consensus," interests, including bureaucratic 
interests, were in strong competition for resources. LDP leaders 
and Budget Bureau officials needed great skill to reach mutually 
acceptable compromises. The image of "Japan Incorporated," in 
which harmony and unanimity were virtually automatic, belied 
the reality of intense rivalry. The late twentieth-century system was 
successful insofar as superior political skills and appreciation of com- 
mon interests minimized antagonisms and maintained an accept- 
able balance of power among groups. Whether this system would 
continue, as Japan faced such problems as growing social inequal- 
ity, an aging society, and the challenge of "internationalization" 
of its society and economy, in the early 1990s remained unclear. 

The Opposition Parties 

With the exception of the period from May 1947 to March 1948, 
when a socialist, Katayama Tetsu, was prime minster, heading a 
coalition of socialists and conservatives, opposition parties failed 
to gain enough national electoral support to participate in forming 



356 



The Political System 



a cabinet or to form one of their own. In 1990, major opposition 
parties with representation in the Diet were the Japan Socialist 
Party, the Komeito, the Japan Communist Party, and the Demo- 
cratic Socialist Party (Minshato). Two smaller opposition parties 
were the Socialist Democratic League and the Progressive Party 
(Shimpoto). None had a sufficiently broad base of support to 
challenge the LDP at the polls, and in the early 1990s, they had 
not been able to form workable coalitions. An exception occurred 
in some local elections, where "progressive" coalitions were more 
effective in electing opposition candidates than on the national level. 

The opposition parties were separated by ideology, with the Japan 
Communist Party and a significant faction of the Japan Socialist 
Party espousing Marxist revolution; the others were moderate and 
pragmatic. In many cases, the programs of the Komeito and 
Democratic Socialist Party differed little from those of the LDP. 
Unlike the Japan Socialist Party, smaller opposition parties lacked 
the resources to run candidates in all the country's constituencies. 

On occasions in the 1970s and 1980s, it seemed that the end of 
conservative power was at hand. One such time was following the 
Lockheed scandal of the mid-1970s (a journalist at the time 
described it as "conservative power self-destructs"); another was 
the combined furor over the 3 percent consumption tax and the 
Recruit scandal in 1988-89. When the LDP was pushed into the 
minority in the July 1989 upper-house election, many commenta- 
tors believed that Doi Takako, chairwoman and leader of the Japan 
Socialist Party, was within striking distance of forming a govern- 
ment, probably in coalition with other opposition groups, in the 
upcoming, more important general election for the lower house. 
That this situation failed to materialize suggested not so much popu- 
lar contentment with the LDP as the opposition's inability to present 
a viable alternative to voters. 

The opposition was important if only because its existence 
legitimized Japan's claim to be a modern, democratic state. 
Moreover, the Japan Socialist Party and Japan Communist Party 
played a major role in the 1950s and 1960s in protecting the 
democratic institutions promoted by the United States occupation. 
The opposition's control of more than one-third of the seats in the 
Diet meant that amendments revising the Constitution (such as 
the proposed rewording or abolition of Article 9) could not be 
passed. If conservatives had had their way in the early postwar 
years, some of Japan's prewar symbols and military power would 
have been restored, a move that most likely would have greatly 
affected relations with East Asian and Southeast Asian countries, 



357 



Japan: A Country Study 

where bitter memories of Japanese wartime occupation remained 
fresh. 

In a political system where the ruling party habitually swept em- 
barrassing matters under the carpet and the established press club 
system inhibited investigative reporting, the opposition functioned 
reasonably well, to use film scholar Donald Richie's phrase, as "car- 
pet picker-uppers." They exposed and demanded parliamentary 
investigations of scandals like the Recruit affair. Routinely, they 
used meetings of the Budget Committee and other committees in 
the Diet to question cabinet ministers and government officials, 
and these sessions received wide media publicity. 

Ideas first proposed by the opposition, such as national health 
insurance and other social welfare measures, were frequently 
adopted and implemented by the ruling party. The ' 'Eda Vision' ' 
of moderate socialist leader Eda Saburo in the early 1960s — "An 
American standard of living, Soviet levels of social welfare, a Brit- 
ish parliamentary system, and Japan's peace constitution" — were 
largely realized under LDP auspices. 

Although opposition control of the upper house after the July 
1989 election represented a change, the opposition had little im- 
pact on the legislative process. Regulations in the Diet Law and 
the rules of the two houses gave presiding House of Representa- 
tives officers the power to convene plenary sessions, fix agendas, 
and limit debates. Because these officers were elected by the LDP 
majority, they used these powers to constrain opposition party ac- 
tivity. Although the opposition could not filibuster, the lack of a 
time limit for formal balloting allowed them to use the gyuho senjutsu 
(cow's pace tactics) to cause excruciating delays in the passage of 
LDP-sponsored bills, walking so slowly to cast their individual votes 
that the process took several hours, sorely trying the tempers of 
LDP Diet members. 

Japan Socialist Party 

The Japan Socialist Party was the largest opposition party in 
the early 1990s. Like the LDP, it resulted from the union of two 
smaller groups in 1955. The new opposition party had its own fac- 
tions, although organized according to left- right ideological com- 
mitments rather than what it called the "feudal personalism" of 
the conservative parties. In the House of Representatives election 
of 1958, the Japan Socialist Party gained 32.9 percent of the popular 
vote and 166 out of 467 seats. After that, its percentage of the popu- 
lar vote and number of seats gradually declined. In the double elec- 
tion of July 1986 for both Diet houses, the party suffered a rout 
by the LDP under Nakasone: its seats in the lower house fell from 



358 



The Political System 



112 to an all-time low of 85 and its share of the vote from 19.5 
percent to 17.2 percent. But its popular chairwoman, Doi Takako, 
led it to an impressive showing in the February 1 990 general elec- 
tion: 136 seats and 24.4 percent of the vote. Some electoral dis- 
tricts had more than one successful socialist candidate. Doi's 
decision to put up more than one candidate for each of the 130 
districts represented a controversial break with the past, because, 
unlike their LDP counterparts, many Japan Socialist Party candi- 
dates did not want to run against each other. But the great majority 
of the 149 socialist candidates who ran were successful, including 
seven of eight women. 

Doi, a university professor of constitutional law before entering 
politics, had a tough, straight-talking manner that appealed to voters 
tired of the evasiveness of other politicians. Many women found 
her a refreshing alternative to submissive female stereotypes, and 
in the late 1980s the public at large, in opinion polls, voted her 
their favorite politician (the runner-up in these surveys was equally 
tough-talking conservative LDP member Ishihara Shintaro). Doi's 
popularity, however, was of limited aid to the party. The power- 
ful Shakaishugi Kyokai (Japan Socialist Association), which was 
supported by a hard-core contingent of the party's 76,000-strong 
membership, remained committed to doctrinaire Marxism, imped- 
ing Doi's efforts to promote what she called perestroika and a more 
moderate program with greater voter appeal. 

In 1983 Doi's predecessor as chairman, Ishibashi Masashi, began 
the delicate process of moving the party away from its strong op- 
position to the Self-Defense Forces. While maintaining that these 
forces were unconstitutional in light of Article 9, he claimed that, 
because they had been established through legal procedures, they 
had a "legitimate" status (this phrasing was changed a year later 
to say that the Self-Defense Forces "exist legally"). Ishibashi also 
broke past precedent by visiting Washington to talk with United 
States political leaders. 

By the end of the decade, the party had accepted the Self-Defense 
Forces and the 1962 Japan-United States Treaty of Mutual Cooper- 
ation and Security as facts of life. It advocated strict limitations 
on military spending (no more than 1 percent of GNP annually), 
a suspension of joint military exercises with United States forces, 
and a reaffirmation of the "three nonnuclear principles" (no 
production, possession, or introduction of nuclear weapons into 
Japanese territory). Doi expressed support for "balanced ties" with 
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) and the 
Republic of Korea (South Korea). In the past, the Japan Socialist 
Party had favored the Kim II Song regime in P'yongyang, and in 



359 



Japan: A Country Study 

the early 1990s it still refused to recognize the 1965 normalization 
of relations between Tokyo and Seoul. In domestic policy, the party 
demanded the continued protection of agriculture and small busi- 
ness in the face of foreign pressure, abolition of the consumer tax, 
and an end to the construction and use of nuclear power reactors. 
As a symbolic gesture to reflect its new moderation, at its April 
1990 convention the party dropped its commitment to "socialist 
revolution" and described its goal as "social democracy": crea- 
tion of a society in which "all people fairly enjoy the fruits of tech- 
nological advancement and modern civilization and receive the 
benefits of social welfare." Delegates also voted Doi a third term 
as party chairwoman. 

Because of the party's self-definition as a class-based party and 
its symbiotic relationship with Sohyo, the public sector union con- 
federation, few efforts were made to attract nonunion constituen- 
cies. Although some Sohyo unions supported the Japan Communist 
Party, the Japan Socialist Party remained the representative of 
Sohyo 's political interests until the merger with private sector unions 
formed the noncommunist Shin Rengo in 1989. Because of declin- 
ing union financial support during the 1980s, some Japan Socialist 
Party Diet members turned to dubious fund-raising methods. One 
was involved in the Recruit affair. The Japan Socialist Party, like 
others, sold large blocks of fund-raising party tickets, and the LDP 
even gave individual Japan Socialist Party Diet members funds 
from time to time to persuade them to cooperate in passing difficult 
legislation. 

Komeito 

In 1990, the Komeito (the euphemistic English translation of the 
Japanese name is Clean Government Party) was the second larg- 
est opposition party, with forty-five legislators in the House of 
Representatives after the February election, although the party lost 
eleven seats compared with its July 1986 showing. The Komeito 
was an offshoot of the Soka Gakkai, which had been founded in 
1930 as an independent lay organization of the Nichiren Shoshu 
sect of Buddhism, whose numbers were estimated at 750,000 in 
1958 and more than 35 million in the late 1980s. In 1962 the Soka 
Gakkai, established a League for Clean Government, which be- 
came a regular political party, the Komeito, two years later. Ties 
between the Komeito and the Soka Gakkai were formally dissolved 
in 1970, and the image of an "open party" was projnoted. But the 
resignation in 1989 of a Komeito Diet member, Ohashi Toshio, 
following his criticism of the religious leader Ikeda Daisaku, sug- 
gested that the Soka Gakkai' s influence over the party remained 



360 



The Political System 



substantial. Public suspicions concerning the religious connection 
(in principle a violation of the Constitution's Article 20), and the 
involvement of several Komeito Diet members in the Recruit scan- 
dal accounted for the party's poor electoral showing in February 
1990. 

The party's supporters tended to be people who were largely out- 
side the privileged labor union and "salarymen" circles of lifetime 
employment in large enterprises. The Komeito 's programs were 
rather vague. They emphasized welfare and quality of life issues. 
In foreign policy, they had dropped their previous opposition to 
the Japan-United States security treaty and the Self-Defense Forces. 
Given the party's aversion to the leftism of the Japan Socialist Party, 
and despite its occasional cooperation with the leftists, it was judged 
unlikely to enter into a lasting coalition with the largest opposition 
group, despite protracted negotiations. In fact, the LDP worked 
hard to gain the Komeito 's cooperation in the upper house to pass 
legislation, and most commentators considered the Komeito, along 
with the Democratic Socialist Party, as a likely coalition partner 
should the LDP lose its parliamentary majority in the lower house. 

Japan Communist Party 

The Japan Communist Party was first organized in 1922, in the 
wake of the Russian Revolution, and remained part of the interna- 
tional, Moscow-controlled communist movement until the early 
1960s. Although the party won a large percentage of the popular 
vote in Diet elections in 1949, it became extremely unpopular after 
1950, when Moscow ordered it to cease being a "lovable party" 
and to engage in armed struggle. It was forced to go underground, 
and in the election lost all its seats in the Diet. A self-reliant party 
line, stressing independence from both Moscow and Beijing, evolved 
during the 1960s. The party's chairman, Miyamoto Kenji, a tough 
veteran of prewar struggles and wartime prisons, promoted the 
"parliamentary road" of nonviolent, electoral politics. Thereafter, 
the fortunes of the Japan Communist Party gradually revived. 
Representation in the lower house reached a high point of thirty- 
nine in the 1979 election, but declined to between twenty- six and 
twenty-nine seats in the 1980s and to sixteen in the February 1990 
election. The party's program promoted unarmed neutrality, the 
severing of security ties with the United States, defense of the post- 
war Constitution, and socialism. It also voiced concern for welfare 
and quality of life issues. 

Both organizationally and financially, the party was stronger than 
its opposition rivals and even the LDP. Revenues from its pub- 
lishing enterprises, especially the popular newspaper Akahata (Red 



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Japan: A Country Study 



Flag), which had the eighth largest circulation in the country, 
provided adequate support for its activities. As a result, the Japan 
Communist Party was the party least mired in money politics. This 
fact earned it the reluctant respect of voters. But suspicions about 
its ultimate intentions remained strong in the early 1990s. It was 
excluded from opposition party negotiations on coalitions. Its loss 
of ten seats in the February 1990 general election was partly the 
result of voter disgust with the party's Chinese counterpart following 
repression of prodemocracy demonstrators in Beijing's Tiananmen 
Incident in 1989. In the election campaigns of 1989-90, the LDP 
eagerly smeared the party with this association, forcing the com- 
munists in their publicity to emphasize that the Chinese and 
Japanese parties were different and that the Japanese party sin- 
cerely supported the struggle for democracy in China and Eastern 
Europe. Ironically, the Japan Communist Party had strongly con- 
demned the Beijing incident, while the LDP government, ever con- 
scious of business interests with big investments in China, had 
reacted lamely to the killings by describing them as 4 'regrettable." 

Democratic Socialist Party 

The Democratic Socialist Party was established in January 1960 
when right-wing members of the Japan Socialist Party broke away 
to form their own group. In the past, the Democratic Socialist Party 
derived much of its financial and organizational support from the 
Domei private sector labor confederation. Like the LDP and the 
Komeito, it supported the security treaty with the United States 
and the Self-Defense Forces. As the most conservative of the op- 
position parties, it had formed coalitions with the LDP and viewed 
an opposition coalition with the Japan Socialist Party with distaste. 
In the February 1990 general election, the Democratic Socialist 
Party won fourteen seats, down from the twenty-six won in the 
July 1986 election. The party's chairman, Tsukamoto Saburo, was 
forced to resign in 1988, after it was revealed that he received 5,000 
shares of stock from Recruit. 

Other Parties and Independents 

Like the Democratic Socialist Party, the tiny Social Democratic 
League was formed, in 1978, by defectors from the Japan Socialist 
Party. A non-Marxist party in the social democratic tradition, it 
won four seats in the February 1990 general election. In February 
1990, the Progressive Party (Shimpoto) won one seat. 

Largely to contest upper house elections, a large number of ' 'mini- 
parties" had emerged. In the July 1989 election, these included the 
Salaryman's New Party, which supported a more equitable tax 



362 



The Political System 



system for salaried workers; the Global Club, devoted to women's 
rights; the Pension Party, concerned with inequities in the national 
pension system; and the People Opposed to Nuclear Power Party. 
The UFO Party advocated a government project to make contact 
with intelligent beings from outer space. 

A relatively large number of candidates ran as independents in 
general elections. Twenty-one of them were elected in the Febru- 
ary 1990 balloting, but the majority later affiliated themselves with 
the LDP, as was the custom. Their number has included powerful 
former members of the LDP such as Tanaka Kakuei and Nakasone 
Yasuhiro, who had resigned from the party because of scandals 
but continued to lead LDP factions. 

Political Extremists 

According to the 1989 Asahi Nenkan, there were 14,400 activist 
members of the "new left" organized into five major "currents" 
(ryu) and 27 or 28 different factions. Total membership was about 
35,000. New left activity focused on the New Tokyo International 
Airport at Narita-Sanrizuka. In the early 1970s, radical groups and 
normally conservative farmers formed a highly unusual alliance 
to oppose expropriation of the latter' s land for the airport's con- 
struction. Confrontations at the construction site, which pitted thou- 
sands of farmers and radicals against riot police, were violent but 
generally nonlethal. Although the airport was completed and began 
operations during the 1980s, the resistance continued, on a reduced 
scale, in the early 1990s. Radicals attempted to halt planned ex- 
pansion of the airport by staging guerrilla attacks on those directly 
or indirectly involved in promoting the plan. By 1990, this activ- 
ity had resulted in some deaths. There were also attacks against 
places associated with the emperor. In January 1990, leftists fired 
homemade rockets at imperial residences in Tokyo and Kyoto. 

In terms of terrorist activities, the most important new left group 
was the Japanese Red Army (Nihon Sekigun). Formed in 1969, 
it was responsible for, among other acts, the hijacking of a Japan 
Airlines jet to P'yongyang in 1970 and the murder of twenty-six 
people at Lod International Airport in Tel Aviv in 1977. Its ac- 
tivists developed close connections with international terrorist 
groups, including Palestinian extremists (see Civil Disturbances, 
ch. 8). The Japanese Red Army also had close ties with the Kim 
II Song regime in North Korea, where several of its hijackers resided 
during the early 1990s. The group was tightiy organized, and one 
scholar has suggested that its "managerial style" resembled that 
of major Japanese corporations. 



363 



Japan: A Country Study 

Right-wing extremists were diverse. In 1989 there were 800 such 
groups with about 120,000 members altogether. By police count, 
however, only about 50 groups and 23,000 individuals were con- 
sidered active. Right-wing extremists indulged in a heady roman- 
ticism with strong links to the prewar period. They tended to be 
fascinated with the macho charisma of blood, sweat, and steel, and 
promoted (like many nonradical groups) traditional samurai values 
as the antidote to the spiritual ills of postwar Japan. Their prefer- 
ence for violent direct action rather than words reflected the ex- 
ample of the militarist extremists of the 1930s and the heroic "men 
of strong will" of the late Tokugawa period of the 1850s and 1860s. 
The modern right-wing extremists demanded an end to the post- 
war "system of dependence" on the United States, restoration of 
the emperor to his prewar, divine status, and repudiation of Arti- 
cle 9. Many, if not most, right-wingers had intimate connections 
with Japan's gangster underground, the yakuza. 

The ritual suicide of one of Japan's most prominent novelists, 
Mishima Yukio, following a failed attempt to initiate a rebellion 
among Self-Defense Forces units in November 1970 shocked and 
fascinated the public. Mishima and his small private army, the 
Shield Society (Tate no Kai), hoped that a rising of the Self-Defense 
Forces would inspire a nationwide affirmation of the old values and 
put an end to the postwar "age of languid peace." Although right- 
ists were also responsible for the assassination of socialist leader 
Asanuma Inejiro in 1960 and an attempt on the life of former prime 
minster Ohira Masayoshi in 1978, most of them, unlike their prewar 
counterparts, largely kept to noisy street demonstrations, especially 
harassment campaigns aimed at conventions of the leftist Japan 
Teachers Union. In the early 1990s, however, there was evidence 
that a "new right" was becoming more violent. In May 1987, a 
reporter working for the liberal Asahi Shimbun was killed by a gun- 
man belonging to the Nippon Minzoku Dokuritsu Giyugun Betsudo 
Sekihotai (Blood Revenge Corps of the Partisan Volunteer Corps 
for the Independence of the Japanese Race), known as Sekihotai 
(Blood Revenge Corps). The Sekihotai also threatened to assas- 
sinate former Prime Minister Nakasone for giving in to foreign 
pressure on such issues as the revision of textbook accounts of 
Japan's war record. In January 1990, a member of the Seikijuku 
(translatable, ironically, as the Sane Thinkers School) shot and seri- 
ously wounded Nagasaki mayor Motoshima Hitoshi. The attack 
may have been provoked by the leftist rocket attacks on imperial 
residences in Tokyo and Kyoto a few days earlier as well as the 
mayor's critical remarks concerning Emperor Hirohito. 



364 



The Political System 



Despite the threat from political extremists on both left and right, 
periodic increases in the strength of opposition parties, and fac- 
tionalism and the taint of scandal in its own ranks, the LDP con- 
tinued to maintain a strong government. In the February 1990 
election, Japan's economically stable citizenry continued to sup- 
port the government that had ruled for nearly forty years. 

* * * 

Democratizing Japan, a collection of essays edited by Robert Ward 
and Sakamoto Yoshikazu, describes the writing of the postwar Con- 
stitution and other effects of the United States occupation on Japan's 
political system. Theodore Cohen's Remaking Japan, and From a 
Ruined Empire, edited by Otis Cary, depict the occupation from par- 
ticipants' points of view. Although most of the essays in Maruyama 
Masao's Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics were com- 
posed in the late 1940s and early 1950s, this volume still provides 
perhaps the best discussion of Japanese political values. Authority 
and the Individual in Japan, edited by J. Victor Koschmann, discusses 
changes in values from the Meiji period to the 1970s and has many 
interesting things to say about how Japanese view authority. Against 
the State by David Apter and Nagayo Sawa challenges the conven- 
tional view of the value placed on harmony (wa) in describing farmer 
and radical resistance to the construction of the New Tokyo In- 
ternational Airport. Although published in 1969, Nathaniel B. 
Thayer's How the Conservatives Rule Japan remained relevant in the 
early 1990s. More recent discussions of the political system include 
Bradley M. Richardson's The Political Culture of Japan, Kyogoku 
Jun'ichi's The Political Dynamics of Japan, T.J. Pempel's Policy and 
Politics in Industrial States, and J. A. A. Stockwin and others' Dynamic 
and Immobilist Politics in Japan. Kent E. C alder's Crisis and Compen- 
sation, however, is especially illuminating because of its avoidance 
of cultural explanations (which are typically overused) and its abun- 
dance of comparisons with other countries. B.C. Koh's Japan's Ad- 
ministrative Elite provides a clear and concise discussion of the elite 
civil service and its policy-making role. Karel G. van Wolferen's 
controversial The Enigma of Japanese Power, which Japanese critics 
have called "a textbook for Japan-bashing," is filled with interesting 
details, even if its main thesis about the leaderless nature of the 
political system is questionable. 

English-language journals and periodicals with useful articles on 
the political system include Journal of Japanese Studies, Journal of Asian 
Studies, Asian Survey, Pacific Affairs [Vancouver], Japan Quarterly 
[Tokyo] , Japan Echo [Tokyo] , and Far Eastern Economic Review [Hong 



365 



Japan: A Country Study 

Kong]. One of the best, Japan Interpreter [Tokyo], ceased publica- 
tion in 1980 but its articles from the 1960s and 1970s are still il- 
luminating. (For further information and complete citations, see 
Bibliography.) 



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Chapter 7. Foreign Relations 



Family crest using Chinese seal-style ideograph for longevity and stylized old 
pine trees (matsu) 



JAPAN'S FOREIGN POLICY was facing new challenges and 
difficult decisions in 1990. The 1980s had seen enormous changes 
in the distribution of international economic power and the politi- 
cal influence that accompanies it. Japan had become the world's 
largest creditor nation and the second largest donor of foreign aid. 
Japanese industries and enterprises were among the most capable 
in the world. High savings and investment rates and high-quality 
education were expected to solidify the international leadership of 
these enterprises in the decade to come. Its economic power gave 
Japan a steadily growing role in the World Bank (see Glossary), 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF — see Glossary), and other 
international financial institutions. Investment and trade flows gave 
Japan by far the dominant economic role in Asia, and Japanese 
aid and investment were widely sought after in other parts of the 
world. It appeared to be only a matter of time before such eco- 
nomic power would be translated into greater political power. 

The collapse of the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe and 
the growing Soviet preoccupation with internal political and eco- 
nomic problems increased the importance of economic competi- 
tion, rather than military power, to Japan. The Soviet Union, a 
military superpower, was often depicted as a large Third World 
country trying desperately to stave off economic disaster and anx- 
iously seeking aid, trade, and technical benefits from the developed 
countries, such as Japan. The power of Japan's ally, the United 
States, was also seen by many as waning. The United States's sta- 
tus in the 1980s had gone from the world's largest creditor to the 
world's largest debtor, and its economic position had weakened 
relative to some other developed countries, notably Japan. The 
United States was forced to look increasingly to Japan and others 
to shoulder the financial burdens entailed in the transformation 
of former communist economies in Eastern Europe and other ur- 
gent international requirements that fall upon the shoulders of world 
leaders. 

Inside Japan, both elite and popular opinion expressed grow- 
ing support for a more prominent international role, proportion- 
ate to the nation's economic power, foreign assistance, trade, and 
investment. But the traditional post- World War II reluctance to 
take a greater military role in the world remained. A firm consen- 
sus continued to support the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation 
and Security and other bilateral agreements with the United States 



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Japan: A Country Study 

as the keystones of Japan's security policy. However, Japanese offi- 
cials were increasingly active in using their economic and finan- 
cial resources in seeking a greater voice in international financial 
and political organizations, and in shaping the policies of the de- 
veloped countries toward international trouble spots, especially in 
Asia. Meanwhile, there was some doubt in both Japan and the 
United States as to whether Japan-United States security arrange- 
ments, predicated on the Soviet threat, could be transformed to 
meet the new strategic realities of the 1990s. 

Throughout the post- World War II period, Japan concentrated 
on economic growth. It accommodated itself flexibly to the regional 
and global policies of the United States while avoiding major in- 
itiatives of its own; adhered to pacifist principles embodied in the 
1947 Constitution, referred to as the * 'peace constitution"; and 
generally took a passive, low-profile role in world affairs. Relations 
with other countries were governed by what the leadership called 
"omnidirectional diplomacy," which was essentially a policy of 
maintaining political neutrality in foreign affairs while expanding 
economic relations wherever possible. This policy was highly suc- 
cessful and allowed Japan to prosper and grow as an economic 
power, but it was feasible only while the country enjoyed the secu- 
rity and economic stability provided by its ally, the United States. 

The need for a revamping of Japan's foreign policy posture had 
become apparent during the 1970s and particularly following the 
middle of the decade, as major changes in the international situa- 
tion and the nation's own development into an economic world 
power made the old diplomacy obsolete. Japan's burgeoning eco- 
nomic growth and expansion into overseas markets had given rise 
to foreign charges of "economic aggression" and demands that 
it adopt more balanced trade policies. Changes in the power rela- 
tionships in the Asia-Pacific quadrilateral — made up of Japan, 
China, the United States, and the Soviet Union — also called for 
reexamination of policies. The deepening Sino-Soviet split and con- 
frontation, the dramatic rapprochement between the United States 
and China, the rapid reduction of the United States military 
presence in Asia following the Second Indochina War (1954-75), 
and the 1970s expansion of Soviet military power in the western 
Pacific all required a reevaluation of Japan's security position and 
overall role in Asia. Finally, the oil crises of the 1970s sharpened 
Japanese awareness of the country's vulnerability to cutoffs of raw 
material and energy supplies, underscoring the need for a less pas- 
sive, more independent foreign policy. 

Japanese thinking on foreign policy was also influenced by the 
rise of a new postwar generation to leadership and policy-making 



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Foreign Relations 



positions. The differences in outlook between the older leaders still 
in positions of power and influence and the younger generation 
that was replacing them complicated formulation of foreign policy. 

By 1990 Japan's foreign policy choices often challenged the 
leadership's tendency to avoid radical shifts and to rely on incremen- 
tal adjustments. Although still generally supportive of close ties, 
including the alliance relationship with the United States, Japanese 
leaders were well aware of strong American frustrations with 
Japanese economic practices and Japan's growing economic power 
relative to the United States in world affairs. Senior United States 
leaders were calling upon Japanese officials to work with them in 
crafting 4 'a new conceptual framework" for Japan-United States 
relations that would take account of altered strategic and economic 
realities and changes in Japanese and United States views about 
the bilateral relationship. The results of this effort were far from 
clear. Some optimistically predicted "a new global partnership" 
in which the United States and Japan would work together as truly 
equal partners in dealing with global problems. Pessimists predicted 
that negative feelings generated by the realignment in United States 
and Japanese economic power and persistent trade frictions would 
prompt Japan to strike out more on its own, without the ' 'guidance' ' 
of the United States. Given the growing economic dominance of 
Japan in Asia, Tokyo was seen as most likely to strike out indepen- 
dently there first, translating its economic power into political and 
perhaps, eventually, military influence. 

Major Foreign Policy Goals and Strategies 

Japan's geography — particularly its insular character, its lim- 
ited endowment of natural resources, and its exposed location near 
potentially hostile giant neighbors — has played an important role 
in the development of its foreign policy. In premodern times, 
Japan's semi-isolated position on the periphery of the Asian main- 
land was an asset (see Physical Setting, ch. 2). It permitted the 
Japanese to exist as a self-sufficient society in a secure environ- 
ment. It also allowed them to borrow selectively from the rich civili- 
zation of China while maintaining their own cultural identity. 
Insularity promoted a strong cultural and ethnic unity, which under- 
lay the early development of a national consciousness that has in- 
fluenced Japan's relations with outside peoples and cultures 
throughout its history. 

Early Developments 

In the early sixteenth century, a feudally organized Japan came 
into contact with Western missionaries and traders for the first time. 



371 



Japan: A Country Study 

Westerners introduced important cultural innovations into Japanese 
society during more than a century of relations with various feu- 
dal rulers. But when the country was unified at the beginning of 
the seventeenth century, the Tokugawa government decided to 
expel the foreign missionaries and strictly limit intercourse with 
the outside world. National seclusion — except for contacts with the 
Chinese and Dutch — was Japan's foreign policy for more than two 
centuries (see Seclusion and Social Control, ch. 1). 

When the Tokugawa seclusion was forcibly breached in 1853- 
54 by Commodore Matthew C. Perry of the United States Navy, 
Japan found that geography no longer ensured security — the coun- 
try was defenseless against military pressures and economic exploi- 
tation by the Western powers. After Perry's naval squadron had 
compelled Japan to enter into relations with the Western world, 
the first foreign policy debate was over whether Japan should em- 
bark on an extensive modernization to cope with the threat of the 
"eastward advance of Western power," which had already vio- 
lated the independence of China, or expel the "barbarians" and 
return to seclusion. The latter alternative — although it appealed 
to many — was never seriously considered. Beginning with the Meiji 
Restoration of 1868, which ushered in a new, centralized regime, 
Japan set out to "gather wisdom from all over the world' ' and em- 
barked on an ambitious program of military, social, political, and 
economic reforms that transformed it within a generation into a 
modern nation- state and major world power. 

Modern Japan's foreign policy was shaped at the outset by its 
need to reconcile its Asian identity with its desire for status and 
security in an international order dominated by the West. The prin- 
cipal foreign policy goals of the Meiji period (1868-1912) were to 
protect the integrity and independence of the nation against Western 
domination and to win equality of status with the leading nations 
of the West by reversing the unequal treaties. Since fear of Western 
military power was the chief concern of the Meiji leaders, their 
highest priority was building up the basic requirements for national 
defense, under the slogan "wealth and arms" (Jukoku kyohei). They 
saw that a modern military establishment required national con- 
scription drawing manpower from an adequately educated popu- 
lation, a trained officer corps, a sophisticated chain of command, 
and strategy and tactics adapted to contemporary conditions (see 
The Modernization of the Military, 1868-1931, ch. 8). Finally, 
it required modern arms together with the factories to make them, 
sufficient wealth to purchase them, and a transportation system 
to deliver them (see The Emergence of Modern Japan, 1868-1919, 
ch. 1). 



372 



A Japanese view of the West, an 1850s woodblock print of a 
contemporary American merchant ship by Hiroshige II 
Courtesy Chadbourne Collection, Library of Congress 

An important objective of the military buildup was to gain the 
respect of the Western powers and achieve equal status for Japan 
in the international community. Inequality of status was symbo- 
lized by the treaties imposed on Japan when the country was first 
opened to foreign intercourse. The treaties were objectionable to 
the Japanese not only because they imposed low fixed tariffs on 



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Japan: A Country Study 

foreign imports and thus handicapped domestic industries, but also 
because their provisions gave a virtual monopoly of external trade 
to foreigners and granted extraterritorial status to foreign nation- 
als in Japan, exempting them from Japanese jurisdiction and placing 
Japan in the inferior category of uncivilized nations. Many of the 
social and institutional reforms of the Meiji period were designed 
to remove the stigma of backwardness and inferiority represented 
by the "unequal treaties," and a major task of Meiji diplomacy 
was to press for early treaty revision. 

Once created, the Meiji military machine was used to extend 
Japanese power overseas, for many leaders believed that national 
security depended on expansion and not merely a strong defense. 
Within thirty years, the country's military forces had fought and 
defeated imperial China in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894- 
95), winning possession of Taiwan and Chinese recognition of 
Korea's independence. Ten years later, in the Russo-Japanese War 
(1904-5), Japan defeated tsarist Russia and won possession of 
southern Sakhalin as well as a position of paramount influence in 
Korea and southern Manchuria. By this time, Japan had been able 
to negotiate revisions of the unequal treaties with the Western pow- 
ers and had in 1902 formed an alliance with the world's leading 
power, Britain. After World War I, in which it sided with the 
Western Allies, Japan, despite its relatively small role in the war 
(with little effort it gained possession of former German territories 
in the Pacific), sat with the victors at Versailles and enjoyed the 
status of a great power in its own right. 

Between World War I and World War II, the nation embarked 
on a course of imperialist expansion, using both diplomatic and 
military means to extend its control over more and more of the 
Asian mainland. It began to see itself as the protector and cham- 
pion of Asian interests against the West, a point of view that brought 
it increasingly into conflict with the Western powers (see Diplomacy, 
ch. 1). When its aggressive policies met firm resistance from the 
United States and its allies, Japan made common cause with the 
Axis partnership of Germany and Italy and launched into war with 
the United States and the Western Alliance (see World War II, 
ch. 8). 

After Japan's devastating defeat in World War II, the nation 
came under an Allied occupation in which the United States, as 
the principal occupying power, was charged with the demilitari- 
zation and democratization of the state. Major changes were made 
in political, social, and economic institutions and practices. Dur- 
ing the seven-year occupation, the country had no control over its 
foreign affairs and became in effect the ward of the United States 



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Foreign Relations 



on the international scene. It adopted a new Constitution where- 
by, in Article 9, the "Japanese people forever renounce war as a 
sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as mean 
of settling international disputes" (see The Postwar Constitution, 
ch. 6). 

Postwar Developments 

When Japan regained its sovereignty in 1952 and reentered the 
international community as an independent nation, it found itself 
in a world dominated by the Cold War between East and West, 
in which the Soviet Union and the United States headed opposing 
camps. By virtue of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed in San 
Francisco on September 8, 1951 (effective April 28, 1952), ending 
the state of war between Japan and most of the Allied powers ex- 
cept the Soviet Union and China, and the Mutual Security As- 
sistance Pact between Japan and the United States, signed in San 
Francisco the same day, Japan was now essentially a dependent 
ally of the United States, which continued to maintain bases and 
troops on Japanese soil. 

Japan's foreign policy goals during most of the early postwar 
period were essentially to regain economic viability and establish 
its credibility as a peaceful member of the world community. Na- 
tional security was entrusted to the protective shield and nuclear 
umbrella of the United States, which was permitted under the secu- 
rity pact that came into effect in April 1952, to deploy its forces 
in and about Japan. The pact provided a framework governing 
the use of United States forces against military threats — internal 
or external — in the region. A special diplomatic task was to assuage 
the suspicions and alleviate the resentments of Asian neighbors who 
had suffered from Japanese colonial rule and imperialist aggres- 
sion in the past. Japan's diplomacy toward its Asian neighbors, 
therefore, tended to be extremely low-key, conciliatory, and non- 
assertive. With respect to the world at large, the nation avoided 
political issues and concentrated on economic goals. Under its omni- 
directional diplomacy, it sought to cultivate friendly ties with all 
nations, proclaimed a policy of "separation of politics and eco- 
nomics," and adhered to a neutral position on some East- West 
issues. 

During the 1950s and 1960s, foreign policy actions were guided 
by three basic principles: close cooperation with the United States 
for both security and economic reasons; promotion of a free trade 
system congenial to Japan's own economic needs; and international 
cooperation through the United Nations (UN) — to which it was 
admitted in 1956 — and other multilateral bodies. Adherence to these 



375 



Japan: A Country Study 

principles worked well and contributed to phenomenal economic 
recovery and growth during the first two decades after the end of 
the occupation. 

In the 1970s, the basic postwar principles remained unchanged, 
but were approached from a new perspective, owing to the pres- 
sure of practical politics at home and abroad. There was growing 
domestic pressure on the government to exercise more foreign policy 
initiatives independent of the United States, without, however, com- 
promising vital security and economic ties. The so-called Nixon 
''shock," involving the surprise United States opening to China 
and other regional issues, also argued for a more independent 
Japanese foreign policy. The nation's phenomenal economic growth 
had made it a ranking world economic power by the early 1970s 
and had generated a sense of pride and self-esteem, especially among 
the younger generation. The demand for a more independent for- 
eign policy reflected this enhanced self-image. 

Changes in world economic relations during the 1970s also en- 
couraged a more independent stance. Japan had become less de- 
pendent on the Western powers for resources. Oil, for example, 
was obtained directly from the producing countries and not from 
the Western-controlled multinational companies. Other important 
materials also came increasingly from sources other than the United 
States and its allies, while trade with the United States as a share 
of total trade dropped significantly during the decade of the 1970s. 
Thus, political leaders began to argue that in the interests of eco- 
nomic self-preservation, more attention should be paid to the finan- 
cial and development needs of other countries, especially those that 
provided Japan with vital energy and raw material supplies. 

The move toward a more autonomous foreign policy was ac- 
celerated in the 1970s by the United States decision to withdraw 
troops from Indochina. Japanese public opinion had earlier favored 
some distance between Japan and the United States involvement 
in war in Vietnam. The collapse of the war effort in Vietnam was 
seen as the end of United States military and economic dominance 
in Asia and brought to the fore a marked shift in Japanese atti- 
tudes about the United States. This shift, which had been developing 
since the early 1970s, took the form of questioning the credibility 
of the United States 's nuclear umbrella, as well as its ability to under- 
write a stable international currency system, guarantee Japanese 
access to energy and raw materials, and secure Japanese interests 
in a stable political order. The shift therefore required a reassess- 
ment of omnidirectional diplomacy. 

Japan's leaders welcomed the reassertion of United States mili- 
tary power in Asian and world affairs following the revolution in 



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Foreign Relations 



Iran, the United States hostage crisis, and the Soviet military in- 
vasion of Afghanistan, all of which occurred in 1979. Japanese lead- 
ers played a strong supporting role in curbing economic and other 
interaction with the Soviet Union and its allies, to help check the 
expansion of Soviet power in sensitive Third World areas. Under 
Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, Japan built up a close political- 
military relationship with the United States as part of a de facto 
international front of a number of developed and developing coun- 
tries intent on checking Soviet expansion. Japan's defense spend- 
ing continued to grow steadily despite overall Japanese budget 
restraint. Japan became increasingly active in granting foreign as- 
sistance to countries of strategic importance in East-West compe- 
tition (see Strategic Considerations; Defense Spending, ch. 8). 

The realignment of United States and Japanese currencies in 
the mid-1980s increased the growth of Japanese trade, aid, and 
investment, especially in Asia. It also accelerated the reversal of 
the United States fiscal position, from one of the world's largest 
creditors in the early 1980s to the world's largest debtor at the end 
of the decade. Japan became the world's largest creditor, an in- 
creasingly active investor in the United States, and a major con- 
tributor to international debt relief, financial institutions, and other 
assistance efforts. 

The crucial issue for the United States and many other world 
governments in the 1990s centered on how Japan would employ 
this growing economic power. The strategic framework of the 
Japan-United States alliance also was called into question by the 
ending of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet empire. Could 
a new rationale be found to sustain the active security tie that had 
been the basis for Japan's foreign affairs in the postwar period? 
Had Japan's foreign interactions become so broad and multifaceted 
that new mechanisms were needed? Were new ways of thinking 
about Japan's foreign policy being formulated and implemented 
in Japan? It appeared clear to observers in Japan in 1990 that the 
majority of the Japanese public and elite were satisfied with the 
general direction of Japanese foreign policy. That policy direction 
was characterized by continued close ties with the United States, 
to sustain world stability and prosperity that were so beneficial to 
Japan, and incrementally more assertive Japanese policies, espe- 
cially regarding international economic and political institutions 
and Asian affairs. Yet, the world order was changing rapidly, and 
there were deep frustrations in some quarters in the United States, 
China, and Western Europe over Japanese practices. There also 
was some evidence of deep frustrations in Japan over Tokyo's seem- 
ing slowness in taking a more active world role. The possibility 



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Japan: A Country Study 

of more radical change in Japanese foreign policy, perhaps in direc- 
tions more independent of the United States, remained a distinct 
possibility. 

Foreign Policy Formulation 
Institutional Framework 

Under the 1947 Constitution, the cabinet exercises the primary 
responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs, subject to the overall 
supervision of the Diet (see The Legislature, ch. 6). The prime 
minister is required to make periodic reports on foreign relations 
to the Diet, whose upper and lower houses each have a foreign af- 
fairs committee. Each committee reports on its deliberations to ple- 
nary sessions of the chamber to which it belongs. Ad hoc committees 
are formed occasionally to consider special questions. Diet mem- 
bers have the right to raise pertinent policy questions — officially 
termed interpellations — to the minister of foreign affairs and the 
prime minister. Treaties with foreign countries require ratification 
by the Diet. As the symbol of the state, the emperor performs the 
ceremonial function of receiving foreign envoys and attesting to 
foreign treaties ratified by the Diet. 

As the chief executive and constitutionally the dominant figure 
in the political system, the prime minister has the final word in 
major foreign policy decisions. The minister of foreign affairs, a 
senior member of the cabinet, acts as the prime minister's chief 
adviser in matters of planning and implementation. The minister 
in 1990 was assisted by two vice ministers: one in charge of ad- 
ministration, who was at the apex of the Ministry of Foreign Af- 
fairs structure as its senior career official, and the other in charge 
of political liaison with the Diet. Other key positions in the minis- 
try included members of the ministry's Secretariat which in 1989 
had divisions handling consular, emigration, communications, and 
cultural exchange functions, and the directors of the various regional 
and functional bureaus in the ministry (see fig. 10). 

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs staff included an elite career 
foreign service corps, recruited on the basis of a competitive ex- 
amination and thereafter trained by the ministry's Foreign Ser- 
vice Training Institute. The handling of specific foreign policy issues 
was usually divided between the geographic and functional bureaus 
to minimize overlaps and competition. In general, bilateral issues 
were assigned to the geographic bureaus, and multilateral problems 
to the functional bureaus. The Treaties Bureau, with its wide- 
ranging responsibilities, tended to get involved in the whole spec- 
trum of issues. The Information Analysis, Research, and Planning 



378 



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Bureau in the ministry's Secretariat engaged in comprehensive and 
coordinated policy investigation and planning. 

Long a profession of high social prestige, diplomatic service from 
the Meiji period through World War II was a preserve of the upper 
social strata. In addition to formal qualifications, proper social ori- 
gin, family connections, and graduation from Tokyo Imperial 
University were important prewar requirements for admission. 
After World War II, these requirements were changed as part of 
democratic reform measures but foreign service continued to be 
a highly regarded career. Most career foreign service officers had 
passed the postwar Higher Foreign Service Examination before 
entry into the service. Many of these successful examinees were 
graduates of the prestigious Law Faculty of the University of Tokyo. 
Almost all ambassadorial appointments since the 1950s have been 
made from among veteran diplomats. 

Diplomacy in postwar Japan was not a monopoly of the Minis- 
try of Foreign Affairs. Given the overriding importance of economic 
factors in foreign relations, the ministry worked closely with the 
Ministry of Finance on matters of customs, tariffs, international 
finance, and foreign aid; with the Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry (MITI) on exports and imports; and with the Ministry 
of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries on questions of foreign 
agricultural imports and fishing rights. The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs also consulted other agencies, such as the Defense Agency, 
the Fair Trade Commission, the Japan Export-Import Bank, the 
Japan External Trade Organization, the Overseas Economic Co- 
operation Fund, and the Overseas Technical Cooperation Agency. 
On many issues affecting the country's foreign economic activi- 
ties — and thus its diplomatic relations as well — the Ministry of For- 
eign Affairs and sometimes MITI and the Ministry of Finance were 
known to favor liberalizing import restrictions. On the other hand, 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries and other 
domestic ministries took a more protectionist stand, evidently be- 
cause of pressures from special interest groups (see Trade and In- 
vestment Institutions, ch. 5). 

The vital importance of foreign affairs expanded to affect virtu- 
ally every aspect of national life in postwar Japan, and the multi- 
plicity of agencies involved in external affairs continued to be a 
source of confusion and inefficiency in the formulation of foreign 
policy. On the other hand, as the postwar generation of leaders 
and policymakers began to assume a greater role in government 
decision making and as public attitudes on foreign policy issues 
matured, there were indications that foreign affairs were being con- 
ducted on the basis of a more stable consensus. 



379 



Japan: A Country Study 





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380 



Foreign Relations 



The Role of Domestic Politics 

The influence of Japanese domestic politics on the conduct of 
foreign affairs changed in the mid-1970s. Up to that time, the for- 
eign policy debate in Japan had been between "progressives," who 
favored advances toward socialist countries and more independence 
from the United States, and "conservatives," who tended to identify 
Japanese interests closely with the United States-led alignment of 
Western countries. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 
was closely associated with the conservative, pro-United States po- 
sition, while opposition parties often staked out positions at odds 
with the status quo (see The Liberal Democratic Party, ch. 6). 

General satisfaction in Japan with the peace and prosperity that 
had been brought to the country made it hard for opposition par- 
ties to garner much support for a radical move to the left in Japan's 
foreign policy. The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and 
the widely publicized brutalities of communist regimes in Asia in 
the late 1980s further dampened popular Japanese interest in shift- 
ing foreign policy to the left. 

Meanwhile, the ruling LDP modified its base of political power. 
By the 1980s, it had markedly shifted the social composition of LDP 
support away from the traditional conservative reliance on busi- 
ness and rural groups, to include every category of the electorate. 
This shift resulted from efforts by LDP politicians to align various 
local interests in mutually advantageous arrangements in support 
of LDP candidates. The LDP had brought together various can- 
didates and their supporting interest groups and had reached a pol- 
icy consensus to pursue economic development while depending 
strongly on the United States security umbrella. 

Domestic political challenges to LDP dominance waxed and 
waned later in the 1980s as the party faced major influence-peddling 
scandals with weak and divided leadership. In 1989 the opposi- 
tion Japan Socialist Party won control of the Diet's House of Coun- 
cillors. But the Japan Socialist Party's past ideological positions 
on foreign policy appeared to be more of a liability than an asset 
going into the lower- house elections in 1990, and the party at- 
tempted to modify a number of positions that called for pushing 
foreign policy to the left. In contrast, the LDP standard bearer, 
Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki, used identification with the United 
States and the West to his advantage in the successful LDP effort 
to sustain control of the House of Representatives in February 1990 
(see The Electoral System, ch. 6). 

In 1990 the government, under the LDP, continued to popula- 
rize its policy of economic and security ties with the United States; 
of responding to domestic and international expectations of greater 



381 



Japan: A Country Study 

Japanese political and economic contributions; and of international 
cooperation through the UN and other international organizations 
in the cause of world peace, disarmament, aid to developing coun- 
tries, and educational and technical cooperation. Foreign policy 
speeches by the prime minister and the minister of foreign affairs 
were widely disseminated, and pamphlets and booklets on major 
foreign policy questions were issued frequently. 

Political groups opposing the government's foreign policy 
presented their views freely through political parties and the mass 
media, which took vocal and independent positions on wide-ranging 
external issues. Some of the opposing elements were leftists who 
sought to exert influence through their representatives in the Diet, 
through mass organizations, and sometimes through rallies and 
street demonstrations. In contrast, special interest groups supporting 
the government — including the business community and agricul- 
tural interests — brought pressure to bear on the prime minister, 
cabinet members, and members of the Diet, usually through behind- 
the-scenes negotiations and compromises (see Interest Groups; The 
Mass Media and Politics, ch. 6). 

Partisan political activities of all ideological tendencies were 
undertaken freely and openly, but the difference in foreign policy 
perspectives appeared increasingly in the 1980s to derive less from 
ideology than from more pragmatic considerations. Broadly stated, 
the partisan disagreement among the various groups competing 
for power had centered on the question of Japan's safety from ex- 
ternal threat or attack. The dominant view was that, although the 
Japanese should be responsible for defending their homeland, they 
should continue their security ties with the United States, at least 
until they could gain sufficient confidence in their own self-defense 
power, which has been interpreted as not being proscribed by Ar- 
ticle 9 of the Constitution. Proponents of this view agreed that this 
self-defense capability should be based on conventional arms and 
that any nuclear shield should be provided by the United States 
under the 1960 security treaty. 

The Sino-United States rapprochement of the 1970s and the 
stiffening of Japan-Soviet relations in the 1980s caused the oppo- 
sition parties to be less insistent on the need to terminate the secu- 
rity treaty. The Democratic Socialist Party and the Komeito (Clean 
Government Party) indicated their readiness to support the treaty, 
while the Japan Socialist Party dropped its demand for immediate 
abrogation. Only the Japan Communist Party remained adamant. 

Despite partisan differences, all political parties and groups were 
nearly unanimous during the 1970s and 1980s that Japan should 
exercise more independence and initiative in foreign affairs and 



382 



Foreign Relations 



not appear so ready to follow the United States on matters affect- 
ing Japan's interests. They also agreed that Japan should continue 
to prohibit the introduction of nuclear weapons into the country. 
These shared views stemmed from the resurgence of nationalism 
during the post- World War II era and from Japanese people's pride 
in their own heritage and in the economic achievements of the post- 
war decades. Although there were indications that the "nuclear 
allergy" produced by Japan's traumatic experience with the atomic 
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 was begin- 
ning to moderate, nuclear weapons remained a sensitive political 
issue in 1990. 

Except for security-related matters, most foreign affairs issues 
involved economic interests and mainly attracted the attention of 
the specific groups affected. The role of interest groups in formulat- 
ing foreign policy varied with the issue at hand. Because trade and 
capital investment issues were involved, for example, in relations 
with China and with the Republic of Korea (South Korea), the 
business community increasingly became an interested party in the 
conduct of foreign affairs. Similarly, when fishing rights or agricul- 
tural imports were being negotiated, representatives of the indus- 
tries affected worked with political leaders and the foreign affairs 
bureaucracies in shaping policy. 

Because of the continuous control of the government enjoyed 
by the LDP since its formation in 1955, the policy-making bodies 
of the LDP had become the centers of government policy formu- 
lation. Because the unified will of the majority party almost in- 
variably prevailed in the Diet, some observers believed that that 
body, had been reduced to a mere sounding board for government 
policy pronouncements and a rubber-stamp ratifier of decisions 
made by the prime minister and his cabinet. This situation meant 
that significant debate and deliberations on foreign policy matters 
generally took place not in the Diet but in closed-door meetings 
of the governing LDP, for example, between representatives of the 
Foreign Affairs Section of the LDP's Policy Research Council and 
officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MITI, or leaders of 
major LDP support groups, such as the Federation of Economic 
Organizations (Keizai Dantai Rengokai — better known as Keidan- 
ren; see Business Interests, ch. 6). 

The role of public opinion in the formulation of foreign policy 
throughout the postwar period has been difficult to determine. Japan 
continued to be extremely concerned with public opinion, and opin- 
ion polling became a conspicuous feature of national life. The large 
number of polls on public policy issues, including foreign pol- 
icy matters, conducted by the Office of the Prime Minister, the 



383 



Japan: A Country Study 



Ministry of Foreign Affairs, other government organizations, and 
the media led to the presumption by analysts that the collective 
opinions of voters do exert significant influence on policymakers. 
The public attitudes toward foreign policy that had held through- 
out much of the postwar period appeared to have shifted in the 
1980s. Opinion polls reflected a marked increase in national pride 
and self-esteem. Moreover, public discussion of security matters 
by government officials, political party leaders, press commenta- 
tors, and academics had become markedly less volatile and doc- 
trinaire and more open and pragmatic, suggesting indirectly that 
public attitudes on this subject had evolved as well. 

The mass media, and particularly the press, as the champion 
of the public interest and critic of the government, continued to 
mold public attitudes strongly. The media was the chief source of 
demands that the government exercise a more independent and 
less "weak-kneed" diplomacy in view of the changing world situ- 
ation and Japan's increased stature in the world. 

An Overview of Japan's Foreign Relations 

Relations with the United States 

Japan-United States relations were more uncertain in 1 990 than 
at any time since World War II. As long-standing military allies 
and increasingly interdependent economic partners, Japan and the 
United States cooperated closely to build a strong, multifaceted 
relationship based on democratic values and interests in world sta- 
bility and development. Japan-United States relations improved 
enormously in the 1970s and 1980s, as the two societies and econ- 
omies became increasingly intertwined. In 1990 their combined 
gross national product (GNP — see Glossary) totaled about one third 
of the world's GNP. Japan received about 11 percent of United 
States exports (a larger share than any other country except Can- 
ada), and the United States bought about 34 percent of Japan's 
exports (see United States and Canada, ch. 5). Japan had US$65 
billion in direct investment in the United States in 1990, while the 
United States had more than US$17 billion invested in Japan. Some 
US$100 billion in United States government securities held by in- 
stitutions in Japan helped finance much of the United States budget 
deficit. Economic exchanges were reinforced by a variety of scien- 
tific, technical, tourist, and other exchanges. Each society continued 
to see the other as its main ally in Asia and the Pacific. Certain 
developments in the late 1980s damaged bilateral relations. Never- 
theless, public opinion surveys continued to reveal that substan- 
tial majorities of Japanese and Americans believed that the bilateral 
relationship was vital to both countries. 



384 



Foreign Relations 



Growing interdependence was accompanied by markedly chang- 
ing circumstances at home and abroad that were widely seen to 
have created a crisis in Japan-United States relations in the late 
1980s. United States government officials continued to emphasize 
the positive aspects of the relationship but warned that there was 
a need for ' 4 a new conceptual framework. " The Wall Street Journal 
publicized a series of lengthy reports documenting changes in the 
relationship in the late 1980s and reviewing the considerable de- 
bate in Japan and the United States over whether a closely co- 
operative relationship was possible or appropriate for the 1990s. 
An authoritative review of popular and media opinion, published 
in 1990 by the Washington-based Commission on US-Japan Re- 
lations for the Twenty First Century, was concerned with preserving 
a close Japan-United States relationship. It warned of a "new ortho- 
doxy" of "suspicion, criticism and considerable self-justification," 
which it said was endangering the fabric of Japan-United States 
relations. 

Three sets of factors stood out as most important in explaining 
the challenges facing Japan-United States relations in the 1990s. 
They were economic, political-military, and domestic in nature. 

The relative economic power of Japan and the United States was 
undergoing sweeping change, especially in the 1980s. This change 
went well beyond the implications of the United States trade deficit 
with Japan, which had remained between US$40 billion and US$48 
billion annually since the mid-1980s. The persisting United States 
trade and budget deficits of the early 1980s led to a series of deci- 
sions in the middle of the decade that brought a major realignment 
of the value of Japanese and United States currencies. The stronger 
Japanese currency gave Japan the ability to purchase more United 
States goods and to make important investments in the United 
States. By the late 1980s, Japan was the main international creditor. 

Japan's growing investment in the United States — it was the sec- 
ond largest investor after Britain — led to complaints from some 
American constituencies. Moreover, Japanese industry seemed well 
positioned to use its economic power to invest in the high-technology 
products in which United States manufacturers were still leaders. 
The United States' s ability to compete under these circumstances 
was seen by many Japanese and Americans as hampered by heavy 
personal, government, and business debt and a low savings rate. 

In the late 1980s, the breakup of the Soviet bloc in Eastern Eu- 
rope and the growing preoccupation of Soviet leaders with mas- 
sive internal political and economic difficulties forced the Japanese 
and United States governments to reassess their longstanding alli- 
ance against the Soviet threat. Officials of both nations had tended 



385 



Japan: A Country Study 

to characterize the security alliance as the linchpin of the relation- 
ship, which should have priority over economic and other disputes. 
Some Japanese and United States officials and commentators con- 
tinued to emphasize the common dangers to Japan-United States 
interests posed by the continued strong Soviet military presence 
in Asia (see Relations with the Soviet Union, this ch.). They stressed 
that until Moscow followed its moderation in Europe with major 
demobilization and reductions in its forces positioned against the 
United States and Japan in the Pacific, Washington and Tokyo 
needed to remain militarily prepared and vigilant. 

Increasingly, however, other perceived benefits of close Japan- 
United States security ties were emphasized. The alliance was seen 
as deterring other potentially disruptive forces in East Asia, nota- 
bly the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea). 
Ironically, some United States officials noted that the alliance helped 
keep Japan's potential military power in check and under the su- 
pervision of the United States. 

The post-Cold War environment strengthened the relative im- 
portance of economic prowess over military power as the major 
source of world influence in the 1990s. This shift affected the per- 
ceived relative standing of Japan, the United States, and other pow- 
ers. Increasingly, Japan was expected to shoulder international aid 
and economic responsibilities that in the past were discharged by 
the United States and other Western countries. 

The declining Soviet threat, the rising power of the Japanese 
economy, increasingly close United States interaction (and related 
disputes) with Japan, and other factors led by 1990 to a decided 
shift in United States opinion about Japan, and less marked but 
nonetheless notable shifts in Japanese opinion. In the United States, 
this shift was reflected in questions about which was the more seri- 
ous, the military threat from the Soviets or the economic challenge 
from Japan. In a series of polls in 1989 and 1990, most respon- 
dents considered the challenge from Japan the more serious. Sim- 
ilarly, poll data from early 1990 showed that most Japanese 
considered negative United States attitudes toward Japan a re- 
flection of United States anger at "America's slipping economic 
position." Meanwhile, Japanese opinion was showing greater con- 
fidence in Japan's ability to handle its own affairs without con- 
stant reference — as in the past — to the United States. Japanese belief 
in United States reliability as a world leader also lessened. 

In both countries, new or "revisionist" views of the Japan-United 
States relationship were promoted. In Japan, some commentators 
argued that the United States was weak, dependent on Japan, and 
unable to come to terms with world economic competition. They 



386 



Foreign Relations 



urged Japan to strike out on a more independent course. In the 
United States, prominent commentators warned of a Japanese eco- 
nomic juggernaut, out of control of the Japanese government, which 
needed to be "contained" by the United States. 

At the same time, it was easy to overstate the changes in opin- 
ion in both countries. Japanese still considered the United States 
positively as their closest friend, the principal guardian of their ex- 
ternal security, their most important economic partner and mar- 
ket, and the exemplar of a life- style that had much to offer — and 
much to envy. Moreover, the vast majority of Americans still viewed 
Japan positively, had high respect for Japanese accomplishments, 
and supported the United States defense commitment to Japan. 

In the years after World War II, Japan's relations with the United 
States were placed on an equal footing for the first time at the end 
of the occupation by the Allied forces in April 1952. This equal- 
ity, the legal basis of which was laid down in the peace treaty signed 
by forty-eight Allied nations and Japan, was initially largely nomi- 
nal, because in the early postoccupation period Japan required 
direct United States economic assistance. A favorable Japanese 
balance of payments with the United States was achieved in 1954, 
mainly as a result of United States military and aid spending in 
Japan. 

The Japanese people's feeling of dependence lessened gradually 
as the disastrous results of World War II subsided into the back- 
ground and trade with the United States expanded. Self-confidence 
grew as the country applied its resources and organizational skill 
to regaining economic health. This situation gave rise to a general 
desire for greater independence from United States influence. Dur- 
ing the 1950s and 1960s, this feeling was especially evident in the 
Japanese attitude toward United States military bases on the four 
main islands of Japan and in Okinawa Prefecture, occupying the 
southern two-thirds of the Ryukyu Islands (see fig. 1). 

The government had to balance left-wing pressure advocating 
disassociation from the United States against the realities of the 
need for military protection. Recognizing the popular desire for 
the return of the Ryukyus and the Bonin Islands (also known as 
the Ogasawara Islands), the United States as early as 1953 volun- 
tarily relinquished its control of the Amami Island group at the 
northern end of the Ryukyus. But the United States made no com- 
mitment to return Okinawa, which was then under United States 
military administration for an indefinite period as provided in Ar- 
ticle 3 of the peace treaty. Popular agitation culminated in a unani- 
mous resolution adopted by the Diet in June 1956, calling for a 
return of Okinawa to Japan. 



387 



Japan: A Country Study 

Bilateral talks on revising the 1952 security pact began in 1959, 
and the new Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security was signed 
in Washington on January 19, 1960. When the pact was submit- 
ted to the Diet for ratification on February 5, it became the sub- 
ject of bitter debate over the Japan-United States relationship and 
the occasion for violence in an all-out effort by the leftist opposi- 
tion to prevent its passage. It was finally approved by the House 
of Representatives on May 20. Japan Socialist Party deputies boy- 
cotted the lower house session and tried to prevent the LDP deputies 
from entering the chamber; they were forcibly removed by the 
police. Massive demonstrations and rioting by students and trade 
unions followed. These outbursts prevented a scheduled visit to 
Japan by President Dwight D. Eisenhower and precipitated the 
resignation of Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, but not before the 
treaty was passed by default on June 19, when the House of Coun- 
cillors failed to vote on the issue within the required thirty days 
after lower house approval. 

Under the treaty, both parties assumed an obligation to assist 
each other in case of armed attack on territories under Japanese 
administration. (It was understood, however, that Japan could not 
come to the defense of the United States because it was constitu- 
tionally forbidden to send armed forces overseas. In particular, the 
Constitution forbids the maintenance of ''land, sea, and air forces." 
It also expresses the Japanese people's renunciation of "the threat 
or use of force as a means of settling international disputes." Ac- 
cordingly, the Japanese find it difficult to send their "self-defense" 
forces overseas, even for peace-keeping purposes.) The scope of 
the new treaty did not extend to the Ryukyu Islands, but an ap- 
pended minute made clear that in case of an armed attack on the 
islands, both governments would consult and take appropriate 
action. Notes accompanying the treaty provided for prior consul- 
tation between the two governments before any major change oc- 
curred in the deployment of United States troops or equipment 
in Japan. Unlike the 1952 security pact, the new treaty provided 
for a ten-year term, after which it could be revoked upon one year's 
notice by either party. The treaty included general provisions on 
the further development of international cooperation and on im- 
proved future economic cooperation. 

Both countries worked closely to fulfill the United States promise, 
under Article 3 of the peace treaty, to return all Japanese territo- 
ries acquired by the United States in war. In June 1968 the United 
States returned the Bonin Islands (including I wo Jima) to Japanese 
administrative control. In 1969 the Okinawa reversion issue and 
Japan's security ties with the United States became the focal points 



388 



Foreign Relations 



of partisan political campaigns. The situation calmed considera- 
bly when Prime Minister Sato Eisaku visited Washington in 
November 1969, and in a joint communique signed by him and 
President Richard M. Nixon, announced the United States agree- 
ment to return Okinawa to Japan in 1972. In June 1971, after eigh- 
teen months of negotiations, the two countries signed an agreement 
providing for the return of Okinawa to Japan in 1972. 

The Japanese government's firm and voluntary endorsement of 
the security treaty and the settlement of the Okinawa reversion ques- 
tion meant that, two major political issues in Japan-United States 
relations were eliminated. But new issues arose. In July 1971, the 
Japanese government was surprised by Nixon's dramatic announce- 
ment of his forthcoming visit to the People's Republic of China. 
Many Japanese were chagrined by the failure of the United States 
to consult in advance with Japan before making such a fundamental 
change in foreign policy. The following month, the government 
was again surprised to learn that, without prior consultation, the 
United States had imposed a 10 percent surcharge on imports, a 
decision certain to hinder Japan's exports to the United States. Re- 
lations between Tokyo and Washington were further strained by 
the monetary crisis involving the December 1971 revaluation of 
the Japanese yen (for value of the yen — see Glossary). 

These events of 1971 marked the beginning of a new stage in 
relations, a period of adjustment to a changing world situation that 
was not without episodes of strain in both political and economic 
spheres, although the basic relationship remained close. The po- 
litical issues between the two countries were essentially security- 
related and derived from efforts by the United States to induce 
Japan to contribute more to its own defense and to regional secu- 
rity. The economic issues tended to stem from the ever- widening 
United States trade and payments deficits with Japan, which began 
in 1965 when Japan reversed its imbalance in trade with the United 
States and, for the first time, achieved an export surplus. 

The United States withdrawal from Indochina in 1975 and the 
end of the Second Indochina War meant that the question of Japan's 
role in the security of East Asia and its contributions to its own 
defense became central topics in the dialogue between the two coun- 
tries. United States dissatisfaction with Japanese defense efforts 
began to surface in 1975 when Secretary of Defense James A. 
Schlesinger publicly stigmatized Japan as a passive defense partner. 

United States pressures continued and intensified, particularly 
as events in Iran and elsewhere in the Middle East after 1979 caused 
the United States to relocate more than 50 percent of its naval 
strength from East Asian waters to the Indian Ocean. Japan was 



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Japan: A Country Study 



repeatedly pressed not only to increase its defense expenditures and 
build up its antisubmarine and naval patrol capabilities, but to play 
a more active and positive security role generally. 

The Japanese government, constrained by constitutional limi- 
tations and strongly pacifist public opinion, responded slowly to 
pressures for a more rapid buildup of its Self-Defense Forces (SDF). 
It steadily increased its budgetary outlays for those forces, however, 
and indicated its willingness to shoulder more of the cost of main- 
taining the United States military bases in Japan. In 1976 the 
United States and Japan formally established a subcommittee for 
defense cooperation, in the framework of a bilateral Security Con- 
sultative Committee provided for under the 1960 security treaty. 
This subcommittee, in turn, drew up new Guidelines for Japan- 
United States Defense Cooperation, under which military plan- 
ners of the two countries have conducted studies relating to joint 
military action in the event of an armed attack on Japan. 

On the economic front, Japan sought to ease trade frictions by 
agreeing to Orderly Marketing Arrangements, which limited 
exports on products whose influx into the United States was creat- 
ing political problems. In 1977 an Orderly Marketing Arrange- 
ment limiting Japanese color television exports to the United States 
was signed, following the pattern of an earlier disposition of the 
textile problem. Steel exports to the United States were also cur- 
tailed, but the problems continued as disputes flared over United 
States restrictions on Japanese development of nuclear fuel- 
reprocessing facilities, Japanese restrictions on certain agricultur- 
al imports, such as beef and oranges, and liberalization of capital 
investment and government procurement within Japan. 

To respond to the call, from its allies and from within the coun- 
try as well, for a greater and more responsible role in the world, 
Japan developed what Ohira Masayoshi, after he became prime 
minister in December 1978, called a "comprehensive security and 
defense strategy to safeguard peace." Under this policy, Japan 
sought to place its relations with the United States on a new 
footing — one of close cooperation but on a more reciprocal and 
autonomous basis, and on a global scale. 

This policy was put to the test in November 1979, when radical 
Iranians seized the United States embassy in Tehran, taking sixty 
hostages. Japan reacted by condemning the action as a violation 
of international law. At the same time, Japanese trading firms and 
oil companies reportedly purchased Iranian oil that had become 
available when the United States banned oil imported from Iran. 
This action brought sharp criticism from the United States of 
Japanese government "insensitivity" for allowing the oil purchases 



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Foreign Relations 



and led to a Japanese apology and agreement to participate in sanc- 
tions against Iran in concert with other United States allies. 

Following that incident, the Japanese government took greater 
care to support United States international policies designed to 
preserve stability and promote prosperity. Japan was prompt and 
effective in announcing and implementing sanctions against the 
Soviet Union following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in De- 
cember 1979. In 1981, in response to United States requests, it 
accepted greater responsibility for defense of seas around Japan, 
pledged greater support for United States forces in Japan, and per- 
sisted with a steady buildup of the SDF. 

A qualitatively new stage of Japan-United States cooperation in 
world affairs appeared to be reached in late 1982 with the election 
of Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro. Officials of the Ronald Rea- 
gan administration worked closely with their Japanese counterparts 
to develop a personal relationship between the two leaders based 
on their common security and international outlook. Nakasone re- 
assured United States leaders of Japan's determination against the 
Soviet threat, closely coordinated policies with the United States 
toward such Asian trouble spots as the Korean Peninsula and 
Southeast Asia, and worked cooperatively with the United States 
in developing China policy. The Japanese government welcomed 
the increase of United States forces in Japan and the Western Pa- 
cific, continued the steady buildup of the SDF, and positioned Japan 
firmly on the side of the United States against the threat of Soviet 
international expansion. Japan continued to cooperate closely with 
United States policy in these areas following Nakasone 's term of 
office, although the political leadership scandals in Japan in the 
late 1980s made it difficult for newly elected President George Bush 
to establish the same kind of close personal ties that marked the 
Reagan years. 

A specific example of Japan's close cooperation with the United 
States included its quick response to the United States call for greater 
host nation support from Japan following the rapid realignment 
of Japan-United States currencies in the mid-1980s. The currency 
realignment resulted in a rapid rise of United States costs in Japan, 
which the Japanese government, upon United States request, was 
willing to offset. Another set of examples was provided by Japan's 
willingness to respond to United States requests for foreign as- 
sistance to countries considered of strategic importance to the West. 
During the 1980s, United States officials voiced appreciation for 
Japan's "strategic aid" to countries such as Pakistan, Turkey, 
Egypt, and Jamaica. Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki's pledges of 
support for East European and Middle Eastern countries in 1 990 



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Japan: A Country Study 

fit the pattern of Japan's willingness to share greater responsibil- 
ity for world stability. 

Despite complaints from some Japanese businesses and diplo- 
mats, the Japanese government remained in basic agreement with 
United States policy toward China and Indochina. The govern- 
ment held back from large-scale aid efforts until conditions in China 
and Indochina were seen as more compatible with Japanese and 
United States interests. Of course, there also were instances of lim- 
ited Japanese cooperation. Japan's response to the United States 
decision to help to protect tankers in the Persian Gulf during the 
Iran-Iraq war in the late 1980s was subject to mixed reviews. Some 
United States officials stressed the positive, noting that Japan was 
unable to send military forces because of constitutional reasons but 
compensated by supporting the construction of a navigation sys- 
tem in the Gulf, providing greater host nation support for United 
States forces in Japan, and providing loans to Oman and Jordan 
(see The Article 9 "No War" Clause, ch. 6). Japan's refusal to 
join even in a mine-sweeping effort in the Gulf was an indication 
to some United States officials of Tokyo's unwillingness to cooperate 
with the United States in areas of sensitivity to Japanese leaders 
at home or abroad. 

The main area of noncooperation with the United States in the 
1980s was Japanese resistance to repeated United States efforts to 
get Japan to open its market more to foreign goods and to change 
other economic practices seen as adverse to United States economic 
interests. A common pattern was followed here. The Japanese 
government was sensitive to political pressures from important 
domestic constituencies that would be hurt by greater openness. 
In general, these constituencies were of two types — those repre- 
senting inefficient or "declining" producers, manufacturers, and 
distributors, who could not compete if faced with full foreign com- 
petition; and those up-and-coming industries that the Japanese 
government wished to protect from foreign competition until they 
could compete effectively on world markets. To deal with domes- 
tic pressures while trying to avoid a break with the United States, 
the Japanese government engaged in protracted negotiations. This 
tactic bought time for declining industries to restructure themselves 
and new industries to grow stronger. Agreements reached dealt 
with some aspects of the problems, but it was common for trade 
or economic issues to be dragged out in talks over several years, 
involving more than one market-opening agreement. Such agree- 
ments were sometimes vague and subject to conflicting interpre- 
tations in Japan and the United States (see Import Policies, ch. 5). 



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Foreign Relations 



During the 1970s and 1980s, United States administrations had 
favored an issue-by-issue approach in negotiating such economic 
disputes with Japan. This approach ostensibly limited the areas 
of dispute. But it resulted in widespread negative publicity, at a 
time when changing economic and security circumstances were 
causing both countries to reevaluate the relationship. Notable out- 
pourings of United States congressional and media rhetoric criti- 
cal of Japan accompanied the disclosure in 1987 that Toshiba had 
illegally sold sophisticated machinery of United States origin to the 
Soviet Union, which reportedly allowed Moscow to make subma- 
rines quiet enough to avoid United States detection, and the United 
States congressional debate in 1989 over the Japan-United States 
agreement to develop a new fighter aircraft — the FSX — for Japan's 
Air Self-Defense Force (see The Defense Industry, ch. 8). 

A new approach was added in 1989. The so-called Structural 
Impediments Initiative was a series of talks designed to deal with 
domestic structural problems limiting trade on both sides. After 
several rounds of often contentious talks, agreements were reached 
in April and July 1990 that promised major changes in such sensi- 
tive areas as Japanese retailing practices, land use, and investment 
in public works. The United States pledged to deal more effectively 
with its budget deficit and to increase domestic savings. United 
States supporters saw the Structural Impediments Initiative talks 
as addressing fundamental causes of Japan-United States economic 
friction. Skeptics pointed to them as ways for officials to buy time 
and avoid an acute crisis in Japan-United States relations. 

Relations with China 

The priority that policy toward China has commanded in 
Japanese foreign affairs has varied over time. During the period 
of United States-backed "containment" of China, there was a sharp 
divergence between official policy and popular attitudes in Japan. 
As a loyal ally of the United States, the Japanese government was 
committed to nonrecognition, whereas popular sentiments favored 
diplomatic relations and expanded trade. The Japan Communist 
Party and the Japan Socialist Party sought to capitalize on this sit- 
uation in their propaganda efforts to promote closer relations with 
Beijing. Pro-Chinese sentiment found support not only in the desire 
of the business community for a new source of raw materials and 
a profitable market, but also in the popular feeling of cultural af- 
finity with the Chinese. Japanese leaders spent considerable effort 
trying to manage this tension. 

The unanticipated United States opening to China in 1971 under- 
mined the administration of Prime Minister Sato, but the subse- 
quent government of Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei quickly 



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Japan: A Country Study 

adjusted policy by normalizing diplomatic relations in 1972. 
Throughout the next decade, policy toward China continued to 
receive high priority as Japanese officials dealt with competing pres- 
sures from the Chinese and Soviet governments. Beijing and 
Moscow pressed Tokyo to side with their respective positions in 
the intense Sino- Soviet competition for influence in Asia follow- 
ing the substantial United States military withdrawal and the fall 
of United States-backed regimes in Indochina. 

China's economic importance to Japanese policymakers rose in 
tandem with the market-oriented reforms and increased foreign 
interaction associated with the post-Mao Zedong policies of Chinese 
leader Deng Xiaoping. Unrealistic Japanese expectations of eco- 
nomic benefit in China were ended by the zigzag course of Chinese 
development in the 1980s. Japanese decision makers by the end 
of the decade were able to settle on a balanced policy toward China 
that required less attention from Japanese leaders and received lower 
priority than in the past. The massacre of prodemocracy demon- 
strators in Beijing's Tiananmen Incident and collapse of communist 
regimes in Eastern Europe and parts of Asia in 1989 discredited 
China's communist leaders in the minds of Japanese people and 
made it more difficult for Chinese officials or opposition Japanese 
politicians to raise China-related issues in Japanese domestic poli- 
tics. The effect was to reduce further the need to make special 
government concessions on China-related issues. 

The early post-World War II political differences between the 
two countries related especially to China's insistence that Japan 
end its official relations with the Guomindang (Chinese Nation- 
alist Party) government on Taiwan and abrogate its security treaty 
with the United States. Initially, neither country allowed its polit- 
ical differences to stand in the way of broadening unofficial con- 
tacts, and in the mid-1950s they exchanged an increasing number 
of cultural, labor, and business delegations. 

In 1958, however, China suspended its trade with Japan — ap- 
parentiy convinced that trade concessions were ineffective in achiev- 
ing political goals. Thereafter, in a plan for improving political 
relations, China requested that the Japanese government not be 
hostile toward it, not obstruct any effort to restore normal rela- 
tions between itself and Japan, and not join in any conspiracy to 
create two Chinas. 

Coincident with its dispute with the Soviet Union, China resumed 
its trade with Japan in late 1960. Important provisions were at- 
tached to the arrangement, however, stipulating that trade was to 
be based on formal government-to-government agreements and 
private trade was to be sanctioned indirectly by the Japanese 



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Foreign Relations 



government. Only Japanese firms that pledged to support the three 
political principles of 1958 were to be allowed to participate. 

In November 1962, Sino-Japanese relations were elevated to 
semiofficial status — still far short of diplomatic recognition — with 
the signing in Beijing of a five-year trade memorandum (1963-67), 
better known as the Liao-Takasaki Agreement. Under its terms, 
Chinese purchases of industrial plants were to be financed partly 
through medium-term credits from the Japan Export-Import Bank. 
The accord also permitted China to open a trade mission in Tokyo 
and in 1963 paved the way for Japanese government approval of 
the export to China of a synthetic textile manufacturing plant valued 
at around US$20 million, guaranteed by the bank. Subsequent pro- 
test from Taiwan caused Japan to shelve further deferred-payment 
plant exports. China reacted to this change by downgrading its 
Japan trade and intensified propaganda attacks against Japan as 
a 4 'lackey" of the United States. 

Relations cooled noticeably during the massive political and eco- 
nomic chaos that prevailed during the radical phases of the Cul- 
tural Revolution in China, from 1966 to 1969. As the turmoil 
subsided, however, the Japanese government — -already under pres- 
sure both from the pro-China factions in the LDP and from oppo- 
sition elements — sought to adopt a more forward posture. Japan's 
efforts to set its own China policy became particularly evident after 
July 1971 when Nixon, according to Japanese sources, ''shocked" 
the Japanese by announcing his forthcoming visit to Beijing. Re- 
lations remained complicated, however, because of Japan's diplo- 
matic and substantial economic ties with Taiwan and the presence 
of a powerful pro-Guomindang faction in the LDP. 

The September 1972 visit to Beijing of Japan's newly elected 
prime minister, Tanaka Kakuei, culminated in the signing of a 
historic joint statement that ended nearly eighty years of enmity 
and friction between the two countries. In this statement, Tokyo 
recognized the Beijing regime as the sole legal government of China, 
stating at the same time that it understood and respected China's 
position that Taiwan was "an inalienable part of the territory of 
the People's Republic of China." For its part, China waived its 
demand for war indemnities from Japan. (This demand was first 
made in the mid-1950s; the war reparations claims totaled as much 
as the equivalent of US$50 billion.) Diplomatic relations were to 
be established as of September 29, 1972. Japan and China also 
agreed to hold negotiations aimed at the conclusion not only of a 
treaty of peace and friendship but also at agreements on trade, ship- 
ping, air transportation, and fisheries. Sino-Japanese trade grew 
rapidly after 1972. In January 1974, a three-year trade agreement — 



395 



Japan: A Country Study 

the first of several working agreements covering civil air transpor- 
tation, shipping, fisheries, and trademarks — was signed. Arrange- 
ments for technical cooperation, cultural exchange, and consular 
matters were also undertaken. 

Negotiations for a Sino-Japanese peace and friendship treaty also 
began in 1974 but soon encountered a political problem Japan 
wished to avoid. China insisted on including in the treaty an 
antihegemony clause, clearly directed at the Soviet Union. Japan, 
wishing to adhere to its "equidistant" or neutral stance in the Sino- 
Soviet confrontation, objected. The Soviet Union made clear that 
a Sino-Japanese treaty would prejudice Soviet-Japanese relations. 
Japanese efforts to reach a compromise with China over this issue 
failed, and the talks were broken off in September 1975. 

Matters remained at a standstill until political changes in China 
after the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 brought to the fore a leader- 
ship dedicated to economic modernization and interested in accom- 
modation with Japan, whose aid was essential. A changing climate 
of opinion in Japan that was more willing to ignore Soviet warn- 
ings and protests and accept the idea of "antihegemonism" as an 
international principle also helped lay the groundwork for new ef- 
forts to conclude the treaty. 

In February 1978, a long-term private trade agreement led to 
an arrangement by which trade between Japan and China would 
increase to a level of US$20 billion by 1985, through exports from 
Japan of plants and equipment, technology, construction materials, 
and machine parts in return for coal and crude oil. This long-term 
plan, which gave rise to inflated expectations, proved overly am- 
bitious and was drastically cut back the following year as China 
was forced to reorder its development priorities and scale down 
its commitments. However, the signing of the agreement reflected 
the wish on both sides to improve relations. In April 1978, a dis- 
pute involving the intrusion of armed Chinese fishing boats into 
the waters off the Senkaku Islands, a cluster of barren islets north 
of Taiwan and south of the Ryukyu Islands, flared up and threat- 
ened to disrupt the developing momentum toward a resumption 
of peace treaty talks. Restraint on both sides led to an amic- 
able resolution. (The Senkakus are claimed by Japan, China, and 
Taiwan, but the question of territorial rights was finessed in this 
case.) Talks on the peace treaty were resumed in July, and agree- 
ment was reached in August on a compromise version of the anti- 
hegemony clause. The Treaty of Peace and Friendship was signed 
on August 12 and came into effect October 23, 1978. 

Chinese domestic political problems and uneven progress in 
China's reform programs at times dampened Japanese enthusiasm 



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Foreign Relations 



for economic relations with China. Yet Sino-Japanese relations 
made considerable progress in the 1980s. In 1982 there was a seri- 
ous political controversy over revision of Japanese textbooks deal- 
ing with the history of imperial Japan's war against China in the 
1930s and 1940s. Beijing also registered concern in 1983 about the 
reported shift in United States strategic emphasis in Asia, away 
from China and in favor of more reliance on Japan, under the 
leadership of the more * 'hawkish" Prime Minister Nakasone 
Yasuhiro, warning anew against possible revival of Japanese 
militarism. By mid- 1983, however, Beijing had decided — coinci- 
dentally with its decision to improve relations with the Reagan 
administration — to solidify ties with Japan. Chinese Communist 
Party general secretary Hu Yaobang visited Japan in November 
1983, and Prime Minister Nakasone reciprocated by visiting China 
in March 1984. 

The Chinese had long looked on Japan — by then a major trad- 
ing partner — as a leading source of assistance in promoting eco- 
nomic development in China. The growth of Soviet military power 
in East Asia in the early 1980s prompted them to consult with Japan 
more frequently on security issues and to pursue parallel foreign 
policies designed to check Soviet influence and promote regional 
stability. While Japanese enthusiasm for the Chinese market waxed 
and waned, broad strategic considerations in the 1980s steadied 
Tokyo's policy toward Beijing. In fact, Japan's heavy involvement 
in China's economic modernization reflected in part a determina- 
tion to encourage peaceful domestic development in China, to draw 
China into gradually expanding links with Japan and the West, 
to reduce China's interest in returning to its more provocative for- 
eign policies of the past, and to obstruct any Sino- Soviet realign- 
ment against Japan. 

Thus, common strategic concerns, as well as economic interests, 
held the two nations together. Until the late 1970s, the Chinese 
appeared more alarmed than Japan about the Soviet military build- 
up in Asia. But as Moscow increasingly sought to impede stra- 
tegic cooperation among Japan, the United States, and possibly 
China, in part by stepped-up intimidation of Japan, the Nakasone 
government became more concerned about the Soviet military 
buildup. 

Many of Tokyo's concerns about the Soviet Union duplicated 
Chinese worries. They included the increased deployment in East 
Asia of Soviet SS-20 missiles, Tu-22M Backfire bombers, and bal- 
listic missile submarines; the growth of the Soviet Pacific fleet; the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the potential threat it posed 



397 



Japan: A Country Study 

to Persian Gulf oil supply routes; and an increased Soviet military 
presence in Vietnam. 

In response, Japan and China adopted strikingly complemen- 
tary foreign policies, designed to isolate the Soviet Union and its 
allies politically and to promote regional stability. In Southeast Asia, 
both countries provided strong diplomatic backing for the efforts 
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN — see Glos- 
sary) to bring about a Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia. 
Japan cut off all economic aid to Vietnam and provided substan- 
tial economic assistance to Thailand to help with resettling Indo- 
chinese refugees. China was a key supporter of Thailand and of 
the Cambodian resistance groups. In Southwest Asia, both nations 
backed the condemnation of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, 
refused to recognize the Soviet-backed Kabul regime, and sought 
through diplomatic and economic means to bolster Pakistan. In 
Northeast Asia, Japan and China sought to moderate the behavior 
of their Korean partners — South Korea and North Korea, 
respectively — to reduce tensions. In 1983 both China and Japan 
strongly criticized the Soviet proposal to redeploy some of their 
European-based SS-20 missiles to Asia. 

Complementary economic interests also strengthened Sino- 
Japanese relations. Japan was a major source of capital, technol- 
ogy, and equipment for China's modernization drive. In fact, Japan 
had been China's largest trading partner since the mid-1960s, ac- 
counting for more than 20 percent of China's total trade. Bilateral 
trade exploded in the 1970s and early 1980s, from US$1 billion 
in the early 1970s to over US$8 billion in 1982. Japan became 
China's largest creditor, accounting for nearly half of the estimated 
US$30 billion in credit China lined up from 1979 to 1983. 

Although its share of Japan's global trade was still small (3 per- 
cent in 1982), China became Japan's sixth largest trading part- 
ner. Japan regarded China as a significant source of coal, oil, and 
strategic minerals, such as tungsten and chromium, and as an im- 
portant market for Japanese steel, machinery plant equipment, 
chemical products, and synthetic textile fibers. 

The optimism that marked the economic relationship in the late 
1970s had given way to a greater degree of realism on both sides 
by the early 1980s. China's decision to curtail imports of heavy 
industrial goods in 1981 and 1982 had a sobering effect on the 
Japanese. Businesspeople in Japan came to appreciate the problems 
China faced, and revised their expections of the growth of economic 
ties as the Chinese experimented with various economic policies. 
The Japanese continued to hope that they would profit from China's 



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Foreign Relations 



potentially huge domestic market, whenever its modernization 
began to pick up speed. 

Japanese economic interests in China focused on developing 
energy resources and infrastructure and on promoting commer- 
cial trade. As of 1983, the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, 
Tokyo's official aid organization, had agreed to grant US$3.5 bil- 
lion in loans to China for basic infrastructure projects, such as port 
and rail modernization. In addition, the Japan Export-Import Bank 
extended US$2 billion for oil exploration and coal mining at a 6.25 
percent annual interest rate, the lowest rate China had gained from 
any country at that time. The Japanese were heavily involved in 
China's oil industry, and Japanese drilling in the Bohai Gulf ap- 
peared promising. 

Japan encountered a number of episodes of friction with China 
during the rest of the 1980s. In late 1985, Chinese officials com- 
plained harshly about Prime Minister Nakasone's visit to the 
Yasukuni Shrine, which commemorates Japan's war dead, and in 
mid- 1986 they complained about the latest revision of Japan's his- 
tory textbooks to soften accounts of World War II atrocities. Eco- 
nomic issues centered on Chinese complaints that the influx of 
Japanese products into China had produced a serious trade deficit 
for China. Nakasone and other Japanese leaders were able to reduce 
these official concerns during visits to Beijing and in other talks 
with Chinese officials. Notably, they assured the Chinese of Japan's 
continued large-scale development and commercial assistance. At 
the popular level in China, it was not easy to allay concerns. 
Student-led demonstrations against Japan, on the one hand, helped 
reinforce Chinese officials' warnings to their Japanese counterparts. 
On the other hand, it was more difficult to change popular opin- 
ion in China than it was to change the opinions of the Chinese 
officials. Meanwhile, the removal of party chief Hu Yaobang in 
early 1987 was detrimental to smooth Sino-Japanese relations, since 
Hu had built personal relationships with Nakasone and other 
Japanese leaders. 

The Chinese government's harsh crackdown on prodemocracy 
demonstrations in the spring of 1989 caused Japanese policymak- 
ers to realize that the new situation in China was extremely deli- 
cate and required careful handling to avoid Japanese actions that 
would push China farther away from reform. At the same time, 
these policymakers were loathe to break ranks with the United States 
and other Western countries, where popular opinion and domes- 
tic pressures to varying degrees required that officials condemn the 
crackdown and take action to restrict economic or other interaction 
of benefit to the Chinese regime. Beijing leaders reportedly judged 



399 



Japan: A Country Study 

at first that the industrialized countries would relatively quickly 
resume normal business with China after a brief period of com- 
plaint over the Tiananmen Incident. When that did not happen, 
the Chinese officials made strong suggestions to Japanese officials 
that they break from most industrialized nations by pursuing nor- 
mal economic intercourse with China, consistent with Tokyo's long- 
term interests in China. Japanese leaders — like West European and 
United States leaders — were careful not to isolate China, and con- 
tinued trade and other relations generally consistent with the poli- 
cies of other industrialized democracies. But they also followed the 
United States lead in limiting economic relations notably advan- 
tageous to China. In particular, they held back for one year the 
disbursement of ¥810 billion in aid, which Japan had promised 
in 1988 to give China in the 1990-95 period. 

Relations with the Soviet Union 

The 1980s saw a decided hardening in Japanese attitudes toward 
the Soviet Union. Japan was pressed by the United States to do 
more to check the expansion of Soviet power in the Third World 
following the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It 
responded by cutting off contacts beneficial to the Soviet regime 
and providing assistance to "front line" Third World states, such 
as Pakistan and Thailand. Under Nakasone, Japan worked hard 
to demonstrate a close identity of views with the Reagan adminis- 
tration on the Soviet threat. Japan steadily built up its military 
forces, welcomed increases in United States forces in Japan and 
the Western Pacific, and pledged close cooperation to deal with 
the danger posed by Soviet power. 

Although public and media opinion remained skeptical of the 
danger to Japan posed by Soviet forces in Asia, there was strong 
opposition in Japan to Moscow's refusal to accede to Japan's claims 
to the Northern Territories, known to the Japanese as Etorofu and 
Kunashiri, at the southern end of the Kuril Island chain, and the 
smaller Shikotan Island and the Habomai Islands, northeast of 
Hokkaido, which were seized by the Soviets in the last days of World 
War II (see fig. 11). The stationing of Soviet military forces on 
the islands gave tangible proof of the Soviet threat, and provoca- 
tive maneuvers by Soviet air and naval forces in Japanese-claimed 
territory served to reinforce Japanese official policy of close iden- 
tification with a firm United States-backed posture against Soviet 
power. In 1979, the Japanese government specifically protested a 
build up in Soviet forces in Etorofu, Kunashiri, and Shikotan. 

The advent of the Mikhail Gorbachev regime in Moscow in the 
mid-1980s saw a replacement of hard-line Soviet government 



400 




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150 



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160 
_J_ 



Foreign Relations 



diplomats who were expert in Asian affairs with more flexible 
spokesmen calling for greater contact with Japan. Gorbachev took 
the lead in promising new initiatives in Asia, but the substance 
of Soviet policy changed more slowly. In particular, throughout 
the rest of the 1980s, Soviet officials still seemed uncompromising 
regarding the Northern Territories, Soviet forces in the Western 
Pacific still seemed focused on and threatening to Japan, and Soviet 
economic troubles and lack of foreign exchange made prospects 
for Japan-Soviet Union economic relations appear poor. By 1990, 
Japan appeared to be the least enthusiastic of the major Western- 
aligned developed countries in encouraging greater contacts with 
and assistance to the Soviet Union. 

Strains in Japan-Soviet Union relations had deep historical roots 
going back to the competition of the Japanese and Russian em- 
pires for dominance in Northeast Asia. In 1990, forty-five years 
after the end of World War II, a state of war between Japan and 
the Soviet Union existed technically because the Soviet Union had 
refused in the intervening years to sign the 1951 peace treaty. The 
main stumbling block in all Japan's subsequent efforts to establish 
bilateral relations on what it called ''a truly stable basis" was the 
territorial dispute over the Northern Territories. 

During the first half of the 1950s, other unsettled problems in- 
cluded Japanese fishing rights in the Sea of Okhotsk and off the 
coast of the Soviet maritime provinces and repatriation of Japanese 
prisoners of war, who, the Japanese claimed, were still being held 
in the Soviet Union. Negotiation of these issues broke down early 
in 1956 because of tension over territorial claims. 

Negotiations soon resumed, however, and the two countries is- 
sued a joint declaration in October 1956 providing for the restora- 
tion of diplomatic relations. The two parties also agreed to continue 
negotiations for a peace treaty, including territorial issues. In ad- 
dition, the Soviets pledged to support Japan for UN membership 
and waive all World War II reparations claims. The joint declara- 
tion was accompanied by a trade protocol that granted reciprocal 
most-favored-nation treatment and provided for the development 
of trade. 

Except for admission to the UN in 1956, Japan derived few ap- 
parent gains from the normalization of diplomatic relations. The 
second half of the 1950s saw an increase in cultural exchanges. 
Soviet propaganda, however, had little success in Japan, where it 
encountered a longstanding antipathy stemming from the Russo- 
Japanese rivalry in Korea, Manchuria, and China proper in the 
late nineteenth century, from the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, 
and from the Soviet declaration of war on Japan in the last days 



403 



Foreign Relations 



diplomats who were expert in Asian affairs with more flexible 
spokesmen calling for greater contact with Japan. Gorbachev took 
the lead in promising new initiatives in Asia, but the substance 
of Soviet policy changed more slowly. In particular, throughout 
the rest of the 1980s, Soviet officials still seemed uncompromising 
regarding the Northern Territories, Soviet forces in the Western 
Pacific still seemed focused on and threatening to Japan, and Soviet 
economic troubles and lack of foreign exchange made prospects 
for Japan-Soviet Union economic relations appear poor. By 1990, 
Japan appeared to be the least enthusiastic of the major Western- 
aligned developed countries in encouraging greater contacts with 
and assistance to the Soviet Union. 

Strains in Japan-Soviet Union relations had deep historical roots 
going back to the competition of the Japanese and Russian em- 
pires for dominance in Northeast Asia. In 1990, forty-five years 
after the end of World War II, a state of war between Japan and 
the Soviet Union existed technically because the Soviet Union had 
refused in the intervening years to sign the 1951 peace treaty. The 
main stumbling block in all Japan's subsequent efforts to establish 
bilateral relations on what it called "a truly stable basis" was the 
territorial dispute over the Northern Territories. 

During the first half of the 1950s, other unsettled problems in- 
cluded Japanese fishing rights in the Sea of Okhotsk and off the 
coast of the Soviet maritime provinces and repatriation of Japanese 
prisoners of war, who, the Japanese claimed, were still being held 
in the Soviet Union. Negotiation of these issues broke down early 
in 1956 because of tension over territorial claims. 

Negotiations soon resumed, however, and the two countries is- 
sued a joint declaration in October 1956 providing for the restora- 
tion of diplomatic relations. The two parties also agreed to continue 
negotiations for a peace treaty, including territorial issues. In ad- 
dition, the Soviets pledged to support Japan for UN membership 
and waive all World War II reparations claims. The joint declara- 
tion was accompanied by a trade protocol that granted reciprocal 
most-favored-nation treatment and provided for the development 
of trade. 

Except for admission to the UN in 1956, Japan derived few ap- 
parent gains from the normalization of diplomatic relations. The 
second half of the 1950s saw an increase in cultural exchanges. 
Soviet propaganda, however, had little success in Japan, where it 
encountered a longstanding antipathy stemming from the Russo- 
Japanese rivalry in Korea, Manchuria, and China proper in the 
late nineteenth century, from the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, 
and from the Soviet declaration of war on Japan in the last days 



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Japan: A Country Study 

of World War II, in violation of the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality 
Pact of 1941. 

The Soviet Union sought to induce Japan to abandon its ter- 
ritorial claims by alternating threats and persuasion. As early as 
1956, it hinted at the possibility of considering the return of the 
Habomai Islands and Shikotan Island if Japan abandoned its alli- 
ance with the United States. In 1960 the Soviet government warned 
Japan against signing the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Secu- 
rity with the United States, and after the treaty was signed declared 
that it would not hand over the Habomai Islands and Shikotan 
Island under any circumstances unless Japan abrogated the treaty 
forthwith. In 1964 the Soviet government offered to return these 
islands unconditionally if the United States ended its military 
presence on Okinawa and the main islands of Japan. 

Despite divergence on the territorial question, on which neither 
side was prepared to give ground, Japanese relations with the Soviet 
Union improved appreciably after the mid-1960s. The Soviet 
government began to seek Japanese cooperation in its economic 
development plans, and the Japanese responded positively. The 
two countries signed a five-year trade agreement in January 1966 
and a civil aviation agreement as well. 

Economic cooperation expanded rapidly during the 1970s, despite 
an often strained political relationship. The two economies were 
complementary, for the Soviet Union needed Japan's capital, tech- 
nology, and consumer goods, while Japan needed Soviet natural 
resources, such as oil, gas, coal, iron ore, and timber. By 1979 
overall trade had reached US$4.4 billion annually and had made 
Japan, next to the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), 
the Soviet Union's most important nonsocialist trading partner. 

This economic cooperation was interrupted by Japan's decision 
in 1980 to participate in sanctions against the Soviet Union for its 
invasion of Afghanistan and by its actions to hold in abeyance a 
number of projects being negotiated, to ban the export of some 
high- technology items, and to suspend Siberian development loans. 
Subsequently, Japanese interest in economic cooperation with the 
Soviet Union waned as Tokyo found alternative suppliers and re- 
mained uncertain about the economic viability and political sta- 
bility of the Soviet Union under Gorbachev. Japan-Soviet trade 
in 1988 was valued at nearly US$6 billion. 

Japan-Soviet political relations during the 1970s were charac- 
terized by the frequent exchange of high-level visits to explore the 
possibility of improving bilateral relations and by repeated discus- 
sions of a peace treaty, which were abortive because neither side 
was prepared to yield on the territorial issue. Minister of Foreign 



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Affairs Andrei Gromyko of the Soviet Union visited Tokyo in Janu- 
ary 1972 — one month before United States president Nixon's his- 
toric visit to China — to reopen ministerial-level talks after a six-year 
lapse. Other high-level talks, including an October 1973 meeting 
between Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei and Leonid I. Brezhnev, 
general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, were 
held in Moscow during the next three years, but the deadlock on 
the territorial issue continued and prospects for a settlement 
dimmed. Moscow began to propose a treaty of friendship and good- 
will as an interim step while peace treaty talks were continued. This 
proposal was firmly rejected by Japan. 

After 1975 the Soviet Union began openly to warn that the 
Japanese peace treaty with China might jeopardize Soviet-Japan 
relations. In January 1976, Gromyko again visited Tokyo to re- 
sume talks on the peace treaty. When the Japanese again refused 
to budge on the territorial question, Gromyko, according to the 
Japanese, offered to return two of the Soviet-held island areas — 
the Habomai Islands and Shikotan Island — if Japan would sign 
a treaty of goodwill and cooperation. He also reportedly warned 
the Japanese, in an obvious reference to China, against "forces 
which come out against the relaxation of tension and which try to 
complicate relations between states, including our countries." 

The signing of the Sino-Japanese peace treaty in mid- 1978 was 
a major setback to Japanese- Soviet relations. Despite Japanese pro- 
testations that the treaty's antihegemony clause was not directed 
against any specific country, Moscow saw it as placing Tokyo with 
Washington and Beijing firmly in the anti- Soviet camp. Officially, 
both sides continued to express the desire for better relations, but 
Soviet actions served only to alarm and alienate the Japanese side. 
The 1980s Soviet military buildup in the Pacific was a case in point. 

Changes in Soviet policy carried out under Gorbachev begin- 
ning in the mid-1980s, including attempts at domestic reform and 
the pursuit of detente with the United States and Western Europe, 
elicited generally positive Japanese interest, but the Japanese 
government held that the Soviet Union had not changed its poli- 
cies on issues vital to Japan. The government stated that it would 
not conduct normal relations with the Soviet Union until Moscow 
returned the Northern Territories. The government and Japanese 
business leaders stated further that Japanese trade with and invest- 
ment in the Soviet Union would not grow appreciably until the 
Northern Territories issue was resolved. 

By 1990 the Soviet government had altered its tactics. The Soviets 
now acknowledged that the territorial issue was a problem and 
talked about it with Japanese officials at the highest levels and in 



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Japan: A Country Study 



working-level meetings. Soviet officials reportedly floated a proposal 
to lease the Northern Territories and part of Sakhalin — once a 
colonial holding of Japan's — to Japan. Gorbachev and others also 
referred to a 1956 Soviet offer to return one of the three main is- 
lands (Shikotan, the smallest of the three) and the Habomai Is- 
lands, and there were indications that Moscow might be prepared 
to revive the offer. The Soviets emphasized that they would not 
return all the islands because of Soviet public opposition and the 
possible reawakening of other countries' territorial claims against 
the Soviet Union. The Soviet military reportedly opposed a return, 
because the Kuril chain provided a protective barrier to the Sea 
of Okhotsk, where the Soviet navy deployed submarines carrying 
long-range ballistic missiles. 

The Soviet government also stepped up its diplomacy toward 
Japan with the announcement in 1990 that Gorbachev would visit 
Japan in 1991 . Soviet officials asserted that their government would 
propose disarmament talks with Japan and might make more 
proposals on the Northern Territories in connection with the visit. 
Observers believed that Gorbachev might propose a package dealing 
with the islands, arms reduction, and economic cooperation. In 
January 1990, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs shifted its 
position, which previously had rejected negotiations with the Soviet 
Union on arms reductions, indicating that Japan would be willing 
to negotiate. Ministry officials stated that the government would 
formulate policy on arms reduction in close coordination with the 
United States. 

Relations with Other Asia-Pacific Countries 

Japan's rapid rise as the dominant economic power in Asia in 
the 1980s helped to define Japanese policy toward this diverse 
region, stretching from South Asia to the islands in the South Pa- 
cific Ocean. The decline in East- West and Sino-Soviet tensions dur- 
ing the 1980s suggested that economic rather than military power 
would determine regional leadership. During the decade, Japan 
displaced the United States as the largest provider of new business 
investment and economic aid in the region, although the United 
States market remained a major source of Asia-Pacific dynamism. 
Especially following the rise in value of the yen relative to the dol- 
lar in the late- 1980s, Japan's role as a capital and technology ex- 
porter and as an increasingly significant importer of Asian 
manufactured goods made it the core economy of the Asia-Pacific 
region. 

From the mid-1950s to the late 1960s, Japan's relations with the 
rest of Asia were concerned mainly with promoting its far-flung, 



406 



Poster protesting the Soviet 
presence in the Northern 
Territories, Tokyo. The date 
on the poster — August 9 — recalls 
the Soviet Union's 1945 entry 
into war against Japan. 
Courtesy Robert L. Worden 




multiplying economic interests in the region through trade, tech- 
nical assistance, and aid. Its main problems were the economic 
weakness and political instability of its trading partners and the 
growing apprehension of Asian leaders over Japan's "over- 
presence" in their region. 

Japan began to normalize relations with its neighbors during the 
1950s after a series of intermittent negotiations, which led to the 
payment of war reparations to Burma, Indonesia, the Philippines, 
and the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam). Thailand's repa- 
rations claims were not settled until 1963. Japan's reintegration 
into the Asian scene was also facilitated early by its joining the 
Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic and Social Development 
in Asia and the Pacific in December 1954 and by its attendance 
at the April 1955 Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung, Indonesia. 
In the late 1950s, Japan made a limited beginning in its aid pro- 
gram. In 1958 it extended the equivalent of US$50 million in credits 
to India, the. first Japanese loan of its kind in post- World War II 
years. As in subsequent cases involving India, as well as Sri Lanka, 
Malaysia, Taiwan, Pakistan, and South Korea, these credits were 
rigidly bound to projects that promoted plant and equipment pur- 
chases from Japan. In 1960 Japan officially established the Insti- 
tute of Asian Economic Affairs (renamed the Institute of Developing 
Economies in 1969) as the principal training center for its specialists 
in economic diplomacy. 



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Japan: A Country Study 

In the early 1960s, the government adopted a more forward 
posture in seeking to establish contacts in Asia. In 1960 the Insti- 
tute of Asian Economic Affairs was placed under the jurisdiction 
of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). In 
1961 the government established the Overseas Economic Cooper- 
ation Fund as a new lending agency. The following year the Over- 
seas Technical Cooperation Agency made its debut. 

By the mid-1960s, Japan's role had become highly visible in Asia 
as well as elsewhere in the world. In 1966 Japan became a full mem- 
ber of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop- 
ment (OECD — see Glossary). As economic and trade expansion 
burgeoned, leaders began to question the propriety and wisdom 
of what they variously described as ''mere economism," an 
"export-first policy," and the "commercial motives of aid." They 
wanted to contribute more to the solution of the North- South 
problem, as they dubbed the issue — the tenuous relationship be- 
tween the developed countries and the developing countries. 

Efforts since the beginning of the 1970s to assume a leading role 
in promoting peace and stability in Asia, especially Southeast Asia, 
by providing economic aid and by offering to serve as a mediator 
in disputes, faced two constraints. Externally there was fear in parts 
of Asia that Japan's systematic economic penetration into the region 
would eventually lead to something akin to its pre-World War II 
scheme to exploit Asian markets and materials. Internally, foreign 
policymakers were apprehensive that Japan's political involvement 
in the area in whatever capacity would almost certainly precipi- 
tate an anti-Japanese backlash and adversely affect its economic 
position. 

After a reassessment of policy, the Japanese leadership appeared 
to have decided that more emphasis ought to be given to helping 
the developing countries of the region modernize their industrial 
bases to increase their self-reliance and economic resilience. In the 
late 1970s, Japan seemed to have decided that bilateral aid in the 
form of yen credits, tariff reductions, larger quota incentives for 
manufactured exports, and investments in processing industries, 
energy, agriculture, and education would be the focus of its aid 
programs in Asia. 

By 1990, Japan's interaction with the vast majority of Asia-Pacific 
countries, especially its burgeoning economic exchanges, was multi- 
faceted and increasingly important to the recipient countries. The 
developing countries of ASEAN (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, and Thailand; Singapore was treated as a newly in- 
dustrialized economy, or NIE) regarded Japan as critical to their 
development. Japanese aid to the ASEAN countries totaled US$1 .9 



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billion in Japanese fiscal year (FY — see Glossary) 1988 versus about 
US$333 million for the United States during United States FY 1988. 
Japan was the number one foreign investor in the ASEAN coun- 
tries, with cumulative investment as of March 1989 of about 
US$14.5 billion, more than twice that of the United States. Japan's 
share of total foreign investment in ASEAN countries ranged from 
70-80 percent in Thailand to 20 percent in Indonesia. 

South Asia 

In South Asia, Japan's role was mainly that of an aid donor. 
Japanese aid to seven South Asian countries totaled US$1.1 bil- 
lion in 1988, about the same as the United States gave. Except 
for Pakistan, which received heavy inputs of aid from the United 
States, all other South Asian countries received most of their aid 
from Japan. Four South Asian nations — India, Pakistan, Bangla- 
desh, and Sri Lanka — were in the top ten list of Tokyo's aid recip- 
ients worldwide. 

Prime Minister Kaifu signaled a broadening of Japan's interest 
in South Asia with his swing through the region in April 1990. In 
an address to the Indian parliament, Kaifu stressed the role of free 
markets and democracy in bringing about "a new international 
order, ' ' and emphasized the need for a settlement of the Kashmir 
territorial dispute between India and Pakistan, and for economic 
liberalization to attract foreign investment and promote dynamic 
growth. To India, which was very short of hard currency, Kaifu 
pledged a new concessional loan of ¥100 billion (about US$650 
million) for the coming year. 

Newly Industrialized Economies 

Japan's relationships with the NIEs (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, and Singapore — often called the Four Tigers) were marked 
by both cooperation and competition. After the early 1980s, when 
Tokyo extended a large financial credit to South Korea for essen- 
tially political reasons, Japan avoided significant aid relationships 
with the NIEs. Relations instead involved capital investment, tech- 
nology transfer, and trade. Increasingly, the NIEs came to be 
viewed as Japan's rivals in the competition for export markets for 
manufactured goods, especially the vast United States market (see 
International Economic Cooperation and Aid, ch. 5). 

Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands 

Japan's economic involvement in Australia was heavily tilted 
toward extraction of natural resources and in-country manufac- 
turing for the Australian domestic market. Japanese investment 



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Japan: A Country Study 

by 1988 made Australia the single largest source of Japanese re- 
gional imports. Japan's trade with New Zealand was a small frac- 
tion of its trade with Australia. 

Politically, Japan's relations with Australia and New Zealand 
had elements of tension as well as acknowledged mutuality of in- 
terest. Memories of World War II lingered among the public, as 
did a contemporary fear of Japanese economic domination. At the 
same time, government and business leaders saw Japan as a vital 
export market and an essential element in Australia's and New 
Zealand's future growth and prosperity. 

By 1990 commercial and strategic interests prompted a strong 
surge in Japanese involvement in the newly independent island na- 
tions of the Pacific. Japan's rapidly growing aid to the South Pa- 
cific was seen by many as a response to United States calls for 
greater burden-sharing, and to the adoption of the 1982 Conven- 
tion on Law of the Sea, which gave states legal control over fish- 
ery resources within their 200-nautical-mile economic zones. Japan 
was second after Australia as an aid donor to the region. The US$93 
million it provided in 1988 was more than three times the United 
States aid of US$26.7 million in FY 1988. Japanese companies also 
invested heavily in the tourism industry in the island nations. 

The Koreas 

Japan's policies toward the two Koreas reflected the importance 
this area had for Asian stability, which was seen as essential to 
Japanese peace and prosperity. In 1990 Japan remained one of four 
major powers (along with the United States, the Soviet Union, and 
China) that had important security interests on the Korean Penin- 
sula. However, Japan's involvement in political and security is- 
sues on the Korean Peninsula was more limited than that of the 
other three powers. Japan's relations with North Korea and South 
Korea had a legacy of bitterness stemming from harsh Japanese 
colonial rule over Korea from 1910 to 1945. Polls during the post- 
war period in Japan and South Korea showed that the people of 
each nation had a profound dislike of the other country and people. 

Article 9 of Japan's Constitution is interpreted to bar Japan from 
entering into security relations with countries other than the United 
States. Consequently, Japan had no substantive defense relation- 
ship with South Korea, and military contacts were infrequent. The 
Japanese government supported noncommunist South Korea in 
other ways. It backed United States contingency plans to dispatch 
United States armed forces in Japan to South Korea in case of a 
North Korean attack on South Korea. It also acted as an inter- 
mediary between South Korea and China. It pressed the Chinese 



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Foreign Relations 



government to open and expand relations with South Korea in the 
1980s. 

Japan's trade with South Korea was US$27.25 billion in 1988, 
with a surplus of US$3.63 billion on the Japanese side. Japanese 
direct private investment in South Korea totaled US$3.25 billion 
in 1988. Japanese and South Korean firms often had interdepen- 
dent relations, which gave Japan advantages in South Korea's 
growing market. Many South Korean products were based on Japa- 
nese design and technology. A surge in imports of South Korean 
products into Japan in 1990 was due partly to production by 
Japanese investors in South Korea. 

Japan- North Korean relations remained antagonistic in the late 
1980s. The two governments did not maintain diplomatic relations 
and had no substantive contacts. The opposition Japan Socialist 
Party, however, had cordial relations with the North Korean 
regime . 

Issues in Japan-North Korean relations that produced tensions 
included North Korean media attacks on Japan, Japan's imposi- 
tion of economic sanctions on North Korea for terrorist acts against 
South Korea in the 1980s, and unpaid North Korean debts to 
Japanese enterprises of about US$50 million. Japan allowed trade 
with North Korea through unofficial channels. This unofficial trade 
reportedly came to more than US$200 million annually in the 1980s. 

Vietnam and Cambodia 

Stability in Indochina also was very important to Japanese in- 
terests. During the Vietnam war of the 1960s and 1970s, Japan 
had consistently encouraged a negotiated settlement at the earliest 
possible date. Even before the hostilities ended, it had made con- 
tact with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) 
government and had reached an agreement to establish diplo- 
matic relations in September 1973. Implementation, however, was 
delayed by North Vietnamese demands that Japan pay the equiva- 
lent of US$45 million in World War II reparations in two yearly 
installments, in the form of "economic cooperation" grants. Giv- 
ing in to the Vietnamese demands, Japan paid the money and 
opened an embassy in Hanoi in October 1975 following the unifi- 
cation of North Vietnam and South Vietnam into the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam. Recognition of the communist Khmer Rouge 
regime in Cambodia came in 1975, and diplomatic relations with 
that country were established in August 1976. 

This Indochina policy was justified at home and to the member 
countries of ASEAN — some of which were hostile to and suspicious 
of Vietnam — on the grounds that official contacts and eventually 



411 



Japan: A Country Study 

aid to Vietnam would promote the peace and stability of Southeast 
Asia as a whole. In December 1978, after a visit to Tokyo by Viet- 
nam's minister of foreign affairs, Nguyen Duy Trinh, Japan agreed 
to give Vietnam US$195 million in grant aid, as well as commodity 
loans and food shipments. When Vietnam launched its invasion 
of Cambodia later that same month, Japan was embarrassed and 
irritated. It joined ASEAN in condemning the invasion, supported 
the UN resolution calling for immediate withdrawal of Vietnamese 
forces, and suspended the aid commitments it had made with 
Hanoi. 

Japan and the United States shared common ground in oppos- 
ing the Soviet-backed Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in De- 
cember 1978. Japan's policy of restricting aid and other economic 
cooperation with Vietnam reinforced international pressures on 
Hanoi to pull back its forces and seek a comprehensive Cambodian 
settlement. Faced with international isolation, waning Soviet bloc 
support, continued armed resistance in Cambodia, and large-scale 
economic problems at home, Hanoi withdrew most if not all of its 
combat troops from Cambodia in 1989. It appealed to developed 
countries to open channels of economic cooperation, trade, and 
aid. Although some Japanese businesses were interested in invest- 
ment and trade with Vietnam and Cambodia, the Japanese govern- 
ment still opposed economic cooperation with those countries until 
there was a comprehensive settlement in Cambodia. This stand 
was basically consistent with United States policy of the time. 

Meanwhile, Japan gave informal assurances that Tokyo was pre- 
pared to bear a large share of the financial burden to help with 
reconstruction aid to Cambodia, whenever a comprehensive set- 
tlement was reached, and to help fund UN or other international 
peacekeeping forces, should they be required. 

Relations with Other Countries 

Japan had diplomatic relations with nearly all independent na- 
tions and had been an active member of the UN since December 
1956. Its relations with countries other than those discussed above 
were mainly commercial and economic. It had few major political 
differences with any of them but was under continuing pressure 
from many to limit its exports and to remove restrictions imposed 
on the import of foreign goods and capital. It was also being pressed 
to contribute more to the socioeconomic betterment of the nations 
of the Third World. 

During the 1970s, the government took positive measures to in- 
crease its Official Development Assistance (ODA) to developing 
countries and to contribute to the stabilization of the international 



412 



Prime ministers Kaifu Toshiki and Margaret Thatcher in Tokyo, 1989 

Courtesy Asahi Shimbun 

trade and monetary system. These measures were generally wel- 
comed abroad, although some countries felt that the steps taken 
were not executed as rapidly or were not as extensive as similar 
efforts by some other advanced industrialized nations. Japan's ODA 
increased tenfold during the decade and stood at US$3.3 billion 
in 1980, but this ODA as a percentage of GNP was still below the 
average of other donor countries. 

In the 1980s, Japan's ODA continued to rise rapidly. ODA net 
disbursements, in nominal terms, averaged around US$3 billion 
per year in the early 1980s, and jumped to US$5.6 billion in 1986 
and US$9.1 billion in 1988. Japan's share of total disbursements 
from major aid donors also grew significantly, from 1 1.76 percent 
in 1979 to about 15 percent in the mid-1980s, and to nearly 19 
percent in 1988. Japan's ODA as a percentage of its GNP, however, 
did not increase substantially during the 1980s, remaining at about 
0.3 percent. 

Japan continued to concentrate its economic assistance in Asia 
(about 72 percent of total commitments in 1987-88), reflecting its 
historical and economic ties to the region. Japan made modest in- 
creases in aid to Africa with the announcement in 1989 of a US$600 
million grant program for the next three years. In early 1990, Japan 
also pledged large amounts of assistance to Eastern Europe, but 



413 



Japan: A Country Study 

most of that aid was to be in the form of market rate credits and 
investment insurance, which did not qualify as ODA. In other 
regions, Japan appeared likely to continue allocating relatively small 
shares of assistance. Nevertheless, by 1987 Japan had become the 
largest bilateral donor in twenty-nine countries, nearly double the 
number in which that had been the case ten years earlier. 

The continued growth of Japan's foreign aid appeared to be moti- 
vated by two fundamental factors. First, Japanese policy aimed 
at assuming international responsibilities commensurate with its 
position as a global economic power. Second, many believed, the 
growing Japanese foreign aid program came largely in response 
to pressure from the United States and other allies for Japan to 
take on a greater share of the financial burdens in support of shared 
security, political, and economic interests. 

Although cultural and noneconomic ties with Western Europe 
grew significantly during the 1980s, the economic nexus remained 
by far the most important element of Japanese-West European re- 
lations throughout the decade. Events in West European relations, 
as well as political, economic, or even military matters, were topics 
of concern to most Japanese commentators because of the immedi- 
ate implications for Japan. The major issues centered on the effect 
of the coming West European economic unification on Japan's 
trade, investment, and other opportunities in Western Europe. 
Some West European leaders were anxious to restrict Japanese ac- 
cess to the newly integrated European Community, but others ap- 
peared open to Japanese trade and investment. In partial response 
to the strengthening economic ties among nations in Western Eu- 
rope and to the 1989 United States-Canada free trade agreement, 
Japan and other countries along the Asia-Pacific rim began mov- 
ing in the late 1980s toward greater economic cooperation. 

International Cooperation 

United Nations 

At the beginning of the 1990s, Japan continued to regard inter- 
national cooperation within the UN framework as a basic foreign 
policy principle. When Japan joined the UN in 1956, it did so with 
great enthusiasm and broad public support, for the international 
organization was seen to embody the pacifist country's hopes for 
a peaceful world order. Membership was welcomed by many 
Japanese who saw the UN as a guarantor of a policy of unarmed 
neutrality for their nation. To others, support for the UN would 
be useful in masking or diluting Japan's almost total dependence 
on the United States for its security. The government saw the UN 



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Foreign Relations 



as an ideal arena for its risk-minimizing, omnidirectional foreign 
policy. 

After the late 1950s, Japan participated actively in the social and 
economic activities of the UN's various specialized agencies and 
other international organizations concerned with social, cultural, 
and economic improvement. During the 1970s, as it attained the 
status of an economic superpower, Japan was called on to play an 
increasingly large role in the UN. As Japan's role increased and 
its contributions to UN socioeconomic development activities grew, 
many Japanese began to ask whether their country was being given 
an international position of responsibility commensurate with its 
economic power. There was even some sentiment, expressed as 
early as 1973, that Japan should be given a permanent seat on the 
UN Security Council with the United States, the Soviet Union, 
Britain, France, and China. 

By 1990 Japan's international cooperation efforts had reached 
a new level of involvement and activism. Japan contributed about 
11 percent of the regular UN budget, second only to the United 
States, which contributed 25 percent. Japan was particularly ac- 
tive in UN peacekeeping activities and in 1989, for the first time, 
sent officials to observe and participate in UN peacekeeping ef- 
forts (in Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and Namibia). Japan sent a small 
team to observe the February 1990 elections in Nicaragua, and 
planned to offer more than 100 people to help supervise elections 
in Cambodia if the UN were to establish a presence there. 

Other Organizations 

In addition to its UN activities and its participation in Asian 
regional groupings, such as the Colombo Plan and the Asian De- 
velopment Bank, Japan was also involved, beginning in the 1950s, 
in worldwide economic groupings largely made up of, or domi- 
nated by, the industrialized nations of Western Europe and North 
America. In 1952 Japan became a member of the IMF and of the 
World Bank, where it played an increasingly important role. In 
1955, it joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT — see Glossary). In 1966 Japan was admitted to the OECD, 
which brought it into what was essentially a club of leading indus- 
trialized nations. Japan has participated actively since 1975 in the 
annual summit meetings of the seven largest capitalist coun- 
tries — the Group of Seven — Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, 
France, Italy, Japan, Britain, and the United States. 

International Banks 

Based on its economic power and performance, Japan steadily ex- 
panded its role in the World Bank, the IMF, and other international 



415 



Japan: A Country Study 

financial institutions. Investment and trade flows made Japan by 
far the dominant economic nation in Asia. Japanese aid and in- 
vestment became widely sought after in other parts of the world, 
and it appeared to be only a matter of time before such economic 
power would translate into greater political influence. 

In the multilateral development banks, Japan's financial and pol- 
icy positions became more prominent. Tokyo had assumed a leading 
role at the Asian Development Bank for a number of years. At the 
World Bank, Japan's voting share represented about 9.4 percent, 
compared with 16.3 percent for the United States. Japan also made 
several "special" contributions to particular World Bank programs 
that raised its financial status but did not alter its voting position. 
Japan planned to participate in the East European Development 
Bank, making a contribution of 8.5 percent, the same as the United 
States and major West European donors. Japan also displayed a 
growing prominence in IMF deliberations, helping ease the massive 
debt burdens of Third World countries, and generally supported 
efforts at the GATT 1990 Uruguay Round of trade negotiations 
to liberalize world trade and investment. 

Policy after the Cold War 

The post-Cold War world promised an important position for 
Japan. Japanese leaders and popular opinion remained tentative 
and uncertain as to how Japan would use its remarkable economic 
power in order to preserve and enhance Japanese national interests. 
There seemed to be little alternative to a continued close strategic 
relationship with the United States and a general international out- 
look designed to promote global peace, development, and access 
to world markets and resources. Japanese leaders and public opinion 
were often anxious to see Japan assert a more pronounced posi- 
tion in world affairs, but the tradition of caution in Japanese for- 
eign policy was reinforced by the still unclear outlines of the 
post-Cold War environment that would affect Japanese foreign pol- 
icy in the years ahead. 

* * * 

There is voluminous literature in English on Japan's postwar 
foreign policy. James W. Morley's Japan's Foreign Policy, 1868-1941, 
Frank C. Langdon's Japan's Foreign Policy, Reinhard Drifte's Japan's 
Foreign Policy, Robert A. Scalapino's The Foreign Policy of Modern 
Japan, and William R. Nester's Japan's Growing Predominance Over 
East Asia and the World Economy are worthwhile monographs. The 
most useful current assessments appear in publications such as the 



416 



Foreign Relations 



Far Eastern Economic Review, Asian Survey, Current History, Foreign Af- 
fairs, and Foreign Policy. Feature articles also appear in such im- 
portant news sources as the Asian Wall Street Journal. Among United 
States government publications, the most useful are the Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service's Daily Report: East Asia and vari- 
ous publications of the United States Congress. (For further in- 
formation and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



417 



Chapter 8. National Security 



Family crest consisting of three Chinese- style round fans (uchiwa), once used 
to direct troops in battle and the symbol of the god of war 



JAPAN IN THE EARLY 1990s was in the unusual position of 
being a major world economic and political power, with an ag- 
gressive military tradition, resisting the development of strong 
armed forces. A military proscription is included as Article 9 of 
the 1947 Constitution, which states, "The Japanese people forever 
renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or 
use of force as a means of settling international disputes. " In 1990 
that article, along with the rest of the "Peace Constitution," re- 
tained strong government and citizen support and was interpreted 
as permitting the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), but prohibiting those 
forces from possessing nuclear weapons or other offensive arms or 
being deployed outside of Japan. 

The SDF were under control of the civilian Defense Agency, 
subordinate to the prime minister. Although highly trained and 
fully qualified to perform the limited missions assigned to them, 
the SDF were small, understaffed, and underequipped for more 
extensive military operations, and as of 1990 had never seen ac- 
tion in any operation other than disaster relief. 

Japan's national defense policy has been based on maintaining 
the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with the 
United States, under which Japan assumed unilateral responsibil- 
ity for its own internal security and the United States agreed to 
join in Japan's defense in the event that Japan or its territories were 
attacked. Although the size and capability of the SDF have always 
limited their role, until 1976 defense planning focused on develop- 
ing forces adequate to deal with the conventional capabilities of 
potential regional adversaries. Beginning in 1976, government pol- 
icy held that the SDF would be developed only to repel a small- 
scale, limited invasion and that the nation would depend on the 
United States to come to its aid in the event of a more serious in- 
cursion. 

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the buildup of 
military forces in the Soviet Far East, including a group of islands 
to the north of Hokkaido, which are occupied by the Soviet Union 
but claimed by Japan, led Japan to develop a program to modern- 
ize and improve the SDF in the 1980s, especially in air defense 
and antisubmarine warfare. In 1990 the government was reevalu- 
ating its security policy based on reduced East-West tensions and 
improving Soviet-Japanese relations. 



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Japan: A Country Study 



The Japanese government valued its close relations with the 
United States and remained dependent on the United States nuclear 
umbrella. Thus, it worked to facilitate military contacts and to sup- 
port the United States diplomatically whenever possible. Both the 
government and the public, however, supported only limited in- 
creases in self-defense capability. National security, it was believed, 
is fostered by international diplomacy and economic aid as much 
as by militai/ might. 

There were few critical issues for Japan's internal security in 
1990. Conditions of public order compared favorably with those 
elsewhere in the world. The crime rate was remarkably low, kept 
that way by well-organized and efficient police assisted by general 
citizen cooperation and support. 

Militarism Before 1945 
The BushidO Code 

Japanese aversion for things military is of recent origin. For cen- 
turies before 1945, military men and a strong martial tradition ex- 
erted a powerful and, at times, dominant influence on national life. 
Although the development of a modern army and navy came only 
during the Meiji period (1868-1912), reverence for the art of war 
and its practitioners had long been characteristic of Japanese society. 

In the middle of the seventh century, under the Taika Reform, 
the Yamato court used military forces, conscripted from the peasants 
and led by court-appointed aristocrats, to extend its realm and main- 
tain order (see Early Developments, ch. 1). Military leaders ini- 
tially were loyal to the emperors, but with the rise of the great private 
estates, or shoen, in the mid-eighth century, imperial control waned 
(see Nara and Heian Periods A.D. 710-1 185, ch. 1). National con- 
scription was abandoned in A.D. 792. Decreased imperial authority 
gave rise to chaotic conditions and lawlessness in the countryside. 
Provincial officials and shoen holders used local militias, civil offi- 
cials under arms, and soldiers of the shoen holders to secure their 
land and compete for power. 

By the mid-twelfth century, these local armed forces had devel- 
oped into a distinct warrior class (bushi, or samurai), completely 
overshadowing the military strength of the imperial government. 
Empowered by a nationwide, feudal, military dictatorship, the chief 
national figure, the shogun, ruled in the name of a figurehead em- 
peror. By the end of the sixteenth century, samurai dominated the 
social and political hierarchy that existed under the shogun and 
developed into a hereditary elite. After 1603 they alone were granted 
the right to bear the sword, which subsequently became the symbol 



422 



National Security 



of their superior status. During the sixteenth century, a wide vari- 
ety of firearms also was introduced from Europe, and used quite 
effectively, particularly against some of the outer daimyo, or feudal 
lords. 

In time, a customary ethical code, bushido (see Glossary), was 
developed. According to this doctrine, the samurai was bound to 
accept death in battle rather than flight or surrender and, seeing 
corruption or disloyalty in another, was expected to slay the guilty 
party and then commit seppuku (see Glossary) lest his honorable 
intentions be questioned. As an ideal of conduct, the code empha- 
sized personal honesty, reverence and respect for parents, willing- 
ness to sacrifice oneself for family honor, consideration for the 
feelings of others, indifference to pain, loyalty to one's superiors, 
and unquestioning obedience to duty in the face of any hardship 
or danger. Although a reality that often fell short of the ideal, bushido 
had a profound and lasting impact on the nation. Its effects were 
still seen in the conduct of battle in World War II. Banzai (a rally- 
ing cry meaning 10,000 years) charges against stronger enemy forces 
and the tenacity of resistance under severe duress testified to the 
strength and persistence of the samurai tradition. 

The Modernization of the Military, 1868-1931 

When Western powers began to use their superior military 
strength to press Japan for trade relations in the 1850s, the coun- 
try's decentralized and, by Western standards, antiquated mili- 
tary forces were unable to provide an effective defense against their 
advances. After the fall of the Tokugawa government in 1867 and 
the restoration of the Meiji emperor, de facto political and adminis- 
trative power shifted to a group of younger samurai who had been 
instrumental in forming the new system and were committed to 
modernizing the military. They introduced drastic changes, which 
cleared the way for the development of modern, European- style 
armed forces. 

Conscription became universal and obligatory in 1872 and, 
although samurai wedded to the traditional prerogatives of their 
class resisted, by 1880 a conscript army was firmly established. The 
Imperial Army General Staff Office was established directly under 
the emperor in 1878 and given broad powers for military planning 
and strategy. The new force eventually made the samurai spirit 
its own. Loyalties formerly accorded to feudal lords were trans- 
ferred to the state and to the emperor. Upon release from service, 
soldiers carried these ideals back to their home communities, ex- 
tending military-derived standards to all classes. 



423 



Japan: A Country Study 

An imperial rescript of 1882 called for unquestioning loyalty to 
the emperor by the new armed forces and asserted that commands 
from superior officers were equivalent to commands from the em- 
peror himself. Thenceforth, the military existed in an intimate and 
privileged relationship with the imperial institution. Top-ranking 
military leaders were given direct access to the emperor and the 
authority to transmit his pronouncements direcdy to the troops. The 
sympathetic relationship between conscripts and officers, particu- 
larly junior officers, who were drawn mostly from the peasantry, 
tended to draw the military closer to the people (see The Meiji Resto- 
ration, ch. 1). In time, most people came to look more for guidance 
in national matters to military commanders than to political leaders. 

The first test of the nation's new military capabilities, a successful 
punitive expedition to Taiwan in 1874, was followed by a series 
of military ventures unmarred by defeat until World War II. Japan 
moved against Korea, China, and Russia, to secure by military 
means the raw materials and strategic territories it believed neces- 
sary for the development and protection of the homeland. Territorial 
gains were achieved in Korea, the southern half of Sakhalin (re- 
named Karafuto), and Manchuria. As an ally of Britain in World 
War I, Japan assumed control over Germany's possessions in Asia, 
notably in China's Shandong Province, and the Mariana, Caro- 
line, and Marshall islands in the Pacific Ocean (see World War I, 
ch. 1). 

The Naval General Staff, independent from the supreme com- 
mand from 1893, became even more powerful after World War I. 
At the 1921-22 Washington Conference, the major powers signed 
the Five Power Naval Disarmament Treaty, which set the interna- 
tional capital ship ratio for the United States, Britain, Japan, France, 
and Italy at 5, 5, 3, 1.75, and 1.75 respectively. The Imperial Navy 
insisted that it required a ratio of seven ships for every eight United 
States naval ships, but settled for three to five, a ratio acceptable 
to the Japanese public (see Diplomacy, ch. 1). The London Naval 
Treaty of 1930 brought about further reduction but, by the end of 
1935, Japan had entered a period of unlimited military expansion 
and ignored its previous commitments. By the late 1930s, the propor- 
tion of Japanese to United States naval forces was 70.6 percent in 
total tonnage and 94 percent in aircraft carriers, and Japanese ships 
slightly outnumbered those of the United States. 

World War II 

Establishment of Manchukuo 

The power of the military grew when, in September 1931, without 
the knowledge or approval of the civil government, members of the 



424 



National Security 



Imperial Army unit stationed in Manchuria — the Guandong, or 
Kwantung, Army — dynamited a short section of the South Man- 
churian Railway near Shenyang (called Mukden by the Japanese). 
Blaming the incident on Chinese saboteurs, the Guandong Army 
declared a state of emergency and quickly occupied all the prin- 
cipal cities in the region. In March 1932 this army formed the pup- 
pet state of Manchukuo (see Rise of the Militarists, ch. 1). At home, 
this quick and inexpensive victory greatly increased the confidence 
of the young nationalist officers, who could rightly claim credit for 
it, but other officers were sobered by the precedent for insubordi- 
nation. Their apprehension was well founded: in the early 1930s 
a series of assassinations and conspiracies occurred within the na- 
tion and armed forces. In 1936 a force from the Tokyo garrison 
rose in open revolt. Although the rebels were suppressed on orders 
of the emperor, the stage was set for more radical military leaders 
to assume gradual control of the government, a process that was 
completed by 1940 and lasted until a few weeks before Japan's 1945 
surrender in World War II. 

Sino-Japanese War 

On July 17, 1937, a new wave of expansion on the Asian main- 
land began with a skirmish between Chinese and Japanese troops 
at Marco Polo Bridge outside of Beiping (now Beijing). Although 
the Japanese commander had committed his troops without prior 
knowledge or consent of the government in Tokyo, he was promptiy 
provided with reinforcements by the general staff, which by this 
time was strongly influenced by the younger officers. The fighting 
quickly spread, and the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-45) had 
begun. On July 28 Chinese forces evacuated Beiping. Two days 
later the Japanese army occupied Tianjin, and on August 13 
Japanese forces attacked China's financial center, Shanghai. 
Chinese forces resisted for three months, but finally succumbed 
to the better-armed and better-trained Japanese forces. The fall 
of Shanghai left China's capital, Nanjing, unprotected, and the 
Chinese government moved its capital to the southwestern moun- 
tain city of Chongqing. Japanese forces quickly occupied Nan- 
jing, indiscriminately massacring about 100,000 civilians in the in- 
famous "Rape of Nanjing." In mid- 1938 the Japanese set their 
sights on the central Chinese industrial city of Wuhan. Wuhan held 
out for four and one-half months, but finally surrendered on De- 
cember 25, 1938. The fall of Wuhan, coupled with the earlier fall 
of Guangzhou on October 2 1 , left most urban areas in central and 
eastern China in the hands of the Japanese. To the north, however, 



425 



Japan: A Country Study 



Japanese forces were defeated after a protracted battle with a joint 
Soviet-Mongolian force in 1939. 

At home, the Japanese armed forces were portrayed as benevo- 
lent crusaders striving to free Asia from European colonial domi- 
nation. The military's control over almost every phase of Japanese 
life was by now complete, and opposition to its policies was tanta- 
mount to treason. The top military commanders enjoyed direct 
access to the emperor, bypassing civilian authority completely. 

War in the Pacific 

In September 1940, with the permission of the pro-Nazi Vichy 
government of France, Japan moved into northern Indochina, es- 
tablishing a foothold in strategically important Southeast Asia. A 
few days later, Japan signed a mutual defense agreement, the 
Tripartite Pact, with Germany and Italy, putting it on a collision 
course with the United States. The German invasion of the Soviet 
Union in June 1941 relieved the Japanese of the Soviet threat in 
East Asia. As a result, in July 1941 Japan decided to move its troops 
into southern Indochina for possible operations against the oil-rich 
Dutch East Indies. The United States responded by freezing 
Japanese assets in the United States and imposing an oil embargo 
on Japan. Britain, the British Commonwealth of Nations coun- 
tries, and the government of the Dutch East Indies quickly followed 
suit, cutting 90 percent of Japan's oil imports. Faced with a choice 
of submitting to United States demands for a return to the pre- 1931 
status quo or confronting the United States, Japan determined to 
strike out boldly. Beginning with a devastating attack against the 
United States fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941, 
it quickly took advantage of superior air and naval power to oc- 
cupy the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, Malaya, and Singa- 
pore. An overland offensive brought Burma and Thailand under 
Japanese control, and a string of amphibious operations established 
Japan's control of the South Pacific. By mid- 1942 Japanese forces 
appeared to be in control of most of their objectives (see fig. 2). 

It was at this point that the superior economic and industrial 
power of the United States began to turn the tide. In June 1942 
the Japanese directed the bulk of their navy to Midway, a tiny atoll 
at the northern tip of the Hawaiian chain, expecting to destroy the 
rest of the United States Pacific fleet. Instead, the Americans, fore- 
warned of the attack, used carrier-based aircraft to devastate the 
Japanese fleet. The United States counteroffensive had begun. In 
the South Pacific, after six months of heavy fighting, Japanese forces 
evacuated Guadalcanal in February 1943. From there, revitalized 
United States and Allied forces retook most of the South Pacific 



426 




Japanese marines and armored cars, Shanghai, 1937 
Courtesy Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress 

islands occupied by the overextended Japanese forces. By June 
1944, United States and Allied forces had reached Saipan, in the 
Mariana Islands, putting their bombers within range of the Japanese 
homeland. 

When United States air, ground, and sea power began to reverse 
the tide of Japanese victories, the authority of the Japanese forces 
began to wane in the captured territories. At home in Japan, 
however, respect remained high until intensive United States ae- 
rial bombardment there raised popular doubt about the military's 
ability to win the war. It was not until the last days of the war, 
after the United States had dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki, that the emperor, in an unprecedented political act, 
compelled the general staff to accept the terms for surrender. 

The Self-Defense Forces 

Japan's defeat in World War II, the only major military defeat 
in the country's history, had a profound and lasting effect on na- 
tional attitudes toward war, the armed forces, and military involve- 
ment in politics. These attitudes were immediately apparent in the 
public's willing acceptance of total disarmament and demobiliza- 
tion after the war and in the alacrity with which all military lead- 
ers were removed from positions of influence in the state. Under 



427 



Japan: A Country Study 

General Douglas MacArthur of the United States Army, serving 
as the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, and in concert 
with the wishes of most Japanese, occupation authorities were com- 
mitted to the demilitarization and democratization of the nation. 
All clubs, schools, and societies associated with the military and 
martial skills were eliminated. The general staff was abolished, along 
with army and navy ministries and the Imperial Army and Im- 
perial Navy. Industry serving the military also was dismantled. 

The trauma of defeat produced strong pacifist sentiments that 
found expression in the United States-fostered 1947 Constitution, 
which forever renounces war as an instrument for setding interna- 
tional disputes and declares that Japan will never again maintain 
"land, sea, or air forces or other war potential" (see The Postwar 
Constitution, ch. 6). Later cabinets interpreted these provisions as 
not denying the nation the right to self-defense and, with the en- 
couragement of the United States, developed the SDF. Antimilitarist 
public opinion, however, remained a force to be reckoned with on 
any defense-related issue. The constitutional legitimacy of the SDF 
was challenged well into the 1970s, and even in the 1980s govern- 
ment acted warily on defense matters lest residual antimilitarism 
be aggravated and a backlash result. 

Early Development 

Deprived of any military capability after 1945, the nation had 
only occupation forces and a few domestic police on which to rely 
for security. Rising Cold War tensions in Europe and Asia, cou- 
pled with leftist-inspired strikes and demonstrations in Japan, 
prompted some conservative leaders to question the unilateral 
renunciation of all military capability. These sentiments were in- 
tensified in 1950 when most occupation troops were transferred 
to the Korean War (1950-53) theater, leaving Japan virtually help- 
less to counter internal disruption and subversion, and very much 
aware of the need to enter into a mutual defense relationship with 
the United States to guarantee the nation's external security. En- 
couraged by the occupation authorities, the Japanese government 
in July 1950 authorized the establishment of the National Police 
Reserve, consisting of 75,000 men equipped with light infantry 
weapons. 

Under the terms of the Mutual Security Assistance Pact, rati- 
fied in 1952 along with the peace treaty Japan had signed with the 
United States and other countries, United States forces stationed 
in Japan were to deal with external aggression against Japan while 
Japanese forces, both ground and maritime, would deal with in- 
ternal threats and natural disasters. Accordingly, in mid- 1952 the 



428 



National Security 



National Police Reserve was expanded to 1 10,000 men and named 
the National Safety Force. The Coastal Safety Force, which had 
been organized in 1950 as a waterborne counterpart to the Na- 
tional Police Reserve, was transferred with it to the National Safety 
Agency to constitute an embryonic navy (see Military Relations 
with the United States, this ch.). 

As Japan perceived a growing external threat without adequate 
forces to counter it, the National Safety Force underwent further 
development that entailed difficult political problems. The war re- 
nunciation clause of the Constitution was the basis for strong po- 
litical objections to any sort of force other than conventional police. 
In 1954, however, separate land, sea, and air forces for purely defen- 
sive purposes were created, subject to the Office of the Prime 
Minister (see The Cabinet and Ministries, ch. 6). 

To avoid the appearance of a revival of militarism, Japan's lead- 
ers emphasized constitutional guarantees of civilian control of the 
government and armed forces and used nonmilitary terms for the 
organization and functions of the forces. The overall organization 
was called the Defense Agency rather than the Ministry of Defense. 
The armed forces were designated the Ground Self-Defense Force 
(GSDF), the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), and the Air 
Self-Defense Force (ASDF), instead of the army, navy, and air 
force. 

Although possession of nuclear weapons is not forbidden in the 
Constitution, Japan, as the only nation to experience the devasta- 
tion of atomic attack, early expressed its abhorrence of nuclear arms 
and determined never to acquire them. The Basic Atomic Energy 
Law of 1956 limits research, development, and utilization of nuclear 
power to peaceful uses, and from 1956 national policy has embod- 
ied "three non-nuclear principles" — forbidding the nation to pos- 
sess or manufacture nuclear weapons or to allow them to be 
introduced into the nation. In 1976 Japan ratified the Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (adopted by the United 
Nations Security Council in 1968) and reiterated its intention never 
to develop, use, or allow the transportation of nuclear weapons 
through its territory. 

Strategic Considerations 

The expansion of military capabilities in the Soviet Far East be- 
ginning in 1970 was of grave concern to Japan, and Japanese 
authorities regularly monitored the activities of the Soviet Pacific 
fleet and Soviet aircraft in the waters and air space around Japan. 
Despite a general lessening of world tensions and Soviet overtures 
for improved bilateral relations, in 1990 the Soviet Union still 



429 



Japan: A Country Study 

maintained a variety of units, including a division headquarters, 
on the southernmost Kuril Islands claimed by Japan as its North- 
ern Territories. The Soviet Union also operated about 100 major 
surface war ships and 140 submarines (about 75 nuclear powered) 
out of Vladivostok and other Pacific ports. Soviet naval combat- 
ants had passed through the Soya, Tsugaru, and Korea straits and 
had sailed in the Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk and in Pa- 
cific Ocean areas adjacent to Japan (see fig. 1). Japan also was 
within range of Tu-22M Backfire bombers and sea- and air- 
launched cruise missiles and tactical nuclear weapons based in the 
Soviet Union. 

Another area of strategic interest to the nation was the Korean 
Peninsula. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North 
Korea) and the Republic of Korea (South Korea) had remained 
implacable enemies since the Korean War, and in 1990 the bor- 
der between them was one of the most heavily fortified in the world. 
Stable and peaceful relations between the two were considered vital 
to Japan's interest: an outbreak of hostilities would involve United 
States forces stationed in Japan, presenting political and possibly 
security problems for the nation, in addition to interrupting flourish- 
ing trade with South Korea. Although Japan maintained formal 
diplomatic relations only with South Korea, it had refused to con- 
tribute to that nation's defense, stating that any aid to a foreign 
military establishment would violate its own Constitution. 

Events on the Asian mainland could also affect Japan. From the 
early 1970s, China possessed a nuclear force capable of striking 
Japan and a large standing army and substantial navy, even if the 
latter were geared primarily to coastal defense. China itself was 
unlikely to present a direct military threat to Japan, but Chinese 
internal unrest or China's conflicts with its neighbors could have 
an indirect impact on Japanese security and trade (see Trade and 
Investment Relations, ch. 5). 

The nation was vitally dependent on maintaining access to re- 
gional and worldwide shipping lanes and fishing areas, but it was 
incapable of defending the sea routes on which it relied. Its energy 
supplies came primarily from Middle Eastern sources, and its 
tankers had to pass through the Indian Ocean, the Strait of Malacca, 
and the South China Sea, making them vulnerable to hostilities 
in Southeast Asia. Vulnerability to interception of oceangoing trade 
remained the country's greatest strategic weakness. Efforts to over- 
come this weakness, beginning with Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko's 
statement in May 1981 that Japan would attempt to defend its sea 
lines of communication (SLOC) to a distance of 1,000 nautical 
miles, met with controversy. Within the Defense Agency itself, some 



430 



National Security 



viewed a role for the MSDF in defending the SLOC as "unrealis- 
tic, unauthorized, and impossible," Even the strongest support- 
ers of this program allowed that constitutional and other legal 
restrictions would limit active participation of the MSDF to cases 
where Japan was under direct attack. Japan could, however, pro- 
vide surveillance assistance, intelligence sharing, and search and 
rescue support to United States naval forces. 

Japan's small size, its geographically concentrated industry, and 
the close proximity of potentially hostile powers all rendered the 
country vulnerable to a major nuclear strike. As for defense against 
conventional aggression, strategy was determined by the nation's 
elongated insular geography, its mountainous terrain, and the near- 
ness of the Asian mainland. The terrain favors local defense against 
invasion by ground forces, but protection of the approximately 
15,800 kilometer coastiine of the four main islands would present 
unique problems in the event of a large-scale invasion. Potentially 
hostile aircraft and missile bases were so close that timely warning 
even by radar facilities might be difficult to obtain. 

Maneuver space was limited to such an extent that ground 
defenses would have to be virtually in place at the onset of hostili- 
ties. No point of the country is more than 150 kilometers from the 
sea. Moreover, the straits separating Honshu from the other main 
islands restrict the rapid movement of troops from one island to 
another, even though all major islands are now connected by bridges 
and tunnels. Within each island, mountain barriers and narrow 
roads restrict troop and supply movements. The key strategic region 
was densely populated and highly industrialized central Honshu, 
particularly the area from Tokyo to Kobe (see Physical Setting, 
ch. 2). 

Place in National Life 

The Defense Agency, aware that it could not accomplish its pro- 
grams without popular support, paid close attention to public opin- 
ion. Although the people retained a lingering suspicion of the armed 
services, in the late 1980s antimilitarism had moderated, compared 
to its form in the early 1950s when the SDF was established. At 
that time, fresh from the terrible defeat of World War II, most 
people had ceased to believe that the military could maintain peace 
or serve the national interest. By the mid-1970s, memories of World 
War II had faded, and a growing number of people believed that 
Japan's military and diplomatic roles should reflect its rapidly grow- 
ing economic strength. At the same time, United States-Soviet stra- 
tegic contention in the area around Japan had increased. In 1976 
Defense Agency Director General Sakata Michita called upon the 



431 



Japan: A Country Study 

cabinet to adopt the National Defense Program Outline to improve 
the quality of the armed forces and more clearly define their strictly 
defensive role. For this program to gain acceptance, Sakata had to 
agree to a ceiling on military expenditures of 1 percent of the gross 
national product (GNP — see Glossary) and a prohibition on export- 
ing weapons and military technology. The outiine was adopted by 
the cabinet and, according to public opinion polls, was approved 
by approximately 60 percent of the people. Throughout the re- 
mainder of the 1970s and into the 1980s, the quality of the SDF 
improved and public approval of the improved forces went up. 

In November 1982, when the Defense Agency's former direc- 
tor general, Nakasone Yasuhiro, became prime minister, he was 
under strong pressure from the United States and other Western 
nations to move toward a more assertive defense policy in line with 
Japan's status as a major world economic and political power. 
Strong antimilitarist sentiment remained in Japanese public opin- 
ion, however, especially in the opposition parties. Nakasone chose 
a compromise solution, gradually building up the SDF and stead- 
ily increasing defense spending while guarding against being drawn 
beyond self-defense into collective security. In 1985 he developed 
the Mid-Term Defense Estimate (see Missions, this ch.). Although 
that program had general public backing, its goals could not be 
met while retaining the ceiling of 1 percent of GNP on military 
spending, which still had strong public support. At first the govern- 
ment tried to get around the problem by deferring payment, bud- 
geting only the initial costs of major military hardware. But by late 
1986, it had become obvious that the 1 percent ceiling had to be 
superseded. Thus, on January 24, 1987, in an extraordinary night 
meeting, the cabinet abandoned this ceiling. A March 1987 Asahi 
Shimbun poll indicated that this move was made in defiance of public 
opinion: only 15 percent approved the removal of the ceiling and 
61 percent disapproved. But a January 1988 poll conducted by the 
Office of the Prime Minister reported that 58 percent approved 
the defense budget of 1 .004 percent of GNP for Fiscal Year (FY — 
see Glossary) 1987. 

During 1987 the Japanese government reviewed ways in which 
it could assist friendly forces in protecting shipping in the Persian 
Gulf. Several possibilities were seriously considered, including send- 
ing minesweepers to the gulf. But, in the end, the government de- 
termined that sending any military forces to the gulf would be 
unacceptable to the Japanese people. Instead the Japanese govern- 
ment agreed to fund the installation of radio navigation guides for 
gulf shipping. 



432 



Armored exercises in Shizuoka Prefecture 
Courtesy Asahi Shimbun 



Appreciation of the SDF continued to grow in the 1980s, with 
over half of the respondents in a 1988 survey voicing an interest 
in the SDF and over 76 percent indicating that they were favor- 
ably impressed. Although the majority (63.5 percent) of respondents 
were aware that the primary purpose of the SDF was maintenance 
of national security, an even greater number (77 percent) saw dis- 
aster relief as the most useful SDF function. The SDF therefore 
continued to devote much of its time and resources to disaster relief 
and other civic action. Between 1984 and 1988, at the request of 
prefectural governors, the SDF assisted in approximately 3,100 dis- 
aster relief operations, involving about 138,000 personnel, 16,000 
vehicles, 5,300 aircraft, and 120 ships and small craft. In addition, 
the SDF participated in earthquake disaster prevention operations 
and disposed of a large quantity of World War II explosive ord- 
nance, especially in Okinawa. The forces also participated in public 
works projects, cooperated in managing athletic events, took part 
in annual Antarctic expeditions, and conducted aerial surveys to 
report on ice conditions for fishermen and on geographic forma- 
tions for construction projects. Especially sensitive to maintaining 
harmonious relations with communities close to defense bases, the 
SDF built new roads, irrigation networks, and schools in those 
areas. Soundproofing was installed in homes and public buildings 



433 



Japan: A Country Study 



near airfields. Despite these measures, in some areas local resistance 
to military installations remained strong. 

Missions 

Despite the nation's status as a major world power, Japan es- 
chewed responsibility for regional defense. Having renounced war, 
the possession of war potential, the right of belligerency, and the 
possession of nuclear weaponry, it held the view that it should pos- 
sess only the minimum defense necessary to face external threats. 
Within those limits, the Self-Defense Forces Law of 1954 provides 
the basis from which various formulations of SDF missions have 
been derived. The law states that ground, maritime, and air forces 
are to preserve the peace and independence of the nation and to 
maintain national security by conducting operations on land, at 
sea, and in the air to defend the nation against direct and indirect 
aggression. 

The general framework through which these missions are to be 
accomplished was set forth in the Basic Policy for National Defense 
adopted by the cabinet in 1957; it remained in force in 1990. Ac- 
cording to this document, the nation's security would be achieved 
by supporting the United Nations (UN) and promoting interna- 
tional cooperation, by stabilizing domestic affairs and enhancing 
public welfare, by gradually developing an effective self-defense 
capability, and by dealing with external aggression on the basis 
of Japan-United States security arrangements, pending the effec- 
tive functioning of the UN. 

The very general terms in which military missions were couched 
left specifics open to wide interpretation and prompted the criti- 
cism that the nation did not possess a military strategy. In the 1976 
National Defense Program Outline, the cabinet sought to define 
missions more specifically by setting guidelines for the nation's read- 
iness, including specific criteria for the maintenance and opera- 
tion of the SDF. Under these guidelines, in cases of limited and 
small-scale attack, Japanese forces would respond promptly to con- 
trol the situation. If enemy forces attacked in greater strength than 
Japan could counter alone, the SDF would engage the attacker until 
the United States could come to its aid. Against nuclear threat, 
Japan would rely on the nuclear deterrence of the United States. 
To accomplish its missions, the SDF would maintain surveillance, 
be prepared to respond to direct and indirect attacks, be capable 
of providing command, communication, logistics, and training sup- 
port, and be available to aid in disaster relief. 

The outline specified quotas of personnel and equipment that 
were deemed necessary for each force to meet its tasks. Particular 



434 



National Security 



elements of each force's mission were also identified. The GSDF 
was to defend against ground invasion and threats to internal secu- 
rity, be able to deploy to any part of the nation, and protect the 
bases of all three services of the Self-Defense Forces. The MSDF 
was to meet invasion by sea, guard and defend coastal waters, ports, 
bays, and major straits, sweep mines, and patrol and survey the sur- 
rounding waters. The ASDF was to render aircraft and missile in- 
terceptor capability, provide support fighter units for maritime and 
ground operations, supply air reconnaissance and air transport for 
all forces, and maintain airborne and stationary early warning units. 

The Mid-Term Defense Estimate for FY 1986 through FY 1990 
envisioned a modernized SDF with an expanded role. While main- 
taining Japan-United States security arrangements and the exclu- 
sively defensive policy mandated by the Constitution, this program 
undertook moderate improvements in Japanese defense capabili- 
ties. Among its specific objectives were bettering air defense by 
improving and modernizing interceptor-fighter aircraft and surface- 
to-air missiles, improving antisubmarine warfare capability with 
additional destroyers and fixed- wing antisubmarine patrol aircraft, 
and upgrading intelligence, reconnaissance, and command, con- 
trol, and communications. 

The SDF disaster relief role is defined in Article 83 of the Self- 
Defense Forces Law of 1954, requiring units to respond to calls 
for assistance from prefectural governors to aid in fire fighting, 
earthquake disasters, searches for missing persons, rescues, and 
reinforcement of embankments and levees in the event of flood- 
ing. As of 1990, the SDF had not been used in police actions nor 
was it likely to be assigned any internal security tasks in the future. 

Organization, Training, and Equipment 

Based on the Self-Defense Forces Law of 1954, the nation's 
defense establishment was organized to ensure civilian control of 
the armed forces. The result has been a unique military system. 
All SDF personnel were technically civilians: those in uniform were 
classified as special civil servants and were subordinate to the 
ordinary civil servants who ran the Defense Agency. There was 
no military secrets law, and offenses committed by military per- 
sonnel — whether on base or off base, on duty or off duty, of mili- 
tary or nonmilitary nature — were all adjudicated under normal 
procedures by civil courts in appropriate jurisdictions (see The 
Criminal Justice System, this ch.). 

The Defense Agency 

In 1990 the Defense Agency, as part of the Office of the Prime 
Minister, was required by Article 66 of the Constitution to be 



435 



Japan: A Country Study 

completely subordinate to civilian authority. Its head, the director 
general, had the rank of minister of state. He was assisted by two 
vice directors general (vice ministers), one parliamentary and one 
administrative; the Defense Facilities Office; and the Internal 
Bureaus (see fig. 12). The highest figure in the command struc- 
ture was the prime minister, who was responsible directly to the 
Diet (see Glossary; The Legislature, ch. 6). In a national emer- 
gency, the prime minister was authorized to order the various com- 
ponents of the Self-Defense Forces into action, subject to the consent 
of the Diet. In times of extreme emergency, that approval might 
be obtained after the fact. 

In July 1986, the Security Council was established. The council 
was presided over by the prime minister and included the ministers 
of state specified in advance in Article 9 of the Cabinet Law, the 
foreign minister, the finance minister, the chief cabinet secretary, 
the chairman of the National Public Safety Commission, the director 
general of the Defense Agency, and the director general of the Eco- 
nomic Planning Agency. The chairman of the Security Council 
also could invite the chairman of the Joint Staff Council and any 
other relevant state minister or official to attend. Replacing the 
National Defense Council, which had acted as an advisory group 
on defense-related matters since 1956, the Security Council ad- 
dressed a wider range of military and nonmilitary security issues, 
including basic national defense policy, the National Defense Pro- 
gram Outline, the outline on coordinating industrial production 
and other matters related to the National Defense Program Out- 
line, and decisions on diplomatic initiatives and defense operations. 

The internal bureaus, especially the Bureau of Defense Policy, 
Bureau of the Finance, and the Bureau of Equipment, were often 
headed by officials from other ministries and were the main centers 
of power and instruments of civilian control in the Defense Agency. 
The Bureau of Defense Policy was responsible for drafting defense 
policy and programs, for determining day-to-day operational ac- 
tivities, and for information gathering and analysis in the SDF. 
The Bureau of Finance was instrumental in developing the Defense 
Agency budget and in establishing spending priorities for the 
Defense Agency and the SDF. The Bureau of Equipment, organized 
into subunits for each of the military services, focused on equip- 
ment procurement. Before any major purchase was recommended 
to the Diet by the Defense Agency, it had to be reviewed by each 
of these important bureaus. 

Below these civilian groups was the uniformed SDF. In 1990 
its senior officer was the chairman of the Joint Staff Council, a body 
that included the chiefs of staff of the ground, maritime, and air 



436 



National Security 



arms of the Self-Defense Forces. Its principal functions were to ad- 
vise the director general and to plan and execute joint exercises. 
The three branches maintained staff offices to manage operations 
in their branches. Although rank established echelons of command 
within the SDF, all three branches were immediately responsible 
to the director general and were coequal bodies with the Joint Staff 
Council and the three staff offices. 

This structure precluded the concentration of power of the 
pre- 1945 general staffs, but it impeded interservice coordination, 
and there were few formal exchanges among commanders from 
various branches. Moreover, some dissatisfaction was reported by 
high-ranking officers who felt they had little power compared with 
younger civilian officials in the bureaus, who most often had no 
military experience. To rectify this situation and to increase input 
by the SDF in policy matters, in the early 1980s the Joint Staff 
Council was enlarged to establish better lines of communication 
between the internal bureaus and the three staff offices. A com- 
puterized central command and communications system and 
various tactical command and communications systems were 
established, linking service and field headquarters with general 
headquarters at the Defense Agency and with one another. 

In the 1980s, efforts were also under way to facilitate a clear and 
efficient command policy in the event of a crisis. The government 
stood by the principle that military action was permitted only under 
civilian control, but in recognition that delay for consultation might 
prove dangerous, ships of the MSDF began to be armed with live 
torpedoes, and fighter- interceptors were allowed to carry missiles 
at all times. Although aircraft had long been allowed to force down 
intruders without waiting for permission from the prime minister, 
ships were still required to receive specific orders before interdict- 
ing invading vessels. The Defense Agency had recommended draw- 
ing up more complete guidelines to clarify what action SDF combat 
units could take in emergencies. 

Cooperation between the SDF and other civilian agencies in con- 
tingency planning was limited. No plans existed to ensure the sup- 
port of civilian aircraft and merchant fleets in times of crisis, even 
though the SDF transportation capabilities were generally judged 
inadequate. In 1990 legislation was being studied to provide the 
SDF with the ability to respond in emergency situations not spe- 
cifically covered by Article 76 of the Self-Defense Forces Law. 

SDF training included instilling a sense of mission. Personnel 
were provided with the scientific and technical education to oper- 
ate and maintain modern equipment and with the physical train- 
ing necessary to accomplish their missions. 



437 



Japan: A Country Study 




438 



National Security 



Modern equipment was gradually replacing obsolescent materiel 
in the SDF. In 1987 the Defense Agency replaced its communica- 
tions system (which formerly had relied on telephone lines of the 
Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation) with a microwave 
network incorporating a three-dimensional transmission system 
using a communications satellite. Despite efforts to increase stocks, 
however, supplies of ammunition and maintenance and repair parts 
in 1990 remained at less than satisfactory levels. 

The Ground Self-Defense Force 

The largest of the three services, the GSDF, operated under the 
command of the chief of the ground staff, based in the city of 
Ichikawa, east of Tokyo. Although allotted 180,000 slots for 
uniformed personnel, in 1989 the force was maintained at about 
86 percent of that level (with approximately 156,200 personnel), 
because of funding constraints. The GSDF consisted of one armored 
division, twelve infantry divisions, one airborne brigade, two com- 
bined brigades, one training brigade, one artillery brigade with 
four groups, eight antiaircraft artillery groups, one helicopter 
brigade with twenty-four squardrons, and two antitank helicopter 
squadrons, with a third being formed, and five engineer brigades 
(see table 38, Appendix). 

In 1989 the GSDF was divided into five regional armies, each 
containing two to four divisions, antiaircraft artillery units, and 
support units (see fig. 13). The largest, the Northern Army, was 
headquartered on Hokkaido, where population and geographic con- 
straints were less limiting than elsewhere. It had four divisions and 
artillery, antiaircraft artillery, and engineering brigades. The North- 
eastern and Eastern armies, headquartered in Sendai and Ichikawa, 
respectively, each had two divisions, and the Central Army, head- 
quartered in Itami, had three divisions in addition to a combined 
brigade located on Shikoku. The Western Army, with two divi- 
sions, was headquartered at Kengun and maintained a combined 
brigade on Okinawa. 

Intended to deter attack, repulse a small invasion, or provide 
a holding action until reinforced by United States armed forces, 
the ground element in 1990 was neither equipped nor staffed to 
offer more than a show of conventional defense by itself. Antitank 
artillery, ground- to- sea firepower, and mobility were being im- 
proved and surface-to-ship missiles were being acquired in the Mid- 
Term Defense Program scheduled for completion in FY 1990 (see 
table 39, Appendix). The number of uniformed personnel was in- 
sufficient to enable an immediate shift onto emergency footing. In- 
stead, the ratio of officers to enlisted personnel was high, requiring 



439 



Japan: A Country Study 



Ground Self-Defense Force 

# Army headquarters 

• Division headquarters 

Maritime Self-Defense Force 

i District headquarters 

Air Self-Defense Force 

Air Defense Command headquarters 
Air Defense Force headquorters 



N 




. Ominafo 

Ominato Maritime 
District 



(Northeaster 
Army 



Maizuru 
Maritime District 



Somagahora/ 

Eastern Army 

Nerimc 



A" 



f 



Fukuokj. 
Saseho • 

Sasebo nt, K( 
Maritime 0/r.# . 



CentrallArmy 



Iruma 
Fu 



1®, 



Mchiiawa 



Moriyamay 



Senzo 



'Yolcosuka 



Yokosuka 
Maritime District 



K/fa- 
. Kumamofc 



Kure 
Maritime 
District 



<7 



1st Composite 
Brigade 



Army boundary 

Maritime defense boundary 

Air defense boundary 

50 100 150 Miles 



50 100 150 Kilometers 



Source: Based on information from Japan, Defense Agency, Defense of Japan, 1990, Tokyo, 
1990, 309. 



Figure 13. Deployment of the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self -Defense Forces, 
1990 



440 



National Security 



augmentation by reserves or volunteers in times of crisis. In late 
1989, however, GSDF reserve personnel, numbering 48,000, had 
received little professional training. 

In 1989 basic training for lower- secondary and upper- secondary 
school graduates began in the training brigade and lasted approx- 
imately three months. Specialized enlisted and noncommissioned 
officer (NCO) candidate courses were available in branch schools, 
and qualified NCOs could enter an eight-to-twelve-week second 
lieutenant candidate program. Senior NCOs and graduates of an 
eighty- week NCO pilot course were eligible to enter officer candi- 
date schools, as were graduates of the National Defense Academy 
at Yokosuka and of four-year universities. Advanced technical, 
flight, medical, and command staff officer courses were also run 
by the GSDF. Like the maritime and air forces, the GSDF ran 
a youth cadet program offering technical training to lower-secondary 
school graduates below military age in return for a promise of en- 
listment. 

Because of population density on the Japanese islands, only lim- 
ited areas were available for large-scale training and, even in these 
areas, noise restrictions were a problem (see Population, ch. 2). 
The GSDF tried to adapt to these conditions by conducting com- 
mand post exercises and map maneuvers and by using simulators 
and other training devices. In live firing during training, propel- 
lants were reduced to shorten shell ranges. Such restriction 
diminished the value of combat training and troop morale. 

The Maritime Self-Defense Force 

The MSDF had an authorized strength in 1989 of 46,000 and 
maintained some 44,400 personnel and operated 149 major com- 
batants, including 14 submarines, 56 destroyers and frigates, 47 
mine warfare vessels, 14 patrol craft, and 6 amphibious ships. It 
also flew some 181 fixed-wing aircraft and 102 helicopters. Most 
of these aircraft were used in antisubmarine and mine warfare oper- 
ations. 

The MSDF was commanded by the chief of the maritime staff 
and included the maritime staff office, the self-defense fleet, five 
regional district commands, the air-training squadron, and vari- 
ous support units, such as hospitals and schools. The maritime staff 
office, located in Tokyo, served the chief of staff in command and 
supervision of the force. The self-defense fleet, headquartered at 
Yokosuka, was charged with defense of all waters around the 
Japanese Archipelago. It commanded four escort flotillas (two based 
in Yokosuka and one each in Sasebo and Maizuru), the fleet air 
force headquartered at Atsugi, two submarine flotillas based at Kure 



441 



Japan: A Country Study 



and Yokosuka, two mine-sweeping flotillas based at Kure and 
Yokosuka, and the fleet training command at Yokosuka. 

Five district units acted in concert with the fleet to guard the 
waters of their jurisdictions and provide shore-based support. Dis- 
trict headquarters were located in Ominato, Maizuru, Yokosuka, 
Kure, and Sasebo. 

MSDF recruits received three months of basic training followed 
by courses in patrol, gunnery, mine sweeping, convoy operations, 
and maritime transportation. Flight students, all upper- secondary 
school graduates, entered a two-year course. Officer candidate 
schools offered six-month courses to qualified enlisted personnel 
and those who had completed flight school. Graduates of four-year 
universities, the four-year National Defense Academy, and par- 
ticularly outstanding enlisted personnel underwent a one-year officer 
course at the Officer Candidate School at Eta Jima (site of the 
former Imperial Naval Academy). Special advanced courses for 
officers were also available in such fields as submarine duty and 
flight training. The MSDF operated its own staff college in Tokyo 
for senior officers. 

The large volume of coastal commercial fishing and maritime 
traffic limited in-service sea training, especially in the relatively 
shallow waters required for mine laying, mine sweeping, and sub- 
marine rescue practice. Training days were scheduled around slack 
fishing seasons in winter and summer — providing about ten days 
during the year. The MSDF maintained two oceangoing training 
ships and conducted annual long-distance on-the-job training for 
graduates of the one-year officer candidate school. 

The naval force's capacity to perform its defense missions varied 
according to the task. MSDF training emphasized antisubmarine 
and antiaircraft warfare. Defense planners believed the most ef- 
fective approach to combating submarines entailed mobilizing all 
available weapons, including surface combatants, submarines, air- 
craft, and helicopters, and the numbers and armament of these 
weapons were being increased in the Mid-Term Defense Program. 
A critical weakness remained, however, in the ability to defend 
such weapons against air attack. Because most of the MSDF's air 
arm was detailed to antisubmarine warfare, the ASDF had to be 
relied on to provide air cover, an objective that competed unsuc- 
cessfully with the ASDF's primary mission of air defense of the 
home islands. Extended patrols over sea lanes were also beyond 
the ASDF's capabilities. The fleet's capacity to provide ship-based 
anti-air-attack protection was limited by the absence of aircraft car- 
riers and the inadequate number of shipborne long-range surface- 
to-air missiles and close-range weapons. The fleet was also short 



442 



Maritime 
Self- Defence Force ships on 
patrol in Tokyo Bay 
Courtesy Asahi Shimbun 




of underway replenishment ships and seriously deficient in all areas 
of logistic support (see table 40, Appendix). These weaknesses seri- 
ously compromised the ability of the MSDF to fulfill its mission 
and to operate independently of the United States Air Force and 
the United States Seventh Fleet. 

The Air Self-Defense Force 

The ASDF was the major aviation arm of the SDF. It had an 
authorized strength of 47,000 and maintained some 46,400 per- 
sonnel and approximately 390 combat aircraft in 1989. Front-line 
formations included three ground- attack squadrons, nine fighter 
squadrons, one reconnaissance squadron, and five transport 
squadrons. 

Major units of the ASDF were the Air Defense Command, the 
Flight Support Command, Flying Training Command, Air Develop- 
ing and Proving Command, and Air Materiel Command. The Air 
Support Command was responsible for direct support of operational 
forces in rescue, transportation, control, weather monitoring, and 
inspection. The Flying Training Command was responsible for basic 
flying and technical training. The Air Developing and Proving Com- 
mand, in addition to overseeing equipment research and develop- 
ment, was also responsible for research and development in such 
areas as flight medicine. The Air Defense Command had North- 
ern, Central, and Western regional commands located at Misawa, 



443 



Japan: A Country Study 



Iruma, and Kasuga, and a Southwestern Composite Air Division 
based at Naha on Okinawa. All four regional headquarters con- 
trolled surface-to-air missile units of both the ASDF and the GSDF 
located in their respective areas. 

For its air defense of the nation, the ASDF in 1989 maintained 
an integrated network of twenty-eight radar installations and air 
defense direction centers known as the Basic Air Defense Ground 
Environment. In the late 1980s, the system was modernized and 
augmented with E-2C airborne early-warning aircraft. 

The nation relied on fighter-interceptor aircraft and surface-to- 
air missiles to intercept hostile aircraft. In 1989 both of these sys- 
tems were undergoing improvement. Outmoded aircraft were being 
replaced with more sophisticated models, and Nike-J missiles were 
being replaced with new Patriot systems (see table 41 , Appendix). 
Essentially, however, the nation relied on United States forces to 
provide interceptor capability. 

The ASDF also provided air support for ground and sea opera- 
tions of the GSDF and the MSDF and air defense for bases of all 
the forces. Although support fighter squadrons were being moder- 
nized in 1989, they lacked precision- guided weapons for support 
of ground operations and attacks on hostile ships, and ASDF pi- 
lots received little flight training over oceans to prepare for mari- 
time operations. The ASDF had a poor base defense capability, 
consisting mainly of outmoded antiaircraft guns and portable 
shelters to house aircraft. Base defenses were being upgraded in 
the late 1980s with new surface-to-air missiles, modern antiaircraft 
artillery, and new fixed and mobile aircraft shelters. 

After passing an entrance examination, recruits could enter sev- 
eral training programs. Lower-secondary school graduates were 
eligible to enter the ASDF's four-year youth cadet program to earn 
upper- secondary school equivalency and NCO status, or they could 
undergo twelve-week recruit training courses followed by techni- 
cal training lasting from five to fifty weeks. Upper-secondary school 
graduates could also enter either two-year NCO or four-year flight 
courses. Specialized training was available for all NCOs, as were 
opportunities to enroll in officer and flight officer candidate courses. 
Graduates of the four-year National Defense Academy or four-year 
universities received thirty to forty weeks of instruction in officer 
candidate schools. Advanced technical, flight, and command staff 
officer programs were available for officers. 

Recruitment and Conditions of Service 

The total authorized strength in the three branches of the SDF 
was approximately 274,000 in 1989. In addition, the SDF maintained 



444 



National Security 



a total of about 48,000 reservists attached to the three services. Even 
when Japan's active and reserve components were combined, 
however, the country maintained a lower ratio of military person- 
nel to its population than did any member nation of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the Warsaw Treaty Or- 
ganization (Warsaw Pact). Of the major Asian nations, only India 
and Indonesia kept a lower ratio of personnel in arms. 

The SDF was an all- volunteer force. Conscription per se was 
not forbidden by law, but many citizens considered Article 18 of 
the Constitution, which proscribes involuntary servitude except as 
punishment for a crime, as a legal prohibition of any form of con- 
scription. Even in the absence of so strict an interpretation, however, 
a military draft appeared politically impossible. 

SDF uniformed personnel were recruited as private, E-l, sea- 
man recruit, and airman basic for a fixed term. Ground forces 
recruits normally enlisted for two years; those seeking training in 
technical specialties enlisted for three. Naval and air recruits nor- 
mally enlisted for three years. Officer candidates, students in the 
National Defense Academy and National Defense Medical Col- 
lege, and candidate enlisted students in technical schools were en- 
rolled for an indefinite period. The National Defense Academy and 
enlisted technical schools usually required an enrollment of four 
years and the National Defense Medical College six years. 

When the SDF was originally formed, women were recruited 
exclusively for the nursing services. Opportunities were expanded 
somewhat when women were permitted to join the GSDF com- 
munication service in 1967 and the MSDF and ASDF communi- 
cation services in 1974. In 1989 about 77 percent of service areas 
were open to women, and there were 4,924 women in the SDF: 
1,046 nurses, 35 physicians, and 3,843 general service personnel. 

In the face of some continued post- World War II public apathy 
or antipathy toward the armed services, the SDF in 1990 had 
difficulties in recruiting personnel. The forces had to compete for 
qualified personnel with well-paying industries and most enlistees 
were ''persuaded" volunteers who signed up after solicitation from 
recruiters. Predominantly rural prefectures supplied military en- 
listees far beyond the proportions of their populations. In areas such 
as southern Kyushu and Hokkaido, where employment opportu- 
nities were limited, recruiters were welcomed and supported by 
the citizens. In contrast, little success or cooperation was encoun- 
tered in urban centers such as Tokyo and Osaka. 

Because the forces were all volunteer and legally civilian, mem- 
bers could resign at any time, and retention was a problem. Many 
enlistees were lured away by the prospects of highly paying civilian 



445 



Japan: A Country Study 

jobs, and Defense Agency officials complained of private indus- 
tries looting their personnel. The agency attempted to stop these 
practices by threats of sanctions for offending firms that held defense 
contracts and by private agreements with major industrial firms. 
Given the nation's labor shortage, however, the problem promised 
to continue. 

Some older officers considered the members of the modern forces 
unequal to personnel of the former Imperial Army and Imperial 
Navy, but the SDF were generally regarded as professional and 
able. Compared with their counterparts in other nations, mem- 
bers of the SDF were remarkably well educated and in good phys- 
ical condition. Literacy was universal, and school training extensive. 
Personnel were trained in the martial arts, judo and kendo, and phys- 
ical standards were strict. The SDF probably did not attract the 
same high level of personnel as other institutions in Japan. Gradu- 
ates of the top universities rarely entered the armed forces, and 
applicants to the National Defense Academy were generally con- 
sidered to be on the level of those who applied to second-rank local 
universities. 

In 1990 general conditions of military life were not such that 
a career in the SDF seemed an attractive alternative to one in pri- 
vate industry or the bureaucracy. The conditions of service provided 
less dignity, prestige, and comfort than they had before World War 
II, and for most members of the defense establishment, military 
life offered less status than did a civilian occupation. Those people 
who entered the SDF were often unfairly perceived by the citizenry 
as unable to find a better job. 

As special civil servants, SDF personnel were paid according to 
civilian pay scales that did not always distinguish rank. At times 
SDF salaries were greater for subordinates than for commanding 
officers; senior NCOs with long service could earn more than newly 
promoted colonels. Pay raises were not included in Defense Agency 
budgets and could not be established by military planners. Retire- 
ment ages for officers below flag rank ranged from fifty-three to 
fifty-five years, and from fifty to fifty-three for enlisted personnel. 
Limits were sometimes extended because of personnel shortages. 
In the late 1980s, the Defense Agency, concerned about the difficulty 
of finding appropriate postretirement employment for these early 
retirees, provided vocational training for enlisted personnel about 
to retire and transferred them to units close to the place where they 
intended to retire. Beginning in October 1987, the Self-Defense 
Forces Job Placement Association provided free job placement and 
reemployment support for retired SDF personnel. Retirees also 
received pensions immediately upon retirement, some ten years 



446 



National Security 



earlier than most civil service personnel. Financing the retirement 
system promised to be a problem of increasing scope in the 1990s, 
with the aging of the population. 

SDF personnel benefits were not comparable to such benefits 
for active-duty military personnel in other major industrialized na- 
tions. Health care was provided at the SDF Central Hospital, 14 
regional hospitals, and 165 clinics in military facilities and on board 
ship, but only covered physical examinations and the treatment 
of illness and injury suffered in the course of duty. There were no 
commissary or exchange privileges. Housing was often substan- 
dard, and military appropriations for facilities maintenance often 
focused on appeasing civilian communities near bases rather than 
on improving on-base facilities. 

Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia 

In 1990 uniforms in all three SDF branches were similar in style 
to those worn by United States forces. GSDF uniforms were gray- 
blue; MSDF personnel wore traditional blue dress, white service, 
and khaki work uniforms; and ASDF personnel wore the lighter 
shade of blue worn by the United States Air Force. The arm of 
service to which members of the ground force were attached was 
indicated by piping of distinctive colors: for infantry, red; artillery, 
yellow; armor, orange; engineers, violet; ordnance, light green; 
medical, green; army aviation, light blue; signals, blue; quarter- 
master, brown; transportation, dark violet; airborne, white; and 
others, dark blue. The cap badge insignia for all displayed a dove 
of peace. 

There were nine officer ranks in the active SDF, along with a 
warrant officer rank; five NCO ranks; and three enlisted ranks (see 
fig. 14). The highest NCO rank, first sergeant (senior chief petty 
officer in the MSDF and senior master sergeant in the ASDF), was 
established in 1 980 to provide more promotion opportunities and 
shorter terms of service as sergeant first class, chief petty officer, 
or master sergeant. Under the earlier system, the average NCO 
was promoted only twice in approximately thirty years of service 
and remained at the top rank for almost ten years. 

Defense Spending 

According to Japanese security policy, maintaining a military 
establishment was only one method — and by no means the best — to 
achieve national security. Diplomacy, economic aid and develop- 
ment, and a close relationship with the United States under the 
terms of the 1960 security treaty were all considered more impor- 
tant. Even in the 1980s, defense spending was accorded a relatively 



447 



Japan: A Country Study 




448 



National Security 



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449 



Japan: A Country Study 



low priority. For FY 1986 through FY 1990, defense's share of the 
general budget was around 6.5 percent, as compared to approxi- 
mately 28 percent for the United States. In 1987 Japan ranked sixth 
in the world in total defense expenditures behind the Soviet Union, 
the United States, France, the Federal Republic of Germany (West 
Germany), and Britain. By 1989 it ranked third after the United 
States and the Soviet Union, mainly because of the increased value 
of the yen. 

In addition to annual budgets, the Defense Agency prepared a 
series of cabinet- approved build-up plans beginning in 1957, which 
set goals for specific task capabilities and established procurement 
targets to achieve them. Under the first three plans (for 1958-60, 
1962-66, and 1967-71), funding priorities were set to establish the 
ability to counter limited aggression. Economic difficulties follow- 
ing the 1973 oil crisis, however, caused major problems in achiev- 
ing the Fourth Defense Buildup Plan (1972-76) and forced funding 
to be cut, raising questions about the basic concepts underlying 
defense policies (see Monetary and Fiscal Policy, ch. 4). 

In 1976 the government recognized that substantial increases in 
spending, personnel, and bases would be virtually impossible. In- 
stead a "standard defense concept" was suggested, one stressing 
qualitative improvements in the SDF, rather than quantitative ones. 
It was decided that defense spending would focus on achieving a 
basic level of defense as set forth in the 1976 National Defense Pro- 
gram Outline. Thereafter, the government ceased to offer buildup 
plans that alarmed the public by their seemingly open-ended na- 
ture and switched to reliance on single fiscal year formulas that 
offered explicit, attainable goals. 

Defense spending increased slightly during the late 1970s, and 
in the 1980s only the defense and Official Development Assistance 
budgets were allowed to increase in real terms. In 1985 the Defense 
Agency developed the Mid-Term Defense Estimate objectives for 
FY 1986 through FY 1990, to improve SDF front-line equipment 
and upgrade logistic support systems. For the GSDF, these mea- 
sures included the purchase of advanced weapons and equipment 
to improve antitank, artillery, ground- to- sea firepower, and mo- 
bile capabilities. For the MSDF, the focus was on upgrading anti- 
submarine capabilities, with the purchase of new destroyer escorts 
equipped with the Aegis system and SH-60J antisubmarine heli- 
copters, and on improving antimine warfare and air defense sys- 
tems. ASDF funds were concentrated on the purchase of fighter 
aircraft and rescue helicopters. The entire cost of the Mid-Term 
Defense Estimate for FY 1986 through FY 1990 was projected at 



450 



National Security 



approximately ¥18.4 trillion (approximately US$83.2 billion, at 
the 1985 exchange rate). 

In FY 1989 the ¥3.9 trillion defense budget accounted for 6.49 
percent of the total budget, 1 .006 percent of the GNP. In addition 
to the Defense Agency itself, the defense budget supported the 
Defense Facilities Administration Agency and the Security Coun- 
cil. Defense Agency funding covered GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, 
and the internal bureaus, the Joint Staff Council, the the National 
Defense Academy, the National Defense Medical College, the Na- 
tional Institute for Defense Studies, the Technical Research and 
Development Institute, and the Central Procurement Office. 

The FY 1990 defense budget, at 0.997 percent of the forecasted 
GNP, dipped below the 1 percent level for the first time since it 
was reached in 1987. But the more than ¥4.1 trillion budget still 
marked a 6.1 percent increase over the FY 1989 defense budget 
and provided virtually all of the ¥104 billion requested for research 
and development, including substantial funds for guided-missile 
and communications technologies. Although some ¥34.6 billion 
was authorized over several years for joint Japan-United States 
research and development of the experimental FSX fighter plane, 
disputes over this project were believed to have convinced the 
Defense Agency to strengthen the capability of the domestic arms 
industry and increase its share of SDF contracts. After originally 
being cut, funds were also restored for thirty advanced model tanks 
and the last Aegis multiple-targeting-equipped destroyer escort 
needed to complete the Mid-Term Defense Estimate. The 6. 1 per- 
cent defense increase was accompanied by an even larger (8.2 per- 
cent) increase in Official Development Assistance funding. 

Officials resisted United States pressure to agree formally that 
Japan would support more of the cost of maintaining United States 
troops, claiming that such a move would require revision of agree- 
ments between the two nations. But in FY 1989 the Japanese 
government contributed US$2.4 billion — roughly 40 percent — of 
the total cost. The contribution slated for FY 1990 was increased 
to US$2.8 billion — nearly 10 percent of the total defense budget — 
and by the end of FY 1 990 the Japanese government expected to 
assume all expenses for utilities and building maintenance costs 
for United States troops stationed in Japan. 

The Defense Industry 

Dismantled by occupation authorities after World War II, ar- 
maments production resumed in 1952 when the nation's manufac- 
turers began repairing and maintaining equipment for United States 
forces operating in Asia. Individual producers emerged as affiliates 



451 



Japan: A Country Study 

of larger industrial conglomerates, including the former zaibatsu 
(see Glossary) of Mitsubishi and Sumitomo. After 1954 the defense 
industry began to arm the SDF, at first making only slight improve- 
ments on United States-designed equipment manufactured for local 
use. The Japanese defense industry received about US$10 billion 
worth of advanced technology from the United States between 1950 
and 1983. 

In July 1970, Defense Agency Director General Nakasone Yasu- 
hiro established five objectives for the defense industry: to main- 
tain Japan's industrial base for national security, to acquire 
equipment from Japan's domestic research and development and 
production efforts, to use civilian industries for domestic arms 
production, to set long-term goals for research and development 
and production, and to introduce competition into defense produc- 
tion. By the late 1970s, indigenous suppliers had developed and 
produced an almost complete range of modern equipment, includ- 
ing aircraft, tanks, artillery, and major surface and underwater 
naval combatants. Certain types of highly sophisticated weaponry, 
including F-15 fighters, P-3C Orion antisubmarine aircraft, and 
8-inch howitzers, were produced under license. Except for the most 
complex and costiy items, such as the E-2C airborne early-warning 
aircraft, little was purchased complete from foreign suppliers. 

Over 25 percent of the ¥18.4 trillion Mid-Term Defense Esti- 
mate for FY 1986 through 1990 was allocated for equipment 
procurement, most of it domestically produced; but the most lucra- 
tive defense contract was for the FSX. Envisioned as a successor 
to the F-l support fighter in the ASDF inventory, the FSX was 
expected to take ten years to develop at an estimated cost of ¥200 
billion. In October 1985, the Defense Agency began by consider- 
ing three development options for the FSX: domestic development, 
adoption of an existing domestic model, or adoption of a foreign 
model. The agency originally favored domestic development. But 
by late 1986, after consultation and much pressure from the United 
States, it decided to consider a coproduction agreement with the 
United States. And in October 1987, Japanese and United States 
defense officials meeting in Washington decided on a joint project 
to remodel either the F-15 or the F-l 6. The Defense Agency se- 
lected the F-16. Once the agreement was reached, it came under 
heavy criticism from members of the United States Congress 
concerned about loss of key United States technologies and tech- 
nological leadership, risks of Japanese commercialization of tech- 
nology at United States expense, and insufficient work share for 
American firms. As a result of the controversy, in early 1989 the 
United States demanded and obtained a review and revision of the 



452 




F-15J interceptor at airbase in Fukuoka Prefecture 
Courtesy Asahi Shimbun 

agreement, restricting technology transfer and specifying that 
American firms would receive 40 percent of the work. The con- 
troversy left bitterness on both sides, and Japanese industrialists, 
convinced that a Japanese-designed and Japanese-developed FSX 
would be superior to a modified F-16 codeveloped by Japan and 
the United States and irritated at United States pressure to renego- 
tiate an agreement they considered already favorable to the United 
States, seemed in 1990 to be inclined to go it alone on future 
weapons research. 

In the late 1980s, the defense industry, limited by the lack of 
research and development, inadequate testing equipment, restricted 
exports, and no economies of scale, accounted for only 0.5 per- 
cent of Japan's total industrial output. The Defense Production 
Committee of the Federation of Economic Organizations (Keizai 
Dantai Rengokai — Keidanren) was an important element in defense 
production, negotiating with the Defense Agency and coordinat- 
ing activities among defense firms. Keidanren disseminated defense 
information and informally limited competition by promoting agree- 
ments between companies. Nearly 60 percent of Japanese defense 
contracts were awarded to five large corporations: Mitsubishi Heavy 
Industries, Toshiba Corporation, Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, 
Kawasaki Heavy Industries, and Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy 
Industries Corporation. Competition for contracts nonetheless in- 
tensified in the 1980s, as larger portions of the defense budget were 
allotted to procurement. But for the Japanese defense industry to 
become efficient it had to depend on economies of scale that could 
only be achieved through export. Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy 
Industries indicated an interest in the arms export market when 
it changed its articles of incorporation to include arms in its list 
of products in June 1987 and later asked that weapons export 



453 



Japan: A Country Study 



restrictions be eased during the 1990s. A secret memorandum cir- 
culating among defense contractors in 1988 estimated that lifting 
the export ban (that existed by general interpretation of Article 9 
of the Constitution) would result in Japan's capturing 45 percent 
of the world tank and self-propelled artillery market, 40 percent 
of military electronic sales, and 60 percent of naval ship construc- 
tion. In 1989 a Keidanren committee headed by Kanamori Masao, 
chairman of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, called for increasing 
defense research and development to 5 percent of the total defense 
budget. The FY 1990 defense budget allotted approximately 2 per- 
cent for this purpose. In the 1990s, Japanese corporations might 
be expected to market mainly dual-use electronics subcomponents, 
vehicles, and transport and communications equipment offshore 
or through front companies and to provide components for mis- 
siles and aircraft produced overseas, especially in the United States. 

Military Relations with the United States 

The 1952 Mutual Security Assistance Pact provided the initial 
basis for the nation's security relations with the United States (see 
World War II and the Occupation, 1941-52, ch. 1; Relations with 
the United States, ch. 7). The pact was replaced in 1960 by the 
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, which declares that 
both nations will maintain and develop their capacities to resist 
armed attack in common and that each recognizes that an armed 
attack on either one in territories administered by Japan will be 
considered dangerous to the safety of the other. The Agreed Minutes 
to the treaty specified that the Japanese government must be con- 
sulted prior to major changes in United States force deployment 
in Japan or to the use of Japanese bases for combat operations other 
than in defense of Japan itself. However, Japan was relieved by 
its constitutional prohibition of participating in external military 
operations from any obligation to defend the United States if it 
were attacked outside of Japanese territories. In 1990 the Japanese 
government expressed its intention to continue to rely on the treaty's 
arrangements to guarantee national security. 

The Agreed Minutes under Article 6 of the 1 960 treaty contain 
a status-of-forces agreement on the stationing of United States forces 
in Japan, with specifics on the provision of facilities and areas for 
their use and on the administration of Japanese citizens employed 
on the facilities. Also covered are the limits of the two countries' 
jurisdictions over crimes committed in Japan by United States mili- 
tary personnel. 

The Mutual Security Assistance Pact of 1952 initially involved 
a military aid program that provided for Japan's acquisition of 



454 



National Security 



funds, materiel, and services for the nation's essential defense. 
Although Japan no longer received any aid from the United States 
by the 1960s, the agreement continued to serve as the basis for pur- 
chase and licensing agreements assuring interoperability of the two 
nations' weapons and for the release of classified data to Japan, 
including both international intelligence reports and classified tech- 
nical information. 

A major issue for military relations between the two nations was 
resolved in 1972 when the Ryukyu Islands, including Okinawa, 
reverted to Japanese control, and the provisions of the 1960 secu- 
rity treaty were extended to cover them. The United States retained 
the right to station forces in these islands. In 1990, 30,000 United 
States troops still occupied 20 percent of Okinawa's land, a source 
of friction with the local population. Military relations improved 
after the mid-1970s. In the early 1960s, a Security Consultative 
Committee, with representatives from both countries, had been 
set up under the 1960 security treaty to discuss and coordinate secu- 
rity matters concerning both nations. In 1976 a subcommittee of 
that body prepared the Guidelines for Japan-United States Defense 
Cooperation that were approved by the full committee in 1978 and 
later approved by the National Defense Council and cabinet. The 
guidelines authorized unprecedented activities in joint defense plan- 
ning, response to an armed attack on Japan, and for cooperation 
on situations in Asia and the Pacific region that could affect Japan's 
security. 

Under the framework of the guidelines, the Japanese Joint Staff 
Council and the commander of United States Forces, Japan, drew 
up a long-range program for joint exercises to encompass all three 
services of both nations. Every year during the 1980s, the GSDF 
conducted command post and field-training exercises involving units 
from each of the regional armies in combined training with United 
States forces. Although the MSDF had participated in exercises 
with the United States Navy since 1955, in 1980 Japan, in an un- 
precedented move, permitted a task force of ships and aircraft to 
train in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) comprehensive naval 
exercise with naval forces from the United States, Australia, Can- 
ada, and New Zealand. Japan also participated in RIMPAC '88 
with eight destroyers and frigates, one submarine, eight P-3C anti- 
submarine aircraft, and one supply ship. The ASDF also conducted 
numerous air defense, fighter, rescue, and command post train- 
ing exercises with United States Air Force units. 

In 1990 over 50,000 members of the United States armed forces 
were stationed in Japan, including almost 24,000 marines, 16,200 
air force personnel, 8,100 members of the navy, and 2,400 army 



455 



Japan: A Country Study 

personnel, who were deployed at several locations on Honshu, 
Kyushu, and Okinawa. These numbers represented a substantial 
increase — more than 10 percent — over 1980 figures, but the number 
of United States troops maintained on Japanese soil was expected 
to be reduced to the 1980 level by 1993. 

Public Order and Internal Security 

Conditions of public order in 1990 compared favorably with those 
in other industrialized countries. The overall crime rate was low 
by North American and West European standards and had shown 
a general decline since the mid-1960s. The incidence of violent crime 
was especially low, owing in part to effective enforcement of strin- 
gent firearms control laws. Problems of particular concern were 
those associated with a modern industralized nation, including 
juvenile delinquency, traffic control, and white-collar crime. 

Civil disorders occurred from the early 1950s, chiefly in Tokyo, 
but did not seriously threaten the internal security of the state. Far 
less frequent after the early 1970s, they were in all cases effectively 
countered by efficient and well-trained police units employing the 
most sophisticated techniques of riot control. 

In 1990 the police were an apolitical body under the general su- 
pervision of independent agencies, free of direct central govern- 
ment executive control. They were checked by an independent 
judiciary and monitored by a free and active press. The police were 
generally well respected and could rely on considerable public 
cooperation in their work. 

Officials involved in the criminal justice system were usually 
highly trained professionals interested in preventing crime and re- 
habilitating offenders. They were allowed considerable discretion 
in dealing with legal infractions and in 1 990 appeared to deserve 
the trust and respect accorded to them by the general public. Con- 
stitutionally guaranteed rights of habeas corpus, protection against 
self-incrimination, and the inadmissability of confessions obtained 
under duress were enforced by criminal procedures. 

The prison system in 1990 was generally modern and conducted 
from the viewpoint of resocialization. Prisoners were treated on 
an individualized basis, and education was emphasized. Special 
attention was given to juvenile offenders who were normally housed 
separately from adult prisoners. A well-organized parole and pro- 
bation program employed numerous citizen volunteers. 

The Police System 

The Japanese government established a European- style civil 
police system in 1874, under the centralized control of the Police 



456 



National Security 



Bureau within the Home Ministry, to put down internal distur- 
bances and maintain order during the Meiji Restoration. By the 
1880s, the police had developed as a nationwide instrument of 
government control, providing support for local leaders and en- 
forcing public morality. They acted as general civil administrators, 
implementing official policies, and thereby facilitating unification 
and modernization. In rural areas especially, the police had great 
authority and were accorded the same mixture of fear and respect 
as the village head. Their increasing involvement in political af- 
fairs was one of the foundations of the authoritarian state in Japan 
in the first half of the twentieth century. 

The centralized police system steadily acquired responsibilities, 
until it controlled almost all aspects of daily life, including fire 
prevention and mediation of labor disputes. The system regulated 
public health, business, factories, and construction, and issued per- 
mits and licenses. The Peace Preservation Law of 1925 gave police 
the authority to arrest people for ' 'wrong thoughts. ' ' Special Higher 
Police were created to regulate motion pictures, political meetings, 
and election campaigns. Military police operating under the army 
and navy and the justice and home ministries aided the civilian 
police in limiting proscribed political activity. After the Manchu- 
rian Incident of 1931 , military police assumed more authority, lead- 
ing to friction with their civilian counterparts (see World War II, 
this ch.). After 1937 police directed business activities for the war 
effort, mobilized labor, and controlled transportation. 

After Japan's surrender in 1945, occupation authorities retained 
the prewar police structure until a new system was implemented 
and the Diet passed the 1947 Police Law. Contrary to Japanese 
proposals for a strong, centralized force to deal with postwar un- 
rest, the police system was decentralized. About 1,600 indepen- 
dent municipal forces were established in cities, towns, and villages 
with 5,000 inhabitants or more, and a National Rural Police was 
organized by prefecture. Civilian control was to be ensured by plac- 
ing the police under the jurisdiction of public safety commissions 
controlled by the National Public Safety Commission in the Office 
of the Prime Minister. The Home Ministry was abolished and 
replaced by the less powerful Ministry of Home Affairs, and the 
police were stripped of their responsibility for fire protection, public 
health, and other administrative duties. 

When most occupation forces were transferred to Korea in 
1950-51, the 75,000 strong National Police Reserve was formed 
to back up the ordinary police during civil disturbances, and pres- 
sure mounted for a centralized system more compatible with 
Japanese political preferences. The 1947 Police Law was amended 



457 



Japan: A Country Study 

in 1951 to allow the municipal police of smaller communities to 
merge with the National Rural Police. Most chose this arrange- 
ment, and by 1954 only about 400 cities, towns, and villages still 
had their own police forces. Under the 1954 amended Police Law, 
a final restructuring created an even more centralized system in 
which local forces were organized by prefectures under a National 
Police Agency. 

The revised Police Law of 1954, still in effect in 1990, preserved 
some strong points of the postwar system, particularly measures 
ensuring civilian control and political neutrality, while allowing 
for increased centralization. The National Public Safety Commis- 
sion system was retained. State responsibility for maintaining public 
order was clarified to include coordination of national and local 
efforts, centralization of police information, communications, and 
recordkeeping facilities, and national standards for training, uni- 
forms, pay, rank, and promotion. Rural and municipal forces were 
abolished and integrated into prefectural forces, which handled basic 
police matters. Officials and inspectors in various ministries and 
agencies continued to exercise special police functions assigned to 
them in the 1947 Police Law. 

National Organization 

In 1990 the mission of the National Public Safety Commission 
was to guarantee the neutrality of the police by insulating the force 
from political pressure and to ensure the maintenance of democratic 
methods in police administration. The commission's primary func- 
tion was to supervise the National Police Agency, and it had the 
authority to appoint or dismiss senior police officers (see fig. 15). 
The commission consisted of a chairman, who held the rank of 
minister of state, and five members appointed by the prime minister 
with the consent of both houses of the Diet. The commission oper- 
ated independently of the cabinet, but liaison and coordination with 
it were facilitated by the chairman's being a member of that body. 

As the central coordinating body for the entire police system, 
the National Police Agency determined general standards and poli- 
cies; detailed direction of operations was left to the lower echelons. 
In a national emergency or large-scale disaster, the agency was 
authorized to take command of prefectural police forces. In 1989 
the agency was composed of around 1,100 national civil servants, 
empowered to collect information and to formulate and execute 
national policies. The agency was headed by a commissioner gen- 
eral who was appointed by the National Public Safety Commis- 
sion with the approval of the prime minister. The central office 
included the Secretariat, with divisions for general operations, 



458 



National Security 



planning, information, finance, management, and procurement 
and distribution of police equipment, and five bureaus. The Police 
Administration Bureau was concerned with police personnel, edu- 
cation, welfare, training, and unit inspections. The Criminal In- 
vestigation Bureau was in charge of research statistics and the 
investigation of nationally important and international cases. This 
bureau's Safety Department was responsible for crime prevention, 
combating juvenile delinquency, and pollution control. In addi- 
tion, the Criminal Investigation Bureau surveyed, formulated, and 
recommended legislation on firearms, explosives, food, drugs, and 
narcotics. The Communications Bureau supervised police commu- 
nications systems. 

The Traffic Bureau licensed drivers, enforced traffic safety laws, 
and regulated traffic. Intensive traffic safety and driver education 
campaigns were run at both national and prefectural levels. The 
bureau's Expressway Division addressed special conditions of the 
nation's growing system of express highways. 

The Security Bureau formulated and supervised the execution 
of security policies. It conducted research on equipment and tac- 
tics for suppressing riots and oversaw and coordinated activities 
of the riot police. The Security Bureau was also responsible for 
security intelligence on foreigners and radical political groups, in- 
cluding investigation of violations of the Alien Registration Law 
and administration of the Entry and Exit Control Law. The bureau 
also implemented security policies during national emergencies and 
natural disasters. 

In 1990 the National Police Agency maintained seven regional 
police bureaus, each responsible for a number of prefectures. 
Metropolitan Tokyo and the island of Hokkaido were excluded from 
these regional jurisdictions and run more autonomously than other 
local forces, in the case of Tokyo, because of its special urban situ- 
ation, and of Hokkaido, because of its distinctive geography (see 
Geographic Regions, ch. 2). The National Police Agency main- 
tained police communications divisions in these two areas to han- 
dle any coordination needed between national and local forces. 

Local Organization 

In 1987 there were 223,000 police officers nationwide, most 
affiliated with local police forces. Local forces included forty- 
three prefectural {ken) police forces; one metropolitan (to) police 
force, in Tokyo; two urban prefectural (fit) police forces, in Osaka 
and Kyoto; and one district (do) police force, in Hokkaido. These 
forces had limited authority to initiate police actions. Their most 
important activities were regulated by the National Police Agency, 



459 



Japan: A Country Study 



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National Security 



which provided funds for equipment, salaries, riot, escort, and 
natural disaster duties, and internal security and multiple juris- 
diction cases. National police statutes and regulations established 
the strength and rank allocations of all local personnel and the 
locations of local police stations. Prefectural police financed and 
controlled the patrol officer on the beat, traffic control, criminal 
investigations, and other daily operations. 

Each prefectural police headquarters contained administrative 
divisions corresponding to those of the bureaus of the National 
Police Agency. Headquarters were staffed by specialists in basic 
police functions and administration and were commanded by an 
officer appointed by the local Office of the National Public Safety 
Commission. Most arrests and investigations were performed by 
prefectural police officials (and in large jurisdictions, by police as- 
signed to substations), who were assigned to one or more central 
locations within the prefecture. Experienced officers were organized 
into functional bureaus and handled all but the most ordinary 
problems in their fields. 

Below these stations, police boxes {koban) — substations near major 
transportation hubs and shopping areas and in residential 
districts — formed the first line of police response to the public. In 
the late 1980s, about 20 percent of the total police force was as- 
signed to koban. Staffed by three or more officers working in eight- 
hour shifts, they served as a base for foot patrols and usually had 
both sleeping and eating facilities for officers on duty but not on 
watch. In rural areas, residential offices usually were staffed by 
one police officer who resided in adjacent family quarters. These 
officers endeavored to become a part of the community, and their 
families often aided in performing official tasks. 

Officers assigned to koban had intimate knowledge of their juris- 
dictions. One of their primary tasks was to conduct twice-yearly 
house-by-house residential surveys of homes in their areas, at which 
time the head of the household at each address filled out a resi- 
dence information card detailing the names, ages, occupations, busi- 
ness addresses, and vehicle registration numbers of household 
occupants and the names of relatives living elsewhere. Police took 
special note of names of the aged or those living alone who might 
need special attention in an emergency. They conducted surveys 
of local businesses and recorded employee names and addresses, 
in addition to such data as which establishments stayed open late 
and which employees might be expected to work late. Participa- 
tion in the survey was voluntary, and most citizens cooperated, 
but in the late 1980s an increasing segment of the population had 
come to regard the surveys as invasions of privacy. 



461 



Japan: A Country Study 

Information elicited through the surveys was not centralized but 
was stored in each police box, where it was used primarily as an 
aid to locating people. When a crime occurred or an investigation 
was underway, however, these files were invaluable in establish- 
ing background data for a case. Specialists from district police sta- 
tions spent considerable time culling through the usually poorly 
filed data maintained in the police boxes. 

Riot Police 

Within their security divisions, each prefectural level police 
department and the Tokyo police maintained special riot units. 
These units were formed after riots at the Imperial Palace in 1952, 
to respond quickly and effectively to large public disturbances. They 
were also used in crowd control during festival periods, at times 
of natural disaster, and to reinforce regular police when necessary. 
Full-time riot police could also be augmented by regular police 
trained in riot duties. 

In handling demonstrations and violent disturbances, riot units 
were deployed en masse, military style. It was common practice 
for files of riot police to line streets through which demonstrations 
passed. If demonstrators grew disorderly or deviated from officially 
countenanced areas, riot police stood shoulder- to- shoulder, some- 
times three and four deep, to push with their hands to control the 
crowds. Individual action was forbidden. Three-person units some- 
times performed reconnaissance duties, but more often operations 
were carried out by squads of nine to eleven, platoons of twenty- 
seven to thirty- three, and companies of eighty to one hundred. Front 
ranks were trained to open to allow passage of special squads to 
rescue captured police or to engage in tear gas assaults. Each per- 
son wore a radio with an earpiece to hear commands given simul- 
taneously to the formation. 

The riot police were committed to using disciplined, nonlethal 
force and carried no firearms. They were trained to take pride in 
their poise under stress. Demonstrators also were usually restrained 
(see Civil Disturbances, this ch.). Police brutality was rarely an 
issue. When excesses occurred, the perpetrator was disciplined and 
sometimes transferred from the force if considered unable to keep 
his temper. 

Extensive experience in quelling violent disorders led to the de- 
velopment of special uniforms and equipment for the riot police 
units. In the 1980s, riot dress consisted of a field- type jacket, which 
covered several pieces of body armor and included a corselet hung 
from the waist, an aluminum plate down the backbone, and shoul- 
der pads. Armored gauntlets covered the hands and forearms. 



462 



National Security 



Helmets had faceplates and flared padded skirts down the back to 
protect the neck. In case of violence, the front ranks carried 
1 .2-meter shields to protect against staves and rocks and held nets 
on high poles to catch flying objects. Specially designed equipment 
included water cannons, armored vans, and mobile tunnels for pro- 
tected entry into seized buildings. 

Because riot police duties required special group action, units 
were maintained in virtually self-sufficient compounds and trained 
to work as a coordinated force. The overwhelming majority of 
officers were bachelors who lived in dormitories within riot police 
compounds. Training was constant and focused on physical 
conditioning, mock battles, and tactical problems. A military at- 
mosphere prevailed — dress codes, behavior standards, and rank 
differentiations were more strictly adhered to than in the regular 
police. Esprit de corps was inculcated with regular ceremonies and 
institutionalization of rituals such as applauding personnel dis- 
patched to or returning from assignments and formally welcom- 
ing senior officers to the mess hall at all meals. 

Riot duty was not popular because it entailed special sacrifices 
and much boredom in between irregularly spaced actions. Although 
many police were assigned riot duty, only a few were volunteers. 
For many personnel, riot duty served as a stepping stone because 
of its reputation and the opportunities it presented to study for the 
advanced police examinations necessary for promotion. Because 
riot duties demanded physical fitness — the armored uniform 
weighed 6.6 kilograms — most personnel were young, often serv- 
ing in the units after an initial assignment in a koban. 

Special Police 

In addition to regular police officers, there were several thou- 
sand officials attached to various agencies who performed special 
duties relating to public safety. They were responsible for such mat- 
ters as railroad security, forest preservation, narcotics control, fish- 
ery inspection, and enforcement of regulations on maritime, labor, 
and mine safety. 

In 1990, the largest and most important of these ministry- 
supervised public safety agencies was the Maritime Safety Agency, 
an external bureau of the Ministry of Transportation established 
to deal with crime in coastal waters and to maintain facilities for 
safeguarding navigation. The agency operated a fleet of patrol and 
rescue craft in addition to a few aircraft used primarily for anti- 
smuggling patrols and rescue activities. In the mid-1980s, the Mari- 
time Safety Agency annually rescued around 500 people and 
arrested another 500 for violations of fishing and smuggling laws. 



463 



Japan: A Country Study 

Other agencies with limited public safety functions included the 
Labor Standards Inspection Office of the Ministry of Labor, rail- 
road police of Japan Railways Group, immigration agents of the 
Ministry of Justice, postal inspectors of the Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications, and revenue inspectors in the Ministry of 
Finance. 

A small intelligence agency, the Public Security Investigation 
Office of the Ministry of Justice, handled national security mat- 
ters both inside and outside the country. Its activities were not 
generally known to the public. 

Police-Community Relations 

Despite legal limits on police jurisdiction, many citizens retained 
their views of the police as authority figures to whom they could 
turn for aid. The public often sought police assistance to settle fam- 
ily quarrels, counsel juveniles, and mediate minor disputes. Citizens 
regularly consulted police for directions to hotels and residences — an 
invaluable service in cities where streets were often unnamed and 
buildings were numbered in the order in which they had been built 
rather than consecutively. Police were encouraged by their superiors 
to view these tasks as answering the public's demands for service 
and as inspiring community confidence in the police. Public atti- 
tudes toward the police were generally favorable, although a se- 
ries of incidents of forced confessions in the late 1980s raised some 
concern about police treatment of suspects held for pretrial de- 
tention. 

Conditions of Service 

Education was highly stressed in police recruitment and promo- 
tion. Entrance to the force in the late 1980s was determined by ex- 
aminations administered by each prefecture. Examinees were divided 
into two groups: upper- secondary- school graduates and university 
graduates. In 1985 there were ten examinees with upper- secondary 
diplomas and six with university degrees for every job opening. 
Recruits underwent rigorous training — one year for upper-secon- 
dary-school graduates and six months for university graduates — at 
the residential police academy attached to the prefectural headquar- 
ters. On completion of basic training, most police officers were as- 
signed to local police boxes. Promotion was achieved by examination 
and required further course work. In-service training provided man- 
datory continuing education in more than 100 fields. Police officers 
with upper- secondary- school diplomas were eligible to take the ex- 
amination for sergeant after three years of on-the-job experience. 
University graduates could take the examination after only one year. 
University graduates were also eligible to take the examination for 



464 



Policewoman directing traffic 
in Tokyo 

Courtesy Asahi Shimbun 




assistant police inspector, police inspector, and superintendent after 
shorter periods than upper-secondary-school graduates. There were 
usually five to fifteen examinees for each opening. 

About fifteen officers per year passed advanced civil service ex- 
aminations and were admitted as senior officers. Officers were 
groomed for administrative positions and, although some rose 
through the ranks to become senior administrators, most such po- 
sitions were held by specially recruited senior executives. 

The police forces were subject to external oversight. Although 
officials of the National Public Safety Commission generally 
deferred to police decisions and rarely exercised their powers to 
check police actions or operations, police were liable for civil and 
criminal prosecution, and the media actively publicized police mis- 
deeds. The Human Rights Bureau of the Ministry of Justice solic- 
ited and investigated complaints against public officials, including 
police, and prefectural legislatures could summon police chiefs for 
questioning. Social sanctions and peer pressure also constrained 
police behavior. As in other occupational groups in Japan, police 
officers developed an allegiance to their own group and a reluc- 
tance to offend its principles. 

The Criminal Justice System 

Three basic features of the nation's system of criminal justice 
characterized its operations in 1990. First, the institutions — police, 



465 



Japan: A Country Study 

government prosecutor's offices, courts, and correctional organs — 
maintained close and cooperative relations with each other, con- 
sulting frequently on how best to accomplish the shared goals of 
limiting and controlling crime. Second, citizens were encouraged 
to assist in maintaining public order and they participated exten- 
sively in crime prevention campaigns, apprehension of suspects, 
and offender rehabilitation programs. Finally, officials who ad- 
ministered criminal justice were allowed considerable discretion in 
dealing with offenders. 

Until the Meiji Restoration in 1868, the criminal justice system 
was controlled mainly by daimyo (see Rule of Shogun and Daimyo, 
ch. 1). Public officials, not laws, guided and constrained people 
to conform to moral norms. In accordance with the Confucian ideal, 
officials were to serve as models of behavior; the people, who lacked 
rights and had only obligations, were expected to obey. Such laws 
as did exist were transmitted through local military officials in the 
form of local domain laws. Specific enforcement varied from do- 
main to domain, and no formal penal codes existed. Justice was 
generally harsh, and severity depended upon one's status. Kin and 
neighbors could share blame for an offender's guilt: whole fami- 
lies and villages could be flogged or put to death for one member's 
transgression. 

After 1868 the justice system underwent rapid transformation. 
The first publicly promulgated legal codes, the Penal Code of 1880 
and the Code of Criminal Instruction of 1880, were based on French 
models. Offenses were specified, and set punishments were estab- 
lished for particular crimes. Both codes were innovative in that they 
treated all citizens as equals, provided for centralized administra- 
tion of criminal justice, and prohibited punishment by ex post facto 
law. Guilt was held to be personal; collective guilt and guilt by as- 
sociation were abolished. Offenses against the emperor were spelled 
out for the first time. 

Innovative aspects of the codes notwithstanding, certain provi- 
sions reflected traditional attitudes toward authority. The prose- 
cutor represented the state and sat with the judge on a raised 
platform — his position above the defendant and the defense coun- 
sel suggesting their relative status. Under a semi-inquisitorial sys- 
tem, primary responsibility for questioning witnesses lay with the 
judge, and defense counsel could question witnesses only through 
the judge. Cases were referred to trial only after a judge presided 
over a preliminary fact-finding investigation in which the suspect 
was not permitted counsel. Because in all trials available evidence 
had already convinced the court in a preliminary procedure, the 



466 



National Security 



defendant's legal presumption of innocence at trial was undermined 
and the legal recourse open to his counsel was further weakened. 

The Penal Code was substantially revised in 1907 to reflect the 
growing influence of German law in Japan, and the French prac- 
tice of classifying offenses into three types was eliminated. More 
importantly, where the old code had allowed very limited judicial 
discretion, the new one permitted the judge to apply a wide range 
of subjective factors in sentencing. 

After World War II, occupation authorities initiated reform of 
the Constitution and laws in general. Except for omitting offenses 
relating to war, the imperial family, and adultery, the 1947 Penal 
Code remains virtually identical to the 1907 version. The crimi- 
nal procedure code, however, was substantially revised to incor- 
porate rules guaranteeing the rights of the accused. The system 
became almost completely accusatorial, and the judge, although 
still able to question witnesses, decided a case on evidence presented 
by both sides. The preliminary investigative procedure was sup- 
pressed. The prosecutor and defense counsel sat on equal levels, 
below the judge. Laws on indemnification of the wrongly accused, 
juveniles, prisons, probation, and minor offenses were also passed 
in the postwar years to supplement criminal justice administration. 

Crime 

The National Police Agency divided crime into six main cate- 
gories. Felonious offenses — the most serious and carrying the stiffest 
penalties — included murder and conspiracy to murder, robbery, 
rape, and arson. Violent offenses consisted of unlawful assembly 
while possessing dangerous weapons, simple and aggravated as- 
sault, extortion, and intimidation. Larceny encompassed burglary, 
vehicle theft, and shoplifting. Crimes classified as intellectual in- 
cluded fraud, embezzlement, counterfeiting, forgery, bribery, and 
breach of trust. Moral offenses included gambling, indecent ex- 
posure, and the distribution of obscene literature. Miscellaneous 
offenses frequently involved the obstruction of official duties, negli- 
gence with fire, unauthorized entry, negligent homicide or injury 
(often in traffic accidents), possession of stolen property, and de- 
struction of property. Special laws defined other criminal offenses, 
among them prostitution, illegal possession of swords and firearms, 
customs violations, and possession of controlled substances including 
narcotics and marijuana. 

In 1986 the police identified over 2.1 million Penal Code viola- 
tions. Two types of violations — larceny (64.7 percent of total vio- 
lations) and negligent homicide or injury as a result of accidents 
(25.6 percent) — accounted for over 90 percent of criminal offenses 



467 



Japan: A Country Study 

in Japan in 1986. Major crimes occurred in Japan at a very low 
rate. Japan experienced 1 .6 robberies per 100,000 population, com- 
pared with 46.8 for West Germany, 60.1 for Britain, and 225.1 
for the United States; and 1.4 murders per 100,000 population, 
compared with 4.5 for West Germany, 4.3 for Britain, and 8.6 
for the United States. Japanese authorities also solved a high per- 
centage of robbery cases (78.5 percent compared with 48.4 per- 
cent for West Germany, 20.4 percent for Britain, and 24.7 percent 
for the United States) and homicide cases (96.7 percent compared 
with 93.9 percent for West Germany, 76.7 percent for Britain, and 
70.2 percent for the United States). 

An important factor keeping crime low was the traditional em- 
phasis on the individual as a member of groups to which he or she 
must not bring shame. Within these groups — family, friends, as- 
sociates at work or school — a Japanese had social rights and obli- 
gations, derived valued emotional support, and met powerful 
expectations to conform. In 1990 these informal social sanctions 
continued to display remarkable potency despite competing values 
in a changing society. Other important factors keeping the crime 
rate low were the prosperous economy and a strict and effective 
weapons control law. Ownership of handguns was forbidden to the 
public, hunting rifles and ceremonial swords were registered with 
the police, and the manufacture and sale of firearms were regu- 
lated. The production and sale of live and blank ammunition were 
also controlled, as were the transportation and importation of all 
weapons. In the late 1980s, crimes were seldom committed with 
firearms. 

Despite Japan's status as a modern, urban nation — a condition 
linked by many criminologists to growing rates of crime — the na- 
tion did not suffer from steadily rising levels of criminal activity. 
Although crime continued to be higher in urban areas, in the 1980s 
rates of crime remained relatively constant nationwide, and rates 
of violent crime continued to decrease. 

The nation was not problem-free, however; of particular con- 
cern to the police were crimes associated with modernization. In- 
creased wealth and technological sophistication brought new 
white-collar crimes, such as computer and credit card fraud, larceny 
involving coin dispensers, and insurance falsification. Incidence 
of drug abuse was minuscule compared with other industrialized 
nations and limited mainly to stimulants. Japanese law enforce- 
ment authorities endeavored to control this problem by extensive 
coordination with international investigative organizations and 
stringent punishment of Japanese and foreign offenders. Traffic 



468 



National Security 



accidents and fatalities in the late 1980s continued to consume sub- 
stantial law enforcement resources. 

Juvenile delinquency, although not nearly as serious as in most 
industrialized nations, was a great concern to authorities. In 1986 
over 46 percent of persons arrested for criminal offenses (other than 
negligent homicide or injuries) were juveniles. Over 75 percent of 
the juveniles arrested were charged with larceny, mainly shoplift- 
ing and theft of motorcycles and bicycles. The failure of the Japanese 
education system to address the concerns of nonuniversity-bound 
students was cited as an important factor in the rise of juvenile crime 
(see Primary and Secondary Education, ch. 3). 

Yakuza (underworld) groups were estimated to number more than 
3,100 and together contained almost 86,000 members. Although 
concentrated in the largest urban prefectures, yakuza operated in 
most cities and often received protection from high-ranking offi- 
cials in exchange for their assistance in keeping the crime rate low 
by discouraging criminals operating individually or in small groups. 
Following concerted police pressure in the 1960s, smaller gangs 
either disappeared or began to consolidate in syndicate-type or- 
ganizations. In 1986 three large syndicates dominated underworld 
crime in the nation and controlled more than 1,000 gangs and 
29,000 gangsters. 

Yakuza had existed in Japan well before the 1800s and followed 
codes based on bushido. Their early operations were usually close- 
knit, and the leader and gang members had father- son relation- 
ships. Although this traditional arrangement continued to exist, 
yakuza activities were increasingly replaced by modern types of gangs 
that depended on force and money as organizing concepts. Nonethe- 
less, yakuza often pictured themselves as saviors of traditional 
Japanese virtues in a postwar society, sometimes forming ties with 
right-wing groups espousing the same views and attracting dissatis- 
fied youths to their ranks. 

Civil Disturbances 

The public and government appeared to tolerate certain forms 
of public disorder as inherent to a properly functioning democracy. 
Demonstrations usually followed established forms. Groups received 
legal permits and kept to assigned routes and areas. Placards and 
bullhorns were used to express positions. Traffic was sometimes 
disrupted, and occasional shoving battles between police and pro- 
testers resulted. But arrests were rare and generally made only in 
cases involving violence. 

Political extremists have not hesitated to use violence and were 
held responsible for bombings in connection with popular causes. 



469 



Japan: A Country Study 

In January 1990 the mayor of Nagasaki was shot by a member 
of the right-wing Seikijuku (Sane Thinkers School), presumably 
for a statement he had made that was perceived as critical of the 
late Emperor Hirohito. That attack came two days after the left- 
wing Chukakuha (Middle Core Faction), opposed to the imperial 
system, claimed responsibility for firing a rocket onto the grounds 
of the residence of the late emperor's brother and a day before the 
government announced the events leading to the enthronement of 
Emperor Akihito in November 1990. The enthronement ceremonies 
were considered likely targets for extremist groups on the left and 
the right who saw the mysticism surrounding the emperor as being 
overemphasized or excessively reduced, respectively. Although 
membership in these groups represented only a minute portion of 
the population and presented no serious threat to the government, 
authorities were concerned about the example set by the groups' 
violence, as well as by the particular violent events. Violent pro- 
test by radicals also occurred in the name of causes apparently iso- 
lated from public sentiments. Occasional clashes between leftist 
factions and between leftists and rightists have injured both par- 
ticipants and bystanders. Security in the early 1990s remained heavy 
at New Tokyo International Airport at Narita-Sanrizuka in Chiba 
Prefecture, the scene of violent protests in the 1970s by radical 
groups supporting local farmers opposed to expropriation of their 
land. 

The most notorious extremists were the Japanese Red Army, 
a Marxist terrorist group (see Political Extremists, ch. 6). This 
group was responsible for an attack on Lod International Airport 
in Tel Aviv, Israel, in support of the Popular Front for the Liber- 
ation of Palestine in 1972. It participated in an attack on a Shell 
Oil refinery in Singapore in 1974 and seized the French embassy 
in The Hague that same year and the United States and Swedish 
embassies in Kuala Lumpur in 1975. In 1977 the Japanese Red 
Army hijacked a Japan Airlines jet over India in a successful de- 
mand for a US$6 million ransom and the release of six inmates 
in Japanese prisons. Following heavy criticism at home and abroad 
for the government's "caving in" to terrorists' demands, the 
authorities announced their intention to recall and reissue approx- 
imately 5.6 million valid Japanese passports to make hijacking more 
difficult. A special police unit was formed to keep track of the ter- 
rorist group, and tight airport security measures were instigated. 
Despite issuing regular threats, the Japanese Red Army was rela- 
tively inactive in the 1980s. In 1990 its members were reported 
to be in North Korea and Lebanon undergoing further training 
and available as mercenaries to promote various political causes. 



470 



National Security 



Criminal Procedure 

In 1990 the nation's criminal justice officials followed specified 
legal procedures in dealing with offenders. Once a suspect was ar- 
rested by national or prefectural police, the case was turned over 
to attorneys in the Supreme Public Prosecutors Office, who were 
the government's sole agents in prosecuting lawbreakers. Although 
under Ministry of Justice's administration, these officials worked 
under Supreme Court rules and were career civil servants who could 
be removed from office only for incompetence or impropriety. 
Prosecutors presented the government's case before judges in the 
Supreme Court and the four types of lower courts: high courts, 
district courts, summary courts, and family courts. Penal and pro- 
bation officials administered programs for convicted offenders under 
the direction of public prosecutors (see The Judicial System, ch. 6). 

After identifying a suspect, police had the authority to exercise 
some discretion in determining the next step. If, in cases pertain- 
ing to theft, the amount was small or already returned, the offense 
petty, the victim unwilling to press charges, the act accidental, or 
the likelihood of a repetition not great, the police could either drop 
the case or turn it over to a prosecutor. Reflecting the belief that 
appropriate remedies were sometimes best found outside the for- 
mal criminal justice mechanisms, in 1987 approximately 49 per- 
cent of criminal cases were not sent to the prosecutor. 

Police also exercised wide discretion in matters concerning 
juveniles. Police were instructed by law to identify and counsel 
minors who appeared likely to commit crimes, and they could refer 
juvenile offenders and nonoffenders alike to child guidance centers 
to be treated on an outpatient basis. Police could also assign 
juveniles or those considered to be harming the welfare of juveniles 
to special family courts. These courts were established in 1949 in 
the belief that the adjustment of a family's situation was sometimes 
required to protect children and prevent juvenile delinquency. Fam- 
ily courts were run in closed sessions, tried juvenile offenders under 
special laws, and operated extensive probationary guidance pro- 
grams. Young people between the ages of fourteen and twenty 
could, at the judgment of police, be sent to the public prosecutor 
for possible trial as adults before a judge under the general crimi- 
nal law. 

Safeguards protected the suspects' rights. Police had to secure 
warrants to search for or seize evidence. A warrant was also neces- 
sary for an arrest, although if the crime were very serious or the 
perpetrator likely to flee, it could be obtained immediately after 
arrest. Within forty-eight hours after placing a suspect under 



471 



Japan: A Country Study 



detention, the police had to present their case before a prosecutor, 
who was then required to apprise the accused of the charges and 
of the right to counsel. Within another twenty-four hours, the prose- 
cutor had to go before a judge and present a case to obtain a de- 
tention order. Suspects could be held for ten days (extensions were 
granted in special cases), pending an investigation and a decision 
whether or not to prosecute. In the 1980s, some suspects were 
reported to have been mistreated during this detention to exact a 
confession. 

Prosecution could be denied on the grounds of insufficient evi- 
dence or on the prosecutor's judgment. Under Article 248 of the 
Code of Criminal Procedures, the prosecutor, after weighing the 
offender's age, character, and environment, the circumstances and 
gravity of the crime, and the accused's rehabilitative potential, did 
not have to institute public action, but could deny or suspend and 
ultimately drop the charges after a probationary period. Because 
the investigation and disposition of a case could occur behind closed 
doors and the identity of an accused person who was not prose- 
cuted was rarely made public, an offender could successfully reenter 
society and be rehabilitated under probationary status without the 
stigma of a criminal conviction. 

Institutional safeguards checked the prosecutors' discretionary 
powers not to prosecute. Lay committees were established in con- 
junction with branch courts to hold inquests on a prosecutor's de- 
cisions. These committees met four times yearly and could order 
that a case be reinvestigated and prosecuted. Victims or interested 
parties could also appeal a decision not to prosecute. 

Most offenses were tried first in district courts before one or three 
judges, depending on the severity of the case. Defendants were pro- 
tected from self-incrimination, forced confession, and unrestricted 
admission of hearsay evidence. In addition, defendants had the right 
to counsel, public trial, and cross-examination. Trial by jury was 
authorized by the 1923 Jury Law but was suspended in 1943. It 
had not been reinstated as of 1990, chiefly owing to defendants' 
distrust of jurors, who were believed to be emotional and easily 
influenced, and the generally greater public confidence in the com- 
petence of judges. 

The judge conducted the trial and was authorized to question 
witnesses, independently call for evidence, decide guilt, and affix 
a sentence. The judge could also suspend any sentence or place 
a convicted party on probation. Should a judgment of not guilty 
be rendered, the accused was entitled to compensation by the state 
based on the number of days spent in detention. 



472 



National Security 



Criminal cases from summary courts, family courts, and dis- 
trict courts could be appealed to the high courts by both the prose- 
cution and the defense. Criminal appeal to the Supreme Court was 
limited to constitutional questions and a conflict of precedent be- 
tween the Supreme Court and high courts. 

The criminal code set minimum and maximum sentences for 
offenses to allow for the varying circumstances of each crime and 
criminal. Penalties ranged from fines and short-term incarceration 
to compulsory labor and the death penalty. Heavier penalties were 
meted out to repeat offenders. Capital punishment consisted of 
death by hanging and could be imposed on those convicted of lead- 
ing an insurrection, inducing or aiding foreign armed aggression, 
arson, or homicide. 

The Penal System 

Prisons, in existence in some feudal domains as early as the late 
sixteenth century, originally functioned to hold people for trial or 
prior to execution. Because of the costs and difficulties involved 
in long-term incarceration and the prevailing standards of justice 
that called for sentences of death or exile for serious crimes, life 
imprisonment was rare. Facilities were used sometimes for shorter 
confinement. Prisoners were treated according to their social sta- 
tus and housed in barracks-like quarters (see Seclusion and Social 
Control, ch. 1). In some cases the position of prison officer was 
hereditary, and staff vacancies were filled by relatives. 

During the Meiji period (1868-1912), the country adopted 
Western-style penology along with systems of law and legal adminis- 
tration. In 1888 an aftercare hostel (halfway house) was opened 
for released prisoners. Staffed mainly by volunteers, this institu- 
tion helped ex-convicts reenter society. Many ex-convicts had been 
ostracized by their families for the shame they had incurred and 
had literally nowhere to go. The Prison Law of 1908 provided basic 
rules and regulations for prison administration, stipulating separate 
facilities for those sentenced to confinement with and without labor, 
and for those detained for trial and short sentences. 

The Juvenile Law of 1922 established administrative organs to 
handle offenders under the age of eighteen and recognized volun- 
teer workers officially as the major forces in the community-based 
treatment of juveniles. After World War II juvenile laws were re- 
vised to extend their jurisdiction to those under the age of twenty. 
Volunteer workers were reorganized under a new law and in 1990 
remained an indispensable part of the rehabilitation system. 

The Correctional Bureau of the Ministry of Justice administered 
the adult prison system as well as the juvenile correctional system 



473 



Japan: A Country Study 

and three women's guidance homes (to rehabilitate prostitutes). 
The ministry's Rehabilitation Bureau operated the probation and 
parole systems. Prison personnel were trained at an institute in 
Tokyo and in branch training institutes in each of the eight regional 
correctional headquarters under the Correctional Bureau. Profes- 
sional probation officers studied at the Legal Training and Research 
Institute of the Ministry of Justice. 

In the late 1980s, Japan's prison population stood at somewhat 
more than 55,000 (about 44 per 100,000 general population), nearly 
9,000 in short-term detention centers, the remaining 46,000 in pri- 
sons. Approximately 45 percent were repeat offenders. The United 
States during that period had a prison population of approximately 
1 million (about 500 per 100,000 general population) with nearly 
90 percent repeat offenders. While the high recidivism in the United 
States prison system was blamed on its failure to reform offenders, 
Japanese recidivism was attributed mainly to the discretionary pow- 
ers of police, prosecutors, and courts, and the tendency to seek 
alternative sentences for first offenders. 

The penal system was intended to resocialize, reform, and re- 
habilitate offenders. On confinement, prisoners were first classi- 
fied according to sex, nationality, kind of penalty, length of 
sentence, degree of criminality, and state of physical and mental 
health. They were then placed in special programs designed to treat 
individual needs. Vocational and formal education were empha- 
sized, as was instruction in social values. Most convicts engaged 
in labor for which a small stipend was set aside for use on release. 
Under a system stressing incentives, prisoners were initially assigned 
to community cells, then earned better quarters and additional 
privileges based on their good behavior. 

Although a few juvenile offenders were handled under the general 
penal system, most were treated in separate juvenile training 
schools. More lenient than the penal institutions, these facilities 
provided correctional education and regular schooling for delin- 
quents under the age of twenty. 

According to the Ministry of Justice, the government's respon- 
sibility for social order did not end with imprisoning an offender, 
but also extended to aftercare treatment and to noninstitutional 
treatment to substitute for or supplement prison terms. A large 
number of those given suspended sentences were released to the 
supervision of volunteer officers under the guidance of professional 
probation officers. Adults were usually placed on probation for a 
fixed period and juveniles until they reached the age of twenty. 
Volunteers were also used in supervising parolees, though profes- 
sional probation officers generally supervised offenders considered 



474 



National Security 



to have a high risk of recidivism. Volunteers hailed from all walks 
of life and handled no more than five cases at one time. They were 
responsible for overseeing the offenders' conduct to prevent the 
occurrence of further offenses. Volunteer probation officers also 
offered guidance and assistance to the ex-convict in assuming a 
law-abiding place in the community. Although volunteers were 
sometimes criticized for being too old compared to their charges 
(more than 70 percent were retired, aged fifty-five or over) and 
so unable to understand the problems they faced, most authorities 
believed that the volunteers were critically important in the na- 
tion's criminal justice system. 

Public support and cooperation with law enforcement officials 
helped in holding down Japan's crime rate, with little or no threat 
to internal security. The external security threat in 1990 was also 
considerably reduced from previous years. The Japanese govern- 
ment was confident that diplomatic activity and a limited SDF, 
backed by United States treaty commitments, would be sufficient 
to deter any potential adversary. 

* * * 

The most comprehensive treatment of the SDF is available in 
Jieitai nenkan (Self-Defense Forces Yearbook), the annual white paper 
published by Defense Daily, and Defense of Japan, published by the 
Japanese Defense Agency. Other sources include James H. Buck's 
The Modern Japanese Military System, Harrison M. Holland's Managing 
Defense: Japan's Dilemma, and Malcolm Mcintosh's Japan Re-armed. 
The International Institute for Strategic Studies' annual, The Mili- 
tary Balance, provides current data on the size, budget, and equip- 
ment inventory of the armed forces. Reinhard Drifte's Arms 
Production in Japan gives insight into Japan's developing defense in- 
dustry. 

The Police of fapan, published by the National Police Agency, gives 
an excellent overview of the police system and Keisatsu hakusho (Police 
White Paper), published annually by the same agency, gives up- 
dated law enforcement information and crime figures. 

Journals such as Japan Quarterly [Tokyo], Far Eastern Economic 
Review [Hong Kong] , and Summaries of Selected Japanese Magazines 
(issued monthly by the United States Embassy in Tokyo) frequently 
cover issues in defense and internal security and public order. (For 
further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



475 



Appendix 



Table 

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 

2 Population Growth, Selected Years, 1920-2030 

3 Adherents of Religious Traditions, 1989 

4 Public Holidays and Festival Days 

5 Number of Schools and Students, 1989 

6 Enrollment in Special Classes in Compulsory Education, 1989 

7 Postsecondary Institutions and Enrollment, by Type of Insti- 

tution, 1988 

8 Combined Social and Education Facilities, 1987 

9 Average Age and Salary for Selected Positions, 1988 

10 Average Monthly Earnings by Firm Size, Selected Years, 

1960-87 

11 National Budget and Fiscal Investment and Loan Program, 

Fiscal Year (FY) 1990 

12 Personal Investment, 1989 

13 National Government and Affilliated Agencies' Budgets, 

Selected Years, 1960-88 

14 Labor Productivity and Wage Cost Indexes, 1977-87 

15 Work Status of the Population, 1985-88 

16 Foreign Nationals in the Technical and Skilled-Labor Work 

Force, Selected Groups, Selected Years, 1970-87 

17 Labor Force Over Fifty-Five Years of Age by Sex and Age, 

Selected Years, 1970-87 

18 Index of Labor Productivity for Selected Economic Sectors, 

Selected Years, 1960-87 

19 Energy Consumption, Fiscal Year (FY) 1986 and FY 1995 

20 High-Technology Sector Developments, 1987 

21 Inland Freight Transportation by Sector and Volume, 1960 

and 1987 

22 Passenger Transportation by Sector and Volume, 1970 and 

1987 

23 Self- Sufficiency Rates for Agricultural Products, Selected 

Years, 1975-87 

24 Merchandise Exports, Imports, Trade Balance, and Annual 

Rate of Export Growth, 1960-88 

25 Exports by Commodity, Selected Years, 1960-88 

26 Imports by Commodity, Selected Years, 1960-88 

27 Composition of Imports, Selected Years, 1960-88 



477 



Japan: A Country Study 

28 Composition of Exports, Selected Years, 1960-88 

29 Balance of Payments, Capital Flows, Official Settlements, and 

Foreign Exchange Reserves, 1961-88 

30 External Assets and Liabilities, Selected Years, 1976-88 

31 Geographical Distribution of Cumulative Direct Investment, 

Selected Years, 1970-88 

32 Exchange Rate Between Yen and United States Dollar, 1970- 

90 

33 Trade Balance with Selected Countries, Selected Years, 1960- 

88 

34 Exports to Selected Countries, Selected Years, 1960-88 

35 Imports from Selected Countries, Selected Years, 1960-88 

36 Candidates Elected to House of Councillors by Party, Elec- 

tions, 1956-89 

37 Candidates, Elected to House of Representatives by Party, 

Elections 1958-90 

38 Order of Battle for Self-Defense Forces, 1989 

39 Major Ground Self-Defense Force Equipment, 1989 

40 Major Maritime Self-Defense Force Equipment, 1989 

41 Major Air Self-Defense Force Equipment, 1989 



478 



Appendix 



lable 1. 


Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 


When you know 


Multiply by 


To find 


Millimeters 


0.04 


inches 




39 


inches 




3.3 


feet 


Kilometers 


0.62 


miles 


Hectares (10,000 m 2 ) 


2.47 


acres 




0.39 


square miles 


Cubic meters 


35.3 


cubic feet 




0.26 


gallons 




2.2 


pounds 




0.98 


long tons 




1.1 


short tons 




2,204 


pounds 




9 


degrees Fahrenheit 


(Centigrade) 


divide by 5 






and add 32 





Table 2. Population Growth, Selected Years, 1920-2030 * 
(in thousands) 



Total Population Percentage 

Year Population 65 and Over 65 and Over 



1920 55,963 2,941 5.3 

1930 64,450 3,064 4.8 

1950 83,200 4,109 4.9 

1960 93,419 5,350 5.7 

1970 103,720 7,331 7.1 

1980 117,060 10,647 9.1 

1987 122,264 13,322 10.9 

1990 . 124,225 14,819 11.9 

2000 131,192 21,338 16.3 

2010 135,823 27,104 20.0 

2020 135,304 31,880 23.6 

2030 134,067 31,001 23.1 



* As projected by Management and Coordination Agency. 

Source: Based on information from Japan, Management and Coordination Agency, Statistics 
Bureau, Nihon tokei nenkan, Showa 63 (Japan Statistical Yearbook, 1988), Tokyo, 
1989, 25, 38. 



479 



Japan: A Country Study 



Table 3. Adherents of Religious Traditions, 1989 



Religion Branch Adherents * 



Shinto 

Shrine Shinto 86,585,845 

Sect Shinto 5,146,574 

Shinto-oriented new religions 3,000,344 

Total Shinto 94,732,763 

Buddhist 

Nichiren Shoshu 35,541,430 

Jodo 20,441,569 

Shingon 15,607,203 

Zen 9,523,505 

Tendai 3,079,357 

Nara sects 2,397,251 

Other 78,370 

Total Buddhist 86,668,685 

Christian 

New sects 484,868 

Old sects 410,692 

Total Christian 895,560 



* Many people observe both Shinto and Buddhist rites. 

Source: Based on information from Shukyo nenkan, Showa 63 (Religion Yearbook, 1988), 
Tokyo, 1989, 32-135. 



480 



Appendix 



Table 4. Public Holidays and Festival Days 



Holiday 



Date 



New Year's Day 1 January 1 

First Writing Day January 2 

First Business Day January 4 

Day of Mankind Janaury 7 

Adults' Day 1 January 15 

Bean-Scattering Ceremony February 3 or 4 

Risshun 2 February 4 or 5 

Needle Memorial Service February 8 

National Foundation Day 1 February 11 

Doll Festival March 3 

Spring higan 3 March 17-24 

Vernal Equinox Day 1 March 21 or 22 

Flower Festival April 8 

Eighty-Eighth Night 4 May 2 or 3 

Constitution Memorial Day 1 May 3 

Children's Day 1 May 5 

Summer Solstice Day June 21 or 22 

Tanabata Festival 5 July 7 

Bon Festival July 13-15 

210th Day 6 September 1 

Chrysanthemum Festival September 9 

Respect for the Aged Day 1 September 15 

Autumn higan 3 September 17-20 

Autumnal Equinox Day 1 September 23 or 24 

Moon- Viewing Night Night of full moon 

Sports Day 1 October 10 

Culture Day 1 November 3 

Seven-Five-Three Festival 7 November 15 

Labor Thanksgiving Day 1 November 23 

Winter Solstice Day December 21 or 22 

Emperor's Birthday 1 December 23 

New Year's Eve December 31 

1 National holiday. 

2 Beginning of spring, based on old solar calendar. 

3 Higan means the other shore and is observed as a Buddhist memorial centered on the vernal equinox 
and the autumnal equinox. 

4 Eighty-eighth day after Old Solar New Year (February 3 or 4). 

5 Based on Chinese Weaving Maid-Cowherd legend. 

6 The 210th Day after Old Solar New Year, first day of typhoon season. 

7 Presentation at local Shinto shrines of three-year-old, five-year-old, and seven-year-old girls and boys 
to pray for a safe and healthy future. 

Source: Based on information from Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan, 2, Tokyo, 1983, 262. 



481 



Japan: A Country Study 



Table 5. Number of Schools and Students, 1989 



Type of School 


Schools 


Students 




15,080 


2,037,618 




24,851 


9,606,786 




11,264 


5,619,297 






5,644,376 




70 


6,006 


Schools for the deaf 


108 


8,319 




760 


80,683 




62 


51,966 




584 


461,849 




499 


2,066,962 




3,252 


741,080 


Other 


3,572 


444,381 



TOTAL 65,613 26,769,323 



* Does not include day-care centers operated by the Ministry of Welfare. 

Source: Based on information from Japan, Ministry of Education, Science, and Culture, 
Monbujiho (Education Review) [Tokyo], No. 1353, October 1989, 64; and Japan, 
Ministry of Education, Science, and Culture, Gakko kihon chosa hokokusho, 1989 (Fun- 
damental School Survey, 1989), Tokyo, 1989, 7-11. 



Table 6. Enrollment in Special Classes in Compulsory Education, 1989 



Category 


Elementary 


Lower secondary 




24,851 


11,264 




317,259 


154,054 




9,606,627 


5,619,297 




10,288 


5,260 




14,420 


6,893 




52,701 


28,352 




41.4 


46.7 




0.5 


0.5 



Source: Based on information from Japan, Ministry of Education, Science, and Culture, 
Gakko kihon chosa hokokusho, 1989 (Fundamental School Survey, 1989), 1989, 7-10, 
30, 31, 63, 122, 123. 



482 



Appendix 



Table 7. Postsecondary Institutions and Enrollment, 
by Type of Institution, 1988 

Number 

Type of Institution of Institutions Enrollment 
Universities 

National 95 491,539 

Local public 38 59,216 

Private 357 1,443,861 

Total universities 490 1,994,616 

Junior colleges 

National 40 19,110 

Local public 54 22,024 

Private 477 409,302 

Total junior colleges 571 450,436 

Technical colleges 1 

National 54 16,080 

Local public 4 1,558 

Private 4 1,257 

Total technical colleges 62 18,895 

Special training colleges 2 

National 158 16,939 

Local public 163 23,582 

Private 2,301 481,053 

Total special training colleges 2,622 521,574 

Other 

National 7 19 

Local public 92 5,122 

Private 3,586 148,161 

Total other 3 3,685 153,302 

TOTAL 7,430 3,138,853 

1 Fourth-year and fifth-year enrollments only. 

2 Includes only special training colleges offering advanced courses that had an entrance requirement 
of upper-secondary school completion. 

3 There were 3,685 miscellaneous schools in 1988, with an actual total enrollment of 451,988 students. 
The figures in the enrollment column here show only students whose entrance required at least gradu- 
ation from an upper-secondary school program. 

Source: Based on information from Japan, Ministry of Education, Science, and Culture, 
Monbutdkeiyoran (Statistical Abstract of Education), Tokyo, 1989, 70, 73-75, 104, 
106. 



483 



Japan: A Country Study 



Table 8. Combined Social and Education Facilities, 1987 



Type 


National 


Prefectural 


Municipal 1 


Private 


Total 







62 


808 





870 


Children's culture centers 2 . 





1 


44 





45 


Children's nature centers 2 . 


10 


93 


153 





256 










17,422 


18 


17,440 







55 


727 





782 




28 


100 


254 


355 


737 







69 


1,699 


33 


1,801 


Sports centers 2 





2,266 


32,143 





34,409 


Women's education centers . 




11 


62 


126 


200 


Youth centers 2 














13 


110 


157 





280 







10 


150 





160 


Total youth centers . . . 


13 


120 


307 





440 


TOTAL 


52 


2,777 


53,619 


532 


56,980 



1 Includes municipal syndicates. 

2 Private facilities not included. 

Source: Based on information from Japan, Ministry of Education, Science, and Culture, 
Monbusho, 1989, Tokyo, 1989, 38; and Japan, Ministry of Education, Science, and 
Culture, Monbu tokeiyoran (Statistical Abstract of Education), Tokyo, 1989, 111-17. 



Table 9. Average Age and Salary for Selected Positions, 1988 



Position Average Age Salary * 





50.4 


5,019 




50.5 


4,558 




45.7 


3,717 




29.7 


1,800 




51.2 


4,251 




49.5 


4,271 




44.9 


3,503 




31.2 


2,156 



* In United States dollars per month. 



Source: Based on information from Japan, National Personnel Authority, Bureau of Com- 
pensation, Nippon 1989: JETRO Business Facts and Figures, Tokyo, 1989, 122. 



484 



Appendix 



Table 10. Average Monthly Earnings by Firm Size, 
Selected Years, 1960-87 
(in thousands of yen) 



Number of Regular Employees 

Year 1 to 4 5 to 29 30 or more 



1960 9 15 24 

1965 20 30 39 

1970 37 56 76 

1975 85 133 177 

1980 129 193 263 

1985 153 228 317 

1987 158 243 336 



Source: Based on information from Japan, Management and Coordination Agency, Statistics 
Bureau, Nihon tokei nenkan, Showa 63 (Japan Statistical Yearbook, 1988), Tokyo, 
1989, 92. 



Table 11. National Budget and Fiscal Investment 
and Loan Program, Fiscal Year (FY) 1990 
(in billions of United States dollars) 



Category Amount 



Revenues 

Tax revenues 414.2 

Other revenues 8.6 

Receipts from NTT * stock sale 9.3 

Public bonds 41.4 

Total revenues 473.5 

Expenditures 

Discretionary expenditures 253.0 

Transfers to local governments 109.1 

Social infrastructure 9.3 

Debt service 102.1 

Total expenditures 473.5 



* Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation. 

Source: Based on information from Japan Economic Institute of America, Japan Economic 
Survey [Washington], October 1989, 3. 



485 



Japan: A Country Study 

Table 12. Personal Investment, 1989 
(in trillions of yen and billions of United States dollars) 



Type of Institution Yen Dollars 





130 


929 




126 


900 




58 


414 




48 


342 




26 


185 




6 


43 



Source: Based on information from "Japanese Utilize Postal Savings, "Japan Economic Journal 
[Tokyo], February 24, 1990, 5. 



Table 13. National Government and Affiliated Agencies' 
Budgets, Selected Years, 1960-88 
(in billions of yen) 

National Government Government- 
General Special Affiliated 
Year Accounts Accounts Agencies Total 



Revenues 



1960 


1,570 


3,750 


1,537 


6,857 


1965 


3,658 


7,215 


3,237 


14,110 


1970 


7,950 


18,403 


6,076 


32,429 


1975 


21,289 


39,723 


12,645 


3,657 


1980 


42,589 


95,121 


20,311 


158,021 


1985 


52,500 


125,744 


13,235 


191,479 


1988 


56,700 


167,301 


5,185 


229,186 


xpenditures 










1960 


1,570 


3,549 


1,383 


6,502 


1965 


3,658 


6,708 


3,090 


13,456 


1970 


7,950 


16,988 


5,808 


30,746 


1975 


21,289 


36,412 


12,234 


69,935 


1980 


42,589 


89,771 


20,438 


152,798 


1985 


52,500 


119,531 


13,307 


185,338 


1988 


56,700 


156,804 


5,246 


218,750 



Source: Based on information from Japan, Management and Coordination Agency, Statistics 
Bureau, Nihon tokei nenkan, Showa 63 (Japan Statistical Yearbook, 1988), Tokyo, 
1989, 438. 



486 



Appendix 



Table 14. Labor Productivity and Wage Cost Indexes, 1977-87 1 
(index: 1980 = 100) 



Labor Productivity Wage Cost 



Year Index Index 2 



1977 83.7 101.6 

1978 90.3 99.6 

1979 96.5 97.4 

1980 100.0 100.0 

1981 100.5 106.1 

1982 100.2 110.8 

1983 102.0 111.8 

1984 108.2 109.1 

1985 110.0 109.1 

1986 109.4 109.6 

1987 113.4 114.0 



1 The average annual rate of increase in the years between 1978 and 1987 was 2.6 percent for labor 
productivity and 1.2 percent for the wage cost index. 

2 The wage cost index is the wage index divided by the labor productivity index. 

Source: Based on information from Japan, National Personnel Authority, Bureau of Com- 
pensation, Nippon 1989: JETRO Business Facts and Figures, Tokyo, 1989, 128. 



Table 15. Work Status of the Population, 1985-88 





1985 


1986 


1987 


1988 


Population over fifteen years * 










Male 


. . 4,602 


4,662 


4,726 


4,790 




. . 4,863 


4,925 


4,994 


5,059 




9,465 


9,587 


9,720 


9,849 


Labor force * 












, . 3,596 


3,626 


3,655 


3,693 


Female 


. . 2,367 


2,394 


2,429 


2,473 




. . 5,963 


6,020 


6,084 


6,166 


Employed people * 












3,503 


3,526 


3,551 


3,602 


Female 


. . 2,304 


2,327 


2,360 


2,409 




5,807 


5,853 


5,911 


6,011 




2.6 


2.8 


2.8 


2.5 


Labor force (as percentage of total population) . . 


. . 63.0 


62.8 


62.6 


62.6 



* In units of 10,000. 

Source: Based on information from Japan, National Personnel Authority, Bureau of Com- 
pensation, Nippon 1989: JETRO Business Facts and Figures, Tokyo, 1989, 116. 



487 



Japan: A Country Study 



Table 16. Foreign Nationals in the Technical and Skilled-Labor 
Work Force, Selected Groups, Selected Years, 1970-87 1 



Year Technical Skilled Labor 



1970 35 182 

1975 29 610 

1980 59 1,035 

1985 

Asian 16 1,009 

European 17 170 

North Americans 9 4 

Others 2 3 

Total 1985 42 1,186 

1987 

Asian 9 1,235 

European 19 261 

North Americans 30 1 

Others 2 4 

Total 1987 58 1,501 



1 Based on legal entries. 

2 From Oceania and "non-nationality." 

Source: Based on information from Japan, Management and Coordination Agency, Statistics 
Bureau, Nihon tokei nenkan, Showa 61 (Japan Statistical Yearbook, 1986), Tokyo, 
1987, 61; and Nihon tokei nenkan, Showa 63 (Japan Statistical Yearbook, 1988), Tokyo, 
1989, 71. 



Table 1 7. Labor Force over Fifty-Five Years of Age 
by Sex and Age, Selected Years, 1970-87 
(in tens of thousands of persons) 

1970 1975 1980 1985 1987 



Males 

Age 55-64 331 344 379 478 523 

Age 65 and over 158 169 184 187 190 

Females 

Age 55-64 193 215 253 298 313 

Age 65 and over 73 76 95 113 122 



TOTAL 755 804 911 1,076 1,148 



Source: Based on information from Japan, Management and Coordination Agency, Statistics 
Bureau, Nihon tokei nenkan, Showa 63 (Japan Statistical Yearbook, 1988), Tokyo, 
1989, 71. 



488 



Appendix 



Table 18. Index of Labor Productivity for Selected Economic 
Sectors, Selected Years, 1960-87 
(1985 average =100) 



Total Public Mining and 

Year Productivity Utilities Manufacturing Manufacturing 



1960 15.4 17.3 15.3 15.4 

1965 22.6 27.0 22.4 22.2 

1970 42.2 47.7 41.8 40.7 

1975 55.0 62.4 54.5 54.4 

1980 82.1 79.2 82.2 82.1 

1985 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 

1987 107.6 105.6 107.8 107.7 



Source: Based on information from Japan, Management and Coordination Agency, Statistics 
Bureau, Nikon tokei nenkan, Showa 63 (Japan Statistical Yearbook, 1988), Tokyo, 
1989, 113. 



Table 19. Energy Consumption, Fiscal Year (FY) 1986 and FY 1995 1 

FY 1986 FY 1995 

Category Amount 2 Percentage 3 Amount Percentage 3 

Demand 

(kiloliters) 433.0 n.a. 490.0 n.a. 

Supply 

Coal (in tons) 103.9 18.3 121.0 18.3 

Nuclear 

(in kilowatts) 25.8 9.5 41.5 13.4 

Natural gas 

(in kiloliters) 42.8 9.9 55.0 11.1 

Hydroelectric 
General 

(in kilowatts) 20.2 n.a. 23.0 n.a. 

Pumped 

(in kilowatts) 15.6 n.a. 19.5 n.a. 

Total hydroelectric 35.8 4.2 42.5 4.5 

Geothermal 

(in kiloliters) 0.4 0.1 2.0 0.4 

New energy 

(in kiloliters) 5.5 1.3 12.5 2.5 

Oil 

(in kiloliters) 246.0 56.8 245.0 49.7 

Total supply 

(in kiloliters) 460.2 100.0 519.5 100.0 

n.a. — not available. 

1 Projected. 

2 In millions. 

3 Figures may not add to totals because of rounding. 

Source: Based on information from Tsuneta Yano Memorial Society, Nippon: A Charted 
Survey of Japan, 1989/90, Tokyo, 1989, 243. 



489 



Japan: A Country Study 

Table 20. High- Techno logy Sector Developments, 1987 

Technical Field Kind of Product 

New materials Composite materials 

Amorphous alloys 
High-molecular separation films 

Electronics Semiconductor memory chips 

Charge-coupled devices 

Data and communications Computer switching boards 

Digital circuit 
Laser printers 

Processing and manufacturing .... Laser processors 

Computer Aided Design/Computer Aided 

Manufacturing (CAD/CAM) 
Hydraulic control valves 

Analytical and measuring 

instruments Accelerometers 

Spectrum analyzers 

Biotechnology Biotechnology products utilizing cellular material 

from animals 
Biotechnology products utilizing microorganisms 

Aeronautical and space Communications satellites 

Large building structures Ultra-high-rise buildings 

Source: Based on information from Japan, National Personnel Authority, Bureau of Com- 
pensation, Nippon 1987: JETRO Business Facts and Figures, Tokyo, 1987, 27. 



Table 21. Inland Freight Transportation 
by Sector and Volume, 1960 and 1987 

I960 1987 

Millions Millions 

Millions of Ton- Millions of Ton- 

of Tons Kilometers of Tons Kilometers 



Railroads 238 54,515 83 20,561 

Motor vehicles 1,156 20,801 5,046 224,053 

Coastal shipping 139 63,659 463 201,386 

Air transport 6 0.7 634 



TOTAL 1,553 138,981 5,582.7 446,634 



Source: Based on information from Tsuneta Yano Memorial Society, Nippon: A Charted 
Survey of Japan, 1989/90, Tokyo, 1989, 267. 



490 



Appendix 



Table 22. Passenger Transportation 
by Sector and Volume, 1970 and 1987 
(in millions) 





Passengers 


carried 


Passenger 


-kilometers 


Sector 


1970 


1987 


1970 


1987 




16,445 


19,972 


288,816 


344,729 




11,812 


8,470 


102,894 


102,895 




12,221 


28,615 


181,335 


437,837 




15 


50 


9,319 


38,534 




174 


155 


4,814 


5,850 


TOTAL 


40,667 


57,262 


587,178 


929,845 



Source: Based on information in Tsuneta Yano Memorial Society, Nippon: A Charted Sur- 
vey of Japan, 1989/90, Tokyo, 1989, 267. 



Table 23. Self -Sufficiency Ratio for Agricultural Products, 
Selected Years, 1975-87 
(in percentages) 



Product 


1975 


1980 


1985 


1987 * 




. . . . 110 


87 


107 


100 


Wheat 


4 


10 


14 


14 


Fruit 


, , , , 84 


81 


77 


75 




. . . . 82 


82 


85 


78 


Beef 


81 


72 


72 


64 


Pork 


. . . . 86 


87 


86 


80 




. . . . 77 


81 


81 


76 




15 


27 


33 


34 


Overall self-sufficiency 












. . . . 77 


75 


74 


71 


Self-sufficiency for cereals 












. . . . 40 


33 


31 


30 



* Estimated. 



Source: Based on information from Japan, National Personnel Authority, Bureau of Com- 
pensation, Nippon 1989: JETRO Business Facts and Figures, Tokyo, 1989, 28. 



491 



Japan: A Country Study 

Table 24. Merchandise Exports, Imports, Trade Balance, 
and Annual Rate of Export Growth, 1960-88 
(in millions of United States dollars) 

Annual Rate 
Trade of Export Growth 



Year 


Exports 


Imports 1 


Balance 2 


(in percentage) 


1960 


4 055 


4 491 


-437 


17.3 


1961 


4 236 


5,810 


-1,574 


4.5 


1962 


4,916 


5^637 


-720 


16.1 


1963 


5,452 


6,736 


-1,284 


10.9 


1964 


6 673 


7,938 


-1,264 


22.4 


1965 


8 452 


8 169 


283 


26.7 


1966 


9 776 


9,523 


254 


15.7 


1967 


10,442 


11^663 


-1,222 


6.8 


1968 


12,972 


12,987 


-16 


24.2 


1969 


15 990 


15 024 


967 


23.3 


1970 


19 318 


18,881 


437 


20.8 


1971 


24 019 


19,712 


4,307 


24.3 


1972 


28,591 


23^471 


5420 


19.0 


1973 


36,930 


38,314 


-1,384 


29.2 


1974 


55 536 


62 110 


-6 574 


50.4 


1975 


55 753 


57 863 


-2 110 


0.4 


1976 


67,226 


64,799 


2,427 


20.6 


1977 


80,495 


70,809 


9,686 


19.7 


1978 


97,543 


79,343 


18,200 


21.2 


1979 


103,032 


110,672 


-7,641 


5.6 


1980 


129,807 


140,528 


-10,721 


26.0 


1981 


152,030 


143,290 


8,740 


17.1 


1982 


138,831 


131,931 


6,900 


8.7 


1983 


146,927 


126,393 


20,534 


5.8 


1984 


170,114 


136,503 


33,611 


15.8 


1985 


175,638 


129,539 


46,099 


3.2 


1986 


209,151 


126,408 


82,743 


19.1 


1987 


229,221 


149,515 


79,706 


9.6 


1988 


264,917 


187,354 


77,563 


15.6 



1 Customs-clearance basis. 

2 Figures may not result in balances because of rounding. 

Source: Based on information from Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics Annual, 1977, Tokyo, 
1978, 207; Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics Annual, 1980, Tokyo, 1981, 223; and 
Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics Annual, 1988, Tokyo, 1989, 250. 



492 



Appendix 



Table 25. Exports by Commodity, Selected Years, 1960-88 
(in millions of United States dollars) 

Commodity 1960 1970 1980 1985 1988 





256 


648 


1,588 


1,316 


1,696 




. 1,223 


2,408 


6,296 


6,263 


6,908 


Chemicals 












Plastics 


14 


436 


1,867 


2,261 


4,002 






143 


377 


127 


137 


Other 


107 


655 


4,524 


5,310 


9,825 






1,234 


6,767 


7,698 


13,964 


Nonmetallic mineral 












manufactures 


169 


372 


1,863 


2,147 


2,936 


Metals 












Iron and steel products 




2,844 


15,454 


13,566 


15,321 


Fabricated metal products . . . 


155 


714 


3,947 


3,458 


4,287 




26 


248 


1,917 


1,467 


2,142 






3,805 


21,319 


18,491 


21,750 


Machinery and equipment 
















1,337 


23,273 


34,377 


48,787 






329 


2,280 


7,785 


18,406 


Semiconductors and other 
















400 


2,307 


4,753 


12,327 


Scientific and optical 
















498 


4,526 


6,831 


10,835 






451 


3,305 


8,440 


7,802 


Power- generating machinery 


OA 


ooo 


2,548 


3,789 


6,738 









1,983 


6,625 


6,203 






1,410 


4,682 


5,929 


3,947 






116 


1,743 


2,599 


3,927 


Electric generators and 














22 


157 


1,503 


2,058 


3,405 


Watches and clocks 


4 


130 


1,734 


1,730 


2,365 




145 


695 


3^009 


2^654 


2^212 




48 


196 


871 


1,007 


2,161 




3 


384 


1,660 


2,625 


1,779 




55 


129 


466 


524 


980 


Other 


. 251 


2,471 


25,591 


34,453 


65,091 


Total machinery and 














. 1,035 


8,941 


81,481 


126,179 


196,965 


Other commodities 














23 


162 


1,382 


1,545 


2,219 




90 


138 


335 


484 


241 


Other 


. 508 


1,609 


8,776 


11,515 


18,237 


Total other commodities * . 


. 622 


1,909 


10,494 


13,544 


20,697 


TOTAL * 


4,054 


19,317 


129,808 


175,638 


264,917 



* Figures may not add to totals because of rounding. 



Source: Based on information from Japan Tariff Association, The Summary Report, Trade 
of Japan, December 1985, Tokyo, 1986, 146-49; Japan Tariff Association, The Sum- 
mary Report, Trade of Japan, December 1988, Tokyo, 1989, 146-49; and Bank of Japan, 
Economic Statistics Annual, 1988, Tokyo, 1989, 250-51. 



493 



Japan: A Country Study 



Table 26. Imports by Commodity, Selected Years, 1960-88 
(in millions of United States dollars) 



Commodity 


1960 


1970 


1980 


1985 


1988 


Foodstuffs 

















262 


3,026 


4,610 


10,461 







145 


1,523 


1,927 


4,313 




78 


294 


1,507 


1,363 


1,490 


Wheat 


177 


318 


1,229 


974 


1,034 




111 


284 


1,225 


210 


456 


Other 


182 


1,678 


6,156 


6,463 


11,366 




548 


2,981 


14,666 


15,547 


29,120 


Textile materials 












Wool 


265 


348 


689 


670 


1,447 




431 


471 


1,359 


1,049 


1,318 


Other 


65 


144 


346 


436 


544 


Total textile materials * ... 


. 762 


963 


2,393 


2,155 


3,309 


Metal ores and scrap 














. 156 


1,064 


3,731 


2,229 


4,104 


Iron ore and ferrous scrap . . . 


. 443 


1,549 


3,946 


3,452 


3,289 


Other 


74 


83 


753 


551 


1,095 


Total metal ores and scrap * 


. 673 


2,696 


8,430 


6,232 


8,488 


Other raw materials 












Wood 


170 


1,572 


6,909 


3,700 


7,122 




107 


366 


1,310 


1,206 


1,426 




. 126 


115 


603 


408 


762 


Other 


. 370 


964 


4,115 


4,343 


6,933 


Total other raw materials * 


. 774 


3,017 


12,937 


9,657 


16,243 


Mineral fuels 














. 600 


2,786 


57,851 


40,574 


25,807 


Coal 


141 


1,010 


4,458 


5,196 


5,375 


Other 





110 


7,682 


10,020 


7,174 




741 


3,906 


69,991 


55,790 


38,356 




265 


1,000 


6,202 


8,073 


14,830 


Machinery and equipment 














53 


322 


1,032 


1,545 


3,279 




12 


12 


483 


571 


3,165 


Precision instruments 


27 


166 


1,087 


1,265 


2,358 




OQ 


9Q4 


QQ1 


1 4.04. 


9 H94 


Other 


. 326 


1,560 


6,733 


7,507 


15,835 


Total machinery and 














447 


2,354 


10,326 


12,372 


26,661 


Miscellaneous commodities 














19 


314 


3,180 


3,886 


10,631 




118 


945 


4,480 


4,041 


9,312 


Iron and steel products 


88 


276 


894 


1,479 


4,625 


Other 


68 


891 


7,511 


10,307 


25,779 


Total miscellanenous 














294 


2,427 


16,066 


19,713 


50,347 


TOTAL * 


4,501 


19,343 


141,011 


129,539 


187,354 



* Figures may not add to totals because of rounding. 



Source: Based on information from Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics Annual, 1988, Tokyo, 
1989, 253-54; Japan Tariff Association, The Summary Report, Trade of Japan, Decem- 
ber 1980, Tokyo, 1981, 129; and Japan Tariff Association, The Summary Report, Trade 
of Japan, December 1988, Tokyo, 1989, 162-65. 



494 



Appendix 



Table 27. Composition of Imports, Selected Years, 1960-88 
(in percentages) 



Commodity 


1960 


1970 


1980 


1985 


1988 


Foodstuffs 












Fish and shellfish 





0.0 


2.2 


3.6 


5.6 


Meat 


0.0 


0.0 


1.1 


1.5 


2.3 




1.7 


1.6 


1.1 




0.8 


Wheat 


3.9 


1.7 


0.9 


0.8 


0.6 




2.5 


1.5 


0.9 


0.2 


0.2 


Other 


4.1 


8.9 


4.3 


5.0 


6.0 




12.2 


13.7 


10.5 


12.2 


15.5 


Textiles materials 












Wool 


5.9 


1.8 


0.5 


0.5 


0.8 




9.6 


2.5 


1.0 


0.8 


0.7 


Other 


1.4 


0.8 


0.2 


0.3 


0.3 


I Vit Q 1 f /=» 1 1 f=» TY"I atpn 51 1 c * 


17 


5.1 


1.7 


1.6 


1.8 


Metal ores and scrap 












Nonferrous metal ores 


3.5 


5.6 


2.7 


1.7 


2.2 




9.9 


8.2 


2.8 


2.7 


1.8 


Other 


1.6 


0.4 


0.5 


0.4 


0.5 


Total metal ores scrap * 


15.0 


14.3 


6.0 


4.8 


4.5 


Other raw materials 












Wood 


3.8 


8.3 


4.9 


2.9 


3.8 




2.4 


1.9 


0.9 


0.9 


0.8 


Natural rubber 


2.8 


0.6 


0.4 


0.3 


0.4 


Other 


8.2 


5.1 


2.9 


3.4 


3.7 


Total other raw materials * 


17.2 


15.9 


9.2 


7.5 


8.7 


Mineral fuels 












Petroleum and products 


13 4 


14.8 


41.2 


31.3 


13.8 


Coal 


3.1 


5.3 


3.2 


4.0 


2.9 


Other 


0.0 


0.6 


5.4 


7.7 


3.8 


Total mineral fuels * 


16.5 


20.7 


49.8 


43.0 


20.5 


Chemicals 


5.9 


5.3 


4.4 


6.2 


7.9 


Machinery and equipment 












Office machines . . . 


1 2 


1.7 


0.7 


1.2 


1.8 




0.0 


0.0 


0.3 


0.4 


1.7 




0.6 


0.9 


0.8 


1.0 


1.3 






1.3 


0.7 


1.1 


1.1 


Other 


. 7.3 


8.3 


4.5 


5.8 


8.3 


Total machinery and equipment * . 


. 9.7 


12.2 


7.0 


9.5 


14.2 


Miscellaneous commodities 














. 0.4 


1.7 


2.3 


3.0 


5.7 




. 2.6 


5.0 


3.2 


3.1 


5.0 




. 2.0 


1.5 


0.6 


1.1 


2.5 


Other 


1.5 


4.7 


5.3 


8.0 


13.7 


Total miscellaneous commodities * . 


6.5 


12.9 


11.4 


15.2 


26.9 


TOTAL * 


. 100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 



* Figures may not add to totals because of rounding. 

Source: Based on information from Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics Annual, 1988, Tokyo, 
1989, 253-54; and Japan Tariff Association, The Summary Report, Trade of Japan, 
December 1980, Tokyo, 1981, 129; and Japan Tariff Association, The Summary Report, 
Trade of Japan, December 1988, Tokyo, 1989, 162-65. 



495 



Japan: A Country Study 



Table 28. Composition of Exports, Selected Years, 1960-88 
(in percentages) 



Commodity 


1960 


1970 


1980 


1985 


1988 




6.3 


3.4 


1.2 


0.7 


0.6 




30.2 


12.5 


4.9 


3.6 


2.6 


Chemicals 














. 0.4 


2.3 


1.4 


1.3 


1.5 




1.5 


0.7 


0.3 


0.1 


0.1 


Other 


2.6 


3.4 


3.5 


3.0 


3.7 


Total chemicals 


4.5 


6.4 


5.2 


4.4 


5.3 




. 4.2 


1.9 


1.4 


1.2 


1.1 


Metals 














9.6 


14.7 


11.9 


7.7 


5.8 


Fabricated metal products 


3.8 


3.7 


3.0 


2.0 


1.6 




. 0.6 


1.3 


1.5 


0.8 


0.8 




. 14.0 


19.7 


16.4 


10.5 


8.2 


Machinery and equipment 












Motor vehicles 


1.9 


6.9 


17.9 


19.6 


18.4 




0.0 


1.7 


1.8 


4.4 


6.9 


Semiconductors and other electronic 














. 0.1 


2.1 


1.8 


2.7 


4.7 




2.3 


2.6 


3.5 


3.9 


4.1 


Audiotape recorders 


0.2 


2.3 


2.5 


4.8 


2.9 




. 0.6 


1.2 


2.0 


2.2 


2.5 




. 0.0 


0.0 


1.5 


3.8 


2.3 




7.1 


7.3 


3.6 


3.4 


1.5 


Metalworking machinery 


. 0.2 


0.6 


1.3 


1.5 


1.5 


Electric generators and equipment . . 


. 0.5 


0.8 


1.2 


1.2 


1.3 




0.1 


0.7 


1.3 


1.0 


0.9 




3.6 


3.6 


2.3 


1.5 


0.8 




1 


1 n 


n 7 
U. / 


u.o 


U.o 




. 0.1 


2.0 


1.3 


1.5 


0.7 




1.4 


0.7 


0.4 


0.3 


0.4 


Other 


. 6.2 


12.8 


19.7 


19.4 


24.6 


Total machinery and equipment . . 


. 25.5 


46.3 


62.8 


71.8 


74.3 


Other commodities 














0.6 


0.8 


1.1 


0.9 


0.8 




. 2.2 


0.7 


0.3 


0.3 


0.1 


Other 


. 12.5 


8.3 


6.7 


6.6 


6.9 




. 15.3 


9.8 


8.1 


7.8 


7.8 


TOTAL * 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 



* Figures may not add to totals because of rounding. 

Source: Based on information from Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics Annual, 1988, Tokyo, 
1989, 227-30. 



496 



Appendix 



Table 29. Balance of Payments, Capital Flows, 
Official Settlements, and Foreign Exchange Reserves, 1961-88 
(in millions of United States dollars) 



Errors Gold and Foreign 

Capital Flows and Overall Exchange Reserves 



Year 


Long-term 


Short-term 


Omissions 


Balance 1 


Changes 


Level 


1961 


-11 


21 


20 


-952 


338 


1,486 


1962 . . . 


172 


107 


6 


237 


355 


1,841 


1963 . . . 


467 


107 


45 


-161 


37 


1,878 


1964 . . . 


107 


234 


10 


-129 


121 


1,999 


1965 . . . 


-415 


-61 


-51 


405 


108 


2,107 


1966 


-808 


-64 


-45 


337 


-33 


2,074 


1967 . . . 


-812 


506 


-75 


-571 


-69 


2,005 


1968 . . . 


-239 


209 


84 


1,102 


886 


2,891 


1969 . . , 


-155 


178 


141 


2,283 


605 


3,496 


1970 . . . 


-1,591 


724 


271 


1,374 


903 


4,399 


1971 . . . 


-1,082 


2,435 


527 


7,677 


10,836 


15,235 


1972 . . . 


-4,487 


1,966 


638 


4,741 


3,130 


18,365 


1973 . . . 


-9,750 


2,407 


-2,595 


-10,074 


-6,119 


12,246 


1974 


-3,881 


1,778 


-43 


-6,839 


1,272 


13,518 


1975 . . . 


-272 


-1,138 


-584 


-2,676 


703 


12,815 


1976 , , , 


-984 


111 


117 


3,024 


3,789 


16,604 


1977 . , , 


. . . -3,184 


-648 


657 


7,743 


6,244 


22,848 


1978 


, , -12,389 


1,538 


267 


5,950 


-10,171 


33,019 


1979 


-12,618 


2,377 2 


2,333 


-16,662 


-12,692 


20,327 


1980 . . . 


2,324 


3,141 


-3,115 


-8,396 


4,905 


25,232 


1981 , , , 


-9,672 


2,265 


493 


-2,144 


3,171 


28,403 


1982 . . . 


-14,969 


1,579 


4,727 


-1,813 


-5,141 


23,262 


1983 . . . 


. . . -17,700 


23 


2,055 


5,177 


1,234 


24,496 


1984 . . . 


. . . -49,651 


-4,295 


3,743 


-15,200 


1,817 


26,313 


1985 . . . 


. . . -64,542 


-936 


3,991 


-12,318 


197 


26,510 


1986 


-131,461 


-1,609 


2,458 


-44,767 


15,729 


42,239 


1987 . . . 


. . . -136,532 


-23,865 


-3,893 


-77,275 


39,240 


81,479 


1988 . . . 


. . . -130,326 


19,536 


2,320 


-28,982 


16,183 


97,662 



1 Overall balance equals the current account balance plus the balance on long- and short-term capital 
flows plus errors and omissions. 

2 In 1979, gensaki transactions (short-term capital transactions using long-term government bonds as 
collateral) moved from the long-term capital account to the short-term capital account. 

Source: Based on information from Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics Annual, 1988, Tokyo, 
1989, 244-58. 



497 



Japan: A Country Study 



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499 



Japan: A Country Study 



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501 



Japan: A Country Study 



Table 32. Exchange Rate Between Yen and United States Dollar, 1970-90 



Year 



Rate 



Year 



Rate 



1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 



360 
351 
303 
271 
291 
292 
297 
269 
211 
219 
227 



1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 



221 
249 
238 
238 
239 
169 
145 
128 
143 
147 



1 Rates are the average market rate for the year. 

2 As of August 1990. 

Source: Based on information from International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statis- 
tics Yearbook, 1989, Washington, 1989, 442-43; and "Prices and Trends," Far Eastern 
Economic Review [Hong Kong], August 30, 1990, 66. 



Table 33. Trade Balance with Selected Countries, 
Selected Years, 1960-88 
(in millions of United States dollars) 



Country 


1960 


1970 


1980 


1985 


1988 


Australia 


. , -200 


-28 


-1,593 


-2,073 


-3,605 




21 


-449 


1,828 


2,906 


6,439 




... -85 


168 


-2,287 


-253 


-1,884 




... -18 


315 


755 


5,994 


-383 




... 133 


608 


4,192 


5,742 


9,597 




... -15 


-287 


-99 


407 


278 


Indonesia 


, , 40 


-321 


-9,709 


-7,947 


-6,443 




... -192 


-253 


-1,410 


-2,162 


-1,650 




-5 


-79 


-268 


-306 


-304 




73 


336 


2,404 


2,266 


5,972 




81 


589 


2,372 


3,005 


3,630 




... -65 


-140 


918 


1,322 


364 




38 


449 


2,853 


1,639 


5,611 




46 


259 


798 


1,003 


2,411 




. . . -452 


380 


6,959 


39,485 


47,597 




... -57 


-958 


3,255 


4,010 


7,692 



Source: Based on information from Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics Annual, 1977, Tokyo, 
1978, 207-10; Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics Annual, 1981, 229; and Bank of 
Japan, Economic Statistics Annual, 1988, Tokyo, 1989, 247-50. 



502 



Appendix 



Table 34. Exports to Selected Countries, 

Selected Years, 1960-88 
(in millions of United States dollars) 



Country 


1960 


1970 


1980 


1985 


1988 




... 144 


589 


3,389 


5,379 


6,680 




, , , 120 


480 


3,782 


4,723 


10,632 




... 119 


563 


2,437 


4,520 


6,424 




3 


569 


5,078 


12,477 


9,476 




156 


700 


4,761 


6,509 


11,706 




. , . Ill 


103 


915 


1,596 


2,082 




... 110 


316 


3,458 


2,172 


3,054 




32 


166 


2,061 


2,168 


3,060 




... 154 


454 


1,683 


937 


1,740 




87 


423 


3,911 


3,860 


8,311 


South Korea 


, , 100 


818 


5,368 


7,097 


15,441 




60 


341 


2,778 


2,751 


3,130 


Taiwan 


. . , 102 


700 


5,146 


5,025 


14,354 


Thailand 


118 


449 


1,917 


2,030 


5,162 




. . . 1,101 


5,940 


31,367 


65,278 


89,634 




66 


550 


5,756 


6,938 


15,793 



Source: Based on information from Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics Annual, 1977, Tokyo, 
1978, 207-10; Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics Annual, 1981, Tokyo, 1982, 229; 
and Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics Annual, 1988, Tokyo, 1989, 247-50. 



Table 35. Imports from Selected Countries, 

Selected Years, 1960-88 
(in millions of United States dollars) 



Country 


1960 


1970 


1980 


1985 


1988 




344 


617 


6,982 


7,452 


10,285 




99 


929 


1,954 


1,817 


4,193 




, , , 204 


395 


4,724 


4,773 


8,308 




21 


254 


4,323 


6,483 


9,859 




23 


92 


569 


767 


2,109 




... 126 


390 


1,014 


1,189 


1,804 




70 


637 


13,167 


10,119 


9,497 


Malaysia 


. . . . 224 


419 


3,471 


4,330 


4,710 




. . . . 159 


533 


1,951 


1,243 


2,044 




14 


87 


1,507 


1,594 


2,339 




19 


229 


2,996 


4,092 


11,811 




... 125 


481 


1,860 


1,429 


2,766 




64 


251 


2,293 


3,386 


8,743 




72 


190 


1,119 


1,027 


2,751 


United States 


1,553 


5,560 


24,408 


25,793 


42,037 


West Germany . . . 


123 


1,508 


2,501 


2,928 


8,101 



Source: Based on information from Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics Annual, 1977, Tokyo, 
1978, 207-10; Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics Annual, 1981, Tokyo, 1982, 229; 
and Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics Annual, 1988, Tokyo, 1989, 247-50. 



503 



Japan: A Country Study 



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504 



Appendix 



Table 37. Candidates Elected to House of 
Representatives by Party, Elections, 1958-90 



Year 


LDP 1 


JSP 2 


Komeito 


DSP 3 


JCP* 


NLC 5 


Other 


Independents 


Total 


1958 


. . . 287 


166 








1 





1 


12 


467 


1960 . . . 


, 296 


145 


— 


17 


3 


— 


1 


5 


467 


1963 . . . 


... 283 


144 




23 


5 







12 


467 


1967 


, , , 277 


140 


25 


30 


5 







9 


486 


1969 


. . . 288 


90 


47 


31 


14 







16 


486 


1972 


... 271 


118 


29 


19 


38 




2 


14 


491 


1976 . . . 


... 249 


123 


55 


29 


17 


17 





21 


511 


1979 . . . 


... 248 


107 


57 


35 


39 


4 


2 


19 


511 


1980 , , , 


... 284 


107 


33 


32 


29 


12 


3 


11 


511 


1983 


, . . 250 


112 


58 


38 


26 


8 


3 


16 


511 


1986 


300 


85 


56 


26 


26 


6 


4 


9 


512 


1990 . . . 


... 275 


136 


45 


14 


16 





5 


21 


512 



— Means party did not exist at time of election. 

1 Liberal Democratic Party. 

2 Japan Socialist Party. 

3 Democratic Socialist Party. 

4 Japan Communist Party. 

5 New Liberal Club. 

Source: Based on information from Japan Foreign Press Center, The Diet, Elections and Political 
Parties, Tokyo, 1985;Japan Times [Tokyo], February 20, 1990, 1, and February 27, 
1990, 1; and Asahi nenkan, 1990 (Asahi Yearbook, 1990) Tokyo, 1990, 94. 



Table 38. Order of Battle for Self -Defense Forces, 1989 



Branch and Units Personnel or Units 



Ground Self-Defense Force 

Personnel 156,200 

Armored division 1 

Infantry divisions 12 

Anti-aircraft artillery groups 8 

Airborne brigades 1 

Combined brigades 2 

Artillery brigade 1 

Artillery groups 4 

Training brigade 1 

Helicopter brigade 1 

Helicopter squadrons 24 

Antitank helicopter squadrons 2 

Engineer brigades 5 

Maritime Self-Defense Force Personnel 44,400 

Air Self-Defense Force Personnel 46,400 

Total Self-Defense Forces personnel 247,000 

Total reserves 48,000 



Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1989-1990, London, 1989, 162-64. 



505 



Japan: A Country Study 



Table 39. Major Ground Self -Defense Force Equipment, 1989 



Country of 

Type and Description Origin 

Armored vehicles 

T-61 medium tanks, 90mm gun, 35 tons, 

modeled on United States M-48 tanks . . . Japan 
T-74 medium tanks, 105mm gun, 38 tons . . -do- 
T-82 and T-87 reconnaissance vehicles .... -do- 
T-60 and T-73 armored personnel 

carriers . . -do- 
Artillery 

105mm, 155mm, and 203mm guns and United States 

howitzers Japan 

T-74 105mm, T-75 155mm, and 203mm 

self-propelled howitzers -do- 
Mortars 

81mm and 107mm United States 



Estimated 
Number in 
Inventory 



300 
870 
230 

700 



500 



300 



1,360 



Rocket launchers 

75mm, Carl Gustav 84mm, and 106mm .... Japan 

T-75 130mm multiple rocket launchers -do- 

Air-defense guns 

35mm, 37mm, and 40mm United States 

Surface-to-surface missiles 

T-30 Japan 

Antitank missiles 

T-64, T-79, and T-87 -do- 
Surface-to-air guided missiles 

Stinger United States 

Improved HAWK -do- 

T-81 Tan Japan 

Aircraft 
Fixed-wing 

LR-1 Japan 

TL-1 -do- 
Attack helicopters 

AH- IS United States 

Transport helicopters 

AS-332L(VIP) Japan 

CH-47J -do- 

V-107/A -do- 

OH-6J/D -do- 

UH-1B/H -do- 

TH-55 (training) -do- 
Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1989-90, London, 1989, 



2,750 
70 



75 



50 



500 



180 
200 
40 



17 

2 

40 

3 
9 
49 
163 
139 
20 



162-64. 



506 



Appendix 



Table 40. Major Maritime Self-Defense Force Equipment, 1989 

Estimated 

Country of Number in 

Type and Description Origin Inventory 



Submarines (SS) 

Y5shio class with 533mm torpedo tubes, 7 

with Harpoon surface-to-surface missiles . . Japan 10 

Uzushio class with 533mm torpedo tubes . . . -do- 4 

Guided missile destroyers (DDG) 

Hatakaze class with SM-1MR Standard 
surface-to-air missile, Harpoon surface-to- 
surface missile, ASROC antisubmarine 
system, antisubmarine torpedo tubes, and 

127mm guns -do- 2 

Tachikaze class with SM-1MR Standard 
surface-to-air missile, Harpoon surface-to- 
surface missile, ASROC antisubmarine 
system, antisubmarine torpedo tubes, and 

127mm guns -do- 3 

Amatsukaze class with SM-1MR Standard 
surface-to-air missile, ASROC anti- 
submarine system, and antisubmarine 

torpedo tubes -do- 1 

Frigates with helicopters (FFH) 

Shirane class with HSS-2B Sea King anti- 
submarine warfare helicopters, ASROC 
antisubmarine system, antisubmarine 

torpedo tubes, and 127mm guns -do- 2 

Haruna class with HSS-2B Sea King anti- 
submarine warfare helicopters, ASROC 
antisubmarine system, antisubmarine 

torpedo tubes, and 127mm guns -do- 2 

Asagiri class with HSS-2B Sea King anti- 
submarine warfare helicopter, Harpoon 
surface-to-surface missiles, ASROC anti- 
submarine system, and antisubmarine 

torpedo tubes -do- 4 

Hatsuyuki class with HSS-2B Sea King anti- 
submarine warfare helicopter, Harpoon 
surface-to-surface missiles, ASROC anti- 
submarine system, and antisubmarine 

torpedo tubes -do- 12 

Frigates (FF) 

Takatsuki class with Harpoon surface-to- 
surface missiles, antisubmarine warfare 
rocket launcher, antisubmarine torpedo 

tubes, and 127mm guns -do- 4 

Yamagumo class with ASROC antisubmarine 
system, antisubmarine warfare rocket 

launcher, and antisubmarine torpedo tubes -do- 6 

Minegumo class with ASROC antisubmarine 
system, antisubmarine warfare rocket 
launchers, and antisubmarine torpedo 

tubes -do- 3 



507 



Japan: A Country Study 



Table 40. — Continued 







• 

±iiStima.tcci 




v^ountry ot 


^Jumber in 


Type find Description. 


Ongin 


Inventory 


Yuban class with Harpoon surface-to-suriace 






missiles, antisubmarine warfare rocket 






launchers, and antisubmarine torpedo 








Japan 


2 


Ishikari class with Harpoon surface-to-surface 






nmccilf*c anticunmann* 1 warfare YCioitf^t 
llllooJJCo, aJ.lU.oU.LIIlla.XJJ.lC Walldi C ILIL-JVCL 






launcher, and antisubmarine torpedo tubes 


-do- 


1 


WlUAUcU Ucloo Willi iiul\\y\J (UlllOUUlllcU lilt 






system and antisubmarine torpedo tubes . . 


-do- 


11 


Tqiitii rlaQQ witH anti«!iiKmflnnp warfarp rrirlrpt 
io u/j u tiaoo vv 1 tj. i aiiiiouuiiicii iiic vvaiiai t iu^iv^i. 






launcher and antisubmarine torpedo tubes 


-do- 


2 


K.3ton clciss with 3,ntisiibrn.3.rin.c w3.rf3.rc rocket 






launcher and antisubmarine torpedo tubes 


-do- 






-UO- 


1 A 




-UO- 


t / 




-ao- 


c 
O 


... . 


-ao- 


1 9 


Fixed-wing aircraft 








United States 


DU 


P-2J 


-do- 


29 


EP-y 


-do- 


2 


TTP-9T 


-Hr>- 


3 




J _ 

-ao- 






j„ 
-ao- 


99 


TO on. /t to qa 


j„ 
-ao- 


90 


V<s_ 1 1 \A 


Japan 


4 


T TO 1 /1 A 


-do- 


Q 


KM-2 


-do- 


30 


YS-11T 


-do- 


10 


Helicopters 






HSS-2A/B 


-do- 


74 


V-107/A 


-do- 


4 


S-80 


-do- 


2 


OH-6D/J 


-do- 


10 


SH-60 


United States 


2 


S-61 


-do- 


10 



Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1989-90, London, 1989, 162-64. 



508 



Appendix 



Table 41. Major Air Self -Defense Force Equipment, 1989 

Estimated 

Country of Number in 

Type and Description Origin Inventory 

Ground- attack aircraft 

Mitsubishi F-l Japan 74 

Fighters 

F-15J/DJ United States 120 

F-4EJ -do- 125 

Reconnaissance aircraft 

RF-4EJ -do- 15 

Airborne early-warning aircraft 

E-2C -do- 8 

Transport aircraft 

C-l Japan 27 

YS-11 -do- 10 

C-130H United States 10 

Surface-to-air missiles 

Nike-J (being replaced by Patriots) -do- 180 

Air-to-air missiles 

Sparrow -do- n.a. 

Sidewinder -do- n.a. 

Air-defense systems 

Base Air Defense Ground Environment Japan 28 

(BADGE) control and warning units United States 

n.a. — not available. 

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1989-90, London, 1989, 162-64. 



509 



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Quarterly [Tokyo], 27, No. 1 , January-March 1980, 11-14. 

Takagi Yosuke. "Forcing Confessions in Japan," World Press 
Review, 36, No. 6, June 1989, 57. 

Takayama Satoshi. "The Soviet Union Smiles at Japan," Japan 
Quarterly [Tokyo], 33, No. 2, April-June 1986, 129-37. 

Takayanagi Kenzo. "A Century of Innovation: The Development 
of Japanese Law, 1868-1961." Pages 163-93 in Tanaka Hideo 
(ed.), The Japanese Legal System: Introductory Cases and Materials. 
Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1976. 

Van de Velde, James R. "Japan's Nuclear Umbrella: U.S. Ex- 
tended Nuclear Deterrence for Japan, "Journal of Northeast Asian 
Studies, 7, No. 4, Winter 1988, 16-39. 

van Wolferen, Karel G. The Enigma of Japanese Power: People and 
Politics in a Stateless Nation. New York: Knopf, 1989. 

von Mehren, Arthur Taylor (ed.). Law in Japan: The Legal Order 
in a Changing Society. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963. 

Wada Haruki. "Japanese-Soviet Relations and East Asian Secu- 
rity," Japan Quarterly [Tokyo], 30, No. 2, April-June 1983, 
188-92. 



570 



Bibliography 



Weinstein, Martin E. "The Evolution of the Japan Self-Defense 
Forces." Pages 41-63 in James H. Buck (ed.), The Modern Japanese 
Military System. Beverly Hills, California: Sage, 1975. 

(Various issues of the following publications were also used in 
the preparation of this chapter: Economist [London] 1989; Far Eastern 
Economic Review [Hong Kong], 1989-90; and the Foreign Broad- 
cast Information Service's Daily Report: East Asia, 1989-90.) 



571 



L 



Glossary 



Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) — Established in 
1967 to foster cooperation in food production, industry and 
commerce, civil aviation, shipping, tourism, communications, 
meteorology, science and technology, and Southeast Asian 
studies. The charter members were Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Brunei was admitted 
in 1984. Papua New Guinea has observer status. 

Bretton Woods System — A structure of fixed exchange rates de- 
veloped at the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference, which estab- 
lished the International Monetary Fund (q. v. ) and the World 
Bank (q.v.), and was in effect until 1971. 

bushido — Literally, the way of the warrior (samurai), a term ap- 
plied to the principles of loyalty and honor; a code of stoic en- 
durance, scorn of danger and death, religious worship of 
country and sovereign, and proper social relationships; an aes- 
thetic life- style. 

Diet — The national legislature. From 1890 to 1947, known as the 
Imperial Diet (in Japanese, Teikoku Gikai) with the appointed 
House of Peers and the elected House of Representatives; since 
1947, the National Diet or Diet (in Japanese, Kokkai) with the 
House of Councillors and the House of Representatives, both 
of which are elected. The word diet comes from the Latin dies 
(day), a reference to the period of time for which a court or 
assembly met. 

FY — Fiscal year. April 1 through March 31. 

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) — An interna- 
tional instrument, under United Nations (UN) auspices, es- 
tablishing rules of trade accepted by countries responsible for 
most of the world's trade; came into effect in 1948. Since 1968 
has operated in conjunction with the UN Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) to provide information and 
training on export markets, marketing techniques, and trade 
policy issues. GATT members have met in a series of "rounds" 
for multilateral trade negotiations since 1964. 

GDP — Gross domestic product. The total value of all final (con- 
sumption and investment) goods and services produced by an 
economy in a given period, usually a year. 

GNP — Gross national product. GDP (q.v.) plus income from over- 
seas investments minus the earnings of foreign investors in the 
home economy. 



573 



Japan: A Country Study 

International Monetary Fund (IMF) — Established along with the 
World Bank (q. v.) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency 
affiliated with the United Nations and is responsible for stabiliz- 
ing international exchange loans to its members (including in- 
dustrialized and developing countries) when they experience 
balance of payments difficulties. These loans frequently carry 
conditions that require substantial internal economic adjust- 
ments by the recipients, most of which are developing countries. 

juku — Privately established schools that teach either academic or 
nonacademic subjects. Academic^a offer tutorial, enrichment, 
remedial, and examination preparatory classes that supplement 
regular school work. Most hold classes after school and/or on 
weekends. 

Nihon (or Nippon) — The official pronunciation of the two Chinese 
ideographs (rtben in piny in romanization, literally, source of 
the sun) comprising the name Japan, as designated by the 
Ministry of Education, Culture, and Science, is Nippon (or 
in full, Nippon Koku — Nippon country). The common pronun- 
ciation in everyday usage, however, is Nihon (Nihon Koku). 
The use of Nihon antedates Prince Shotoku's seventh-century 
reference to himself as the Son of Heaven of the Land of the 
Rising Sun and possibly dates from the establishment of the 
Nihon-fu (Japan Office) in the Yamato (q. v. ) colony in southern 
Korea that served as a liaison office of the Yamato court to 
the Chinese court, probably as early as the sixth century. Marco 
Polo, or his scribe, referred to Zipangu (Ribenguo in pinyin 
romanization), which has variously appeared as Cipango, 
Jipangu, and Jipan, from which the current spelling of Japan 
undoubtedly descends. 

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) — Established in 1961 to promote economic and so- 
cial welfare among member countries (in 1990, Australia, Aus- 
tria, Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, Federal Republic 
of Germany, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United 
States) by assisting member governments in the formulation 
and coordination of policy; and to encourage member-nation 
support of developing (Third World) nations. 

ronin — Originally, a "wave person" or a masterless samurai, who 
has left the service of his lord, either by choice or forced cir- 
cumstances, and serves others with his bold and sometimes 
desperate deeds. In contemporary Japan, a student who has 
failed the entrance examination to the institution of choice and 



574 



Glossary 



has chosen to spend an additional year or more in study to take 
the examination again. 
seppuku — either voluntary (to expiate serious failure) or obligatory 
suicide (instead of execution) to regain one's honor in death. 
A privilege reserved for the samurai class. Commonly referred 
to as hara-kiri. 

World Bank — Informal name used to designate a group of three 
affiliated international institutions: the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International 
Development Association (IDA), and the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC). The IBRD, established in 1945, has the 
primary purpose of providing loans to developing countries for 
productive projects. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund but 
administered by the staff of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to 
furnish credits to the poorest developing countries on much eas- 
ier terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC, 
founded in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD 
through loans and assistance designed specifically to encourage 
the growth of productive private enterprises in the less devel- 
oped countries. The president and certain senior officers of the 
IBRD hold the same positions in the IFC . The three institu- 
tions are owned by the governments of the countries that sub- 
scribe their capital. To participate in the World Bank group, 
member states must first belong to the International Mone- 
tary Fund (IMF — q.v.). 

Yamato — Refers to the country of Japan or things Japanese, such 
as yamato-e (Japanese painting) and to the ancient court from 
which the imperial family rose. The Yamato court was situated 
either in modern Nara Prefecture, from the early fourth cen- 
tury A.D. , or in northern Kyushu, starting perhaps in the early 
third century A.D. 

yen (¥) — The national currency, in coins of 1, 5, 10, and 100 yen 
and notes of 500, 1,000, 5,000, and 10,000 yen. From 1945 
to 1971, Japan maintained a fixed parity to the United States 
dollar of US$1 = ¥360. After a period of adjustment during the 
financial crises of the 1971-73 period, the value has floated ac- 
cording to movements in the international capital markets. The 
exchange rate in August 1990 was ¥147 = US$1 . Fluctuations 
in recent years have been considerable, producing exchange 
rates for US$1 of ¥142 (August 1989), ¥134 (August 1988), 
¥149 (August 1987), ¥155 (August 1986), and ¥239 (August 
1985) 

yobiko — A type of private school that specializes in preparing high- 
school graduates for university-entrance examinations, often 
through intensive full-time programs. 



575 



Japan: A Country Study 

zaibatsu — Literally, ' 'wealth group." Zaibatsu were powerful indus- 
trial or financial combines that merged during the Meiji era 
and were implicated in the militarist regimes of the 1930s and 
1940s. They were an amalgamation of sometimes hundreds of 
businesses controlled by a holding company owned by a single 
family. The major zaibatsu were Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumimoto, 
and Yasuda. The zaibatsu were abolished in 1945 and 1946. 
After 1947, numerous companies formerly controlled by zaibatsu 
came together as keiretsu (enterprise groups) — conglomerates 
no longer controlled by a singe family and whose individual 
member companies had greater autonomy than they had had 
as part of a zaibatsu. 



576 



Index 



Abe Kobo, 190 

Abe Masahiro, 34, 35; opposition to, 35 
Abu Dhabi, 229 

acquired immune deficiency syndrome 

(AIDS), 125 
Administrative Management Agency, 355 
administrative reform, 344, 353 
aerospace industry {see also space pro- 
gram), 232, 234 
Afghanistan, Soviet invasion of, 291, 377, 

391, 398, 400, 404, 421 
AFL-CIO. See American Federation of 
Labor-Congress of Industrial Organi- 
zations 

Africa: aid to, 293-94; direct investment 
in, 279, 290; exports to, 290; imports 
from, 290 

Afro-Asian Conference (Bandung), 407 
Agency for Cultural Affairs, 165, 167; 

budget, 165; Cultural Affairs Division, 

165; preservation roster, 166 
age stratification, 121-23 
aging: of Japanese population, 223; of 

labor force, 223 
agriculture, 82, 199, 226, 337; labor force 

in, 204, 244; performance of, 231, 245; 

subsidies for, 204, 245 
Agriculture, Ministry of, 258 
agricultural cooperatives, 339 
agricultural production, 33, 245; crops, 79, 

81, 82; livestock, 246; self-sufficiency in, 

246 

agricultural products: import restrictions 

on, 266, 339; imported from United 

States, 283 
AIDS. See acquired immune deficiency 

syndrome 
Aikokusha (Society of Patriots), 42 
Ainu, 13, 93, 329, 335; handicrafts of, 

178; population of, 77 
Air Defense Command, 443-44 
Air Developing and Proving Command, 

443 

airlines, 236, 240 

Air Materiel Command, 443 

airports, 240 

Air Self-Defense Force, 429, 451, 452, 
455; materiel, 444; missions, 435, 444; 



number of, 443; training, 444; units of, 
443 

Air Support Command, 443 

Akahata (Red Flag), 361-62 

Akihito (Heisei emperor), 310, 332; ac- 
cession of, 310, 312, 470 

Akira (Otomoto), 192 

Akutagawa Prize, 167 

Alien Registration Law, 459 

Allied Expeditionary Force, 51 

All Nippon Airways, 240, 345 

amakudari, 213, 354 

Amami Islands, 72, 387 

Amaterasu Omikami (Sun Goddess), 4, 
11 

American Federation of Labor-Congress 
of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), 
340 

Ando Tadao, 169-70 
Ansei Reform, 35 
Anti-Comintern Pact, 58 
archaeology, 4, 166 

architecture, 168-70; in Meiji period, 168; 
in Muromachi culture, 23; New Wave, 
169; origins of Japanese style of, 4; 
skyscraper design, 168; synthesis of 
Western and traditional, 169; traditional 
styles, 168 

armed forces. See military 

art {see also under art forms): Chinese in- 
fluence on, 162; facilities for, 167-68; 
imitative, 164; individuality in, 98; in- 
ternational, 164; miniature forms, 162; 
patronage for, 167; schools, 165; struc- 
tural devices, 163; suggestion in, 163; 
synthesized Western and traditional, 
164; Zen Buddhist influence on, 164 

art, traditional, xxxii; endangered, on pres- 
ervation roster, 166; as mukei bunkazai, 
166-67; in Muromachi culture, 22-23; 
in popular culture, 117; taught to chil- 
dren, 132; technical virtuosity as hall- 
mark of, 165; training in, 165; under 
Tokugawa, 32 

art, Western, xxxii; in Meiji period, 164 

Article 9 ("no war" clause), 312, 375, 
421, 428 

artisans, 30 



577 



Japan: A Country Study 



artist, social status of, 164-65 

Arts Festival, 167 

Asahi Shimbun, 342, 364, 432 

Asanuma Inejiro, 364 

ASEAN. See Association of Southeast 

Asian Nations 
Ashikaga court, 180 
Ashikaga School (Ashikaga Gakko), 133 
Ashikaga Takauji, 21 
Ashikaga Yoshimitsu, 22; restoration of 

order under, 22; reunification of north 

and south under, 22; trade with Chinese 

under, 22 

Asia: aid to, 293-94, 409, 413; exports 
to, 285; imports to, 285; investment in, 
286; trade surplus with, 286 

Asia, Southeast: Chinese support for, 398; 
Japanese support for, 398; deforestation 
of, 85; strategic position of, 391 

Asia, Southwest: Chinese support for, 
398; Japanese support for, 398 

Asian Development Bank, xxx, 262, 263, 
415, 416 

Asia-Pacific: balance of power in, 370; 

direct investment in, 279 
Association of Repatriates, 335 
Association of Shinto Shrines, 101 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations 

(ASEAN), xxxv, 294, 398, 408; aid to, 

408- 9 

associations: merchant, 115; neighbor- 
hood, 115; shrine, 115; women's, 120 
Asuka, 7, 10, 166 
Asuka STOL jet, 234 
Atelier Miura, 179 
Atsumi Kiyoshi, 192 
Austin, Lewis, 334 

Australia, 455; economic involvement in, 

409- 10; imports from, 282; investment 
in, 288-89; nuclear technology imported 
from, 229; trade surplus with Japan, 288 

automobile manufacturing (see also motor 
vehicles), xxxi, 198, 204, 207, 232 

automobiles, 236, 250; exports of, 259, 
268, 279, 283 

aviation, civil, 240; passengers, 240 

awamori, 339 

Axis powers, 374 

Azuchi, 25 

Azuchi-Momoyama period, 25 
Bachnik, Jane, 113, 117 



Bahamas, 290 

bakufu, Ashikaga, 21-22, 23, 25; art 
under, 172; Muromachi culture under, 
22 

bakufu, Kamakura, 17-18, 21; attempt to 
expand, 18; control of imperial court 
by, 18; decline of, 21; foreign affairs 
under, 20; loss of power, 18 

bakufu, Tokugawa, 27, 34, 329; abolished, 
36, 37; damage to, 35; disruption of, 
34; increase in government by, 31 

bakuhan, 28 

balance of payments, 265, 273-82, 276, 
387; capital flows in, 274; deficit, 257; 
long-term capital account, 276 

balance of power: in Asia-Pacific, 370 

Bandai-Asahi National Park, 78 

Bando Tamasaburo, 187 

Bangladesh, 294 

banking system: commercial banks, 209, 
214; control of, 353; long-term credit 
banks, 209, 210; mutual loan and sav- 
ings banks, 209, 210; trust banks, 209, 
210 

Bank of Japan, 205, 209, 258, 277 
Bank of Tokyo, 209 
bar hopping, 94, 116 
Basic Agricultural Law, 245 
Basic Air Defense Ground Environment, 
444 

Basic Atomic Energy Law, 429 

Basic Policy for National Defense, 434 

Baykal, Lake, 50 

Beckett, Samuel, 186 

Beiping (see also Beijing), 58, 425 

Bellah, Robert, 104 

Bering Sea, 48 

Besshi copper mine, 81 

Betsuyaku Minoru, 186 

Biddle, James, 34 

biotechnology, 232, 233 

biwa, 180 

Biwa, Lake, 25, 74 

Board of Audit, 318 

Board of Audit Law, 318 

Board of House Administrators, 26 

Board of Mediators, 26 

Board of Regents, 26 

Bolshevik Revolution, 50 

Bon Festival, 108 

Bonin Islands (Ogasawara Islands), 72, 

387, 388 
Booker Prize, 190 



578 



Index 



books, 342 

Boxer Uprising, 47 

Brady Plan (1989), 262, 290 

Brazil, 289 

Bretton Woods System, 256, 271, 272, 
280 

Brezhnev, Leonid I., 405 

Britain, 223; agreements with, 50; deteri- 
oration of relations with, 58; exports, 
282, 286; exports as percentage of 
GNP, 267; imports from, 286; invest- 
ment by, in United States, 285; Japan 
as ally of, 54, 374; political relations 
with, 47 

British Trades Union Congress, 340 

Broadcasting Law (1950), 193, 243 

Brunei, xxxv, 228, 408 

Buddha, Amida, 20 

Buddha Dainichi, 11 

Buddhism, xxvii, 31, 32, 100, 101-4; 
adoption of, 8, 11; ancestral and funer- 
ary rites, 104, 107-8; and art, 131; 
clergy, 104; festivals, 108; in Kamakura 
period, 19-20; influence of, xxxii, 101, 
131; introduction of, xxvii, 7, 133; music 
in, 180; origin of, 101; "poignancy of 
things," 131, 190-91; prohibitions 
against killing, 91; resistance to, 8; 
resurgence of, 37-38; spread of, 12; syn- 
creted with Shinto, 11; temples, 104; 
three treasures of, 11; values, 104; world 
view, 101 

Buddhism, Heian, 18-20 

Buddhism, Jodo (Pure Land), 19-20, 
101-4 

Buddhism, Nara, 11 

Buddhism, Nichiren Shoshu, 64, 101-4, 
106, 336, 360 

Buddhism, Shingon (True Word), 12, 23 

Buddhism, Tendai (Heavenly Terrace), 12 

Buddhism, Zen, 18-20, 106; appeal of, for 
samurai, 104; artistic forms in, 131, 176; 
importance of education in, 133; in- 
fluences of, 22; influence of, on art, 
163-64, 174; in poetry, 189; priests, 22 

Buddhist commentary, 187 

budget process, 356 

bugaku, 180 

bullying, 145, 147, 150 

Bungei Shunju (Literary Annals), 342 

bunraku (puppet) theater, xxxii, 32, 180, 

182-83; elements of, 182; women in, 

183 



burakumin, 90, 91-93, 329, 334; discrimi- 
nation against, 91; identification of, 92; 
isolation of, 92; liberation of, 92-93 

Burakumin Liberation League, 92, 335 

bureaucracy. See civil service 

Bureau for Investigation of Constitutional 
Systems, 43 

burial chambers, 6 

Burma, 407 

buses, 239 

Bush, George, 391 

bushi. See samurai 

bushido. See also under samurai, 422-23; de- 
velopment of, 31, 423; legacy of, xxvii, 
422, 423 

butoh dance, 185-86 



cabinet, 317-18, 458; responsibilities of, 
for foreign affairs, 378 

Cabinet Law, 436 

Cabinet Legislative Bureau, 318 

Calder, Kent, 336, 337, 338 

calligraphy, xxxii, 174; Bokusho abstract 
school of, 174; incorporated into paint- 
ing, 173, 174; styles of, 174; Zen Bud- 
dhist influence on, 174 

Cambodia, xxxv, 398, 411-12 

Canada, 455; balance of trade with Japan, 
285; cooperation of, in space program, 
244; exports as percentage of GNP, 267; 
imports from, 282; investment by, in 
United States, 285; limits by, on Japa- 
nese imports, 295; nuclear technology 
imported from, 229 

capital flows, 275-80, 281; controls on, 
278; decontrol of, 278; direct invest- 
ment, 279; effect of government policy 
on, 277-78; foreign-exchange reserves, 
277; gold reserves, 277; growth of, 276; 
long-term, 276; short-term, 277 

capital markets: liberalization of, 278; par- 
ticipation in, 276 

capital movements, 276 

Caroline Islands, 50, 424 

casties, 25 

Central Association of Korean Residents 

in Japan, 335 
Central Council on Education, 138 
Central Japan Railway Company, 236 
Central Procurement Office, 451 
Central Union of Agricultural Coopera- 
tives, 339 



579 



Japan: A Country Study 



ceramics, 176-78; Chinese influence, 177; 

folk movement in, 177; glazes, 177; 

Jomon ware, 176; Korean influence, 

176, 177-78; porcelain, 176; stoneware, 

176; Yayoi ware, 176 
"ceramic wars," 176 
Chang'an, 10, 12 
Chang Jiang (Yangtze River), 46 
Charter Oath: implementation of, 37; 

provisions of, 36-37 
chemicals, 204, 207, 398 
Chemulpo (Inch' on), 48 
cherry blossoms, 56, 131 
Chiang Kai-shek, 55 
Chikamatsu Monzaemon, 32, 182, 184, 

188 

children: arts training of, 132; custody of, 
120; inheritance by, 112; marriage by, 
112; neighborhood activities of, 115 

China (see also under individual dynasties; see 
also China, People's Republic of; Sino- 
Japanese War; Taiwan), 23, 53, 73, 
110; anti-Japanese riots in, 51; disputes 
with, 41; end of Japan's subordination 
to, 8; Hideyoshi's desire to conquer, 
27; neutrality toward, 54; as part of 
Japanese empire, 199, 424; relations 
with, 20, 46; Russo-Japanese rivalry 
over, 403 

China, People's Republic of: aid to, 294, 
392; containment of, 393; cultural revo- 
lution in, 395; economic development 
in, 397; imports from, 282; investment 
in, 291, 301; nuclear force, 430; pol- 
icy toward, 394; rapprochement with 
United States, 64, 389, 393; security 
problem, 430; trade deficit, 399; trade 
with, xxxvi, 290-91, 395-96; war repa- 
rations demands, 395 

Chinese: discrimination against, 90; refu- 
gees, 91 

Chinese influence, xxvii, 13-14; end of, 
14; on Japanese culture, 3, 22, 133; on 
Japanese expansion, 6; on Japanese 
government, 3, 6, 13; on literature, 
188; on Yamato culture, 7, 8; on Yayoi 
culture, 5 

Chinese traders, 30 

Chinese writing system, xxvii, 133, 187 

chonin class, 33, 188 

chonindo, 31-32 

Choshu, 36, 37, 38, 44 

Christianity, 27, 30, 100, 106; impact of, 



24; legalized, 38; suppression of, 24-25, 
29, 30, 32, 106 

Christians: execution of, 30; number of, 
106; persecution of, 30 

Chronicle of the Direct Descent of the Di- 
vine Sovereigns. See Jinno shoto ki 

Chrysler, 295 

Chubu, 78-79; Hokuriku district, 79; 

Tokai district, 79; Tosan district, 79 
Chugoku, 80 

Chukakuha (Middle Core Faction), 470 

Chuo koron (Central Review), 342 

Churchill, Winston, 306 

Churitsu Roren. See Federation of Inde- 
pendent Labor Unions 

C. Itoh, 260 

citizen movements, 341 

Civil Code of 1948: women's rights in, 
xxx, 120 

civil disturbances, 456, 462, 469-70; 
decrease in, after occupation, 64; dem- 
onstrations for universal male suffrage, 
51; under Meiji oligarchy, 41; peace- 
ful demonstrations, 469; put down by 
force, 330; under Tokugawa, 33, 34, 
36, 330 

civil rights, 307 

civil servants, 350-54; categories of, 318; 
typical, 351 

civil servants, elite, 343, 346, 351, 353; 
administrative vice ministers, 351; cir- 
culation of, 333; private lives sacrificed 
by, 355; public's attitude toward, 351 

civil service, 97, 350, 351-54; examina- 
tions, 351; politicization of, 353; as 
power behind National Diet, 352; ties 
of, with interest groups and parties, 
335, 354; under Tokugawa, 33 

clans (see also under names of individual fam- 
ilies), 3; power of, under Hqjo, 21 

clan system, 15 

climate, xxvii, 82-83; influencing factors, 

83; precipitation, 83; seasons, 82-83 
coal, 81, 200, 227-28, 398, 399 
CoCom. See Coordinating Committee for 

Multilateral Export Controls 
Code of Criminal Instruction (1880), 466 
Code of Criminal Procedures, 472 
Cold War, 61, 375, 428; end of, 377 
Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic 

and Social Development in Asia and the 

Pacific, 407, 415 
Columbia Pictures, 353 



580 



Index 



comic books. See manga 

Comintern. See Communist International 

Commerce and Industry, Ministry of, 258 

Commission on US-Japan Relations for 
the Twenty First Century, 385 

communications: in feudal period, 24; 
modernization of, 39-40 

Communications and Broadcasting Satel- 
lite Organization, 193 

communist countries: exports to, 291; im- 
ports from, 291 

Communist International (Comintern), 
52-53 

community: consciousness, 330; egalitar- 
ian, 332; hierarchical, 332; inclusive- 
ness, 330; survival, 330 

company song, 116 

competition: avoidance of, 94; suppres- 
sion of, 95 
computers, xxxi, 207, 232, 298-99; arti- 
ficial intelligence project, 197; develop- 
ment of industry, 298; export of, 283, 
298; growth of, 201; imports of, 298; in 
lower-secondary schools, 146; manufac- 
turers, 298; in primary schools, 145; as 
subject of trade disputes, 298-99 
Conference of Prefectural Governors, 42 
confessions, forced, 328-29, 464, 472 
Confucianism {see also neo-Confucianism), 
38, 100, 104-6; in education, 134; em- 
phasis of, 96; essence of, 104; ideals of, 
131-32; influence of, xxxii, 8, 96, 104, 
131, 205; in Tokugawa period, 31 
Confucius, 104 

conscription: established, 423; in Nara 

period, 11 
consensus: importance of, 94; process, 

334 
constables, 22 

Constitutional Study Mission, 43 
Constitution of 1947, xxxii, 60, 306-14, 
435; academic freedom under, 313, 
314; Article 9 ("no war" clause), 312, 
312, 428; attempts to revise, 308; Diet 
under, 309, 314; duties and rights in, 
313-14; education in, 137; foreign af- 
fairs under, 378; MacArthur draft of, 
307-8; proscription of military in, 199, 
312; welfare rights, 313-14; women's 
rights in, xxx, 120, 314 
construction, 198, 200, 227; investment 
in, 227; projects, 227; starts, 227; tech- 
nology, 227; trade agreement on, xxxiv 



Construction, Ministry of, 258; respon- 
sibilities of, 205-6 

consumer: credit industry, 249; move- 
ments, 341; products, 250; services, 
neglect of, 203-4 

Constitution of the Empire of Japan. See 
Meiji Constitution (1889) 

Convention on Law of the Sea, 410 

cooperation: importance of, 94; self-control 
in, 99 

Coordinating Committee for Multilateral 
Export Controls (CoCom), 292 

corporate system: elite in, 354; groupings, 
214; and government, 337 

corporations, large, 216; competitive ex- 
aminations for, 216-17; employees of, 
216; training by, 216 

corporations, private, 213-16; auditing 
system, 216; corporation, 213-14; cross- 
holding of stock by, 215; number of, 
213; overborrowing by, 215; relations 
among, 214-15, 215; relationship of, 
with labor union, 225; research and 
development funded by, 230; single 
proprietorships, 213 

corporations, public, 212-13, 318; bene- 
fits of, to economy, 213; development 
corporations, 213; number of, 212; 
problems with, 213; public service cor- 
porations, 212-13 

cost of living, 86-87, 247-48; food prices, 
248; household expenditures, 248 

Council of Elders, 42 

Council of State, 18, 37, 42, 43 

Course of Study for Elementary Schools, 
144 

Course of Study for Lower- Secondary 
Schools, 146, 147 

Course of Study for Preschools, 141 

Course of Study for Upper- Secondary 
Schools, 146, 147 

court system, 435; appeal in, 473; fam- 
ily courts, 471; judges in, 472; lower 
courts, 471; overburdened, 326-27; 
penalties, 473 

crime, 467-69; categories, 467; juvenile 
delinquency, 469, 473; most common, 
467-68; white-collar, 468; yakuza, 469 

crime rate, xxxii, 422, 456; decreasing, 
456, 468; factors in, 468 

criminal justice procedure, 471-73 

criminal justice system, 456, 465-67; 
agency cooperation, 466; citizen partici- 
pation, 466; confessions, forced, 328-29, 



581 



Japan: A Country Study 



464, 472; courts in, 471; discretion of 
officials, 466; German influence on, 
467; juveniles in, 471, 473; under Meiji 
Restoration, 466-67; prosecution, 472; 
prosecutors, 472; rights of accused, 
467, 471-72 
Cultural Medal, 166 
Cultural Properties Foundation, 167 
Cultural Properties Protection Act (1897), 
166 

Cultural Properties Protection Division, 
166, 167 

Cultural Village, 168 

culture, traditional {see also under individ- 
ual activities), xxxii 

current account balance, 282; formula for, 
275; net transfers, 274; surplus, 281; 
value of yen in, 280-81 



Daigo (emperor), 14 

Dai-Ichi Kangyo, 214 

Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, 261 

daimyo, 22, 23, 34, 176; assumption of 
government by, 37; classes of, 28; con- 
trol of land by, 24; conversion to Chris- 
tianity by, 24; criminal justice under, 
466; defeat of, 25; investment by, 45- 
46; laws regulating, 29, 30; under Meiji 
Restoration, 39 

Daini Denden, 244 

Daiwa, 210-11, 261 

Dalian (Port Arthur), 47, 48 

dance: ballet, 185; butoh, 184; jazz, 185; 
Kabuki, 184; modern, 195; traditional, 
184-85 

Daoism, 100, 104, 106 

Darien. See Dalian, 47 

Dazai Osamu, 190 

death, causes of, 87 

Defense Agency, 66, 318, 379, 421, 429, 
430-31, 435-39, 446, 450, 453; duties 
of, 436; members of, 436; structure of, 
436, 437; subordinate to civilian au- 
thority, 436 

Defense Facilities Administration Agency, 
451 

Defense Facilities Officer, 436 
defense industry, 451-54; contracts in, 
453; dismantled, 428; equipment, 452; 
objectives for, 452; origins of post-war, 
451-52; output, 453; weapons for ex- 
port, 453-54 



Defense Policy, Bureau of, 436 

defense spending, 65, 199, 230-31, 
447-51; budget, 451; build-up plans, 
450; ceiling, 432; ceiling abandoned, 
432; increase in, 450; lower priority, 
450; qualitative improvements, 450; 
share of budget, 450 

Delors, Jacques, xxxv 

Democratic Merchants and Manufac- 
turers Association, 338 

Democratic Party (Minshuto), 61, 63 

Democratic Socialist Party, 65, 336, 340, 
357, 361, 362, 382 

Deng Xiaoping, 394 

Department of Rites, 10 

Department of State, 10 

dependency ratio, 87-88 

Deshima: Rangaku school in, 32; trade 
restricted to, 30 

diet, 248-49 

Diet (legislature). See Imperial Diet; Na- 
tional Diet 

diplomatic service, requirements for ad- 
mission to, 379 

diplomacy: toward Asia, 375; omnidirec- 
tional, 375 

diplomats, 40, 318 

discipline, 200; in school, 144, 149 

discrimination, 71, 90-93; against Ainu, 
93; against burakumin, 90, 150; in edu- 
cation, 147, 150; against foreign resi- 
dents, 90-91; against Japanese who 
have lived abroad, 90, 147 

divorce: rate, 113; and women, 120 

Doi Takako, xxxvi, 317, 339, 357, 360; 
background of, 359; popularity of, 359; 
support of, for ties with Koreas, 359 

Doko Toshio, 355 

Domei. See Japan Confederation of Labor 
Domestic Relations and Inheritance Law 

(1898), 112 
Doshisha University, 184 
Dostoevsky, Fyodor, 186, 187 
DRAMs. See dynamic random-access 

memory units 
Dreams (Kurosawa), 191 
Dunhuang, China, 167 
Dutch: arrival of, 24; restriction on trade 

by, 30 
Dutch East Indies, 426 
dynamic random- access memory units 

(DRAMs), 299 



582 



Index 



earthquakes, 83-84 

East Japan Railway Company, 236 

East European Development Bank, 416 

economic activity, 33 

economic aggression, 370 

economic development, 198, 226; goal of, 
198; government influence in, 204; 
post- World War II, 200, 256; and sense 
of vulnerability, 272, 273 

economic exchanges, 384 

economic growth, xxviii, 65, 408; Minis- 
try of Finance role in, 208; problems 
with, 203 

Economic Planning Agency, 258, 436 

economic power, 386, 406 

economic problems, 52, 53 

economic reforms, 372 

economic relations, factors shaping, 255 

economic restructuring, 197 

economy: changes in domestic, 255-56; 
changes in international, 255-56; em- 
phasis, 197; government mechanisms 
to affect, 206; rising power of, 386 

Eda Saburo, 358 

Edo {see also Tokyo), 27, 29, 35; chonindo 

culture in, 31-32; population of, 31 
Edo Bay, 34 

education (see also under type of school), xxxi- 
xxxii, 200; academic achievement, 132; 
adult, xxxii; beliefs about 142-43; of 
commoners, in Tokugawa period, 134; 
curricula, 143, 144, 145; demands made 
by, 143; democratization of, 135; fund- 
ing for, 139, 158; health care in, 143; 
Japanese values in, 134; lifelong, xxxii, 
160, 161; literature in, 188; moral 
values in, xxxii, 135; reform of, 159; 
of samurai, 133-34; school year, 141- 
42; textbooks, 143; twentieth century, 
135; Western style, 134 

education, early childhood: day care, 141; 
at home, 141; Montessori method, 135; 
preschool, 1414 

education, graduate, 157-58, 158-59, 
216; and competitiveness, 161; enroll- 
ment, 157-58; issues in reform of, 160- 
61; women in, 158 

education, higher (see also universities), 
xxxii, 133; admissions processes, 155; 
campus unrest, 136, 388; college en- 
trance, 152-55; competition, 152-54; 
elitism in, 135; entrance examinations 
for, 152, 154; internationalization of, 



160; junior college, 156; liberal, 135; 
miscellaneous schools, 156-57; private 
institutions, 152; public national 
universities, 152; quality of, 159; re- 
form, 159-61; special training schools, 
158; technical college, 157; universities, 
155-56; for women, 135 
education, moral, xxxii, 144, 146; abol- 
ished, 135; reinstated, 136; venues for, 
139 

education, public: development of, 134 

education reform, 136-37, 159-61; edu- 
cational aspects, 137; recommendations 
for, 159-60; social aspects, 137 

Education, Science, and Culture, Minis- 
try of (Monbusho), 136, 137, 139, 140, 
141, 158-59, 165, 311, 354; budget, 
139; conflict of, with Japan Teachers 
Union, 140-41; control by, 327; pow- 
ers of, 138; reform implemented by, 
138; responsibilities of, 138, 158-59; 
right to determine curriculum, 326 

education, social, 161-62; availability of, 
161-62; miscellaneous schools for, 161; 
responsibility for, 161 

education, special, 147-48; mainstream- 
ing, 147; private schools, 148; public 
schools, 147-48 

education system: legal foundation of, 
137; local boards in, 138; prefectural 
boards in, 138; problems in, 136; struc- 
ture of, 132 

Eguchi Takaya, 185 

Egypt: aid to, 294, 391 

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 388 

elderly, 121-23; employment of, 122, 224; 
health insurance for, 124; living arrange- 
ments, 122-23; medical care, 123; 
respect for, 122; suicide among, 122 

elections: first national, 44; House of Rep- 
resentatives, 347; Liberal Democratic 
Party in, 347 

Election Systems Research Council, 355 

electoral districts, 323-24; distribution, 
323; reapportionment, 324 

electoral system, 320-24; age require- 
ments for candidates, 321; campaigns, 
323, 346; elections, 321-23; political 
funding, 321-23, 360; types of elec- 
tions, 320; voting age, 320 

electronic components, xxxi 

electronics, 204; import restrictions on, 
266 



583 



Japan: A Country Study 



electronics, consumer, xxxi, 232, 296-98; 

export of, 296; foreign investment in, 

296-98; growth of, 201 
Emishi. See Ainu 

emperor, xxviii, 166, 422, 470; divinity 
repudiated, 60, 101, 110, 308; rever- 
ing, 36, 55; role of, 110, 307, 308-12; 
as symbol of unity, 36, 307; succession, 
10, 310; Tokugawa power over, 28-29 
Emperor's Private Office, 13, 14 
empire, twentieth century, xxviii-xxix, 
199 

Employee Pension Insurance Plan, 125 
employees, permanent, 217; bonuses, 220; 
changing attitudes, 222-23; compensa- 
tion for, 217, 223; evaluation of, 217; 
fringe benefits, 220; job switching by, 
222-23; of large corporations, 216; 
layoffs of, 218; loyalty, 222; promotion 
of, 217, 218; qualifications, 217; retire- 
ment, 218, 223-24; training of, 217; 
working conditions, 220; working hours, 
220 

employment, 116, 197; in agriculture, 
244; bosses, 116; lifetime model, 116, 
117, 330; mandatory retirement, 116, 
122; permanent, 217; small business as 
provider of, 215; team effort, 116; and 
university background, 152, 216 

Endo Shusaku, 190 

energy, 228-29; coal, 228, 270; consump- 
tion, 228, 229; electric, 200, 228, 229; 
geothermal, 229; hydroelectric, 74, 81, 
228; importation of, 271; natural gas, 
79, 227, 228-29; nuclear, 207, 227, 
228, 229; oil, 79, 228, 270; price in- 
crease in, 257 
Ensemble Nipponica, 183 
entertainment, 118; bar hopping as, 94; 
in late twentieth century, 71; under 
Tokugawa, 33 
Enthronement Ceremony, 310 
entrance examinations, 152, 154; debate 
over, 154-55; kinds of, 154; prepara- 
tion for, 154 
Entry and Exit Control Law, 459 
Environmental Agency, 85, 341 
environmental disasters, 84, 341 
environmental issues, 204; citizens' move- 
ments regarding, 84-85, 229; public 
perception of, 85-86 
Equal Employment Opportunity Law, 
120 



Equipment, Bureau of, 436 
Ethnological Museum, 167 
Etorofu (see also Kuril Islands), xxxv, 72, 

400-3 
Eto Shimpei, 41 

Europe: "learning mission" to, 40; stu- 
dents in, 198 

European Commission, xxxv 

European Community, xxxv; cooperation 
with, xxxv; trade with Japan after 
EC92, 287, 295, 414 

Europe, Eastern: aid to, 413-14; collapse 
of communism in, 349, 369, 381, 385; 
support for, 391; trade with, 290 

Europe, Western: cooperation of, in space 
program, 244; direct investment in, 
287; exports to, 286; imports from, 
286; involvement in Japanese product 
development, 233; relations with, 414; 
restrictions by, on Japanese imports, 
287, 295; trade deficits with Japan, 287 

exchange rate: determining import levels, 
271; fixed, 257, 281; in 1971, 281; in 
1973, 281 

Exim Bank. See Japan Export-Import 
Bank 

Expo '70. See Osaka International Expo- 
sition 

export policy, xxi, 264-65; incentives, 

264; restraining, 264-65 
export products, 269; demand for, 268; 

price competitiveness of, 268; quality 

of, 268 

exports, xxx, 267-69; aggressive backing 
of, 268-69; destinations of, 282; growth 
of, 257, 267, 268; importance of, 207; 
limits on, 295; nature of, 255; to pay 
for imports, 255; as percentage of 
GNP, xxxi, 267; promotion of, 264; to 
the United States, 265, 282, 384; value 
of, during 1960s, 256; and value of yen, 
277 

Ezoe Hiromasa, 321 



face, 114 

factions in Liberal Democratic Party, 345; 
in election campaigns, 346; funding by, 
345; leaders, 345; number of, 345; ser- 
vices, 345 

Fair Trade Commission, 214, 258, 379 
family, 111-14; beyond life of current 
members, 112, 113; business, 117; 



584 



Index 



changes in, after World War II, 71; as 
focus of leisure activities, 118; forms, 
111-12; gender roles in, 113, 114; 
households, 112-13; mother-child ties 
in, 113; planning, 87; rural, 114; size, 
87; uchi and, 111 
Family Game, The (Morita), 192 
farm: households, 245; population, 245 
farmers, 30; income of, 219, 244; rice 

production by, 245; riots by, 38, 41 
farmland, 245 
February 26th Incident, 58 
Federal Republic of Germany. See West 
Germany 

Federation of Economic Organizations 
(Keidanren), 337, 339, 355, 383, 453, 
454; Defense Production Committee, 
453 

Federation of Independent Labor Unions 
(Churitsu Roren), 225 

fertility rate, 87 

festivals. See matsuri 

feudal economy, xxviii 

feudal period, 17, 23-24; emperor in, 
311; foreign policy in, 371; hierarchy, 
28; infrastructure in, 23; legacy of, 
305-6; society, 3; trade in, 24 

film, 71; animated, 191; foreign, 191; por- 
nographic, 191; production, 191; Tora- 
san series, 192 

Finance, Bureau of, 436 

Finance, Ministry of, 65, 208, 258, 279, 
352, 379, 464; Budget Bureau, 208, 356; 
responsibilities of, 205, 353; role of, in 
economic growth, 208; Tax Bureau, 208 

financial institutions, xxix, 261-62, 318, 
377, 415; city banks, 261; controls, 261; 
government- owned, 261; investment 
houses, 261; life insurance companies, 
261; loans by, to Latin America, 290 

financial system, 209 

Fiscal Investment and Loan Program, 
208 

fiscal policy, 207-8 

fishing, 82, 83, 226; catches, 246; sea 

farming, 246-47 
Five Power Naval Disarmament Treaty, 

54, 424 

flower arranging, xxxii; in Muromachi 

culture, 23 
Flying Training Command, 443 
folk: art movement, 177, 179; dance, 183; 

music, 183 



food: imports of, 271; processing, 232, 

234; under Tokugawa, 33 
Ford, 295 

foreign affairs: economic nature of, 383; 
independence in, 382-83, 387; influ- 
ence of domestic policies on, 381 

Foreign Affairs, Ministry of, 258, 309, 
379, 379, 383, 384, 406; Foreign Ser- 
vice Training Institute, 378; Informa- 
tion Analysis, Research, and Planning 
Bureau, 378-79; staff, 378; Treaties 
Bureau, 378 

foreign aid, 274-75, 369; bilateral, 293, 
408; budget, 293; components of, 293; 
conduct of, 378; constraints, 408; dis- 
tribution of, 293-94; growth, 293, 414; 
motivation for, 414; responsibility for, 
386; strategic, 377; tied, 293; untied, 
293; use of, 294 

foreign aid institutions, 262 

foreign aid program, xxxi, 292-94; repa- 
rations payments as original, 293 

foreign exchange: marketing, 281; mar- 
kets, 277; reserves, 277; Tokyo mar- 
ket, 261; and value of yen, 280 

Foreign Exchange and Foreign Control 
Law, 278 

foreign influence, 305 

foreign policy, xxxiii, 369; close cooper- 
ation with United States in, 375; con- 
sensus in, 379; economic independence 
and, 375; feudal, 371; goals of, 375; 
groups opposing, 382; independent of 
United States, 376; influence of new 
generation on, 370; international co- 
operation in, 375; Japan Socialist Party 
position on, 381; Liberal Democratic 
Party's role in, 383; need to revamp, 
370, 377-78; public opinion of, 383; 
responsibilities for, 378-79; role of geo- 
graphy in, 371; after World War I, 53 

foreign relations, xxxv; independence in, 
371; under Meiji oligarchy, 40 

foreign residents: alien registration cards 
for, 91 

forest products: import restrictions on, 
266 

forestry: performance of, 231 
Forestry and Fisheries, Ministry of, 258 
forests, 81, 226, 246 
Four Power Treaty on Insular Posses- 
sions, 47, 54 



585 



Japan: A Country Study 



France, 50; exports as percentage of 
GNP, 267; imports from, 286; Japan 
as ally of, 54; nuclear technology im- 
ported from, 229 

Francis Xavier (saint), 24 

freight, 239 

FSX, 234, 393, 451, 452; controversy, 

452-53 
fudai, 28, 35, 36 
Fuji Bank, 261 
Fujimoto Yoshimichi, 177 
Fuji, Mount, 74, 131 
Fujian Province (China), 47 
Fujisan. See Fuji, Mount 
Fuji-Sankei, 167, 214 
Fujisawa Mitsu, 305 
Fujitsu, 298 
Fujiwara, 166 

Fujiwara family, 11, 17, 58; destruction 
of, 17; growth of power of, 14; support 
of, by samurai, 16; war against, 18 

Fujiwara Kamatari, 9 

Fujiwara Michinaga, 14 

Fujiwara Nakamaro, 12 

Fujiwara regency, 12-15; art under, 15; 
culture under, 14; decline of, 16 

Fujiwara Yorinaga, 17 

Fukuda Takeo, 346, 347 

Fukui, 79 

Fukuzawa Yukichi, 40, 305 
Fundamental Law of Education, 137 
funeral mounds, 6 
funerals, 107 
Furui Yoshikichi, 190 
Fushima, 26 
fusuma, 179 



GATT. See General Agreement on Tariffs 

and Trade 
GDP. See gross domestic product 
geisha, 32, 183 
gender roles, 113 
gender stratification, 118-21 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 

(GATT), xxx, 262, 265, 415, 416; 

guidelines, 264-65; tariff-cutting under, 

265 

General Council of Trade Unions of 
Japan (Sohyo), 225, 336, 340, 360 

Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), 
280, 291 

General Motors, 295 



gengo system, 310 

Genji monogatari (Tale of Genji) (Mura- 

saki), 15, 111, 188, 192 
Genpei War, 17 
genro, 44, 45, 48, 49, 51 
Gen'yosha (Black Ocean Society), 55 
geography: artificial islands, 74; natural 

harbors, 74; Omote-Nihon (face of 

Japan), 73, 78; regions, 77-82; role of, 

in foreign policy, 371 ; Ura-Nihon (back 

of Japan), 73, 79 
Germany (see also East Germany; West 

Germany), 58; influence of, on Meiji 

Constitution, 43 
giri (duty), 97-98; conflict of, with ninjo, 

98 

Global Club, 363 
Globe Theater, 168, 186 
GNP. See gross national product 
Gorbachev, Mikhail, xxxv, 292, 400, 405 
Go-Daigo, 21; exiled, 21; rebellion, 21 
Godzilla, 192 
Go-Sanjo (emperor), 16 
government: attitudes toward, 205; and 
business, 337; cabinet, 317-18; control 
on family by, 112; mechanisms of, for 
affecting economy, 206; ministries, 
317-18; National Diet, 314-17; reor- 
ganization of, 42, 43; research and de- 
velopment funded by, 230-31; unitary 
system of, 319 
government-business relations, conduct 
of, 205 

government, local, 318-20; administra- 
tive divisions, 318-19; assembly, 319; 
cities, 319; governor, 319; mayor, 319; 
subsidies, 319; towns, 319; villages, 319 

Governors' Conference, 38 

Graduate School for Advanced Studies, 
161 

Great Depression, xxviii, 199 
Greater East Asia Conference, 59 
Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere, 

58-59; inability to sustain, 60 
Greater East Asia Ministry, 59 
Great Thanksgiving Festival, 310-11 
Gromyko, Andrei, 405 
gross domestic product (GDP), 200 
gross national product (GNP), 72, 197; 
exports as percentage of, xxxi; growth 
in, xxxiv, 65; of Japan, 384; loans as 
percentage of, 208; ODA as percentage 
of, 413; research and development as 



586 



Index 



percentage of, 230; of United States, 
384 

Ground Self-Defense Force, 429, 439- 41, 
451, 455; missions, 435; number of, 
439, 441; organization of, 439; struc- 
ture of, 439; training, 441 

group: bar hopping and, 94; conflict, 
334-35; consciousness, 330-31; ideol- 
ogy of harmony in, 95; importance of, 
94; and individual, conflicts between, 
98; Japanese nation as, 332; problems 
within, 95-96; in school, 144; solidar- 
ity, 330; symbols of, 94; requirements 
for working in, 94 

group identity: hierarchical relations in, 
332; use of rituals to develop, 331-32 

Group of Seven, 415 

growth rate: factors affecting, 201; in 
1980s, 201 

growth strategies, 202 

GSP. See Generalized System of Pref- 
erences 

Guadalcanal, 426 

Guandong Army: international reaction 
to, 56; popular support for, 56; ultra- 
nationalist activities of, 55, 56, 425 

Guandong Territory, 48 

Guidelines for Japan-United States De- 
fense Cooperation, 390, 455 

guilds, 24 

gun-control laws, 456, 468 
Guomindang (Chinese Nationalist Party), 
394 

gyosei shido (administrative guidance), 352 
gyuho senjutsu, 358 

Habomai Islands {see also Kuril Islands), 

xxxv, 64, 72, 404, 405 
Hakone Open- Air Museum, 171 
Haley, John O., 352 
Halhin Gol, Battle of, 58 
Hamada Shqji, 177 

Hamaguchi Osachi, 52, 54; assassinated, 
54 

Hamlet (Shakespeare), 186 
han, 37 

handicrafts, 178-79; lacquer, 178; metal- 
work, 179; papermaking, 178-79; tex- 
tiles, 178 

Hanae Mori, 178 

Hanayagi school, 184 

haniwa, 6 



Hara Kazuko, 184 
Hashi, 176 

Hara Takashi, 51; assassinated, 52; as 
prime minister, 51; problems confront- 
ing, 51 

harmony. See wa 

Hawaii, 54, 337; Japanese attack on, 426 

Health and Welfare, Ministry of, 258; 
responsibilities of, 206 

health care, 123-25; expenditures, 124, 
125; facilities, 124; Japanese approach 
to, 99-100; options for, 123; prenatal, 
123; system, 124 

health care personnel: distribution of, 
124; number of, 124 

health insurance, 124, 352, 358 

health, public, 123; acquired immune de- 
ficiency syndrome, 125; environmen- 
tal diseases, 84; kitchen syndrome, 98; 
school-refusal syndrome, 98, 113 

Heian (Heiankyo) (see also Kyoto), 1 1 ; as 
imperial capital, 12 

Heian court, 20, 188 

Heian period, 12; art in, 163 

Heijokyo. See Nara 

Heike monogatari (Tale of the Heike), 19, 
188 

Hideyoshi. See Toyotomi Hideyoshi 

Hiei, Mount, 12, 19 

hierarchy: early retirement, 332-33; in- 
terdependence in, 97; internal, 332; 
loyalty in, 333; as natural, 96; senior- 
ity principle, 332-33; vertical bonds in, 
333; we/they in, 332 

Higher Foreign Service Examination, 379 

Higher Police, 457 

high technology, 197; growth in, 198 

Hijikata Tatsumi, 185-86 

Hikosaka Naoyoshi, 173 

Himiko, 6 

Hinomaru (rising sun flag), 311 
Hino Teramasu, 184 
Hirado, 30 

Hirohito (Showa emperor), 55, 310, 328, 
364; assassination attempt on, 53; state 
funeral of, 310; repudiation of divinity 
by, 60, 101, 110, 308 

Hiroshima, 383; atomic bomb detonation 
over, 60, 427; atomic bomb survivors, 
90; population of, 80 

Hitachi, 298 

Hizen, 37, 38 

Hobbes, Thomas, 342 



587 



Japan: A Country Study 



Hojo family, 18 

Hojoki (An Account of My Hut), 19 
Hojo regency: achievements of, 18; defeat 

of, 21; literature under, 19 
Hokkaido, xxvii, 72, 77; area, 77; indus- 
try, 77, 228 
Hokkaido Railway Company, 236 
Home Affairs, Ministry of, 319, 457 
Home Ministry, 37, 319, 350, 457, 457 
Honda, 295 

Hong Kong, 286; exports to, 285; imports 
from, 285 

Honshu, xxvii, 4, 5, 7, 13, 72, 77; stra- 
tegic importance of, 43 1 ; United States 
armed forces stationed on, 456 

Horiuchi Gen, 195 

Hosono Haruomi, 184 

Hotta Masayoshi, 35 

House of Councillors, xxxii, xxxvi, 315, 
317, 340; constituencies in, 315, 324; 
factions in, 345; foreign policy position 
of, 381, 388; number of councillors, 
315; proportional representation, 315; 
terms in, 315 

House of Peers, 44, 49, 51, 307; abolished, 
315 

House of Representatives, xxxiii, 44, 45, 
49, 50, 307, 381, 388; constituencies, 
315, 324; disputes in, 44; elections to, 
44; factions in, 345, 346; power of, 
315-17, 358; term in, 315; vote of no 
confidence, 315 

Housewives Association, 341 

housing: corporations, 318; cost of, 248; 
loans for, 249-50; starts, 227; under 
Tokugawa, 33 

Housing Loan Corporation, 210 

human rights, 307, 313, 328-29; discrimi- 
nation in workplace, 329; forced confes- 
sions, 328-29; treatment of minorities, 
329; women's rights, 328 

Human Rights Bureau, 465 

Hu Yaobang, 397, 399 



IBM Japan, 298 
Ichikawa Ennosuke III, 182 
Ichikawa Kon, 191 
Ichinohe Sachiko, 184 
Idiot, The (Dostoevsky), 187 
ie system, 112; households in, 112; work- 
place as, 117 
Ihara Saikaku, 188 



Ikeda Daisaku, 360 

illegal aliens, 222 

Imaizume Imaiemon, 177 

IMF. See International Monetary Fund 

immigration laws, 222 

Imperial Army, 334; abolished, 428; con- 
trol of government by, 426; General 
Staff Officer, 423; revolt, 425 

Imperial Conference, 59 

imperial court, 3, 12; families, 30 

Imperial Diet, 44 

imperial expansion, 374 

imperial family, 23, 28; estates of, con- 
fiscated, 309 

imperial government, 3; Chinese influ- 
ence on, 3; and the military, 424 

Imperial Household Agency, 309 

Imperial House Law, 309, 310 

Imperial Japanese Army, 55 

Imperial Navy, 334; abolished, 428; Gen- 
eral Staff, 424 

imperial regalia, 4 

Imperial Rescript on Education, 134 
Imperial Rule Assistance Association, 59 
Important Cultural Properties, 166 
import policies, 265-67; barriers, 265, 
266; changes in, 267; liberalization of, 
265; quotas, 265-66 
import products, 271-72 
imports, 269-72; demand for, 270; deter- 
mined by exchange rate, 271; growth, 
269-70, 271; manufactured, xxxi, 272, 
283; nature of, 255; price of, 270-71; 
of raw materials, 270, 271, 282, 300; 
restrictions on, 266; sense of depen- 
dence on, 255; sources of, 282-83; of 
textiles, 272; trade liberalization, 271; 
from United States, 282, 384 
Incho (Office of the Cloistered Emperor); 

role of, 16 
Inch 'on, 48 

India, 23, 101, 407, 409, 445 
Indian Ocean, 430 

individual: and group, conflicts between, 

98; welfare, 330 
individualism, 98 
individuality, 98 

Indochina, 411-12; aid to, 392; invasion 
of, 426; refugees from, 398; United 
States withdrawal from, 376, 389, 394 

Indochina War, Second, 64, 370; effect 
of, on economy, 202-3; end of, 389 

Indonesia, 65, 228, 445; aid to, 294; 



588 



Index 



direct investment in, 286, 409; exports 
to, 285; imports from, 282, 285; rela- 
tions with, 408; trade surplus with, 286; 
war reparations for, 407 

industrial: automation, 197; base, 201-2, 
259; energy, 200-1; expansion, 205; 
growth, 200, 204; producers, 214, 215; 
productivity, 257 

industrial development, 200, 206; main 
elements in, 206 

industrial policy, 206; administrative 
guidance, 206; decrease of government 
role in, 207 

industrialization, xxviiii, 45-46; govern- 
ment promotion of, 198-99 

industry, 79, 231-36; destruction of, in 
World War II, 199; geared toward 
exports, 231; high-technology devel- 
opment, 231-32; leadership in inter- 
national, 256; performance of, 231; 
regions, 231; women in, 118-20 

industry, primary sector: decline in, 198, 
219, 231; employment in, 219 

industry, tertiary sector, 206, 231; growth 
in, 234-35, 236; move toward, 204 

information, 197 

infrastructure, 200, 226-29; destruction of, 
in World War II, 199; investment in, 
208 

infrastructure development, 227; employ- 
ment in, 227; participation of SDF in, 
433-34; as percentage of GDP, 227 

inheritance, 112 

Inland Sea (Seto Naikai), 6, 24, 74, 80 
Inoue Mitsuaki, 190 
Inoue Yasushi, 190 
insei system, 16 

Institute of Asian Economic Affairs, 407-8 

Institute of Developing Economies, 407 

insurance, xxxi; as savings vehicle, 211; 
social, for employees, 224 

insurance companies, 211 

interest groups, 335-41, 352; distribution 
of, 336; examples of, 335; and foreign 
policy, 382, 383; response to, 336; role 
of, in elections, 336; role of, in policy 
making, 335; ties with parties and 
bureaucracy, 335-36, 354 

Internal Bureaus, 436, 451 

international: cooperation with United Na- 
tions, 382; debt relief, 377 

international affairs, 374-75; economic and 
financial resources in shaping, 370; po- 



litical neutrality in, 370; status in, 

373-74; support for more prominent 

role in, 369 
internationalization: of society, 353 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 

xxxiii, 256, 262, 264, 265, 290, 369, 

415, 416; voting rights in, 263 
International Whaling Commission, 247 
interpersonal relationships, 94 
Inukai Tsuyoshi, 56 
investment: direct, 279, 285, 287, 384; by 

foreigners in Japan, 280; industrial, 206; 

in infrastructure, 208; interest rates for, 

205 

investment flows, 369, 416; liberalizing 
controls on, 262 

investment, foreign, 201, 260, 274; ac- 
cumulated holdings, 277; by auto pro- 
ducers, 295; controls on, 257-58; growth 
of, xxxi, 256, 258, 276; by life insurance 
companies, 261; motives for, 279-80; as 
overseas base for home markets, 280; 
securities, 277; in United States, 377, 
384, 385; value of, 285; value of yen 
and, 280 

investment income, xxxi, 274; surplus, 274 

investment in Japan, 276 

investment relations, 282-92; with Africa, 
290; with Asia, 285-86; with Canada, 
285; with Communist countries, 290- 
92; with Latin America, 289-90; with 
Middle East, 287-88; with Oceania, 
288-89; with United States, 283-85; 
with Western Europe, 286-87 

Iran, 288; hostage crisis in, 377, 390; revo- 
lution in, 377 

Iran-Iraq War, 288, 392; support for ship- 
ping during, 432 

Iraq, 288 

iron and steel, xxxi, 81, 198, 200, 204, 
207, 232, 300-1, 398; charges of dump- 
ing, 300; decline in, 300; export of, 269, 
284, 300; import of, 272, 300; minimum 
price, 300; trade disputes, 300, 390 

Ise Bay, 79 

Ishibashi Masashi, 359 
Ishiguro Kazuo, 190 
Ishihara Shintaro, 359 
Ishikari Plain, 74 

Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries, 
453 

Isozaki Arata, 169 
Isuzu, 295 



589 



Japan: A Country Study 



Itagaki Taisuke, 42, 49, 343 
Italy, 58; exports as percentage of GNP, 
267 

Itamijuzo, 192 

Ito Hirobumi, 43, 45, 48 

Ito Masayoshi, 347 

Ito Shunya, 192 

Iwakura Tomomi, 38, 40, 43 

I wo Jima, 72, 38 

Izanagi, 4 

Izanami, 4 

Izu Peninsula, 35 



Jamaica, 391 

Japan, Sea of, xxvii, 72, 74, 430 

Japan Academy of Arts, 166 

Japan Airlines, 240 

Japan Air System, 240 

Japan Art Association, 167 

Japan Artists League, 168 

Japan Broadcasting Corporation (Nippon 
Hoso Kyokai — NHK), 118, 192, 243, 
318, 342; campaign speeches on, 323; 
public radio networks, 243; public tele- 
vision networks, 243; School Education 
Division, 145 

Japan Chamber of Commerce and Indus- 
try, 338 

Japan Committee for Economic Develop- 
ment (Keizai Doyu Kai), 337 

Japan Communist Party (Nihon Kyosanto), 
53, 61, 140, 336, 357, 360; funding of, 
361; goals of, 53; origins of, 361; party 
line, 361; representation, 361; role of, 
357; support of, for relations with China, 
393 

Japan Confederation of Labor (Domei), 

225, 336, 340 
Japan Confederation of Trade Unions 

(Zenroren), 340 
Japan Democratic Party {see also Liberal 

Democratic Party), 63, 343-44 
Japan Development Bank, 210, 213 
Japanese Alps (Nihon Arupusu), 74, 79 
Japanese Imperial Navy, 54 
Japanese Joint Staff Council, 455 
Japanese language, 165; difficulties with, 

144; as school subject, 144, 146; status 

differences in, 96-97; teaching of, to 

foreign students, 160 
Japanese National Railways, 212-13, 

236, 238, 318 



Japanese National Railways Settlement 

Corporation, 238 
Japanese Red Ary, 363, 470 
Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact, 59, 404 
Japanese Trade Union Confederation 

(Shin Rengo), 225, 336, 340, 360 
Japan Exchange and Teaching Program, 

147 

Japan Export-Import Bank (Exim Bank), 
xxxvi, 210, 261, 262, 379, 395, 399 

Japan External Trade Organization 
(JETRO), xxix, 259-60, 379 

Japan Federation of Employers Associa- 
tion (Nikkeiren), 337 

Japan Folkloric Dance Ensemble, 183 

Japan Foundation, 167 

Japan Freight Railway Company, 238 

Japan International Cooperation Agency 
(JICA), 262 

Japan League of Medium and Small En- 
terprise Organizations, 338 

Japan Medical Association, 341 

Japan Mothers League, 335 

Japan Progressive Party (Nihon Shimpoto), 
61 

Japan Railways Group, 81, 236, 238-39, 
352, 464 

Japan, Sea of, xxvii, 72, 74, 430 

Japan Scholarship Association, 156 

Japan Socialist Association (Shakaishugi 
Kyokai), 359 

Japan Socialist Party (Nihon Shakaito), 
xxxiii, xxxvi, 52, 61, 64, 65, 140, 315, 
317, 329, 336, 339, 343, 357; control 
of House of Councillors, 381; demands 
of, 360; and foreign policy, 382; goal 
of, 360; labor unions and, 340; origin 
of, 358; position on foreign policy, 381; 
representation, 358; role of, 357; sup- 
port of, for relations with China, 393 

Japan Teachers Union, 335, 364; conflicts 
of, with Education Ministry, 140-41; 
functions of, 140; support of, for polit- 
ical parties, 140 

Japan Tobacco and Salt Public Corpora- 
tion, 212-13, 318 

Japan-United States security arrange- 
ments, 370 

Jesuits, 24, 133 

JETRO. See Japan External Trade Or- 
ganization 

JICA. See Japan International Coopera- 
tion Agency 



590 



Index 



Jimmu, 4 

Jinno shoto ki (Chronicle of the Direct 

Descent of the Divine Sovereigns) 

(Kitabatake), 3, 23 
Jiyiito (Liberal Party), 42, 44 
Jodo sect. See Buddhism, Jodo 
Joei Code, 18 
Johnson, Chalmers, 351 
Joint First Stage Achievement Test, 154; 

content of, 154-55; schedule of, 154-55 
Joint Staff Council, 436, 451; members 

of, 436-37; reorganization of, 437 
Jokyii Incident, 18 

Jomon culture, 4-5; era, 4; musical in- 
struments of, 180; pottery of, 4 
Jordan, 392 

judges: appointment and removal of, 324 

judicial system, 324-29; courts in, 324- 
25; judges in, 324; structure of, 325 

juku, 143, 151-52; academic ,151; atten- 
dance, 151; educational functions of, 
151; expense, 152; nonacademic, 151; 
self-study materials published by, 152; 
social role of, 151 

Justice, Ministry of, 92, 326, 353, 465, 
471; Correctional Bureau, 473-74; 
Legal Training and Research Institute, 
326; Public Security Investigation 
Office, 464; Rehabilitation Bureau, 474 

Juvenile Law (1922), 473 

Kabuki Society, 168 

Kabuki theater, xxxii, 180, 18, 1882; con- 
ventions, 182, 186; dance in, 183; 
themes in, 182, 186; women barred 
from performing in, 165, 182 

Kades, Charles, 312 

Kagero nikki (The Gossamer Years) 
("Mother of Michitsuna"), 15 

Kagoshima, 24 

Kaifuso (Fond Recollections of Poetry), 1 1 
Kaifu Toshiki, xxxiv, xxxvi, 317, 349, 

381, 391, 409 
Kaishinto (Constitutional Study Party), 

44 

Kamakura, 17 

Kamakura period, 17, 188 

kami, 7, 32, 100, 332; defined, 4 

kamikaze, 20, 23 

Kammon Bridge, 81 

Kammu (emperor), 12; avoidance of re- 
form, 12; military offensives, 13; suc- 
cession to, 13 



kana, 14, 174; hiragana, 14; katakana, 14 

Kanamori Masao, 454 

Kanazawa, 79 

Kanematsu-Gosho, 260 

Kaneshiro Jiro, 178 

kanji, 14, 174, 176 

Kano ink painting, 173 

kanpaku, 14, 26 

Kansai International Airport, 74, 240 
Kanto, 78; industry, 78; population den- 
sity, 78 
Kanto Plain, 74 
Karafuto (see also Sakhalin), 34 
Kara Joro, 186 
karaoke, 184 

KARAS Company, 185 

Katayama Tetsu, 356 

Katsura Shijaku, 183 

Katsura Taro, 49, 50 

Kawabata Yasunari, 190 

Kawai Kanjiro, 177 

Kawasaki Heavy Industries, 453 

Kazan Retto. See Volcano Islands 

Kaze no matasaburo (Children of the Wind) 

(Miyazawa), 192 
Keidanren. See Federation of Economic 

Organizations 
keiretsu, 202 

Keizai Doyu Kai. See Japan Committee 

for Economic Development 
kejime, 349 

Kellogg-Briand Pact, 54, 312 

Kemmu Restoration, 21 

Kenseikai (Constitutional Government 

Association), 52 
Kenseito (Constitutional Party), 49 
Khubilai Khan, 20; demand for tribute, 

20 

Kido Koin, 38, 40, 42 
"Kimigayo," 311 
Kimmei (emperor), 8 
King Lear (Shakespeare), 186 
Kinki, 80 
Kinki Plain, 74 
Kishi Nobusuke, 388 
Kitabatake Chikafusa, 23 
Kitadake mountain, 74 
Kitakyushu, 81, 82 
Kitaro, 184 
Kiyomizu Kyiibei, 172 
koan, 164, 174 
Kobayashi Issa, 188 
Kobayashi Masaki, 192 



591 



Japan: A Country Study 



Kobe, 74, 80 

Kobo Daishi. See Kukai 

Kochi, 81 

Kofun period. See Yamato period 
Koh, B.C., 352 

Kojiki, 11, 32, 187; creation story in, 4 
Koken (empress), 11-12, 12 
Kokkai Kisei Domei (League for Estab- 
lishing a National Assembly), 43 
koku, 26 

kokugaku movement, 31; reverence for em- 
peror in, 32 

Kokumin Seiji Kyokai. See People's Pol- 
itics Association 

Kokuryukai (Black Dragon Society, Amur 
River Society), 55 

Kokusai Denshin Denwa Company, 244 

kokutai, 23, 37, 106, 305, 331 

Komeito, (Clean Government Party), 64, 
65, 336, 357, 382; background of, 360; 
programs of, 360; representatives, 360; 
ties of, with Soka Gakkai, 360 

Kondo, Dorinne K., 116, 117 

Kong Fuzi. See Confucius 

Kongzi. See Confucius 

Konoe Fumimaro, 58, 60 

Korea (see also North Korea, South 
Korea), 6, 41, 53, 90; annexed, 48, 
199; Buddhism introduced by, xxvii, 7; 
Hideyoshi's invasion of, 27; indepen- 
dence of, 374; as Japanese protectorate, 
48, 424; renunciation of Japanese claim 
to, 61; Russo-Japanese rivalry over, 
403; trade with, 30 

Korean influence: on Yamato culture, 8; 
on Yayoi culture, 5 

Korean Peninsula, 8, 81; foreign policy 
regarding, 391; Japanese construction 
of railroads on, 47; Japanese occupa- 
tion of, xxxv, 6; proximity to, 73; secu- 
rity problems, 430; strategic position of, 
46 

Koreans: discrimination against, 90, 329, 
334; as Japanese citizens, 91 

Korean War, xxix, 61 ; effect of, on econ- 
omy, 202-3, 256, 428 

Korea Strait, 73 

Koshi. See Confucius 

koto, 180, 183 

Kukai (Kobo Daishi), 12, 188 
Kumamoto, 81 

Kunashiri (see also Kuril Islands), xxxv, 
72, 400-3 



Kurigama Kazumi, 176 

Kuril Islands (see also Northern Territo- 
ries), 34, 41, 64; area, 73; dispute with 
Soviet Union over, 72, 292, 406, 421, 
430; renunciation of Japanese claim to, 
61 

Kurosawa, Akira, 191 
Kuroshio Current, 83 
Kuwait, 288 
kwaiko-chan, 184 
kyogen, 188 

Kyoto, 11, 18, 21, 30, 133, 319; capital 
moved from, 37; chonindo culture in, 
31-32; migration patterns around, 89; 
missionary activity in, 24; population 
of, 31 

Kyushu, xxvii, 4, 5, 7, 24, 41, 72, 73, 77, 
81-82; climate, 82; industry, 81, 228; 
United States armed forces stationed 
on, 456 
Kyushu Mountains, 81 
Kyushu Railway Company, 236 

labor: market, 220; movement, 214 
Labor, Ministry of, 141, 223, 353, 464 
labor force, 202, 213-14; aging of, 223- 
24; in agriculture, 204; distribution of, 
219; foreign workers, 221-22, 353-54; 
number of, 214; participation in, 219; 
women in, 221 
Labor Standards Inspection Office, 464 
labor unions, 218, 339-40, 388; bargain- 
ing, 225, 226; demands, 220; member- 
ship, 225, 339; officers of, 225-26; pay 
increases, 226; relationship of, with com- 
pany, 225; role of, in policy-making 
process, 339-40; strikes, 226 
Lafcadio Hearn Prize, 167 
land: distribution, 28; prices, 86; recla- 
mation, 74 
Land of the Rising Sun, 4 
land reform, 9, 10, 39, 60, 339; in Meiji 
period, 198; under occupation, 203, 
214 

landscape gardening, 23 

Large-Scale Retail Store Law, 235, 338 

Last Emperor, The, 184 

Latin America, 289-90; aid to, 293; direct 
investment in, 279, 289; exports to, 
289; imports from, 289; lending to, 290 

law: control-oriented use of, 327; role of, 
326-27 



592 



Index 



Law Concerning the Stabilization of Em- 
ployment for Elderly People, 224 

Law for Equal Opportunity in Employ- 
ment for Men and Women, 328 

lawyers: functions performed by, 317; 
number of, 326 

LDP. See Liberal Democratic Party 

leadership, 97, 333 

League of Nations: Japan as member of, 

51; withdrawal from, 56 
"learning missions," 40 
LeCorbusier, Charles, 168, 169 
leisure activities, 117; family as focus of, 

118 

Levelers Association of Japan (Suiheisha), 
92 

Leviathan (Hobbes), 342 
Liaodong Peninsula, 46, 47, 48 
Liao-Takasaki Agreement, 395 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), xxvii, 

xxxii, xxxvi, 63, 140, 305, 315, 323, 
343-50; budget process, 356; in elec- 
tions, 347-49; factions, 345; feudal per- 
sonalism in, 306; foreign affairs under, 
381; interest groups affiliated with, 336, 
338; leadership, 64; local support 
groups, 346-47; as minority party, 

xxxiii, 317; national elections, 347-50; 
party history, 343-44; Policy Research 
Council, 352, 355-56, 383; principles, 
344; problems in, 349; Recruit scandal 
and, 322, 350; resiliency of, 349-50; 
structure, 344-47; turnover of leaders 
in, 333 

Liberal Party (see also Liberal Democratic 
Party), 61, 62-63, 343 

Liberia, 290 

licensing fees, xxxi 

life expectancy, 87 

Li Hongzhang, 46 

literacy rate, 33, 162, 200, 243 

literature, 187-91; Buddhist influence on, 
190-91; diary as, 188; European, 189; 
under Hojo, 19; "I novel," 190; kinds 
of, 191; in Muromachi culture, 23, 188; 
novels, 188; origins of, 187; themes in, 
98, 131, 188, 190; under Tokugawa, 
32, 188; tradition, 189 

literature, vernacular, 188; diaries, 188; 
under Fujiwara, 14; by women, 15 

living standards, 203, 247-51; cost of liv- 
ing, 86-87, 247-48; cross-cultural com- 
parisons, 250-51; household savings, 



248; income distribution, 248; sanitary 
amenities, 248; under Tokugawa, 33 

loans as percentage of GNP, 208 

Lockheed scandal, xxxii, 65, 344, 345, 
347, 357 

London Naval Conference, 54 

London Naval Treaty, 58, 424 

London Stock Exchange, 210 

Long-Term Trade Agreement (Japan- 
China), 291 

Lubbers, Ruud, xxxv 



MacArthur, Douglas, 60, 305, 307, 428 

MacArthur Constitution. See Constitution 
of 1947 

machine industry, 207 

Maekawa Kunio, 168-69 

magatama, 6 

magazines, 342 

Mahabharata, 184 

Mainichi Shimbun, 342 

Maki Fumihiko, 169 

Makioka Sisters, The (Ichikawa), 191-92 

Makura no soshi (The Pillow Book) (Sei), 15 

Malaya, 27; occupation of, 426 

Malaysia, xxxv, 228, 407, 408; trade sur- 
plus with, 286 

Management and Coordination Agency, 
222, 355 

management culture, 216-18; company 
union, 218; employee advancement, 
218 

managerial style: consensus-building as, 
218; emphasis of, 218 

Manchukuo, 56; establishment of, 424-25 

Manchuria, 47, 50, 374; evacuation of, 
48; Guandong Army in, 55, 56; Japa- 
nese invasion of, 54; as part of Japanese 
empire, 199; Russian leaseholds in, 47; 
Russo-Japanese rivalry over, 403 

Manchurian Incident, 56, 425, 457 

Mandate of Heaven, 8 

manga (comic books), 71, 118, 191, 192, 
342 

manufacturing, 200; growth in, 232-34 
Man 'yoshu (Collection of Ten Thousand 

Leaves), 11, 32, 187 
Mao Zedong, 291 
Marco Polo Bridge Incident, 58 
Mariana Islands, 50, 424 
Maritime Safety Agency, 463 
Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), 



593 



Japan: A Country Study 



xxiv, 429, 451, 455; capabilities of, 
442; equipment, 441; missions, 435; 
number of, 441; organization of, 441- 
42; role of, 431; structure of, 439; train- 
ing, 441; weaknesses, 442-43 

Market Oriented Sector Selective 
(MOSS) talks, 266 

marriage: arranged, 112; ceremonies, 
107; customs, origins of, 4; under ie sys- 
tem, 112; by mutual consent, 314; tim- 
ing of, 87 

Marshall Islands, 50, 424 

Maruyama-Okyo school, 173 

Marubeni, 260 

Matsue, 167 

Matsumoto Commission, 307 
Matsumoto Joji, 307 
Matsuo Basho, 32, 188 
matsuri (festivals), 108 
Matsushima Bay, 78 
May 15th Incident, 56 
Mazda, 295 

media: books, 342; foreign policy opin- 
ions of, 384; magazines, 342; news- 
papers, 341-42 

medical equipment, import restrictions 
on, 266 

medieval period, 17 

Meiji Constitution (1889), 44, 60, 305, 
307; emperor under, 308, 311, 314; 
government under, 44; provisions of, 
37; rights and duties of subjects under, 
313; strengths and weaknesses of, 44 

Meiji oligarchy, 43, 331; abolition of class 
system, 38; art under, 164, 172; educa- 
tion under, 198; establishment of nobil- 
ity under, 43; foreign relations under, 
40, 372; goals of, 38; industry under, 
201; legal theories under, 327; members 
of, 38; military machine, 374; modern- 
ization of infrastructure under, 40; op- 
position to, 39, 41; public education 
established by, 134; reforms by, xxviii, 
38, 198; social divisions under, 39; 
treaties revised, 374; use of symbols, 331 

Meiji Restoration, xxviii, 36-40, 423, 
457; burakumin in, 92; civil service in, 
350; end of, 49; legacy of, 52; legal 
codes, 466; purpose of, 37; religious 
resurgence under, 37-38; structure of, 
37; trials, 466-67 

Mengukuo, 58 

merchant marine, 207, 240 



merchants, 30 

Merrill Lynch, 210, 211 

Metropolitan Police Board, 13 

Mexico, 289 

middle class, 336 

Middle East, 287-88, 389; aid to, 293, 
391; exports to, 288; imports from, 
282, 287; investment in, 288 

Midori, 183 

Mid-Term Defense Estimate, 435; cost of, 
450-51; equipment procurement, 452 

Mid-Term Defense Program, 439, 442 

migration: Japanese living abroad, 90; 
number of migrants, 89; patterns of, 89 

Miki Takeo, 344 

military: dismantied, 350, 428; moderni- 
zation of, 40, 372, 423; power, 386, 
406; relationship of, with imperial 
government, 424; reorganization of, 
61; role, 369 

military buildup, 400; objective of, 373 

military, restriction on (see also Article 9); 
international criticism of, xxxiii; popu- 
lar acceptance of, xxxiii, 427 

military class, rise of, 15-17 

military families, 16 

military government (twentieth century), 
xxix 

military materiel: funding for, 451; pro- 
duction of, 50 

Military Pensions Association, 335 

Mill, John Stuart, 331 

Minamoto family, 17; support of, by 
samurai, 16 

Minamoto government, 17 

Minamoto regency, 18 

Minamoto Yoriie, 18 

Minamoto Yoritomo, 17; failure to con- 
solidate, 18; powers of, 17 

Ming Dynasty, 22 

Minimum Wage Law, 224 

mining, 200, 226, 227-28, 232; decline 
in, 227; performance of, 231 

ministers, cabinet, 351; rotation in and 
out of posts, 351 

ministries, 317-18; rivalry among, 352 

Ministry of International Trade and In- 
dustry (MITI), xxix, 258-59, 353, 383; 
business links with, 337; import poli- 
cies, 265; influence, 353; responsibili- 
ties of, 205, 258, 353, 408; role of, in 
international affairs, 379; trade balance 
under, 259 



594 



Index 



minorities, 90-93; Ainu, 93; burakumin, 
90; Chinese, 90; intolerance of, 90; 
Koreans, 90 

Mishima Yukio, 180, 190, 305, 364 

missionaries, 24, 371 

MITI. See Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry 

Mito school, 35, 37 

Mitsubishi, 214, 260, 452 

Mitsubishi Bank, 261 

Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, 453 

Mitsubishi Estate, 353 

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, 453, 454 

Mitsui, 214, 260 

Miwa Kyusetsu, 177 

Miyako Odori, 183 

Miyamoto Kenji, 361 

Miyazawa Kenji, 192 

Miyazawa Kiichi, xxxvi, 290 

Miyazawa Plan, 290 

modernization, xxviii, 3, 45-46, 372; gov- 
ernment involvement in, 46 

Moeran, Brian, 98 

Momoyama art, 26-27 

Monbusho. See Education, Science, and 
Culture, Ministry of 

monetary policy, 207-8 

Mongolia, Inner, 50, 58 

Mongolian People's Republic, xxxv, 58 

Mongol invasions, 20-21; first, 20; leg- 
acy of, 20-21, 23; second, 20 

Mononobe family, 8 

Moriguchi Kako, 178 

Morishita Yoko, 185 

Morita Yoshimitsu, 192 

mortality rate, 87 

MOSS. See Market Oriented Sector Selec- 
tive talks 

motor vehicles, xxxi, 294-96; export of, 
269, 294-95, 295; imports of, 295; in- 
vestment restrictions on, 295; Japanese 
demand for foreign, 295-96; Japan's 
market share, 295; production of, 294; 
trade barriers on, 295 
Motoshima Hitoshi, 328, 364, 470 
mountains, xxvii, 73-74, 81; Akaishi 
chain, 74; Hida chain, 73; Kiso chain, 
73 

MSDF. See Maritime Self-Defense Force 
Mukden, 56 

muhei bunkazai, 166-67, 177, 178, 183 
Munakata Shiko, 174-76 
Murakami Haruki, 191 



Murakami Yasusuke, 329 
Murasaki Shikibu, 15, 188 
Muromachi culture, 22-23 
Muromachi period. See bakufu, Ashikaga 
Museum of Western Art, 165 
museums, 167 
musical theater, 184 
Music Today, 183 

music, traditional, 32; instruments, 180 
music, Western, xxxii, 183; jazz, 184; 

opera, 184; popular, 184 
Mutsuhito (emperor), 36; as Meiji em- 
peror, 37 

Mutual Security Assistance Pact, 61, 64, 

375, 428, 454-55; military aid program 

in, 454-55 
mythology: creation of the world in, 100; 

divinity of imperial family in, 100; kami 

in, 100; values in, 93-94 



Nabeshima clan, 177 
Nachi Falls, 131 
Nagano Prefecture, 74 
Nagaoka, 11 

Nagasaki, 24, 27, 82, 328, 383; atomic 
bomb detonation over, 60, 427; atomic 
bomb survivors, 90; military school at, 
35; naval training school at, 35; Ran- 
gaku school in, 32; trade restricted to, 
30 

Nagasawa Hidetoshi, 172 
nagauta singing, 183 
Nagoya, 74, 79 

Naka (prince) (see also Tenji), 9 
Nakane Chie, 332 

Nakasone Yasuhiro, xxxvi, 66, 308, 322, 
346, 363, 432; objectives for defense in- 
dustry, 452; official visit to Yasukuni 
Shrine, 110, 311, 399; relations with 
China under, 397; relations with 
United States, 391 

Nakatomi family, 8 

Nakatomi Kamatari, 9 

nakodo, 95 

Namikawa Banri, 176 

Nampo islands, 72 

Naoki Prize, 167, 190 

Nara, 7, 166; commercial activity in, 10; 

model for, 10; as permanent capital, 10; 

population of, 10 
Nara culture, 12 

Nara period, 10-11; establishment of 



595 



Japan: A Country Study 



Buddhism in, 11; handicrafts in, 178; 
literature in, 11 
Nastasya, 187 

National Association of Consumer Coop- 
eratives, 341 

National Bunraku Theater, 167 

National Central Association of Medium 
and Small Enterprise Associations, 338 

National Center for University Entrance 
Examination, 155 

National Committee for Burakumin Lib- 
eration, 92 

National Council on Educational Reform, 
137, 138, 159 

National Defense Academy, 441, 442, 
444, 451 

National Defense Council, 455 

National Defense Medical College, 451 

National Defense Program Oudine, 432, 
434, 436, 450 

National Diet, 208, 258, 308, 309, 314- 
17, 458; Budget Committee, 358; civil 
servants in, 318; foreign affairs commit- 
tees in, 378; prime minister designated 
by, 315; responsibilities, 314 

National Federation of Industrial Organi- 
zations (Shinsanbetsu), 225 

National Federation of Private Sector 
Unions (Rengo), 225, 340 

National Federation of Regional Wom- 
en's Associations, 341 

National Institute for Defense Studies, 
451 

National Institute for Educational Re- 
search, 159 

National Institute for Special Education, 
159 

National Museum of History and Folk 
Culture, 167 

National No Theater, 167, 182 

National Police Agency, 458, 467; bu- 
reaus of, 459; duties, 458; number of, 
458; structure of, 458-59 

National Police Reserve, 428, 429, 457 

National Public Safety Commission, 436, 
457, 458, 461, 465; members of, 458; 
mission of, 458 

National Rural Police, 457, 458 

National Safety Force, 429 

national security: entrusted to United 
States, 375, 381, 386, 434; increased 
responsibility for, 389, 390, 410, 432; 
military to achieve, 447; policy, 436; 



role of United Nations in, 434 
National Space Development Agency, 
234 

National Storehouse for Fine Arts, 167 

national symbols, 144 

National Trade Union Council (Zen- 
rokyo), 340 

National Treasures, 166 

NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Or- 
ganization 

Natsume Soseki, 190 

Naval General Staff, 54 

NEC, 298 

neighborhood, 114-15; activities, partic- 
ipation in, 114; associations, 115; cen- 
tral city, 114; company housing, 114; 
socialization in, 114 

nemawashi (consensus building), 334; in 
policy-making process, 355 

neo-Confucianism, 35, 104-6; contribu- 
tion of, 31; influences on, 104 

Netherlands: exports as percentage of 
GNP, 267; investment by, in United 
States, 285 

New Deal, 350 

New Liberal Club (Shin Jiyii Kurabu), 
344, 349 

newly industrialized economies (NIEs), 
408, 409 

New Morning of Billy the Kid, The (Yama- 

kawa), 192 
New Order in Greater East Asia, 58 
new religions, 101, 106-7, 336; founded, 

107 

New Tokyo International Airport (Narita- 

Sanrizuka), 240; protests against, 330, 

363, 470 
newspapers, 341-42 
New Year's Day, 108 
New York City, 337 
New York City Ballet, 185 
New York Stock Exchange, xxx, 210, 

212, 261-62; October 1987 crash of, 

212 

New Zealand, 288-89, 455; economic in- 
volvement in, 410 

Nguyen Duy Trinh, 412 

NHK. See Japan Broadcasting Corpo- 
ration 

Nichimen, 260 

NIEs. See newly industrialized economies 
Nihon (see also Nippon); origin of, as name 
of Japan, 9 



596 



Index 



Nihon Arupusu. See Japanese Alps 
Nihongi, 11, 32; creation story in, 4; foun- 
dation of Japan in, 6 
Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 342 
Nihon Kokusai Tsushin, 244 
Nihon Shakaito. See Japan Socialist Party 
Nihon shoki. See Nihongi 
Niigata, 79 

Niigata Prefecture, 74, 347 
Nikkei Stock Average, 212 
Nikkeiren. See Japan Federation of Em- 
ployers Association 
Nikko, 210, 261 
Nine Powers Treaty, 54 
Ninigi, 4 

ninjo (compassion), 98 

Nippon {see also Nihon); origin of, as name 
of Japan, 9 

Nippon Life Insurance Company, 211 

Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Cor- 
poration, 212, 244, 318, 439 

Nishihara Kamezo, 50 

Nishihara Loans, 50 

Nishijin weaving center, 178 

Nissan, 197, 295 

Nissho Iwai, 260 

Nixon, Richard M., 389 

"Nixon shock," 376, 389, 395 

Nobi Plain, 74, 79 

Nomura, 210-11, 261 

nonferrous metals industry, 232; import 
of, 272 

Norinchukin Bank, 210 

North Adantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), 445 

Northern Court, 21 

Northern Territories, 64, 400-3, 405-6, 
430; proposals on, 406 

North Korea (People's Democratic Re- 
public of Korea), xxxv, 110, 292, 386, 
398; mutual bitterness, 410; policies 
toward, 410; security interests in, 410; 
tensions with, 411 

Norwegian Wood (Murakami), 191 

No theater, xxxii, 180-82, 188; dance in, 
183; in Muromachi culture, 23; themes 
in, 186; women barred from perform- 
ing in, 165 

nuclear: strike, vulnerability to, 431; war, 
3-4; weapons, 383, 429 

Obon festival, 108 



occupation, 60-61, 305, 374-75; effect of, 
on economy, 203; goals of, 306; land 
reform under, 203; United States finan- 
cial assistance, 203; zaibatsu dissolved 
under, 188, 214 

October Incident (1931), 56 

ODA. See Official Development Assistance 

Oda Nobunaga, 25, 329; accomplish- 
ments of, 25; assassination of, 25; 
resistance to, 25; rise to power, 25 

OECD. See Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development 

OECF. See Overseas Economic Cooper- 
ation Fund 

Oe Kensaburo, 190 

Officer Candidate School, 442 

Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
budget, 293, 412-13, 450, 451; as per- 
centage of GNP, 413 

Ogasawara Islands. See Bonin Islands 

Ohashi Toshio, 360 

Ohira Masayoshi, 65, 346, 364, 30 

Ohnuki-Tierney, Emiko, 124-25 

oil crisis, 200, 281, 281 

Okhotsk, Sea of, 48, 406, 430; Japanese 
fishing rights in, 403 

Okinawa, 72, 82, 329, 341; crafts in, 178; 
military installations on, 335; returned 
to Japan, 389, 404; United States oc- 

_ cupation of, 64, 387, 388-89, 455, 456 

Okubo Toshimichi, 38, 40, 41 

Okuma Shigenobu, 38, 42, 43, 48, 343 

Oman, 392 

Omote-Nihon. See geography 
Onin War, 22; legacy of, 23-24 
On Liberty (Mill), 331 
onnagata, 187 

OPEC. See Organization of Petroleum 

Exporting Countries 
Opium War, 34 

Orderly Marketing Arrangements, 390 

Order of Cultural Merit, 166 

Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), 262, 278, 
408, 415; Development Assistance Com- 
mittee, 293 

Organization of Petroleum Exporting 

_ Countries (OPEC), 65 

Osaka, 26, 28, 35, 80; chonindo culture in, 
31-32; migration patterns around, 89; 
peasant uprising in (1837), 34; popu- 
lation of, 31 

Osaka Bay, 74 



597 



Japan: A Country Study 



Osaka Conference, 42 

Osaka International Exposition (Expo 

_ '70), 65, 80 

Osaka Plain, 80 

Osaka Stock Exchange, xxx, 212 
Oshima, 72 

Otomoto Katsushiro, 192 

Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund 

(OECF), 262, 379, 398, 408 
Overseas Technical Cooperation Agency, 

379, 408 

oyabun-kobun relationship, 333, 334, 347; 

in Liberal Democratic Party, 345 
Oyashio Current, 83 
Ozawa Hisako Modern Dance Company, 

185 



Pacific Islands, 410 

Pacific Ocean, xxvii 

painting (see also calligraphy), 172-73; 
Buddhist influence on, 172; Chinese in- 
fluence on, 172; ink painting, 172, 173; 
international style, 172, 173; Kano 
style, 173; landscape painting, 172; 
Maruyama-Okyo school, 1 73 ; mono-ha, 
173; nihonga, 173; "op," 173; "pop," 
173; rimpa, 173; traditional, 172, 173; 
Western theories of, 172 

Pakistan, 294, 391, 391, 400, 407 

papermaking, 178-79; Izumo, 179; mar- 
bleized, 179 

patents, 230 

Peace Preservation Law (1925), 52, 53, 
457 

Peace Preservation Law (1928), 53 

peasant uprising (1837), 34 

Pempel, T.J., 326, 354 

Penal Code (1880), 466 

penal system, 456, 473-75; aftercare 
hostels, 473, 474; history of, 473; in- 
tention of, 474; prison population, 474; 
professional probation officers in, 
474-75; recidivism rate, 474; volunteer 
workers in, 473, 474-75 

P.E.N. Club of Japan, 168 

Penghu Islands, 46; renunciation of 
Japanese claim to, 61 

Pension Party, 363 

People Opposed to Nuclear Power Party, 
363 

People's Democratic Republic of Korea. 
See North Korea 



People's Politics Association (Kokumin 

Seiji Kyokai), 338 
performing arts (see also under individual 

form), 180-87; religious influence on, 

180 

Perry, Matthew C, 34, 372 
Persian Gulf War: Japan's support in, 
xxxiv 

petrochemicals industry, 232 

petroleum, 200, 398; dependence on for- 
eign, 201, 376; imports, value of, 271; 
prices, 257, 272, 273, 287, 295; sup- 
pliers, 288, 430 

pharmaceuticals: import restrictions on, 
266; industry, 232, 233 

Philippines, xxxv, 27; aid to, 294; brides 
imported from, 91 ; occupation of, 426; 
relations with, 408; trade with, 286; 
war reparations for, 407 

pirates, 22 

Plato, 342 

Plaza Accord, 281-82 

poetry, 174; Chinese influence on, 187; 
European influence on, 189; free verse, 
189; under Fujiwara, 14; haiku, 188, 
189; under Hqjo, 19; in Muromachi 
culture, 23; renku, 188, 189; tanka, 189; 
waka, 188, 189 

police, 53, 456; accidents and fatalities in- 
vestigated by, 469; discretion of, 471; 
involvement in political affairs, 457; 
oversight, 465; promotion, 464; recruit- 
ment, 464; relations of, with com- 
munity, 464; responsibilities, 457; 
training, 464 

police boxes, 464; function, 461; primary 
tasks, 461; surveys, 461-62 

Police Bureau, 457 

Police Law (1947), 457-58 

Police Law (1954), 458 

police, riot, 459, 462-63; assignments, 
463; operations, 462; temperament, 
462; training, 463; uniforms and equip- 
ment, 462-63 

police, special, 463-64; responsibilities, 
463 

police system, 456-65; divisions, 461; de- 
centralized, 457, 458; established, 
457-58; local organization, 459-62; na- 
tional organization, 458-59 

policy-making process, 306, 308, 343, 
350, 354-56; collaboration of bureau- 
cracy, interest groups, and party, 354; 



598 



Index 



consensus building in, 334, 355; role 
of interest groups in, 335; role of labor 
unions in, 339-40 

political: elite, 353; extremists, 469-70; 
instability, 56-58; machines, 347; re- 
form, 349; repression, 42, 43, 52, 53, 
58, 462; scandals, 342-43 

political funding: corruption in, 322-23; 
expenses for, 322; proposals for reform 
of, 323; secrecy surrounding, 323 

Political Funds Control Law, 322 

political leaders: characteristics of, 329 

political parties, 52; ordered to dissolve, 
59; revival of, 61 ; ties of, with bureau- 
cracy and interest groups, 335, 353 

political parties, opposition, 306, 356-63; 
impact of, 358; importance of, 357; as 
nonviable alternative, 357; progressive 
proposals by, 358 

political system: two-party, 51, 56 

politicians, 352, 354 

politics: features of, 330; nonideological 
nature of, 329 

pollution, 84-86; citizens' pressure against, 
85; health problems from, 84; industrial, 
249; worsening of, 203 

Pollution Health Damage Compensation 
Law (1973), 85 

popular culture, 117-18; leisure activities, 
117-18; traditional art forms in, 117 

population, xxx, 72; age structure, 87-89; 
aging of, 223; migration of, 89-90; 
minorities, 90-93; under Tokugawa, 33 

population density, 86-87; comparisons, 
86 

population distribution, 86, 87 
Port Arthur. See Dalian 
Port Island, 74 
ports, 240 

Portuguese, 133; arrival of, 24; expulsion 
of, 30 

postal savings system, 210 

Posts and Telecommunications, Ministry 

of, 243, 258, 464 
Potsdam Declaration, 306, 307, 313 
prehistoric people, 4 
Premium Imperiale, 167 
president, 344 

press club system, 342-43, 358 
prime minister, 248, 315, 354, 458; elec- 
tion of, 344; Office of, 230, 309, 318, 
341, 355, 383, 429, 435, 457; respon- 
sibilities, 317-18, 436; tenure of, 333 



prints, 174-76; avant-garde, 176; photog- 
raphy, 176; themes in, 176; twentieth- 
century, 174; ukiyo-e, 174 
Prison Law (1980), 473 
Private School Promotion Law, 158 
Privy Council, 43, 307 
Prix de L'Academie d' Architecture, 170 
Prix de Lausanne Ballet Competition, 185 
productivity, 202, 218-19; growth, 256, 

257; rate, 218 
professional associations, 340-41 
Progressive Party (Shimpoto), 357, 362 
Provisional Commission for Administra- 
tive Reform, 355 
Public Assembly Law, 43 
public opinion polling, 383-84 
Pure-Hearted Shopping District in Koenji, 

Tokyo, 190 
Puyi, 56 

Qian Qichen, xxxvi 

radio: educational, 146 

railroads, 79, 236; construction of, in Meiji 
period, 198; Japanese construction of, 
in Korea 47; passenger, 237-38; privati- 
zation of, 355; Shinkansen (bullet train), 
81 

Raku family potters, 177 

Rangaku, 32, 38, 134; importance of, 34 

Reagan, Ronald, 66, 391 

rearmament, 66 

Recruit Corporation, 321 

Recruit Cosmos, 321 

Recruit scandal, xxxii, 321-22, 349, 350, 

351, 357, 358, 360, 361, 362 
reemployment, 224 

reform: constitutional, under occupation, 
60; economic, under Meiji govern- 
ment, 45; economic, under occupation, 
60; under Go-Sanjo, 16; under Meiji 
Restoration, 36, 38 

Reischauser, Edwin O., 27, 96, 99 

religion, 107-10; freedom of, 108-10, 
313; history of state involvement in, 
110; required temple registration, 30, 
32; ritual visits to Shinto shrine, 107; 
and the state, 108-10, 311 

Rengo. See National Federation of Private 
Sector Unions 

representative government: efforts to es- 
tablish, 42-43 



599 



Japan: A Country Study 



Republic (Plato), 32 
Republic of China. See Taiwan 
Republic of Korea. See South Korea 
research and development, 229-31; bio- 
technology, 232, 233; energy-related, 
227; independent, 229; originality in, 
230; as percentage of GNP, 230; scien- 
tific, 230 
research institutes, 159, 161 
Respect for the Aged Day, 122 
retail stores: changes in operations of, 
235; department, 235-36; discount, 
235; mail order, 235; mom-and-pop, 
235; specialty, 235; supermarkets, 
235-36; superstores, 235-36 
retailing, 235 

retirement, 223-24; corporate retirement 
allowance, 126, 224; employment after, 
213; government pensions for, 125- 
26, 224; mandatory, 224; saving for, 
250 

reunification, 25-27 

rice, 5, 78, 81; closed market for, xxxiv; 
consumption of, 249; cultivation of, 74; 
excessive production of, 245; import 
restrictions on, 266, 339; mass produc- 
tion of, 245; price supports for, 337, 
339, 352 

Richie, Donald, 358 

right-wing extremists, 364 

Rikuchu Coastline National Park, 78 

Rikken Doshikai (Constitutional Associ- 
ation of Friends), 50 

Rikken Minseito (Constitutional Demo- 
cratic Party) {see also Japan Progressive 
Party), 52; platform, 52, 61 

Rikken Teiseito (Imperial Rule Party), 42 

Rikyu (Teshigawara), 192 

RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific) exercise, 
455 

Ripening Summer (Todo), 190 

Rissho Koseikai (Society for the Establish- 
ment of Justice and Community for the 
Rise [of Buddhism]), 106 

rivers, 74 

roads, 23, 201, 226, 239-40; construction 
of, 239-40; length of, 239; passenger 
transport on, 239 

Rockefeller Center, 353 

romaji, 189 

ronin (university applicants), 154 
ronin ("wave people"), 10-11 
royalties, xxxi 



rural life: changes in, after World War II, 

71; family in, 114 
Russia, 50, 53 

Russo-Japanese War, 48, 199, 403, 424; 

effect of, on economy, 202-3 
Ryukyii Islands, 72, 73, 82, 387, 388, 

455; dispute with China over, 41, 396; 

trade with, 30 



sabi, 163 

Sado Island Kodo drummers, 184 

Saga, 41, 81 

Saga Rebellion, 41 

Saigo Takamori, 38, 41 

Saigy6,193, 188 

Saipan, 427 

Saito Kiyoshi, 176 

Saionji Kimmochi, 49, 51, 56 

Sakaida Kakiemon, 177 

Sakamoto Ryiiichi, 184 

Sakata Michita, 431 

Sakhalin (see also Karafuto), 34, 41, 48, 

53, 374; renunciation of Japanese claim 

to, 61 
Sakishima islands, 72 
Sakurakai (Cherry Society), 56 
salaries, 197 

Salaryman's New Party, 362-63 
Salomon Brothers, 210, 211 
samisen, 182, 183 

samurai, xxviii, 22, 26, 33, 112; as calli- 
graphers, 164; control by, of court 
affairs, 17, 30; curricula, 133-34; de- 
velopment of bushido, 31; interests, 16; 
under Meiji Restoration, 39, 305; oc- 
cupations of, 39; opposition of, to Meiji 
oligarchy, 39, 41; origins of, 15-16, 422; 
population of, 33; role of, 133, 350; sti- 
pends paid to, 37; ultranationalism of, 
55; Zen Buddhism and, 104, 131 

Sankei Shimbun, 342 

Sansom, George B., 14 

Sanwa, 214 

Sanwa Bank, 261 

Sapporo, 77 

Sasebo, 82 

Sato Eisaku, 333, 389, 393 
Satsuma, 36, 37, 44 
Satsuma Rebellion, 41 
Saudi Arabia, 288 
savings, 211 
Sayama incident, 92 



600 



Index 



scandals, 381, 391 

Schlesinger, James A., 389 

school, business, 216 

school, Korean, 150 

school, lower-secondary, 132, 145-48; 
classroom organization, 146; class size, 
146; expenses, 146; foreign language 
classes, 146-47; Japanese language 
classes, 146; mandatory club meetings, 
146; moral education, 146; private, 
146; public, 146; special activities, 146; 
teachers, 146; teaching methods, 146 

school, primary, 141-47; administration 
of, 145; class size, 144; computers in, 
145; curriculum, 144; egalitarian style 
of, 135; expenses, 143-44; history cur- 
riculum, 144; Japanese language class, 
144; lunch, 145; moral education, 144; 
private, 143; problems in, 145; public, 
143; special activities, 144; teachers, 
145; teaching methods, 145; work 
groups in, 144 

school, temple, 134 

school, upper- secondary, 132, 148-51; 
academic track, 148; admission to, 148; 
after- school clubs, 151; bullying in, 160; 
commercial track, 148; curriculum, 149; 
drop-out rate, 150; elitist style of, 15; 
English language class, 148; expenses 
for, 148; family life class, 149; Japanese 
language class, 148; private, 148; pub- 
lic, 148; ranking of, 148; students, 149; 
teachers in, 149; teaching methods in, 
149; vocational-technical program, 149 

School Education Law, 137 

school-refusal syndrome, 98, 113, 147 

Science and Technology Agency, 229 

scientific view, 99 

sculpture, 170-72; environment in, 171; 
influence of Buddhist art on, 170, 171, 
172; influence of high technology on, 
172; influence of Shinto art on, 170; in- 
fluence of Western art on, 170; mono- 
ha school, 170-71; "op," 170; outdoor, 
171-72; "pop," 170; rhythm in, 172; 
traditional, 170; video components in, 
172 

sea lines of communication (SLOC), 430- 
31 

securities houses, 210-11 
securities markets, 210 
Security Consultative Committee, 390, 
455 



Security Council, 318, 436, 451 

security, internal, 421 

seii taishogun. See shoguns 

Seikan Tunnel, 77, 236 

Seikijuku, 364, 470 

Seiko Epson, 298 

Seikyo Shimbun, 342 

seishin, 98 

Sei Shonagon, 15 

Seiyii Honto (True Seiyukai), 52 

Seiyukai (Association of Friends of Con- 
stitutional Government) (see also Liberal 
Party), 49, 50, 61 

Sekai (World), 342 

Sekigahara, Battle of, 27 

Sekihotai (Blood Revenge Corps), 364 

Sekino Jun'ichiro, 176 

self, 98-99; as individual, 111; as mem- 
ber of a group, 111; soto and, 111; uchi 
and, 111 

self-control, 99, 328 

Self-Defense Forces, xxvii, xxxiii, 199, 
312, 362, 364, 382, 421, 427-47; autho- 
rized strength of, 444; buildup of, 391; 
as civil servants, 318, 429; conditions, 
446; constitutionality of, 326; disaster 
relief by, 435; equipment of, 435, 439; 
established, 61, 428; functions, 433, 
437; government appropriations for, 
312; insignia, 447; missions of, 434-35, 
437; modernization of, 421; opposition 
to, 359, 361; organization of, 435; pub- 
lic opinion on, 431, 432, 433; quotas, 
434-35; ranks, 447; reservists, 445; role 
of, in Persian Gulf War, xxxiv; struc- 
ture, 437; training of, 435, 437; uni- 
forms, 447 

Self-Defense Forces Central Hospital, 447 

Self-Defense Forces Job Placement As- 
sociation, 446 

Self-Defense Forces Law (1954), 434, 435 

Self-Defense Forces personnel: benefits, 
447; as civil servants, 445; demographic 
profile, 445; difficulties in recruiting, 
445; education, 446; health care, 447; 
pay, 446; postretirement employment, 
446; retention of, 445-46; retirement, 
446; training, 446; women as, 445 

semiconductors, xxxi, 197, 207, 232, 
299-300; charges of dumping, 299; ex- 
port of, 269, 299; imports of, 299; sanc- 
tions on trade in, 299-300; success of, 
296; trade agreement on, xxxiv 



601 



Japan: A Country Study 



Sendai Plain, 74 

Senkaku Islands, 396 

services: deficit, xxxi, 273-74; examples 

of, xxxi; overseas travel and spending, 

274 
Seto, 176 

Seto Naikai. See Inland Sea) 

Seto-Ohashi bridge network, 80-81, 238 

Seventeen Article Constitution, 8 

Shakaishugi Kyokai. See Japan Socialist 
Association 

Shakespeare, William, 186 

Shandong Province, 50, 51, 424; with- 
drawal of troops from, 54 

Shanghai, 56, 425 

Shearson Lehman, 210 

Shenyang. See Mukden 

shibui, 163 

Shidehara Kijiiro, 307, 312 
Shield Society, 364 

Shikoku, xxvii, 72, 77, 80-81; area, 80; 

industry, 81; mountains, 81 
Shikoku Railway Company, 236 
Shikotan (see also Kuril Islands), xxxv, 64, 

72, 400-3, 404, 405 
Shimabara Rebellion, 30 
Shimane Prefecture, 347 
Shimizu Kunio, 186 
Shimoda, 35 

Shimpoto. See Progressive Party 
Shinano River, 74 
shingikai, 355 

Shingon Sect. See Buddhism, Shingon 
shinjinrui, 333 

Shin Jiyu Kurabu. See New Liberal Club 
Shinsanbetsu. See National Federation of 

Industrial Organizations 
Shinkansen (bullet train), 81, 238 
Shinkansen Property Corporation, 238 
Shin kokinshu wakashu (New Collection of 

Ancient and Modern Times), 19 
Shinoda Toko, 173 
Shinohara Ushio, 173 
shinpan, 28, 35, 36 

Shin Rengo. Japanese Trade Union 
Confederation 

Shinto, 32, 100-101, 326; Buddhist in- 
fluence on, 100-101, 131; Confucian 
influence on, 100-101, 131; customs, 
6; festivals, 108; gods, 131; importance 
of, 37, 55; influence of, xxxii; music in, 
180; mythology, 4; origins of Japan in, 
4; pollution notions of, 91; purification 



in, 100; resurgence of, 23; ritual visits 
to shrines, 107; shrines, 101; syncreted 
with Buddhism, 11; world view, 100 
Shinto, Ryobu, 23 

Shinto, Sect, 101; as new religions, 101, 
106 

Shinto, Shrine, 101 

Shinto, State, 55, 101, 110; disestablish- 
ment of, 60, 101 

Shinto Worship, Office of, 37 

shipbuilding, 204, 207, 232, 233 

Shizuoka Prefecture, 74 

shorn,, 10, 11, 15, 16, 422; destroyed, 24; 
expansion of, 14 

shoen holders: military service by, 15 

shoen system, 17 

shoguns, Fujiwara, 13 

shoguns, Minamoto, 17, 18 

shoguns, Tokugawa, xxviii, 28, 33, 36 

Shomu (emperor), 11 

Shotoku (empress), 12 

Shotoku Taishi, 8 

Showa (emperor). See Hirohito 

"Showa fascism," 305 

"Showa Restoration," 55, 56; role of em- 
peror under, 311 

Shushigaku, 104 

Siam (see also Thailand), 27 

Siberia, 50, 51, 53, 73, 83, 292; aid for, 
404; withdrawal of troops from, 54 

silk production, 79 

Silk Route, 167 

Singapore, xxxv, 54, 286, 408; exports to, 
285; imports from, 285; occupation of, 
426 

Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friend- 
ship, 405; antihegemony clause, 396, 
405; negotiations for, 396; and Soviet- 
Japanese relations, 405 

Sino-Japanese relations, 64, 65, 383, 393- 
400; bilateral trade, 398; complemen- 
tary economic policies in, 398; com- 
plementary foreign policies in, 398; 
friction in, 399; in the 1980s, 397, 398; 
Soviet interference in, 397; trade, 
394-95; unofficial, in the 1950s, 394 

Sino-Japanese War, First, 46, 374; repa- 
rations for, 46-47 

Sino-Japanese War, Second, 58, 425-26; 
justification for, 425 

Sino-Soviet competition, 394 

Sino-United States rapprochement, 382 

SLOC. See sea lines of communication 



602 



Index 



small business, 215, 338; benefits of, 338; 
political muscle of, 338 

Smith, Robert, 97 

Smithsonian Agreement, 281 

Smithsonian Institution, 167 

Social Democratic league, 340, 357, 362 

social interaction: giri in, 97-98; protocol 
for, 94-95; socialization for, 110-11; 
status differences defining, 96 

socialist movement, 52 

social organization, 110-23; age stra- 
tification in, 121-23; family, 111-14; 
gender stratification in, 118-21; neigh- 
borhood, 114-15; popular culture, 117- 
18; workplace, 115-17 

social welfare, 125-26; spending on, 88- 
89, 125 

Society to Protect Japan (Nihon o 

Mamoru Kai), 310, 335 
Soga family, 7-8 
Soga Umako, 8 

Sohyo. See General Council of Trade 

Unions of Japan 
Soka Gakkai (Value Creation Society), 

64, 106, 336, 360 
Song Dynasty, 22, 177 
sonno-joi, 34, 36 
Sony Corporation, 353 
soto, 111 

Sound Space Ark, 183 

South Africa, 290; nuclear technology im- 
ported from, 229 

South China Sea, 430 

Southern Court, 21, 23 

South Korea (Republic of Korea), xxxv, 
110, 233, 286, 292, 300-1, 398; aid to, 
407; exports, 282, 285; imports from, 
282, 285; mutual bitterness, 410; poli- 
cies toward, 410; relations with, 383; 
security interests in, 410; support for, 
410-11; trade with, 411 

South Manchurian Railway, 48, 425 

South Manchurian Railway Company, 
47, 56 

South Pacific, 426 

South-West Air Lines, 240 

Soviet-Japanese relations, 400-6; cultural 
exchanges, 403; economic cooperation, 
404; fishing rights, 403; history of, 403; 
in 1970s, 404-5; problems in, 382; 
reciprocal most-favored-nation treat- 
ment, 403; and Sino-Japanese rela- 
tions, 405; territorial dispute in, 72, 



400-3; trade relations, 404 

Soviet Union, 58; commercial relations 
with, 291-92, 377, 393; defense spend- 
ing, 199, 312; dispute over Kuril Is- 
lands, 292; financial aid to, 292; 
German invasion of, 426; invasion of 
Afghanistan, 291, 377, 391, 398, 400, 
404, 421; military presence of, in Asia, 
386; perceived threat from, 350, 369, 
386, 397-98, 421, 429-30; relations 
with, 58, 64, 65; trade with, 290 

space program, 197, 232, 234, 244 

space station, 244 

Spain, 233 

Spanish, 24 

Special Measures Law for Assimilation 

Projects, 92 
"Spring Struggle," 337 
Sri Lanka, 407 
Stalin, Joseph, 306 

status differences: giri in, 97-98; impor- 
tance of, 96; in Japanese language, 
96-97; in social interaction, 96 

steel. See iron and steel 

stock: corporate cross-holding of, 215; 
stockholders, 215-16 

Strait of Malacca, 430 

stress, 96 

strikes, 213, 218, 226 

Structural Impediments Initiative, 267, 
284, 353, 393 

students: delinquency among, 149; dis- 
cipline for, 149; handicapped, 147-48, 
150; job placement for, 150; returning 
from abroad, discrimination against, 
150; supervision of, 149; tutoring of, 
152 

Subaru, 295 

subway systems, 239 

suffrage, 44; calls for universal, 51, 52; 
universal adult, 315 

Suiheisha. See Levelers Association of 
Japan 

Suiko (empress), 8 

Sumitomo, 214, 260, 452 

Sumitomo Bank, 261 

Supreme Court, 324, 327, 471; judicial 
review exercised by, 312, 314, 325-26, 
473; responsibilities of, 324-25 

Supreme Public Prosecutors Office, 471 

Supreme War Council, 43-44 

Susano-o (Storm God), 4 

Suzuki violin method, 183 



603 



Japan: A Country Study 



Suzuki Tadashi, 186 

Suzuki Zenko, 65, 346, 347, 355, 430 



Taiho-ryoritsu (Great Treasure Code), 

xxvii, 9-10, 15 
Taika Reform, 422; abandonment of, 14; 

administration under, 9; consolidated, 

9-10; decline of, 12; land redistribution 

under, 9; taxes, 9 
taiko, 26 

Taira family, 17, 18, 19; estates of, con- 
fiscated by, Minamoto, 17-18; support 
of, by samurai, 16 

Taisho period, 49, 305; role of emperor 
during, 311 

Taiwan, 46, 47, 53, 90, 286, 396; exports, 
282, 285; imports from, 282, 285; in- 
dependence of, 374; investment in, 298; 
as part of Japanese empire, 199; rela- 
tions with, 64, 395; renunciation of 
Japanese claim to, 61 

Takeshita Noboru, xxxvi, 322, 346, 347; 
downfall of, 349 

takotsubo seikatsu, 334 

Tama Arts University, 165 

Tamasaburo Bando, 182 

Tanaka Giichi, 51; downfall of, 56; as 
prime minister, 55 

Tanaka Kakuei, 65, 66, 322, 333, 343, 
347, 363; political machine of, 346-47; 
relations with China under, 393-94, 
395; relations with Soviet Union under, 
405; role of, in Lockheed scandal, 
345-46 

Tanegashima Space Center, 244 

Tang Dynasty, 10, 20, 350 

Tange Kenzo, 168, 169 

Tanizaki Jun'ichiro, 190, 191 

taxes, 10, 39; consumption, 349, 352, 357; 
income, 209; as percentage of GNP, 
208-9; reform of, 355 

tea ceremony, xxxii, 176; in Muromachi 
culture, 23 

teachers, xxxii; elementary school, 145; 
fringe benefits, 139; lower- secondary 
school, 146; salaries, 139; social respon- 
sibilities of, 139; social status of, 139; 
supervision of, 140; training, 139-40; 
training, in-service, 140 

teaching, 139; competition for jobs, 
139-40; materials, 145; methods, 145, 
/146 



Technical Research and Development In- 
stitute, 451 

technology (see also high technology): 
cooperation on, xxxv; research in, 198 

Teito Rapid Transit Authority, 239 

telecommunications, 243-44; equipment, 
export of, 284; equipment, import re- 
strictions on, 266 

telephones, 244 

telephone system, privatization of, 355 
television, 71, 118, 192-93, 243; broad- 
casting systems, 192; educational, 145, 
146, 193; experimental broadcasting, 
243; "From the North Country," 193; 
growth of, 243-44; innovations, 243; 
news programs, 342; "Oshin," 193; 
problems, 193; programming, 192; 
satellite, 244; "Sazae-san," 192; 
themes, 193 
Temmu (emperor), 9-10 
Tendai monastery, 12, 19, 25 
Tendai Sect. See Buddhism, Tendai 
Tenji (emperor) (see also Naka), 9 
tenno, 9 

Tenrikyo (Religion of Divine Wisdom), 
106 

terrorism, 55, 56 

Teshigawara Hiroshi, 192 

Teshigawara Saburo, 185 

textiles, 232, 234, 398; crafts, 178; dye- 
ing, 178; export of, 269, 284, 390; im- 
port of, 272 

Thailand (see also Siam), xxxv, 65, 408; 
aid to, 294, 398, 400; investment in, 
409 

theater (see also under kind of theater), xxxii; 
classical Greek, 186; drama, 186-87; 
shingeki, 186; themes in, 98; women 
barred from performing in, 165 

Tiananmen Incident, 291, 362, 394; reac- 
tion to, 399-400 

Tianjin, 425 

Tianjin Convention, 46 

Todaiji (Great East Temple), 11 

Todo Shizuko, 190 

Togo troupe, 186 

Tohoku, 77-78; as granary of Japan, 77; 

industry, 77-78 
Toho School of Music, 183 
Tojo Hideki, 59, 60 
Tokaido road, 79 
Tokara Strait, 82 
Tokugawa family, 28 



604 



Index 



Tokugawa Hidetada, 28 

Tokugawa Ieyasu, 25, 26, 329; consoli- 
dation of power, 27-28; control of 
trade, 30; encouragement of trade, 
29-30 

Tokugawa Nariaki, 35, 36 

Tokugawa period: art in, 170, 172, 173, 
177; burakumin in, 91-92; bureaucracy 
in, 33, 350; bushidd developed in, 31; 
class system established in, 26, 38; 
chonindo developed in, 31-32; Confu- 
cian studies in, 31; decline of, 32-36; 
economic development during, 30-31; 
education in, 133; government, 372; 
legacy of, 201; living standards in, 33; 
missionaries expelled by, 372; popula- 
tion in, 33; seclusion, 372; shoguns, 
xxviii, 28, 33, 36 

Tokugawa society: Confucian influence, 
30; hierarchy, 30 

Tokugawa Yoshinobu (Keiki), 35, 36 

Tokugawa Yoshitomi, 36 

Tomen, 260 

Tonghak religious rebellion, 46 
Tosa, 37, 38, 42 
Tosa Memorial, 42 

Tokyo, 27, 78, 319; capital moved to, 37; 

migration patterns around, 89 
Tokyo Arts University, 165, 177 
Tokyo Bay, 78 

Tokyo Electric Power Company, 229 
Tokyo Imperial University, 379 
Tokyo Institute of Technology, 157 
Tokyo International Airport, 240 
Tokyo Modern Dance School, 185 
Tokyo Olympic Games (1964), 65 
Tokyo saiban (Kobayashi), 192 
Tokyo Securities and Stock Exchange, 
xxix-xxx, 211; expansion of, 212; types 
of securities traded on, 212; world's 
largest, 212, 261-62 
Tokyu Corporation, 168 
Toshiba Corporation, 298, 453 
Toshiba Machine Tool, 292 
Toshiba scandal, 292, 393 
tourism, 78; in Ryiikyu Islands, 82 
Towada, Lake, 78 
Toyama, 79 
Toy a Shigeo, 172 
Toyo Kogyo (Mazda), 295 
Toyota, 197, 295 

Toyotomi family, 27; destruction of, 28 
Toyotomi Hideyori, 26 



Toyotomi Hideyoshi, 25, 29, 176, 192; 
distribution of territory, 26; invasion of 
Korea by, 27; rise to power, 25-26 

tozama, 28, 35, 36 

trade, 260; with Chinese, 22; control of, 
30; effect of, on economy, 203; en- 
couraged by Ieyasu, 29-30; expansion, 
45, 408; with Europeans, 24; in feudal 
period, 24; and foreign affairs, 383, 
390; importance of, 255; liberalization, 
271; relations, 282-92; restriction of, 
30; routes, 73; with United States, 35, 
284 

Trade Act of 1988, 199 
Trade Agency, 258 

trade, balance of, 272-73, 283; under 

MITI, 259 
trade competition, protection from, 259 
trade flows, 369, 416 
trade policy, 264-67; MITI's role in, 258 
trade surplus, xxxi, 66, 255, 257, 270; in- 
crease in, 281; value of, 273 
trading companies, 268; roles of, 260; 

sales figures of, 260; top nine, 260 
transportation, xxxi, 78; deficit, 274; in 

feudal period, 24; performance of, 231; 

public, 115; under Tokugawa, 33 
Transportation Bureau, 239 
transportation, maritime, 240 
Transportation, Ministry of, 258, 463; 

responsibilities of, 205 
travel: expenditures, xxxi; prohibition 

against, 30 
treaties, 378 

Treaty of Alliance, 47; terminated, 54 

Treaty of Kanagawa. See Treaty of Peace 
and Amity, 35 

Treaty of Kanghwa, 46 

Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Secu- 
rity, xxxiii, 64, 65, 359, 361, 362, 369, 
388, 404, 421; Agreed Minutes, 454 

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nu- 
clear Weapons, 429 

Treaty of Peace and Amity, 35 

Treaty of Peace with Japan, 61, 375 

Treaty of Shimonoseki, 46 

Tripartite Pact, 59, 426 

Truman, Harry S., 306 

Trust Fund Bureau, 210 

Tsuchitori Toshi, 184 

Tsukamoto Saburo, 362 

Tsuji Seimei, 177 

Tsushima, Battle of, 48 



605 



Japan: A Country Study 



Tsushima Current, 83 
Tsushima Islands, 73 
Turkey, 391 

Twenty-One Demands, 50 



uchi, 111; neighbors as, 114 
UFO Party, 363 
ukiyo, 32 
ukiyo-e, 32 
Ulaanbaatar, xxxvi 

ultranationalism: in the 1930s, 55; of 

samurai, 55; after World War I, 55 
unemployment, 117, 150; rate, 218, 219 
unions. See labor unions 
Unisis, 298 

United Arab Emirates, 288 

United Nations, xxxv, 262, 429; admis- 
sion to, 375, 403, 414; Charter, 61; 
cooperation with, 382; increased role 
in, 415; International Organization for 
Migration, xxxiv; peacekeeping activi- 
ties, 415; Security Council membership 
proposed, 415; support for, 414-15, 
434 

United States, 38, 50, 197, 211, 223; au- 
tomobile exports to, 259, 283; charges 
by, of unfair trading practices, xxxi, 
300; Constitution, 43; cooperation of, 
in space program, 244; criminal recidi- 
vism rate, 474; as debtor nation, 209; 
defense spending, 199, 312; denial of 
diplomatic relations with, 34; direct in- 
vestment in, 279; economic assistance 
from, 256; economic ties with, 381; ex- 
ports to, 265, 282, 384; exports as 
percentage of GNP, 267; gross national 
product of, 384; growth rate of, 201; 
as impediment to development, 53; 
imports from, 282, 296, 384; imports, 
surcharge on, 389; involvement in Jap- 
anese product development, 233; Japan 
as ally of, 54; Japanese plants located 
in, 295, 298; "learning mission" to, 40; 
liquid natural gas supplied by, 229; 
military cooperation with, 375, 376-77; 
military defense of Japan by, xxxiii, 
376; military presence of, in Japan, 
375, 387, 390, 451; nuclear technolo- 
gy imported from, 229; opinion of 
Japan, 386; payment deficit, 389; pow- 
er of, waning, 369; presence of, in Asia, 
53; prison population, 474; rapproche- 



ment with People's Republic of China, 
64, 291, 376; security ties with, 381, 
387; students in, 198; Tanaka's talks 
with, 65; trade deficit, 385, 389; with- 
drawal from Indochina, 376 
United States-Canada free trade agree- 
ment, 414 
United States Education Mission, 135 
United States-Japan relations, xxxiii, 59, 
371, 384-93; changes in, 385; cooper- 
ation and independence in, 390, 391; 
debate over, 388; deterioration of, 58, 
384; economic factors in, 385; mutual 
assistance in, 388; necessity of, 384; 
political-military factors in, 385; rela- 
tive value of currencies, 391; views of, 
386, 387 

United States-Japan security relations, 
435, 454-56; benefits of, 386; Japanese 
support for, 451; joint exercises, 455; 
military aid program, 454-55; troops 
stationed in Japan, 454, 455-56 

United States-Japan trade relations, 256, 
278, 283-85, 384; access problems, 
284; balance, 284, 386; closed markets 
in, 392; disputes in, 298-99, 353; 
dumping charged, 284, 296; finance is- 
sues in, 278; negotiations with, 392-93; 
patent infringement charged, 284; ten- 
sions in, 257, 284 

United States-Soviet relations, 431 

United States Trade Act (1988), 266-67, 
284; retaliation under, 266 

United States Treasury: bond market, 
211, 261; securities, 211 

universities, 155-56; costs, 156; courses, 
155, 156; national, 155; number of stu- 
dents in, 155; private, 155; public, 155; 
tuition assistance, 156 

University Control Law, 136 

University Council, 159, 160 

University of the Air, 160, 243 

University of Tokyo, 157, 39; Law 
Faculty, 327, 346, 351 

Uno Sosuke, 349 

Upper-Secondary School of the Air, 152 

Ura-Nihon. See geography 

urban life: changes in, after World War 
II, 71; convenience of, 115; cultural 
activities, 115; safety of, 115; sense of 
community in, 115; sports activities, 
115 

Utari Kyokai, 335 



606 



Index 



values, 93-99 

van Wolferen, Karel G., 334 
Versailles Peace Conference, 51, 374 
Vietnam, 398, 407, 411-12 
Vietnamese refugees, 91 
Volcano Islands (Kazan Retto), 72 
volcanos, 83 

Wa (ancient Japan), 6 

wa (social harmony), xxxii, 94; and legal 
system, 326; mechanism for achieving, 
331-32; in the workplace, 116 

wabi, 163, 177 

Wagahai wa neko de am (I Am a Cat) (Na- 

tsume). 190 
wage demands, 202 
wages, 219-20; minimum, 224 
wako. See pirates 

war: among prominent feudal families, 

16; rejection of, 427 
War Between the Courts, 21 
war in the Pacific, 426-27 
war of reunification, 25-26 
Ward, Robert, 306 

Warsaw Treaty Organization (Warsaw 

Pact), 445 
Washington Conference (1921-22), 53, 

424 

Watanabe Sadao, 184 
wealth, distribution of, 71 
Weber, Max, 327 
Wei Dynasty, 6 

West, desire to catch up with, 255 

Western influence, xxvii, xxviii, 3, 372; 
European, 24; under Meiji Restora- 
tion, 38; repulsion of, 35 

Westernization: of industry, 46; Japanese 
desire for, 40 

Western traders, 34, 371 

West Germany, 223; exports to, 282, 286; 
exports as percentage of GNP, 267; im- 
ports from, 282, 286, 296; investment 
by, in United States, 285; trade with, 
255 

West Japan Railway Company, 236 
whaling, 85, 247 
White Paper on the Environment, 85 
wholesaling, 235 

Wild Sheep Chase, A (Murakami), 191 
women, 118-21; artists, 166; barred from 
imperial succession, 10, 12, 310; barred 
from performing in theater, 165; educa- 



tional opportunities, 120, 135, 156, 158; 
equal rights, xxx, 112, 120; under feudal 
system, 118; geisha, 32, 183; under ie 
system, 112; neighborhood activities of, 
115; as news anchors, 118; novelists, 
190; peasant, 118, 120, 121; political af- 
filiation of, 64; portrayal of, on tele- 
vision, 118; as professional housewife, 

113, 120; restricted rights of, 112, 117; 
as rulers of Japan, 310; in Self-Defense 
Forces, 445; suffrage for, xxx, 61, 120; 
as teachers, 145, 149; in twelfth century, 
118; upper class, 118; vernacular liter- 
ature by, 15, 188 

women in paid labor force, 71, 87, 88, 

114, 117, 118-21, 203; career, 328; 
changes in, 121, 220; demographics of, 
219; discrimination against, 328; mar- 
ried women in, 121; number of, 221; 
participation rate of, 221; pension 
benefits for, 125, 203; status in, 121; 
suits by, for equal treatment, 328 

workplace, 115-17; demands of, on hus- 
bands, 121; in ie, 117; inequities in, 
116-17; lifetime employment model, 
116, 117 

World Bank, xxxiii, 262, 290, 369, 415, 
416; voting rights in, 263 

world view, 72; characteristics of, 99; 
scientific models in, 99 

World War I, 50-51 ; effect of, on econo- 
my, 202-3 

World War II, 60-61 , 424-27; defeat in, 
374; destruction of economy by, xxix; 
destruction of infrastructure by, 199; 
recovery from, xxix; terms of sur- 
render, 60, 307 

Wright, Frank Lloyd, 168 

yakuza (underworld), 364, 469 
Yamagata Aritomo, 43, 48, 49 
Yamaichi, 210, 261 
Yamakawa Naoto, 192 
Yamamoto Masao, 177 
Yamatai, 6 
Yamato, 3, 4 
Yamato clan, 9 

Yamato court, 3, 422; Chinese influence 

on, 7, 187; domain of, 7 
Yamato Dynasty, 35 
yamato-e, 15, 163 

Yamato period, 6-10; characteristics of, 6 



607 



Japan: A Country Study 



Yamato polity, 6-8; great clans of, 6-7; 

organization of, 7 
Yasukuni Shrine, 110, 311, 399 
Yayoi: era, 5; location, 5; musical instru- 
ments of, 180; pottery of, 5; wet-rice 
culture, 5 

yen, value of, xxx, 257; appreciation of, 
270, 271, 295, 406; demand for, 290; 
determined by, 280; effect of, on ex- 
ports, 277; effect of, on investment, 
280; floating, 281; in 1949, 280; relative 
to the dollar, 282, 377, 385; revalua- 
tion of, 389; supply of, 280; undervalu- 
ation of, 280-81 

Yen-Dollar Accord, 278 

yobiko, 154; cost of, 154; programs of, 154 

Yokohama, 78 

Yomiuri Shimbun, 341-42 



Yosa Buson, 188 
Yoshida Shigeru, 61 
Yoshida Shoin, 36, 38 
Yoshihito (Taisho emperor), 49 
Yoshimoto, "Banana," 191 
Yuan Dynasty, 20, 22 



zaibatsu: dissolution of, 188, 214, 350; suc- 
cessors of, 202, 214 

Zeami Motokiyo, 188 

Zenroren. See Japan Confederation of 
Trade Unions 

Zenrokyo. See National Trade Union 
Council 

Zhang Zuolin, 55 

zoku (tribes), 335 



608 



Published Country Studies 



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